



RB 202968



*Presented to the*  
**LIBRARY of the**  
**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**  
*by*  
**Harry Sutherland**




*From the collection of*  
*Harry Sutherland*









Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2012 with funding from  
University of Toronto





HISTORY  
OF THE  
PENINSULAR WAR.

HISTORY  
OF THE  
PENINSULAR WAR.

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.



HISTORY  
OF THE  
PENINSULAR WAR.

---

“Unto thee  
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”  
DONNE.

---

BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.

POET LAUREATE,

HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE  
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL  
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE  
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.

A NEW EDITION.

*IN SIX VOLUMES.*

VOL. III.

LONDON:  
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

---

MDCCCXXVIII.

Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἔαν ἀφέλη τις το διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν  
ἐπράχθη, καὶ το πραχθὲν ποτέρα ἔυλογον ἔσχε το τέλος, το κατα-  
λειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ  
παραντικά μὲν τερπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παρά-  
παν.

POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.

# CONTENTS.

---

## CHAPTER XVI.

	PAGE
TREATY between Great Britain and Spain . . . .	1
Surrender of Coruña . . . . .	3
Situation and strength of Ferrol . . . . .	5
Surrender of Ferrol . . . . .	6
Exultation of the French . . . . .	8
Pursuit of Romana's army . . . . .	10
Dismay in Galicia . . . . .	11
Romana retreats toward Monterrey . . . . .	12
Blake leaves the army . . . . .	13
The French cease the pursuit . . . . .	14
Buonaparte is advised that Austria is arming . . . .	15
Change in his views concerning Spain . . . . .	16
He returns to France . . . . .	18
His professions to the Spaniards at Madrid . . . .	19
Registers opened . . . . .	24
The people of Madrid take the oath of allegiance to Joseph . . . . .	25
Addresses to the Intruder . . . . .	26
Edicts of the Intruder before his return to Madrid . .	27
His entrance into Madrid . . . . .	29
Edicts against the patriots . . . . .	31
Circular epistle to the clergy . . . . .	32
Condition of Madrid . . . . .	34



	PAGE
False intelligence published by the intrusive government . . . . .	36
Unwillingness of the Spaniards to believe that Morla was a traitor . . . . .	37
Proofs of his prior treachery . . . . .	38
Morla's letter to the Central Junta . . . . .	39
His letter to the governor of Cadiz . . . . .	41
Arrest and cruel imprisonment of the French at Cadiz	42
Death of Florida Blanca . . . . .	43
Marques de Astorga chosen president of the Central Junta . . . . .	44
Catalonia . . . . .	45
Siege of Barcelona . . . . .	46
St. Cyr appointed to command the French . . . . .	48
He determines upon besieging Rosas . . . . .	50
Dilapidated state of that fortress . . . . .	52
Preparations for the siege . . . . .	ib.
British squadron in the Bay of Rosas . . . . .	54
Disposition of the Italian troops to desert . . . . .	56
Attack upon Fort Trinidad repulsed . . . . .	57
The French establish themselves in the town . . . . .	59
Lord Cochrane arrives, and throws himself into Fort Trinidad . . . . .	ib.
Gallant defence of the fort . . . . .	60
The citadel captured, and the fort evacuated . . . . .	62
St. Cyr marches to relieve Barcelona . . . . .	63
He discovers a mountain path near Hostalrich . . . . .	64
Indecision of General Vives . . . . .	67
He marches against the French . . . . .	68
Rout of the Spaniards at Llinas . . . . .	ib.
Retreat of the Spaniards from Barcelona to the Llobregat	71
St. Cyr marches against them . . . . .	72
Indecision of the Spaniards . . . . .	73
The Spaniards routed and pursued to Tarragona . . . . .	76

## CHAPTER XVII.

The Spaniards not discouraged by their reverses . . . . .	80
Condition of Infantado's army at Cuenca . . . . .	81

	PAGE
Dreams of offensive operations . . . . .	83
Movement against the French at Tarancon . . . . .	84
Venegas falls back from Tarancon to Ucles . . . . .	ib.
Rout of the Spaniards at Ucles . . . . .	86
Cruelties committed there by the French . . . . .	88
Infantado collects the fugitives . . . . .	89
Retreat from Cuenca . . . . .	91
Loss of the artillery . . . . .	92
Infantado frustrates a movement of the enemy against the Carolina army . . . . .	94
He is superseded by Cartaojal . . . . .	95
Calumnies against Castaños . . . . .	96
His memorial to the Central Junta . . . . .	99
Conde de Montijo's intrigues . . . . .	100
Progress of the French in Castille and Leon . . . . .	101
New levies raised by the Spaniards . . . . .	102
Temporizing conduct of certain magistrates . . . . .	103
Sir Robert Wilson . . . . .	ib.
He raises a Portuguese legion at Porto . . . . .	104
Sir Robert goes to Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	106
He refuses to return to Porto . . . . .	107
Effect of his movements . . . . .	108
Part of the legion detained at Porto . . . . .	109
Displeasure of the authorities there . . . . .	110
Rank given him by the Spanish government . . . . .	ib.
Proposal that British troops should be admitted into Cadiz . . . . .	111
Objections of the Spanish government . . . . .	112
Troops arrive in the bay . . . . .	114
Mr. Frere's representations to the Central Junta . . . . .	ib.
Reply of the Spanish government . . . . .	116
Their proposal for employing the troops . . . . .	117
Conference with Mr. Frere . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Frere requests Cuesta's opinion . . . . .	120
Cuesta's reply . . . . .	122
Close of the discussion . . . . .	123
Insurrection at Cadiz . . . . .	127
Confidence of the people in the English . . . . .	129

	PAGE
Proclamation of the governor . . . . .	130
Murder of D. Juan de Heredia . . . . .	131
The tumult subsides . . . . .	ib.
Proclamation of the Central Junta . . . . .	132

## CHAPTER XVIII.

Castañes accused at Zaragoza as a traitor . . . . .	135
State of public feeling in that city . . . . .	136
Measures of precaution . . . . .	137
None of the inhabitants leave the city . . . . .	139
Supposed miracles . . . . .	140
Works of defence . . . . .	141
The city crowded with soldiers . . . . .	144
Preparations within the city . . . . .	145
Marshal Moncey reconnoitres the Torrero . . . . .	ib.
The French appear before the city . . . . .	146
They take the Torrero . . . . .	ib.
Unsuccessful attack upon the suburbs . . . . .	148
Moncey summons Palafox to surrender . . . . .	149
The investment of the city completed . . . . .	150
Proclamation of Palafox to the people of Madrid . . . . .	152
Junot takes the command of the French . . . . .	153
St. Joseph's and the Redoubt of the Pillar taken . . . . .	ib.
Rumours of success, and rejoicings in the city . . . . .	154
An infectious disease appears in the city . . . . .	155
Attempts of Lazan and Francisco Palafox to succour the city . . . . .	157
Condition of the army in Catalonia . . . . .	158
Reding takes the command . . . . .	159
The army re-formed at Tarragona . . . . .	160
Conduct of the French under St. Cyr . . . . .	162
Orders to attempt the relief of Zaragoza . . . . .	164
Tardiness in obeying them . . . . .	166
Defeat of the peasantry . . . . .	ib.
Alcañiz occupied by the French . . . . .	ib.
Movements in Navarre and Aragon . . . . .	167
Marshal Lasnes takes the command . . . . .	ib.



	PAGE
He summons Palafox to surrender . . . . .	168
The French enter the city, but with great loss . . . . .	ib.
They establish themselves in the Trinidad Convent . . . . .	171
Convents of S. Augustin and S. Monica won . . . . .	ib.
The enemy proceed by mining . . . . .	173
Progress of the pestilence . . . . .	174
First talk of surrender in the city . . . . .	176
The contest carried on by fire . . . . .	177
Convent of Jesus in the suburb taken . . . . .	179
St. Francisco taken . . . . .	180
The French begin to murmur . . . . .	182
Not even an attempt is made to relieve the city . . . . .	183
The suburbs taken . . . . .	185
The university taken . . . . .	186
Palafox transfers his authority to a Junta . . . . .	ib.
Condition of the besieged . . . . .	187
Flag of truce sent to the French . . . . .	189
Last efforts of the besieged . . . . .	190
D. Pedro Maria Ric goes out to treat with Marshal Lasnes . . . . .	192
Capitulation . . . . .	194
Farther conditions asked, and refused . . . . .	196
Conduct of the French . . . . .	198
Treatment of the prisoners . . . . .	ib.
Palafox compelled by threats of death to sign orders for delivering up four fortresses . . . . .	201
He is sent into France . . . . .	202
Demands of the French . . . . .	203
Lasnes makes his entrance . . . . .	204
Baseness of the suffragan bishop . . . . .	ib.
Language of the French upon their triumph . . . . .	206
Decree of the Central Junta . . . . .	ib.
Address to the nation . . . . .	208
Honours decreed to the inhabitants of Zaragoza . . . . .	211
Falsehoods of the French government . . . . .	212

## CHAPTER XIX.

	PAGE
Portugal threatened by the French . . . . .	214
Preparations of the English for evacuating Lisbon . . . . .	ib.
Address of the Portuguese Regency to the nation . . . . .	215
State of public feeling at Lisbon . . . . .	216
Marshal Soult ordered to enter Portugal from Galicia . . . . .	218
Difficulty of providing for the French army . . . . .	219
His confidence of success . . . . .	220
Combined plans of the French . . . . .	ib.
Vigo and Tuy occupied by the French . . . . .	221
Preparations for crossing the Minho below Tuy . . . . .	ib.
Failure of the attempt . . . . .	223
Soult marches by way of Orense . . . . .	ib.
Romana rouses the Galicians . . . . .	224
Opinion of his strength . . . . .	225
Villages burnt by the French . . . . .	226
Intended plan of co-operation between Romana and Silveira . . . . .	ib.
Difference between Marshals Soult and Ney . . . . .	227
Rout of Romana's army . . . . .	228
The French remove their sick and wounded to Mon- terrey . . . . .	229
Situation of Chaves . . . . .	230
Silveira retires from Chaves . . . . .	231
Some mutinous officers resolve to defend it . . . . .	232
Surrender of Chaves . . . . .	ib.
The French establish their hospital there . . . . .	234
Preparations for defence at Porto . . . . .	235
Advance of the French from Chaves . . . . .	237
Tumults at Braga . . . . .	238
General Freire murdered . . . . .	240
The Portuguese routed before Braga . . . . .	242
The French enter Braga . . . . .	243
They appear before Porto . . . . .	245
Oliveira murdered . . . . .	246
The Bishop leaves the city . . . . .	247
Porto taken . . . . .	ib.

# CONTENTS.

xi

	PAGE
Massacre there . . . . .	248
Soult remains in Porto . . . . .	250
Disposition of the inhabitants . . . . .	251
Marshal Soult's views respecting the Liberals and the Jews . . . . .	252
His hopes of becoming King of Northern Lusitania . . . . .	254
He visits the Church of N. Senhor de Bouças . . . . .	256
Chaves retaken by Silveira . . . . .	260
Proceedings at Coimbra . . . . .	262
Colonel Trant takes a position upon the Vouga . . . . .	265
Cruelties of the French . . . . .	268
Positions of the French and Portuguese . . . . .	269
Romana captures the garrison at Villa Franca . . . . .	270
Efforts of the Galicians . . . . .	273
Barrios sent into Galicia . . . . .	275
The Portuguese and Galicians blockade Tuy . . . . .	276
Vigo . . . . .	277
The Spaniards appear before Vigo . . . . .	278
Recapture of that place . . . . .	279
Blockade of Tuy . . . . .	283
The Portuguese recross the Minho . . . . .	284
The French in Tuy relieved and withdrawn . . . . .	ib.

## CHAPTER XX.

Plans of the intrusive government . . . . .	286
Effect of the war upon the French soldiery . . . . .	287
Temper of the Spanish generals in La Mancha and Ex- tremadura . . . . .	290
Reforms in the Spanish army . . . . .	291
The Duque del Alburquerque . . . . .	ib.
He proposes offensive operations . . . . .	292
They are undertaken when too late . . . . .	293
The Duke sent to join Cuesta . . . . .	294
Cartaojal advances against the French . . . . .	ib.
Rout of the Carolina army at Ciudad Real . . . . .	295
Operations of Marshal Victor . . . . .	ib.
The French cross the Puente del Arzobispo . . . . .	296

	PAGE
Cuesta retreats from the Puerto de Miravete . . . . .	297
Skirmishes at Truxillo and Miajadas . . . . .	298
Junction with Alburquerque's division . . . . .	301
Cuesta offers battle at Medellin . . . . .	ib.
Battle of Medellin . . . . .	303
Misconduct of the Spanish cavalry . . . . .	304
Cuesta thrown and wounded . . . . .	ib.
Dispersion of the Spanish army . . . . .	305
No quarter given . . . . .	306
Escape of Alburquerque . . . . .	307
The remnant of the Spanish army collect . . . . .	308
Cuesta disgraces those who had behaved ill . . . . .	309
The Junta act wisely and generously upon these defeats	310
Their appeal to the people . . . . .	311
Tribunal of public safety . . . . .	312
Correspondence on the Intruder's part with the Junta	313
Measures for securing Badajoz . . . . .	317
A crusade proclaimed there . . . . .	318
Regulations concerning the ejected religioners . . . . .	319
Plans of the intrusive government . . . . .	320
Sir Robert Wilson's conduct at Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	321
Attempt to surprise that fortress . . . . .	323
The French summon it . . . . .	324
March of Lapisse to unite with Victor . . . . .	325
The French enter Alcantara . . . . .	ib.
Junction of Lapisse and Victor . . . . .	327

## CHAPTER XXI.

Conduct of the opposition in England . . . . .	328
Return of the troops from Coruña . . . . .	332
The King's speech . . . . .	333
Proceedings in Parliament . . . . .	334
Lord Sidmouth . . . . .	ib.
Earl St. Vincent . . . . .	335
Lord Grenville . . . . .	ib.
Earl of Liverpool . . . . .	336
Mr. Ponsonby . . . . .	338



	PAGE
Mr. Whitbread . . . . .	339
Debates on the overture from Erfurth . . . . .	341
Lord Grenville . . . . .	ib.
Lord Auckland . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Canning . . . . .	ib.
Lord Henry Petty . . . . .	343
Mr. Whitbread . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Croker . . . . .	346
Mr. Whitbread's speech circulated by the French go- vernment . . . . .	347
Debates on the campaign in Portugal . . . . .	348
Both parties agree in extolling Sir John Moore . . . . .	ib.
Inquiry into the campaign in Spain called for . . . . .	349
Lord Grenville . . . . .	ib.
Lord Erskine . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Ponsonby . . . . .	350
Lord Castlereagh . . . . .	354
Mr. Tierney . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Canning . . . . .	357
Mr. Windham . . . . .	361
Sir John Moore's dispatches . . . . .	367
Mr. Frere's correspondence with Sir John Moore . . . . .	372
Earl Grey . . . . .	373
Earl of Liverpool . . . . .	374
Mr. Canning . . . . .	377
Earl Grey . . . . .	381
Expedition to the Scheldt . . . . .	382
Troops sent to Portugal . . . . .	384
Earl of Buckinghamshire . . . . .	ib.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Feelings of the Portugueze toward the English . . . . .	387
Sir Arthur Wellesley's instructions . . . . .	388
General Beresford appointed commander-in-chief of the Portugueze army . . . . .	389
He begins to reform the army . . . . .	390
Intercepted letter from General Kellermann to Soult . . . . .	392

	PAGE
Laborde sent to attack Silveira at Amarante . . .	393
State of Penafiel when the French entered . . .	394
The Bridge of Amarante . . . . .	395
Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick killed in defending it . .	397
The French endeavour to throw a bridge over the river	398
Repeated attempts to effect the passage . . .	399
Plan for demolishing the Portuguese entrenchments	400
The French win the bridge . . . . .	401
Situation of the enemy . . . . .	402
Sir Arthur Wellesley lands at Lisbon . . . . .	404
He communicates his plans to Cuesta . . . . .	ib.
Views of the Philadelphes in Marshal Soult's army	406
The Sieur d'Argenton goes to Sir Arthur Wellesley to explain their views . . . . .	409
Advance of the British army towards Porto . . .	410
D'Argenton is arrested . . . . .	411
Soult prepares to retreat from Portugal . . . . .	412
The French driven from Albergaria . . . . .	413
They are driven from their position at Grijo . . .	414
Measures of Soult to prevent the passage of the Douro	415
Passage of that river . . . . .	416
Deliverance of Porto . . . . .	418
Soult and Loison effect a junction on their retreat .	421
Sir Arthur pursues the French . . . . .	422
Sufferings of the enemy in their flight . . . . .	423
Loss of the French at Puente de Misarella . . . .	425
The pursuit given over at Montalegre . . . . .	ib.
Movement of troops from Aragon . . . . .	426
Reasons for not continuing the pursuit . . . . .	427
Victor enters Portugal by way of Alcantara, and speedily retreats . . . . .	428
Soult reaches Orense . . . . .	429
Romana enters Asturias, and displaces the Junta .	ib.
Combined movements of the French against Romana	430
Romana escapes by sea . . . . .	431
Ney returns into Galicia . . . . .	432
The French in Lugo relieved by Soult . . . . .	433
Mahy returns to Mondoñedo . . . . .	434

# CONTENTS.

XV

	PAGE
The French driven from Compostella . . . . .	435
Combined operations of Marshals Ney and Soult in Galicia . . . . .	436
Romana rejoins his army . . . . .	437
Proceedings of Soult . . . . .	ib.
Cruelties exercised by the French . . . . .	439
Defeat of the French at the Bridge of S. Payo . . . . .	440
The Spaniards retaliate upon the invaders . . . . .	443
Soult retreats out of Galicia . . . . .	ib.
Ferrol and Coruña evacuated by the French . . . . .	444
Soult complains of certain officers . . . . .	446
He recommends a plan for securing Galicia . . . . .	447
Romana summoned to take his place in the Central Junta . . . . .	448
He orders a monument to be erected to Sir John Moore . . . . .	449
His farewell to the army . . . . .	450
Address of the Central Junta to the Galicians . . . . .	451

## CHAPTER XXIII.

Proceedings of the French after the fall of Zaragoza . . . . .	456
State of the Catalan army . . . . .	457
Reding determines to act on the offensive . . . . .	460
The Spaniards driven from Igualada . . . . .	461
Failure of the French against the Abbey of the S. Creus . . . . .	462
Reding takes the field, and collects his scattered troops . . . . .	465
He is advised to retreat . . . . .	466
Battle of Valls . . . . .	469
The French received at Reus . . . . .	472
Arrangement concerning the wounded . . . . .	473
Alarm at Tortosa . . . . .	474
Lazan separates his army from Reding's command . . . . .	475
Mortality in Tarragona . . . . .	476
St. Cyr removes to the plain of Vicq . . . . .	477
Vicq deserted by its inhabitants . . . . .	480
Arrest of the persons in office at Barcelona for refusing the oath . . . . .	481
Prisoners sent into France . . . . .	483

	PAGE
Barcelona relieved by sea . . . . .	484
Reding dies of his wounds . . . . .	ib.
Peasants of the Vallés . . . . .	486
Blake appointed to the command . . . . .	488
Movements of the Aragonese . . . . .	ib.
Monzon recovered by the Spaniards . . . . .	490
Capture of a French detachment . . . . .	491
Blake moves upon Alcañiz . . . . .	492
The French withdraw . . . . .	495
Suchet comes against him . . . . .	496
Defeat of the French before Alcañiz . . . . .	497
Anniversary of the insurrection at Valencia . . . . .	499
Celebration of S. Ferdinand's day . . . . .	500
Executions in Barcelona . . . . .	502
Blake advances toward Zaragoza . . . . .	504
Suchet attacks the Spaniards . . . . .	505
Blake retreats to Belchite . . . . .	506
Flight of the Spaniards . . . . .	507
Blake's resignation not accepted . . . . .	509
Commencement of the Guerillas . . . . .	511
Porlier . . . . .	ib.
The Empecinado . . . . .	ib.
Renovales in the valleys of Roncal . . . . .	512
He defeats a French detachment . . . . .	ib.
A second party defeated . . . . .	513
Proclamation of the Duque de Mahon . . . . .	514
Executions and reprisals . . . . .	516
Attempts to win over Renovales . . . . .	517
Troops sent from Zaragoza against him . . . . .	520
He capitulates for the valleys . . . . .	522
Xavier Mina . . . . .	523
Siege of Gerona commenced . . . . .	526

# HISTORY

## OF THE

# PENINSULAR WAR.

---

### CHAPTER XVI.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN.  
SURRENDER OF CORUNA AND FERROL. SITUATION OF ROMANA'S ARMY. BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO FRANCE. PROCEEDINGS AT MADRID. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

HAPPILY for the interests of Great Britain, and for its honour, which is paramount to all interests, the British government entertained more generous hopes than its General had done, and acted upon wiser views. At the very time when the Spaniards had sustained the heaviest losses, and our own army was known to be in full retreat, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and the Spanish nation acting in the name of Ferdinand. It proclaimed a christian, stable, and inviolable peace between the two countries, perpetual and sincere amity, and strict alliance during the war with France ;

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Treaty between Great Britain and Spain.*



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

---

and it pronounced an entire and lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done on either side in the course of the late wars wherein they had been engaged against each other. His Britannic Majesty engaged to assist the Spaniards to the utmost of his power, and not to acknowledge any other King of Spain, and of the Indies thereunto appertaining, than Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation should acknowledge; and the Spanish government engaged, on behalf of Ferdinand, never to cede to France any portion of the territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the world. The contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against France, and not to make peace except by common consent. It was agreed by an additional article, that as the existing circumstances did not admit of the regular negotiation of a treaty of commerce with all the care and consideration due to so important a subject, such a negotiation should be effected as soon as it was practicable; and meantime mutual facilities afforded to the commerce of both countries, by temporary regulations, founded on reciprocal utility. Another separate article provided that the Spanish government should take the most effectual measures for preventing the Spanish squadrons, in all their ports, from falling into the power of France. Before the treaty could reach Spain, the mischief against which this latter article

was intended to provide had been done in the ports of Galicia. CHAP.  
XVI.

There were Englishmen at Coruña, who, when Sir John Moore was preparing to embark, doubted whether the inhabitants would protect his embarkation. In the bitterness of grief and shame they said, "should the Galicians tell us that we came into their country and by the imposing display of our well-equipped army prevented them from defending their native mountains; that they entrusted their passes to us and we abandoned them to the enemy; that disregarding any service which seemed immaterial to our own safety, we let the French occupy the approaches to their city; . . should the volunteers of Coruña tell us this (they said), and throw down their arms when they see us flying to our ships, . . we should have little right to complain of desertion or abandonment!" But the Spaniards are a more generous people than these doubts implied. Astonished indeed they were at the manner in which an army that had excited by its proud appearance the highest hopes as well as the highest admiration, had retreated through one of the strongest and most defensible countries in Europe; but severely as these hopes were disappointed, and cruelly as they suffered in consequence, they were not betrayed into one unworthy act or expression of resentment. The Governor of Coruña, D. Antonio de Alcedo, had made vigorous preparations as soon as it

1809.  
January.  
*Surrender  
of Coruña.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

seemed likely that the enemy might enter Galicia. His name will be remembered as the author of a Geographical Dictionary of Spanish America, much more accurate and copious than any former work relating to those countries. It would be well for him could it be forgotten in the history of his own. While he expected that the British army would make a stand, and maintain Coruña and Ferrol at least, even if they abandoned the field, he held brave language, calling upon the inhabitants to supply stakes, beams, fascines and butts for additional works, and exhorting the women to busy themselves in providing sacks to be filled with earth. "If the French come," said he in his proclamation, "I will take such measures that Coruña shall be not less gloriously distinguished than Gerona, Valencia, and Zaragoza. But should fortune prove adverse to us, as a chastisement from God for our sins, I will bury myself in the ruins of this fortress rather than surrender it to the enemy: thus finishing my days with honour, and trusting that all will follow my example." Wherever in Spain a Governor was found willing to set such an example, the resolution to follow it was not wanting.

Coruña is a regular fortress, and might long have held out against any means which Marshal Soult could have brought against it. But when an English army with the sea open to them for succours did not think of maintaining it, it is

not surprising that the inhabitants should have despaired of making a successful resistance. Their Governor was prepared to play the traitor; he had still however honour enough left not to propose a capitulation till the last transport was beyond the enemy's power. Terms were then easily agreed on, the one party asking only what the other would have imposed. Alcedo stipulated for a general amnesty; that all persons in office should retain their appointments on taking an oath to the Intruder; and that the military who took that oath might either continue in the service or receive their dismissal at their own option, such as refused the oath becoming prisoners of war. He himself set the example of swearing allegiance to Joseph Buonaparte; and soon in his own person properly experienced with what fidelity the French kept their engagements, for they presently dismissed him from his government and sent him into France.

CHAP.  
XVI.1809.  
*January.**Jan. 19.*

Coruña and Ferrol are situated on the opposite sides of a spacious bay which receives in four deep inlets the rivers Mero, Mandeu, Eume and Juvia. Ferrol is placed in the deepest and most capacious of these inlets, and nothing which skill and expense could effect had been spared during the last half century for improving the natural advantages of the harbour, and rendering it impregnable. It had thus been rendered one of the strongest naval establishments in the world, being also one of the

*Situation  
and strength  
of Ferrol.*



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

most commodious. To force the passage is impossible, ships having for the distance of a league to file one by one along a shore defended by forts. Equal care had been taken to protect it on the land side. There were at this time eight ships of the line in the harbour, of which three were of the largest size, . . three frigates, and a considerable number of smaller vessels. From Betanzos to Ferrol was but a march of fourteen miles farther than from Betanzos to Coruña; and it was a topic of exultation for the French, that the English in the precipitance of their flight had not marched upon Ferrol instead of Coruña, where they might have occupied a fortress strong enough to be called impregnable, and have secured the squadron. It was still fresh in remembrance that when Sir James Pulteney had landed on the coast there with a part of that army by which the French were afterwards expelled from Egypt, he deemed it more prudent to re-embark his troops without attempting any thing, than to hazard an attack against so formidable a place. It is indeed almost impossible to lay regular siege to it: the nature of the ground being such that trenches cannot be opened there.

*Surrender  
of Ferrol.*

Marshal Soult found in Coruña a battering train sufficient for making a feint of besieging Ferrol; that it would not be in his power to take it he well knew; . . but he reckoned upon the pusillanimity and treason of the commanders,



and upon the fortune of Buonaparte. The population was estimated at 8000, double the number in Coruña; but the peasantry from the adjacent country had flocked thither, and there were 8000 men within its walls, burning with hatred and indignation against the French, and requiring only a leader in whom they could confide. The persons in authority they suspected, and with too much reason. One of these, the admiral D. Pedro Obregon, they displaced and threw into prison; it was only removing one traitor to make room for another. D. Francisco Melgarejo, who succeeded to the command of the squadron, opened a correspondence with the enemy by water; and the military commanders, equally ready to betray their country and their trust, sent messengers round by land at the same time. Accordingly General Mermet had no sooner made a demonstration of investing the town, than the Castles of La Palma and San Martin were abandoned to him; and as the disposition of the people was of no avail against the vile purposes of their chiefs civil and military, the town was delivered up, upon the same terms as Coruña; a few additional articles being added, stipulating for the arrears of pay, as also that if resistance were made in any part of Galicia, no inhabitant of Ferrol should be compelled to serve against his countrymen. Obregon was then released from prison, and placed by the French at the head of the arsenal; he and the

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Jan. 26.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1839.  
*January.*

comrades of his treason took the oath of allegiance to the Intruder; and those persons who had been most active in arresting him and in promoting the national cause were seized and reserved for punishment.

*Evaluation  
of the ene-  
my.*

If the Central Junta had at one time dissembled the danger of the country (or rather partaken too much of that unreasoning confidence which was one characteristic of the Spaniards), they never attempted to conceal its disasters, nor to extenuate them. On such occasions their language was frank and dignified, becoming the nation which they represented. In announcing the loss of Coruña and Ferrol, they pronounced the surrender of those strong places to have been cowardly and scandalous, and promised to condemn the persons who had thus betrayed their duty, to condign punishment. The enemy meantime failed not to blazon forth their triumphs in this Galician campaign: to represent the battle of Coruña as a victory on their part was a falsehood, which all circumstances, except those of the action itself, tended to confirm; . . . and the results of the campaign had been so rapid, and apparently so complete, as to excite their own wonder. Three British regiments, they said, the 42d, 50th, and 52d, had been entirely destroyed in the action, and Sir John Moore killed in attempting to charge at their head, with the vain hope of restoring the fortune of the day. The English had lost every thing which constitutes an army, artillery,

horses, baggage, ammunition, magazines, and military chests. 80 pieces of cannon they had landed, they had re-embarked no more than 12. 200,000 weight of powder, 16,000 muskets, and 2,000,000 of treasure (about £83,000) had fallen into the hands of the pursuers, and treasure yet more considerable had been thrown down the precipices along the road between Astorga and Coruña, where the peasantry and the soldiers were now collecting it. 5000 horses had been counted which they had slaughtered upon the way, . . 500 were taken at Coruña, and the carcasses of 1200 were infecting the streets when the conquerors entered that town. The English would have occupied Ferrol and seized the squadron there, had it not been for the precipitance of their retreat, and the result of the battle to which they had been brought at last. Thus then had terminated their expedition into Spain! thus, after having fomented the war in that unhappy country, had they abandoned it to its fate! In another season of the year not a man of them would have escaped; now the facility of breaking up the bridges, the rapidity of the winter torrents, shortness of days, and length of nights, had favoured their retreat. But they were driven out of the peninsula, harassed, routed, and disheartened. The kingdom of Leon, the province of Zamora, and all Galicia, which they had been so desirous to cover, were conquered and subdued; and Romana, whom they had brought from the Baltic, was, with the wreck of his army,

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

reduced to less than 2500 men, wandering between Vigo and Santiago, and closely pursued. . . This was the most stinging of all the French reproaches. Wounded to the heart as we were that an English army should so have retreated, still we knew that wherever our men had been allowed to face the enemy they had beaten them; and that, however the real history of the battle of Coruña might be concealed from the French people, the French army had received a lesson there, which they would remember whenever it might be our fortune to encounter them again. But that we should have drawn such a force in pursuit of Romana, who, if he were taken prisoner, would be put to death with the forms of justice, by a tyrant who made mockery of justice, was of all the mournful reflections which this disastrous expedition excited, the most painful and the most exasperating.

*Pursuit of  
Romana's  
army.*

At this time indeed Romana's situation might have appeared hopeless to any but a Spaniard, and few Spaniards would have regarded it with such equanimity as this high-minded nobleman. In the virtuous determination of doing his duty to the uttermost, whatever might betide, he trusted Providence with the event, and gave way to no despondent or repining thought. A detachment under G. Franceschi had pursued his army after it had separated from Sir J. Moore at Astorga, and according to the French statements taken some 3000 men, and killed a great number before he entered the Val de Orras.



The charge of completing its destruction was then transferred by Soult to M. Ney, and he dispatched G. Marchand's division and a regiment of cavalry as amply sufficient for the intended service. Romana left his vanguard under D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to cover the Val de Orras, and the Riberas del Sil; . . one division was posted at Pueblo de Tribes and Mendoya, to support him if he should be attacked, and defend the bridge over the Bivey; the others were distributed where they could find subsistence, and at the same time afford support to the more advanced.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

The country was in a state of the utmost alarm. The Vizconde de Quintanilla, one of the deputies for Leon to the Central Junta, had been sent to Romana's army, and disagreeing with him before the retreat commenced, had preceded him, in the hope of taking some measures which might be serviceable to the common cause. Manifest as it was that Sir J. Moore had given up that cause in his heart as hopeless, it had never been apprehended that he would retreat with such precipitation, and abandon Coruña and Ferrol to their fate; ports the maintenance of which was of so great importance to Great Britain as long as she took any part in the contest. Of all the Spaniards the Galicians had least reason to fear that the war would be brought to their own doors; and their consternation was extreme when they saw the enemy among them. Quintanilla repaired to

*Dismay in  
Galicia.*



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

Santiago, from which city the Archbishop had fled, having been insulted by the people, and dreading farther outrages from the insubordination which these dreadful times produced. As it seemed that nothing could be done for resisting the enemy, Quintanilla endeavoured at least to disappoint them of their expected booty, and proposed that the church plate should be removed. In such treasure that city was peculiarly rich, having been during many centuries more in vogue than any other place of pilgrimage in Europe ; but his advice was rejected, upon the ground that the populace, who were suspicious of whatever was done, would not suffer it.

*Romana re-  
treats to-  
ward Mon-  
terry.*

Romana's was a buoyant spirit, not to be depressed by any dangers. He had read the British General rightly, but his confidence in the British character was unshaken ; and in the expectation that something would be attempted upon the coast, he moved one of his divisions from Mazeda to Taboada and other villages near Lugo, for the purpose of observing and harassing the enemy. This movement was ordered the day before the battle of Coruña. On the afternoon of the 17th he was apprised that 5000 French were at St. Esteban de Ribas del Sil, three leagues from Orense, and in the night advice came from Mendizabal that he had been attacked by a detachment moving upon that city. Romana reconnoitred this force ; they were plainly waiting for reinforcements, but even in their present

state he was not strong enough to resist them ; for as soon as he entered Galicia, the whole of the new levies had dispersed : they belonged to that province, and feeling themselves within reach of home, believed with some reason that they could provide better for themselves than it was in the power of their general and their government to provide for them.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

At his last interview with Sir J. Moore it had been arranged that the British army should make its stand at Villafranca, and there defend the entrance into Galicia, while the Marquis should endeavour to collect and reform his troops upon the river Sil. But because this resolution, fatally for Sir J. Moore, had been abandoned, Romana's left flank and rear were exposed to the enemy. They were at leisure to direct their efforts against him, and he saw that the only way of escape open for him was by Monterry. In that direction therefore he moved, and fixed his head-quarters on the 21st at Villaza, a league from that town, on the side of Portugal. Here, to his surprise and displeasure, he found that Blake, who had continued with the army till this day, had left it without giving him any intimation of his departure, taken with him the officers whom he could trust, and left directions for others to follow him through Portugal. The camp-marshal, D. Rafael Martinengo, was missing also : his conduct, though irregular, was afterwards honourably explained ; he had gone to collect stragglers. With regard to General Blake,

*Blake leaves  
the army.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

serving only as an individual after he had been removed from the command, he was at liberty to retire whither and when he pleased, . . but not thus, in a manner derogatory to the commander, subversive of discipline, and injurious to the army. His disappearance, and that of the officers who followed him, increased the distrust and despondency of the troops; and the reports which they spread to excuse themselves for thus withdrawing, contributed still farther to dishearten the people. "I assure your excellency," said Romana, when he communicated this to the war minister, "that I never gave a more trying proof of patriotism, love to my King, and gratitude to the government which in his name has conferred so many honours upon me, than in taking upon myself the command of this army in such circumstances, and retaining it, though abandoned by those who ought to have assisted me. I know not wherein this patriotism consists which is so loudly vaunted . . any reverse, any mishap, prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice their country, and compromise their commander."

*The French  
cease the  
pursuit.*

The next intelligence was of Sir J. Moore's death in action with M. Soult. The first thought which occurred to Romana was that this would not have happened if they had given battle to that very Soult at Saldaña. It was his firm persuasion that if the British force and his ill-fated troops had been united in October, they

might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees. The British had now actually embarked. Coruña and Ferrol were still points of hope; and if the governors there performed their duty, he could yet render them some service in the field. With this view he moved to cover the province of Tuy; but having reached La Guironda, he learnt in the night that the French with superior forces were at hand. His troops, though well equal to the business of harassing an enemy that should be otherwise employed, would have been lost if brought to action; he returned therefore to Oimbra, with the intention, if he should be pursued, of entering Portugal, and making through Tras-os-Montes for Ciudad Rodrigo, there to refit his army, or reinforce some other with the remnant that was left. A little respite was allowed him, for the French did not think the wreck of this army of sufficient consequence to fatigue themselves by pursuing and hunting it down. Where he and his handful of fugitives were secreting themselves they knew not, and on his part Romana knew as little what was passing in other parts of Spain.

Buonaparte had never appeared so joyous as when he left Madrid with the expectation of surprising Sir John Moore. He had intended to go to Lisbon, and the troops had actually received orders to hold themselves in readiness for beginning their march toward that capital, but the desire of encountering a British army

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*Buonaparte  
advised that  
Austria is  
arming.*

*De Pradt,  
211.*



CHAP. made him change his intention; and Lisbon  
XVI.

1809. was thus doubly preserved from a second sub-  
January. jugation, for this movement interposed between the British and Portugal, and if Sir J. Moore had retreated thither, he would have abandoned Lisbon as he did Coruña. When there was no longer a hope of overtaking the English, Buonaparte stopped at Astorga; it was more consistent with his dignity that a detachment of his army should hunt them to the coast, than that he should continue the pursuit in person. Beyond that city, therefore, he would not have proceeded, even if dispatches had not reached him there which recalled him into France. He had designs against Austria, concerning which the Emperor Alexander had been deceived at Erfurt: his intention had been to complete the easy subjugation of Spain before he began to execute these further projects of insatiable ambition; but he was informed that Austria, instead of waiting for the blow, was preparing to avail herself of the advantage which the Spanish war afforded her. The news was not unwelcome to him; for he had now entertained a new train of ambitious and perfidious thoughts, which made him desirous of leaving Spain. From Astorga he turned back to Valladolid, and remained there a few days to make his last arrangements before he returned into France.

*Change in  
his views  
concerning  
Spain.*

An attachment to his family was almost the only human part of Buonaparte's character; but when any object of aggrandisement presented



CHAP.  
XVI.1809.  
*January.*

itself to his all-grasping desires, that attachment stood as little in his way as the obligations of truth, honour, and justice. He had been sincere in his intention of giving Spain to Joseph, while he thought it an easy gift, and one which in its results would prove beneficial to the giver. The resistance which had been made to the intrusion, and the reverses which his arms had for a time experienced, disturbed and mortified him; and in that temper of mind which escapes self-condemnation by reproaching others, he imputed to Joseph's flight from Madrid, as a consequence, the very spirit of resistance which had rendered that measure necessary for his own preservation. For this reason there had been no cordiality at their meeting; he had treated Joseph with disrespect, as well as coldness, and leaving him in the rear, had issued edicts by his own authority, and in his own name. This had been resented by Joseph, as far as one who was the receiver of a stolen crown could resent it: having been made King, he represented it was proper he should appear to be such; to debase him was not the way of rendering him more acceptable to a proud and high-minded nation. In addition to this there was another cause of discontent between them. Whatever country Buonaparte entered, that country was made to support his army; war was to him no expense, . . the cost fell always upon his enemies or his allies. Thus he had expected to proceed in Spain; . . but even when he was master of Madrid the intrusive

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

government had no other revenue than the duties which were paid at his gates, and Joseph, instead of paying his brother's armies, looked to him for the maintenance of his own court. Joseph had represented also the impolicy of continuing to exasperate the people by a system of military exactions; and Napoleon, impatient of any contradiction, instantly perceived that a King of Spain, whether of the Buonaparte or the Bourbon dynasty, must have a Spanish feeling incompatible with that entire subserviency to himself which he expected and required. Having so lately and so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Spain, and proclaimed his brother king, he could not at once subvert his own arrangements; but he avowed to M. de Pradt at this time that when he had given that kingdom, he did not understand the value of the present: follies would be committed, he said, which would throw it again into his hands, and he would then divide it into five viceroyalties.

*De Pradt,*  
207—225.

*He returns  
to France.*

He apprehended no difficulty in this: any military opposition which could be attempted he despised, the more entirely because of the ease with which the Spanish armies had been dispersed, . . . and the moral obstacles he was still incapable of appreciating. A dispatch reached him from Galicia, and upon reading it he said to those about him, "Every thing proceeds well. Romana cannot resist a fortnight longer. The English will never make another effort; and three months hence the war will be at an end."

One of the marshals hinted at the character of the people and of the country. "It is a La Vendée," he replied; "I have tranquillized La Vendée. Calabria also was in a state of insurrection, . . . wherever there are mountains there are insurgents; but the kingdom of Naples is tranquil now. It is not enough to command an army well, . . . one must have general views. The continental system is not the same as in the time of Frederick; the great powers must absorb the smaller. The priests have considerable influence here, and they use it to exasperate the people: but the Romans conquered them; the Moors conquered them; and they are not near so fine a people now as they were then. I will settle the government firmly; I will interest the nobles, and I will cut down the people with grape-shot. What do they want? the Prince of Asturias? Half the nation object to him: . . . besides he is dead to them. There is no longer any dynasty to oppose to me. They say the population is against us. Why Spain is a perfect solitude, . . . there are not five men to a square league. Besides, if it be a question of numbers, I will pour all Europe into their country. They have to learn what a first-rate power can effect." With this flagitious determination the remorseless tyrant returned into France.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*Jones's Account of the War, vol. i.*  
165.

Before he left Madrid to march against the English, an address framed by the traitors of that city in the name of the magistrates and citizens was presented to him by the Corre-

*Professions to the Spaniards at Madrid.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---

gidor. They thanked him for his gracious clemency, that in the midst of conquest he had thought of the safety and welfare of the conquered, and forgiven all which had been done during the absence of Joseph, their king: and they entreated that it might please him to grant them the favour of seeing King Joseph once more among them, to the end that under his laws that capital and the whole kingdom might enjoy the happiness which they expected from the benevolence of their new sovereign's character. The tyrant replied to this in one of his characteristic harangues. "I am pleased," he said, "with the sentiments of the city of Madrid. I regret the injuries she has suffered, and am particularly happy that, under existing circumstances, I have been able to effect her deliverance, and to protect her from great calamities, and have accomplished what I owed to myself and my nation. Vengeance has had its due: it has fallen upon ten of the principal culprits; . . . the rest have entire and absolute forgiveness." He then touched upon the reforms by which he thought to reconcile the Spaniards to a foreign yoke. "I have preserved the spiritual orders, but with a limitation of the number of monks: they who were influenced by a divine call shall remain in their cloisters; with regard to those whose call was doubtful, or influenced by worldly considerations, I have fixed their condition in the class of secular priests. Out of the surplus of mo-



nastic property I have provided for the maintenance of the pastors, that important and useful branch of the clergy. I have suppressed that court which was a subject of complaint to Europe and the present age. Priests may guide the minds of men, but must exercise no temporal or corporal jurisdiction over the citizens. I have annulled those privileges which the grantees usurped during times of civil war. I have abolished feudal rights, and henceforth every one may set up inns, ovens, mills, employ himself in fishing and rabbit-hunting, and give free scope to his industry, provided he respects the laws. The selfishness, wealth, and prosperity of a small number of individuals were more injurious to your agriculture than the heat of the Dog-days. All peculiar jurisdictions were usurpations, and at variance with the rights of the nation. I have abolished them. As there is but one God, so should there be in a state but one judicial power.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

“There is no obstacle,” he continued, “which can long resist the execution of my resolutions. But what transcends my power is this, to consolidate the Spaniards as one nation, under the sway of the king, should they continue to be affected with those principles of hatred to France which the partizans of England and the enemies of the continent have infused into the bosom of Spain. I can establish no nation, no king, no independence of the Spaniards, if the king be not assured of their attachment and



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

fidelity. The Bourbons can no longer reign in Europe. The divisions of the royal family were contrived by the English. It was not the dethronement of King Charles and of the favourite, that the Duke del Infantado, that tool of England, had in view. The intention was, to establish the predominant influence of England in Spain; a senseless project, the result of which would have been a perpetual continental war. No power under the influence of England can exist on the continent. If there be any that entertain such a wish, the wish is absurd, and will sooner or later occasion their fall. It would be easy for me, should I be compelled to adopt that measure, to govern Spain, by establishing as many viceroys in it as there are provinces. Nevertheless, I do not refuse to abdicate my rights of conquest in favour of the king, and to establish him in Madrid, as soon as the 30,000 citizens which this capital contains, the clergy, nobility, merchants, and lawyers shall have declared their fidelity, set an example to the provinces, enlightened the people, and made the nation sensible that their existence and prosperity essentially depend upon a king and a free constitution, favourable to the people, and hostile only to the selfishness and haughty passions of the grandees. If such be the sentiments of the inhabitants, let the 30,000 citizens assemble in the churches; let them, in the presence of the holy sacrament, take an oath, not only with their mouths, but also with their

hearts, and without any jesuitical equivocation, that they promise support, attachment, and fidelity to their king; let the priests in the confessional and the pulpit, the merchants in their correspondence, the lawyers in their writings and speeches, infuse these sentiments into the people: . . . then will I surrender my right of conquest, place the king upon the throne, and make it my pleasing task to conduct myself as a true friend of the Spaniards. The present generation may differ in their opinions; the passions have been too much brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their renovator; they will reckon the day when I appeared among you among their memorable festivals; and from that day will the happiness of Spain date its commencement. Thus," he concluded, addressing himself to the Corregidor, "you are informed of the whole of my determination. Consult with your fellow-citizens, and consider what part you will choose; but whatever it be, make your choice with sincerity, and tell me only your genuine sentiments."

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

There was something more detestable in this affectation of candour and generosity than in his open and insolent violence. "Consult! and consider what part you will choose, and make your choice with sincerity!" . . . The Spanish nation had made their choice! They had made it at Baylen and at Reynosa, at Cadiz and at Madrid, at Valencia and at Zaragoza; for life

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

or for death; deliberately, and yet as if with one impulse, . . with enthusiasm, and yet calmly, . . had that noble people nobly, and wisely, and religiously made their heroic choice. They had written it in blood, their own and their oppressors'. Its proofs were to be seen in deserted houses and depopulated towns, in the blackened walls of hamlets which had been laid waste with fire, in the bones which were bleaching upon the mountains of Biscay, and in the bodies, French and Spaniard, which were at that hour floating down the tainted Ebro! Here, in the capital, their choice had been recorded; they who had been swept down by grape-shot in its streets, or bayoneted in the houses, they who had fallen in the heat of battle before its gates, and they who in cold blood had been sent in droves to execution, alike had borne witness to that choice, and confirmed it, and rejoiced in it with their dying breath. And this tyrant called upon the people of Madrid now to tell him their sentiments, . . now when their armies were dispersed, and they themselves, betrayed and disarmed, were surrounded by his legions!

*Registers  
opened.*

Registers were opened in every quarter, and, if French accounts could be believed, 30,000 fathers of families rushed thither in crowds, and signed a supplication to the conqueror, entreating him to put an end to their misfortunes, by granting them his august brother Joseph for their king. If this impossible eagerness had really been manifested, it could admit of no

other solution than that the people of Madrid, bitterly as they detested and heartily as they despised Joseph, yet thought it a less evil to be governed by him than by the tyrant himself, . . for this was the alternative allowed them. But a census of this kind, as it is called, like those which coloured Buonaparte's assumption, first of the consulship for life, and then of an hereditary throne, was easily procured, when neither threats, nor persuasions, nor fraud, nor violence were spared.

The ceremony of voting and taking the oath was delayed till after Buonaparte's departure, "because," said the French journalists, "a suspicion of fear might else have attached to it. The act was now more noble, as being entirely free, . . as being confirmed by the weightiest considerations whereby a people can be influenced, their interest, their happiness, and their glory." With such language the better part of the French nation were insulted, and the unreflecting deceived, while all knowledge of the real state of things was shut out by the vigilance of a government, conscious enough of wickedness to know that it required concealment. The votes were then exacted, the host was exposed in all the churches, and the priests were compelled to receive from their countrymen at the altar, and as they believed in the actual and bodily presence of their Saviour and their God, a compulsory oath of allegiance to the Intruder. The Catholic system has a salvo in such cases ;

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*The people  
of Madrid  
take the  
oath of  
allegiance  
to Joseph.*



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*Addresses  
to the In-  
truder.*

and the same priests who administered the oath were believed by the French themselves to have released those who took it from its obligations.

The higher ranks in Madrid had shown themselves from the commencement of these troubles as deficient in public spirit as they had long been in private virtues. Scarcely an individual in that capital who was distinguished for rank, or power, or riches, had stood forward in the national cause, so fallacious is the opinion that those persons will be most zealous in the defence of their country, who have what is called the largest stake in it. Addresses from all the councils and corporate bodies of the metropolis were dispatched to Buonaparte while he tarried at Valladolid, . . all alike abject, and all soliciting that they might be indulged with the presence of their king. The Council of state, by a deputy, expressed its homage of thanks for the generous clemency of the conqueror. "What gratitude," said he, "does it not owe you for having snatched Spain from the influence of those destructive councils which fifty years of misfortune had prepared for it; for having rid it of the English armies, who threatened to fix upon its territories the theatre of continental war! Grateful for these benefits, the Council of state has still another supplication to lay at the feet of your majesty. Deign, sire, to commit to our loyalty your august brother, our lord and King. Permit him to re-enter Madrid, and to take into his hands the reins of government;



that under the benevolent sway of this august prince, whose mildness, wisdom, and justice, are known to all Europe, our widowed and desolate monarchy may find a father in the best of Kings.”

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

D. Bernardo Yriarte spoke for the Council of the Indies. “It entirely submits itself,” he said, “to the decrees of your Majesty, and to those of your august brother, the King our master, who is to create the happiness of Spain, as well by the wisdom and the assemblage of the lofty virtues which he possesses, as by the powerful support of the hero of Europe, upon whom the Council of the Indies founds its hopes of seeing those ties reunited, which ought always to unite the American possessions with the mother country.” The Council of finance requested that it might behold in Madrid the august and beloved brother of the Emperor, expecting from his presence the felicity and repose of the kingdom. The Council of war supplicated him, through an effect of his august beneficence, to confer upon the capital the felicity of the presence of their sovereign, Joseph I. This was the theme upon which all the deputations rung their changes. The Council of marine alone adding an appropriate flattery to the same request, expressed its hope of contributing to the liberty of the seas.

Joseph meantime had exercised his nominal sovereignty in passing decrees. By one the circulation of French money was permitted till farther measures concerning it should be an-

*Edicts of the  
Intruder be-  
fore his re-  
turn to Ma-  
drid.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

nounced ; by another all persons entitled to any salary or pension from the government were deprived of it till they should have taken the oath of allegiance to him. He made an attempt also in the autumn, before reinforcements entered Spain, to place the persons belonging to his army under civil protection : and for this purpose required that in every district occupied by the army, from eight to thirty stand of arms should be deposited in every town-house, and an equal number of the respectable inhabitants registered to serve as an escort therewith for any officer or serjeant either on his road as an invalid, or in the execution of any commission. They were also to act as a patrol, for the purpose of preventing any insults or outrages which might be offered to the military, and if men did not volunteer for this service, which would entitle them to pay and rewards, the magistracy were to fix upon those whom they deemed fit to discharge it. He created also a new military order by the name of the *Orden Militar de España*. The Grand Mastership was reserved to himself and his successors ; and the two oldest Captains General of the Army and the Fleet were always to be Grand Chancellor and Grand Treasurer : but the order itself was open to soldiers of every rank who should deserve it. A pension of 1000 *reales vellon* was attached to the order, and the device was a crimson star, bearing on one side the Lion of Leon with this motto . . *Virtute et Fide* ; on the other the Castle

of Castille with *Joseph Napoleo, Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex, instituit*. Decrees were also issued for raising new regiments, one to be called the Royal Foreign, and the other the first of the Irish Brigade.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

On the 22d of January the Intruder re-entered that city, from which he had been driven by the indignation of a whole people. At break of day his approach was announced by the discharge of an hundred cannon; a fit symphony, announcing at once to the people by what right he claimed the throne, and by what means he must sustain himself upon it. From the gate of Atocha to the church of St. Isidro, and from thence to the palace, the streets were lined with French troops, and detachments were stationed in every part of the city, more for the purpose of overawing the inhabitants than of doing honour to this wretched puppet of majesty, who, while he submitted to be the instrument of tyranny over the Spaniards, was himself a slave. The cavalry advanced to the Plaza de las Delicias to meet him; there he mounted on horseback, and a procession was formed of his aides-de-camp and equerries, the grand major domo, the grand master of the ceremonies, the grand master of the hounds, with all the other personages of the drama of royalty, the members of the different councils, and those grandees who, deserting the cause of their country, stained now with infamy names which had once been illustrious in the Spanish annals. At the gate

*Joseph's entrance into Madrid.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

of Atocha the governor of Madrid was ready to present him with the keys. As soon as he entered another discharge of an hundred cannon proclaimed his presence, and all the bells struck up. He proceeded through the city to the church of St. Isidro, where the suffragan Bishop, in his pontificals, the canons, vicars, and rectors, the vicar-general, and the prelates of the religious orders, received him at the gate, and six of the most ancient canons conducted him to the throne. Then the suffragan Bishop addressed him in the only language which might that day be used, the language of servility, adulation, impiety, and treason. The Intruder's reply was in that strain of hypocrisy which marked the usurpation of the Buonapartes with new and peculiar guilt. This was his speech :

“Before rendering thanks to the Supreme Arbiter of Destinies, for my return to the capital of this kingdom entrusted to my care, I wish to reply to the affectionate reception of its inhabitants, by declaring my secret thoughts in the presence of the living God, who has just received your oath of fidelity to my person. I protest, then, before God, who knows the hearts of all, that it is my duty and conscience only which induce me to mount the throne, and not my own private inclination. I am willing to sacrifice my own happiness, because I think you have need of me for the establishment of yours. The unity of our holy religion, the independence of the monarchy, the integrity of its territory,



and the liberty of its citizens, are the conditions of the oath which I have taken on receiving the crown. It will not be disgraced upon my head ; and if, as I have no doubt, the desires of the nation support the efforts of its king, I shall soon be the most happy of all, because you through me will all be happy.”

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

Two rows of banqueting tables were laid out in the nave of the church, where the civil and military officers of the intruder, and the members of the councils, were seated according to their respective ranks. High mass was performed by the chapel-royal, and a solemn *Te Deum* concluded the mockery. That done, Joseph proceeded with the same form to the palace, and a third discharge of an hundred guns proclaimed his arrival there. On the day which followed this triumphal entry, its ostentatious joy, and the affected humanity and philanthropy of his professions, he issued a decree for the formation of special military tribunals, which should punish all persons with death who took arms against him, or enlisted others for the patriotic cause : the gallows was to be the mode of punishment, and over the door of the sufferer's house a shield was to be placed, for infamy, recording the cause and manner of his ignominious death. Any innkeeper or householder in whose dwelling a man should be enlisted for the Junta's service should undergo the same fate ; but if they gave information, 400 reales were promised them, or an equivalent reward. The very day that this

*Edicts  
against the  
Patriots.*



CHAP  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*Circular  
epistle to the  
clergy.*

decree was issued, mingling, like his flagitious brother, words of blasphemy with deeds of blood, he addressed a circular epistle to the Archbishops and Bishops of the realm, commanding them to order a Te Deum in all the churches of their respective dioceses. “ In returning to the capital (this was his language), our first care, as well as first duty, has been to prostrate ourselves at the feet of that God who disposes of crowns, and to devote to him our whole existence for the felicity of the brave nation which he has entrusted to our care. For this only object of our thoughts we have addressed to him our humble prayers. What is an individual amid the generations who cover the earth? What is he in the eyes of the Eternal, who alone penetrates the intentions of men, and according to them determines their elevation? He who sincerely wishes the welfare of his fellows serves God, and omnipotent goodness protects him. We desire that, in conformity with these dispositions, you direct the prayers of the faithful whom Providence has entrusted to you. Ask of God, that his spirit of peace and wisdom may descend upon us, that the voice of passion may be stifled in meditating upon such sentiments as ought to animate us, and which the general interests of this monarchy inspire: that religion, tranquillity, and happiness may succeed to the discords to which we are now exposed. Let us return thanks to God for the success which he has been pleased to grant to the arms of our august brother and

powerful ally the Emperor of the French, who has had no other end in supporting our rights by his power than to procure to Spain a long peace, founded on her independence.”

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

A heavy load of national guilt lay upon the nations of the Peninsula; and those persons, who, with well-founded faith, could see and understand that the moral government of the world is neither less perfect, nor less certain in its course, than that material order which science has demonstrated, . . . they perceived in this dreadful visitation the work of retribution. The bloody conquests of the Portuguese in India were yet unexpiated; the Spaniards had to atone for extirpated nations in Cuba and Hayti, and their other islands, and on the continent of America for cruelties and excesses not less atrocious than those which they were appointed to punish. Vengeance had not been exacted for the enormities perpetrated in the Netherlands, nor for that accursed tribunal which, during more than two centuries, triumphed both in Spain and Portugal, to the ineffaceable and eternal infamy of the Romish church. But the crimes of a nation, like the vices of an individual, bring on their punishment in necessary consequence, . . . so righteously have all things been ordained. From the spoils of India and America the two governments drew treasures which rendered them independent of the people for supplies; and the war which their priesthood waged against knowledge and reformation succeeded in shutting them out

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Condition  
of Madrid.*

from these devoted countries. A double despotism, of the throne and of the altar, was thus established, and the result was a state of degradation, which nothing less than the overthrow of both, by some moral and political earthquake, loosening the very foundations of society, could remove. Such a convulsion had taken place, and the sins of the fathers were visited upon the children. Madrid, the seat of Philip II., "that sad intelligencing tyrant," who from thence, as our great Milton said, "mischieved the world with his mines of Ophir," that city which once aspired to be the mistress of the world, and had actually tyrannized over so large a part of it, was now itself in thralldom. The Spanish cloak, which was the universal dress of all ranks, was prohibited in the metropolis of Spain, and no Spaniard was allowed to walk abroad in the evening, unless he carried a light. All communication between the capital and the southern provinces, the most fertile and wealthiest of the kingdom, was cut off. Of the trading part of the community, therefore, those who were connected with the great commercial cities of the south coast were at once ruined, and they whose dealings lay with the provinces which were the seat of war were hardly more fortunate. The public creditors experienced that breach of public faith which always results from a violent revolution. The intrusive government acknowledged the debt, and gave notice of its intention to pay them by bills upon Spanish America: for

this there was a double motive, the shame of confessing that the Intruder was unable to discharge the obligations of the government to whose rights and duties he affected to succeed, and the hope of interesting the holders of these bills in his cause : but so little possibility was there of his becoming master of the Indies, that the mention of such bills only provoked contempt. While commercial and funded property was thus destroyed, landed property was of as little immediate value to its owner. No remittances could be made to the capital from that part of Spain which was not yet overrun ; and the devastations had been so extensive every where as to leave the tenant little means of paying the proprietor. These were the first-fruits of that prosperity which the Buonapartes promised to the Spaniards, .. these were the blessings which Joseph brought with him to Madrid ! He, meantime, was affecting to participate in rejoicings, and receiving the incense of adulation, in that city where the middle classes were reduced to poverty by his usurpation, and where the wives whom he had widowed, and the mothers whom he had made childless, mingled with their prayers for the dead, supplications for vengeance upon him as the author of their miseries. The theatre was fitted up to receive him, the boxes were lined with silk, the municipality attended him to his seat, he was presented with a congratulatory poem upon his entrance, and the stage curtain represented the

---

CHAP.  
XVI.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---



CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
February.

Feb. 18.

Genius of Peace with an olive-branch in his left hand, and a torch in his right, setting fire to the attributes of war. Underneath was written, "Live happy, Sire! reign and pardon!" At the very time when this precious specimen of French taste complimented the Intruder upon his clemency, an extraordinary criminal Junta was formed, even the military tribunals not being found sufficiently extensive in their powers for the work of extermination which was begun. It was "for trial of assassins, robbers, recruiters in favour of the insurgents, those who maintained correspondence with them, and who spread false reports." Persons apprehended upon these charges were to be tried within twenty-four hours, and sentenced to the gallows, and the sentence executed without appeal.

*False intelligence published by the intrusive government.*

Another of the Intruder's decrees enjoined that the Madrid Gazette should be under the immediate inspection of the Minister of Police, and copies of it regularly sent to every Bishop, parochial priest, and municipality, that the people might be informed of the acts of government, and of public events. Joseph's ministers, under whatever self-practised delusion they entered his service, conformed themselves in all things now to the spirit of Buonaparte's policy, and employed force and falsehood with as little scruple as if they had been trained in the revolutionary school. While they affected to inform the people of what was passing, they concealed whatever was unfavourable, distorted what they



told, and feigned intelligence suited to their views. They affirmed that the English goods taken at Bilbao, S. Andero, and the ports of Asturias, would defray the expenses of the war; and that England itself was on the point of bankruptcy. Such multitudes, it was affirmed, had repaired to Westminster Hall to give bail for their debts, that it seemed as if all London had been there; numbers were thrown down by the press, and trodden under foot, . . many almost suffocated, and some were killed. Such falsehoods were not too gross for the government where it could exclude all truer information; where this was not in its power, it resorted to the more feasible scheme of exciting suspicions against England; and here the Buonapartes had a willing agent in Morla.

Prone as the Spaniards were in these unhappy times to suspect any person, and to act upon the slightest suspicion, they were slow in believing that Morla had proved false. The people of Cadiz would hardly be convinced that their governor, whose patriotic addresses were still circulating among them, could possibly have gone over to the Intruder. So many measures of utility, so many acts of patriotism and of disinterested vigilance in his administration, were remembered, that the first reports of his perfidy were indignantly received; a fact so contrary to all their experience was not to be credited, and they felt as if they injured him in listening to such an accusation. He had established

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

*Unwilling-  
ness of the  
Spaniards  
to believe  
that Morla  
was a traitor.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

among them a reputation like that which a Cadi sometimes enjoys in Mahommedan countries, where his individual uprightness supplies the defects of law, and resists the general corruption of manners. A peasant, whom he had acquitted upon some criminal charge, brought him a number of turkeys, as a present in gratitude for his acquittal. Morla put him in prison, consigned the turkeys to the gaoler for his food, and set him at liberty when he had eaten them all. There was neither law, equity, nor humanity in this, . . yet it had an extravagant, oriental ostentation of justice, well calculated to impress the people with an opinion of his nice honour and scrupulous integrity. But this man, who in all his public writings boasted of his frankness and of his honourable intentions, was in reality destitute both of truth and honour; and the revolution, which developed some characters and corrupted others, only unmasked his. Early in these troubles Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple had discovered his duplicity. He had signed, and was believed to have written, Solano's ill-timed and worse-intended proclamation, in which the English were spoken of with unqualified reprobation, and as the real enemies against whom all true Spaniards ought to unite; and when warned by Solano's fate, he joined in the national cause, the desire of injuring that cause by every possible means seems to have been the main object of his crooked policy. When Castaños

*Proofs of  
his prior  
treachery.*

wanted the assistance of General Spencer's corps, he threw out hints to that General that it would be required for the defence of Cadiz ; though, from jealousy of the English, at that very time he prevented the Junta from bringing the garrison of Ceuta into the field, and had given it as his decided opinion that no English troops should be admitted into any Spanish fortress. And while he endeavoured to make the Junta of Seville suspicious of English interference, he recommended to the accredited agents of England, that they should interfere early and decidedly in forming a central government, and appointing a commander-in-chief, and that their influence should be strengthened by marching an army into Spain.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

But the most prominent feature of Morla's sophisticated character was his odious hypocrisy. In the letter which announced to the Central Junta the capitulation of Madrid he bestowed the highest eulogiums upon the Intruder and himself. "Yesterday," said he, "as a Counsellor of State I saw Prince Joseph, our appointed King, and the object of the rabble's contumely. I assure you, with all that ingenuousness which belongs to me, that I found him an enlightened philosopher, full even to enthusiasm of the soundest principles of morality, humanity, and affection to the people whom his lot has called him to command. My eulogies might appear suspicious to those who do not know me well ; I suppress them therefore, and

*Morla's letter to the Central Junta ;*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

only say thus much, that the Junta, according to circumstances, may regulate its own conduct and resolutions upon this information. My whole aim and endeavour will always be for the honour and integrity of my country. I will not do myself the injustice to suppose that any of the nation can suspect me of perfidy; my probity is known and accredited, and therefore I continue to speak with that candour and ingenuousness which I have always used." He also delivered his opinion as an individual who was most anxious for the good of the nation, that the governor of Cadiz should be instructed not to let the English assemble either in or near that city in any force; but that, under pretext of securing himself from the French, he should throw up works against them, reinforce the garrison, and secretly strengthen the batteries toward the sea. And that advices should be dispatched to the Indies, for the purpose of preventing treasure or goods from being sent, lest they should fall into the hands of these allies, who having no longer any hope of defending the cause, would seek to indemnify themselves at the expense of the Spaniards. The Junta published this letter as containing in itself sufficient proofs of perfidiousness and treason in the writer. And they observed that at the very time when this hypocrite was advising them to distrust the English, and arm against them, large sums had been remitted them from England, farther pecuniary aids were



on the way, their treasures from America had been secured from the French, by being brought home in British ships, and Great Britain had given the most authentic proof of its true friendship with Spain, by refusing to negotiate with Buonaparte.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
January.

Shortly afterwards a letter of Morla's was intercepted, written in the same strain to D. Josef Virues, the provisional governor of Cadiz. The thorough hypocrite talked of the good which he had done in surrendering Madrid, and the consolation which he derived from that reflection; he lamented over his beloved Cadiz and its estimable inhabitants, who had given him so many proofs of their confidence and affection, and wished that he could avert the dangers that impended over them with the sacrifice of his own blood. "If it became an English garrison," he said, "it would be more burdensome to the nation than Gibraltar, and the commerce of the natives would be ruined: much policy as well as courage would be required to prevent this. I need not," he concluded, "exhort your excellency to defend Cadiz with the honour and patriotism which become you; but when you have fulfilled this obligation, honourable terms may save the city, and secure its worthy inhabitants." In consequence of this letter it became necessary to remove Virues from the command, more for his own sake than for any distrust of his principles, though he had at one time been Godoy's secretary, and though Morla

and to the  
governor  
of Cadiz.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

had been his friend and patron. Unwilling, and perhaps unable to believe that one whom he had so long been accustomed to regard with respect and gratitude was the consummate hypocrite and traitor which he now appeared to be, Virues attempte to excused Morla as having acted under compulsion, an excuse more likely to alleviate for the time his own feelings than to satisfy his judgement. But he felt that under these circumstances it was no longer proper for him to remain in possession of an important post: high as he stood in the opinion of his countrymen, the slightest accident might now render him suspected; and at this crisis it was most essential that the people should have entire confidence in their chiefs. He therefore gladly accepted a mission to England, and D. Felix Jones, who had distinguished himself in the operations against Dupont, was appointed governor. Instead of additional defences toward the sea, new works were begun on the land side, to protect the city against its real enemies, and Colonel Hallowell came from Gibraltar to direct them. Ammunition and stores in abundance were sent from Seville. The new governor began by taking measures of rigorous precaution. No person whatever, not even an Englishman, was permitted to go a mile beyond the city without a passport. Every Frenchman in the place was arrested and sent on board the ships. This was intended for their own security as well as the safety of the city; for so

*Arrest and  
cruel imprisonment of  
the French  
at Cadiz.*

highly were the people incensed against that perfidious nation, and such was their fear of treachery in every person belonging to it, that they purposed putting all whom they should find at large to death; and it was said that three hundred knives had been purchased at one shop, to be thus employed. Had there been leisure, or had the Spaniards been in a temper for humane considerations, these persons ought to have been supplied with means of transport to their own country; instead of which they were consigned to a most inhuman state of confinement. The property also of all French subjects, under which term the natives of all countries in subjection to France were included, was confiscated; . . and in consequence above three hundred shops were shut up, and more than as many families reduced to ruin. Thus it is, that in such times injustice provokes retaliation, wrongs lead to wrongs, and evil produces evil in miserable series.

At this juncture, when every hour brought tidings of new calamities and nearer danger, Florida Blanca, the venerable president of the Central Junta, died, at the great age of eighty-one; fatigue, and care, and anxiety having accelerated his death. When the order of the Jesuits was abolished, he was ambassador at Rome, and is believed to have been materially instrumental in bringing about that iniquitous measure; and it was under his ministry that Spain joined the confederacy against Great Bri-

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Death of  
Florida  
Blanca.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1809.  
*January.*

tain during the American war. These are acts of which he had abundant reason to repent; but there were specious motives for both; and this must be said of Florida Blanca, that of all the ministers who have exercised despotic authority in Spain, no other ever projected or accomplished half so much for the improvement of the people and the country. Whatever tended to the general good received his efficient support, and twenty years of subsequent misrule had not been sufficient to undo the beneficial effects of his administration. It was Godoy's intention that his exile from the court should be felt as a disgrace and a punishment; but the retirement to which it sent him suited the disposition and declining years of the injured man, and he passed his time chiefly in those religious meditations which are the natural support and solace of old age. Many rulers and statesmen have retired into convents when they have been wearied or disgusted with the vanities and vexations of the world; few have been called upon, like Florida Blanca, in extreme old age, to forsake their retirement, their tranquillity, and their habits of religious life, for the higher duty of serving their country in its hour of danger. The Central Junta manifested their sense of his worth by conferring a grandee-ship upon his heir, and all his legitimate descendants who should succeed him in

*Marques de  
Astorga  
president of  
the Junta.*

the title. He was succeeded as president by the Marques de Astorga, a grandee of the highest



class, and the representative of some of the proudest names in Spanish history. The education of this nobleman had been defective, as was generally the case with Spanish nobles, and his person excited contempt in those who are presumptuous and injurious enough to judge only by appearances. But he had not degenerated from the better qualities of his illustrious ancestry: they who knew him best, knew that he possessed what ought to be the distinctive marks of old nobility: he was generous, magnanimous, and high-spirited, without the least apparent consciousness of being so.

CHAP.  
XVI.

---

1808.

---

After the fall of Madrid there was yet one quarter to which the Junta might look with reasonable hope, amid the disasters that crowded upon them. If Barcelona could be recovered, the acquisition of that most important place would balance the worst reverses which they had yet sustained. But ill fortune every where pursued them, and there was this to aggravate the disappointment, that their losses in Catalonia were more imputable to misconduct than to any want of strength. A force had been collected there fully equal both in numbers and discipline (had it been directed with common prudence) to the services expected from it. After the arrival of the troops from Portugal and Majorca, and the Granadan army, it consisted of about 28,000 regular troops, and 1600 cavalry, besides the garrisons of Rosas, Hostalrich, and Gerona, who were nearly 6000. The

*Catalonia,*  
1808.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.

sea being commanded by their allies, was open to them along the whole line of coast, except at Barcelona; and the people, who have always been eminently distinguished for their activity, industry, hardihood, and invincible spirit of independence, were ready to make any sacrifices and any exertions for the deliverance of their native land. The province too was full of fortified places, and even in so defensible a country as Spain peculiarly strong by nature. But to counterbalance these advantages, there were the confusion and perplexity, as well as the distance of the Central Junta; the inexperience and rashness of those who had taken upon themselves the local government; want of science, of decision, and of ability in the generals; want of authority every where; the fearful spirit of insubordination, which on the slightest occasion was ready to break out; . . and, above all, that reckless and unreasonable confidence which had now become part of the Spanish character.

*Siege of  
Barcelona.*

There was some excuse for this confidence in the Catalans; they knew their own temper and the strength of their country; and they had obtained some signal successes before any regular troops came to their assistance. But this remembrance, and the knowledge that so large a regular force was in the field, induced a fatal belief that the difficulties of the struggle were over, and that nothing remained to complete their triumph but the recovery of Barcelona.

And this, they said, might easily be effected: the enemy there were weak, in want of provisions, sickly, dispirited by defeat and desertion; the English squadron at hand to assist in an attack upon Monjuich and the citadel; and the inhabitants ready upon the first appearance of success to rise upon their invaders and open the gates. Among the French and Italians themselves, there were some, they affirmed, who would gladly forsake the wicked cause wherein they were engaged, and by contributing to deliver up these places atone for the treachery in which they had been compelled to bear a part. This was the cry of the people; and these representations were strengthened by some of the citizens, who were perpetually proposing plans contradictory to each other, and alike impracticable: the Supreme Junta represented the people but too faithfully, partaking their inexperience, their impatience, and their errors; and General Vives, surrounded by ignorant advisers, controlled if not intimidated by popular opinion, and himself altogether incompetent to the station which he filled, wasted the precious weeks in a vain display before Barcelona; not perceiving or not regarding that the possession of the city would have been useless to him while the French possessed the citadel and Montjuich; that he had no means for besieging those strong places; . . and above all, that if the French were prevented from relieving them,

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.

CHAP. they must inevitably soon fall into his hands  
XVI. without a blow.

1808.

*St. Cyr appointed to command the French in Catalonia.*

Duhesme, in fact, had announced to his government that his provisions would not hold out beyond the month of December; and to throw in supplies by sea was impossible. Buonaparte was well aware of the danger, and saw in part what consequences might be apprehended from it. He knew how Barcelona had been defended in the Succession war, and had calculated that if it were now to be recovered by the Spaniards it would cost him not less than fourscore thousand lives to regain possession of it. Such a sacrifice he would have made without one compunctious feeling; but that blood might have been expended without effecting the purchase, . . . for if such a siege had been undertaken, England must and would have made exertions commensurate to the occasion. That these consequences did not follow was owing to the errors and incapacity of his opponents, not to his own measures. In other cases the force which he prepared was always fully equal to the service for which it was designed; in the present, it was so inadequate, as to excite in the General, Gouvion Saint Cyr, a suspicion that failure on his part would be more agreeable to the Emperor than success. That General had belonged to the army of the Rhine, which was an original sin in Buonaparte's eyes; and having a command in Naples he had refused to obtain addresses from the troops soliciting the First Consul to



take upon himself the imperial dignity; . . an irremissible offence. Moreover, great commander as Buonaparte was, he was jealous of any victories which were not obtained when he was in the field, so that the renown might redound to himself. Indulging at once this littleness of mind, and his personal or political dislike, it was his wish that Gouvion St. Cyr should not distinguish himself by any brilliant success; at the same time he knew the miserable state of the Spanish armies, and still more of the counsels by which they were directed, well enough to rely upon his relieving Barcelona. His instructions were to effect that object, to collect considerable magazines in Figueras at the enemy's expense; to subdue the valleys, making them feel the whole weight of the war, and in fine to crush the enemy: having these objects in view, every thing was left to his own discretion.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808

*St. Cyr, 26.  
42. Do.  
Pièces Jus-  
tificatives,  
No. 7.*

When St. Cyr arrived at Perpignan, at the end of August, the town was full of sick and wounded, for whose relief no preparation had been made, so little had any reverses been expected. He found there some Tuscan regiments, the poor Queen of Etruria's guards, and a battalion from the Valais . . for even that country was called upon to contribute from its recesses to this insatiable tyrant's demand for human life. These troops had been sent back from Figueras by General Reille as being quite unable to take the field, not for want of discipline only, but of equipments, arms, and even necessary clothing.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.

St. Cyr,  
19. 34.

So miserable was their condition, that it was deemed prudent to quarter them in remote places, and train them out of sight, lest they should excite indignation as well as commiseration in the people, who in the south of France had always been ill affected toward Buonaparte, and suffering at this time from the loss of their trade with Spain, detested the injustice of the war, and were in a temper which might have produced formidable consequences if any serious invasion had been attempted on that side. During the autumn troops continued to arrive there, mostly consisting of conscripts from Genoa, Naples, and other parts of Italy: under good training they soon became good soldiers, and only less to be trusted than the French because they were more inclined to desert. These forces when collected amounted to 18,000 men. Reille had 4000 at Figueras, and 8000 were with Duhesme in Barcelona.

*He determines upon  
besieging  
Rosas.*

Early in November St. Cyr received orders to enter Spain, and he determined to commence his operations with the siege of Rosas. While the fine roadstead which that fortress commands was open to the English, there was scarcely a chance of throwing supplies into Barcelona by sea; to escort them by land was not possible while Gerona and Hostalrich were in possession of the Spaniards; and if those places had been taken they could not be provisioned unless Rosas also were held by the French. Rosas is situated four leagues east of Figueras, in the bottom of

the bay, where the plain of Ampurdan touches the skirts of the Pyrenees. The town, containing then about 1200 inhabitants, is built along the shore, and completely commanded by the fortress; the fortress, which is an irregular pentangle, the town, and a smaller fort, called, after a custom too prevalent in Catholic countries, *Fuerte de la Trinidad*, forming a semi-circle round the bay. This place had sustained a most gallant siege of ten weeks in 1795 after *Figueras*, strong as it was, had been surrendered without defence; and when the commander, *D. Domingo Yzquierdo*, could maintain the almost demolished works no longer, he succeeded in embarking the remains of his garrison. During the peace nothing had been done to repair the works, as if no future war was to be apprehended. Even after the present struggle had commenced, six months, in that supineness which belongs to the Spanish character, had been suffered to elapse without taking any measures for strengthening and securing a place of such evident importance. There were many persons, and even some members of the nearest *Juntas*, who were acquainted with the details of the last siege, and knew what repairs were necessary, and also what the points were which it was most material to strengthen. But their attention was wholly engrossed by local and immediate interests, and the pressing representations which the commandant of engineers repeatedly addressed to the higher authorities produced no

CHAP.  
XVI.1808.  
*November.**Marcillac.*  
299—313.

CHAP. effect. Nothing could rouse them from their  
XVI. dream of recovering Barcelona by force of arms.

1808. The Governor, however, D. Pedro O'Daly,  
November.

*Dilapidated  
state of that  
fortress.*

Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment of Ulster, as soon as he apprehended an attack had made some preparations; he ordered all strangers who had taken refuge there to depart, and sent away by sea such of the garrison as were incapable of service. The ditches were cleared, parapets formed, and guns mounted. The north angle of the fort had been demolished by the explosion of a magazine; a wall of stones without mortar was run up by the peasants; it closed the breach, but that part of the works remained useless. The stores were as incomplete as the works: there were neither measures for the powder, nor saws for the fusees, . . hats and axes were used instead. The buildings within the fort were in ruins, an old church and one other edifice being all that were serviceable. Before the former siege a line nearly half a mile in length, with some redoubts, had been formed from the citadel to that part of the mountain range which is called Puig-rom, for the purpose of covering the town; but it was now in all parts so dilapidated, that though the garrison as well as the inhabitants were aware how much they needed this additional protection, any attempt at re-establishing it was deemed hopeless.

*Cabañes,  
c. 10.*

*Prepara-  
tions for the  
siege.*

Preparations for the siege had been made at Figueras, and in order to deceive the Spaniards a report had been encouraged that the design



was against Gerona. St. Cyr established his head quarters at Figueras, and General Reille, to whom the conduct of the siege had been entrusted, encamped before Rosas with his own division and that of the Italian General Pino. General Souham took a position between Figueras and the Fluvia, to protect the besiegers on that side against any attempt which might be made from Gerona; and Chabot was stationed nearer the frontier, the General being well aware that the opposition which he had to apprehend was not so much from regular troops as from the whole population of the country. But the measures of the Catalans were so ill-directed at this time, that the invaders suffered more from the weather, and from the gross neglect of their own government in sending them supplies, than from all the efforts of their enemies. St. Cyr was obliged to send his cavalry back into France to the neighbourhood of Beziers, that the horses might not perish for want of fodder during the siege; and when he wrote pressingly for supplies for his men, directions were sent him in return to collect and convoy provisions to Barcelona. He was desired not to regard any reports concerning the rabble opposed to him, for it was nothing more, and the time was fixed within which the Emperor expected that he would be master of Barcelona and of the country ten leagues round. In reply to this he stated that he would not break up the siege of Rosas without positive orders; that it was sufficiently hazardous to

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
November.

Nov. 6.

St. Cyr,  
34—41

CHAP. advance leaving Gerona behind him ; but if  
XVI.

1808.  
November.

Do. Pièces  
Justif. 45—  
16.

Rosas were left also, Figueras would be again blockaded by the Spaniards, and must fall, because it was not possible to store it: so that the only way to secure that most important fortress was to take Rosas.

British  
squadron in  
the Bay of  
Rosas.

However much St. Cyr and the government under which he acted differed in other points, they both knew the incapacity of the forces opposed to them, and relied upon it. They knew that there would be no difficulty in routing the Spaniards whenever they were brought to action, that nothing was to be apprehended from any combined operations, and that neither by sea or land was any such exertion as the time required to be expected from the English, . . the siege of Rosas would otherwise have been a more perilous undertaking than the march to Barcelona. The English had just force enough in the Bay to give the French an opportunity of boasting that the siege was effected in spite of them, and to show what might have been done if a flying squadron with troops on board had been on the coast ready to act wherever it might be most serviceable. Captain West was in the bay in the *Excellent*, with the *Lucifer* and *Meteor*, bomb-vessels ; and when the enemy, having taken possession of the heights which encompass the whole bay, had driven the troops in, and the peasants from the nearest villages with them, and entered the town, these vessels bore a part in the action, and assisted in dis-

lodging them. Five-and-twenty marines were then sent to reinforce Fort Trinidad, and the rest of the marines, with fifty seamen, went cheerfully to assist in defending the citadel. Upon this a report was spread by the enemy, who were always endeavouring to make the Spaniards jealous of their allies, that the English had taken possession of the place; and as while this report was circulated they succeeded in intercepting all communications from Rosas to Gerona, the Junta of that city wrote to Captain West, requesting an explanation of his conduct. The artifice was then discovered; but not till the end had been answered of deceiving the Junta for a time, and thus preventing them from taking such measures for the relief of the place as might have been in their power.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*November.*

Reille had expected to take Rosas by a sudden attack. The commandant of the engineers had served in that same capacity at the last siege, and was therefore well acquainted with the place and with its weakness. On the evening of the 9th a breach was made in the ramparts of the citadel sufficient for twenty men abreast; but it was so dark that the enemy did not discover the extent of the mischief. Immediate intelligence was sent to the ships; one of the bomb-vessels was then stationed where it could flank the breach, and the boats appointed to enfilade the shore with carronades, while more seamen were landed to repair the damage. British seamen are made of such materials, that it is indifferent

CHAP. to them on what service they are employed ;  
 XVI. whether at sea or ashore, whatever is to be done  
 1808. by courage, activity, intelligence, and strenuous  
 November. exertion, they can accomplish. The Spaniards  
 exerted themselves with emulous alacrity, and  
 this, against which the enemy had directed their  
 fire as the weakest part of the works, was by  
 their united labour placed in a respectable state  
 of defence.

*Disposition  
 of the Ita-  
 lian troops  
 to desert.*

Reille now found that neglected as Rosas had  
 been, with its feeble works, its unsupported gar-  
 rison, and its insufficient stores, it was necessary  
 to proceed against it by regular siege. Some dif-  
 ficulties he encountered from the state of the  
 weather, some from the sallies which were made  
 to interrupt him ; but his greatest uneasiness  
 arose from the desertion of the Italians, which  
 was so frequent as to leave no doubt that in case  
 of any serious reverse the whole division would  
 go over to the Spaniards. The state of durance  
 in which the Pope was held had probably of-  
 fended their religious feelings, and the Tuscans  
 perhaps in their indignation for the treatment  
 of the Queen of Etruria felt some sympathy with  
 the Spaniards. But Buonaparte cared not for  
 the hearts of men, so their hands were at his  
 service and their lives at his disposal. And such  
 are the effects of discipline, that the Italians, who  
 when left to themselves are the worst troops in  
 the world, became as efficient as the best soldiers  
 in his army. One regiment at this siege was  
 composed of subjects turned out from others,

*St. Cyr, 38.*



CHAP.  
XVI.1808.  
*November.*

the refuse of the whole Italian army : example, encouragement, and restraint, made them behave well in the field, . . . and how they behaved out of it was a matter of indifference to their officers and the government which employed them. Two companies of Italians having been surrounded and made prisoners by the Soma-tenes, under an old man of seventy, (who had been a captain of Miquelets in the last war, and now acted under the orders of the Spanish commander, D. Juan Claros), St. Cyr gave orders to seize an equal number of the inhabitants, and send them into France ; there to be confined till an exchange should take place ; and this he did to give a humaner character to the war, upon so brutal a system had it been carried on by his predecessors. His plea was that the peasantry had entrapped his troops by leading them astray ; but the Catalans did not understand upon what principle he acted, and were more exasperated than if he had pursued the old system of burning their villages, because they believed that their countrymen were thus carried off as recruits for Buonaparte's armies in the north. Among the Italian prisoners was the wife of an officer who accompanied her husband in man's attire.

On the 16th the French attempted to carry Fort Trinidad by assault. They were repulsed ; returning in greater strength, they forced the outer gate, and endeavoured to force the second ; but here such a steady fire of mus-

*Attack upon  
Fort Trini-  
dad re-  
pulsed.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*November.*

quetry and hand-grenades was kept up against them, that they retired a second time, leaving many of their men under the walls. Captain West expecting a third attack, reinforced the fort with a party of marines, who entered by means of a rope-ladder under an incessant fire. Nothing could be more cordial than the co-operation of the Spaniards and English at this time; but they were not strong enough to prevent the enemy from erecting batteries, which compelled the ships to keep at a distance, and a brave but unsuccessful attack from Gerona upon Souham's division on the Fluvia was the only effort made to relieve them: on that side the Spaniards would have done more had it not been for want of cavalry. There were two regiments in Tarragona with excellent horses, but so miserably in want of equipments, that it was impossible for them to take the field; there was no money to equip them, and while they were thus remaining inactive the enemy were overrunning the Ampurdan, and carrying on the siege of Rosas at their will, because the Spaniards had no cavalry to keep them in check. The French acted with a full knowledge of the Spaniards' embarrassments, and in full reliance upon the paralysing imbecility which such difficulties must needs produce; nevertheless St. Cyr was far from feeling at ease, knowing that Barcelona must fall unless it were speedily succoured, and that if the force which was now idly besieging it were brought to the

relief of Rosas, Catalonia might speedily be cleared of its invaders, and Rousillon become in its turn the scene of invasion. It was therefore necessary to press the siege, the farthest day which had been appointed for his reaching Barcelona being past. During the night of the 27th an attack was made upon the town; the helpless part of the inhabitants had been removed by sea at the first approach of danger; there were about 500 men stationed there, some of whom were peasants, the others part of the garrison: they defended themselves with a courage to which the French, who are seldom just to their enemies, bore witness; but they were overpowered; about 300 fell, and hardly fifty escaped into the citadel. The conquerors immediately established batteries under cover of the houses, then set fire to the houses, and cut off the communication between the citadel and the fort. They rendered it also impossible for the English to communicate with the citadel. Captain West had at this time been superseded by Captain Bennett of the *Fame*; and when an officer from the *Marques de Lazan* came on board his ship with dispatches for the governor, some lives were lost in an unsuccessful attempt at landing him.

The citadel was soon in a desperate state, and the fort might have been considered so; for it was at this time battered in breach, and a passage to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected, the marines of the *Fame* were withdrawn. At this juncture Lord Cochrane arrived

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*November.*

*The French  
establish  
themselves  
in the town.*

*Lord Coch-  
rane throws  
himself into  
Fort Trini-  
dad.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
November.

in the Imperieuse. During the month of September this gallant officer with his single ship had kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm, destroyed the newly-constructed semaphoric telegraphs (which were of the utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French) at Bourdique, La Pinede, St. Maguire, Frontignan, Canet, and Foy; demolished fourteen barracks of the gens-d'armes; blown up a battery and the strong tower upon the lake of Frontignan; and not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into Spain, but excited such dismay there, that 2000 men were drawn from Figueras to oppose him. The coasting trade was entirely suspended during this alarm; and with such consummate prudence were all his enterprises planned and executed, that not one of his men was either killed or hurt, except one, who was singed in blowing up the battery.

*Gallant defence of the fort.*

Lord Collingwood, with his wonted prudence, had entrusted Cochrane with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards wherever it could be done with most probability of success, and he hastened to the Bay of Rosas as soon as he knew of the siege, . . too late, and yet in time to signalize himself. Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, did not alter Lord Collingwood's orders, and Cochrane threw himself into Fort Trinidad with eighty seamen and marines, at a time when the garrison, amounting to the same number, would else have sur-



rendered, perceiving that further resistance had been thought unavailing by the English themselves. This garrison was changed, and the new men brought with them fresh hope and unexhausted strength. Cochrane formed a rampart within the breach of palisadoes and barrels, ships' hammock-cloths, awning, &c. filled with sand and rubbish; these supplied the place of walls and ditches. Sanson, the commandant of the engineers, pronounced the breach practicable. His opinion was relied on with the more confidence because he was well acquainted with the place; but the Captain who was ordered to lead the assault thought otherwise; he had been in the Spanish service, and in garrison at that very fort, and he said that it was not possible to enter there; nevertheless he would make the attempt if he were ordered, with the certainty of perishing in it, and leading his party to destruction. Under such circumstances it requires more firmness to give the order than to obey, .. but it is of a different kind. The order was given, and the officer perished as he had foreseen and foretold. Two of his companions escaped by the humanity of the English, who, instead of killing four men whose lives were at their mercy, suffered two to retire, while they drew up the others by a rope, to secure them as prisoners. When the breach had been rendered practicable, a more formidable assault was made. Lord Cochrane had prepared for it with that sportiveness by which English sailors are as

---

CHAP.  
XVI.

---

1808.  
*December.*

---

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
December.

*The citadel  
captured,  
and the fort  
evacuated.*

much characterised as schoolboys. He not only stationed men with bayonets immediately within the breach, to give the assailants an immediate greeting, but he laid well-greased planks across the breach, upon which many of the French slipped and fell in endeavouring to pass; and he hung ropes there with fish-hooks fastened to them, by which not a few were caught in their retreat. The enemy suffered a severe loss on this occasion. There was in Lord Cochrane's conduct here, and in all places, that contempt of danger which in former ages would have been imputed to a reliance upon charms, and which never fails to inspire confidence. Once, while the besiegers were battering the fort, the Spanish flag fell into the ditch: he let himself down by a rope through a shower of balls to recover it, returned unhurt, and planted it again upon the walls. The citadel at length having been battered in breach till it was no longer tenable, capitulated, and the garrison, marching out with the honours of war, were sent prisoners\* into

\* St. Cyr (p. 50) reproaches the English for this, and says, '*Nous n'avions jamais espéré prendre à la vue, et sous le canon de l'escadre, une garnison forte encore d'environ 3000 hommes. Il aurait été possible aux Anglais, en plein jour, et sur-tout facile durant la nuit, d'embarquer la garnison, et de la transporter, en quelques heures, sur la rive droite de la Fluvia, en laissant seulement un faible détachement pour remettre la forteresse; comme cela s'était pratiqué, en Février,*

*1795, quand une escadre Espagnole occupait la baie.*' But in that siege the enemy were not masters of the town, and they had now established a battery in it to cut off the communication between the citadel and the ships, which was done so effectually, that five days before the surrender Captain Bennett found it impossible to land a single messenger there. M. St. Cyr adds, that when the prisoners defiled along the shore the English ships opened a brisk fire upon them, and that the

France. Two thousand men, who had given proof of steadiness and courage, were thus lost to Spain. Lord Cochrane then saw that any farther resistance in Fort Trinidad was impossible; and having maintained its shattered walls twelve days after they had been deemed untenable, he embarked all the men, and blew up the magazine.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
December.

The French had thus been detained a whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress. But the men who so often during this war heroically defended half-ruined works, had too much reason to feel how little it availed by their exertions to gain time for generals who knew not how to use it. By the French commanders every thing was calculated, .. by the Spanish, nothing. On the day after the capitulation the conquerors marched from Rosas; on the next day the whole army was collected on the Fluvia, the cavalry having returned from France. The force disposable for the relief of Barcelona consisted of 15,000 foot and 1500 horse: more than twice their number might have been brought against them, besides the Miquelets, who were esteemed by the French themselves as the best light troops in Europe, and the whole peasantry, always remarkable for their hardihood, and now animated with a hatred of their invaders as intense as it was well-founded.

*St. Cyr  
marches to  
relieve Bar-  
celona.*

Spaniards would never be persuaded that this was done in mistake. The Marshal was not upon the spot himself; if he had, this statement would not have appeared in his Journal.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

*Dec. 12.*

*He discovers a  
mountain  
path near  
Hostalrich.*

*Cabañes,  
p. ii. p. 92.*

To deceive an enemy who was easily deceived, St. Cyr manœuvred as if he intended to besiege Gerona. One precaution, and one only, had been effectually taken by the Spaniards: they had broken up the road along the coast, so as to render it impracticable, and any attempt at repairing it must have been made under the guns of the English squadron. Hostalrich commanded the other road, but this was not passable for artillery. He sent back his guns and his ammunition waggons to Figueras, and having reached La Bisbal, distributed to every soldier four days' biscuit and fifty cartridges, and with no farther ammunition than ten rounds per man more, which were carried upon mules, set off to force his way to Barcelona, sure of well storing it when he arrived there from the magazines of the besiegers.

Claros, who saw the enemy debouche from La Bisbal, dispatched immediate intelligence to General Vives, and taking a position with his Miquelets and a party of Somatenes at Col de la Grange, opposed their march. If this system had been well followed up, the French must soon have expended their cartridges; but every thing had been concerted on their part, and with the Spaniards in their multitude of counsellors there was neither concert nor wisdom; and so well were the French prepared, that they were better acquainted with the country than the Spaniards themselves. In passing near Palamos they received some shot from the English ships;



it was the only part of the route they had chosen which exposed them to this danger. They encamped that night in the Val de Aro. The destination of the army could then no longer be concealed; still it was of importance to keep the Spaniards in doubt concerning its course, and St. Cyr profited by every hour which they passed in indecision. The next day he arrived at Vidreras. Lazan's troops were seen behind them, to the right, on the heights of Casa de la Selva; and on the 14th some skirmishing took place near Mallorquinas between these troops and the rear of the French. This gave them little interruption, and no alarm: what St. Cyr apprehended was, that he should find Vives upon the Tordera, a strong position, where some bodies of Miquelets and peasantry, well posted, might have made him expend his ammunition, and easily have frustrated his design; but it was the fate of the Spaniards now never to profit by the opportunities which were offered them. Passing by Masanet and Martorell de la Selva, upon the heights which command Hostalrich, he halted his right at Grions and his left at Masanes, while search was made for a mountain path, which leading out of reach of shot from the fortress, comes into the Barcelona road beyond it. A man who had formerly kept sheep in these parts had assured him that such a path existed, in opposition to the statement of all the smugglers whom St. Cyr consulted before he left Perpignan, and it was in reliance upon his

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

single but sure testimony that this course was taken. The officers of the staff went to look for it, and returned exhausted with fatigue, declaring that no such path was there. St. Cyr then, who had full reliance upon his informant, set out himself, and after two hours' search discovered it, but in the attempt he had nearly fallen into the hands of a party of Somatenes.

By this path, on the 15th, the French succeeded in passing Hostalrich; they started at day-break, and had just regained the high road when the garrison, having discovered the way which they had taken, came out and annoyed their rear. In the course of the day they lost about two hundred men by repeated attacks of the Miquelets: and the troops, harassed by these skirmishes and by a fatiguing march, in which they had to cross many torrents, would fain have halted for the night when they arrived at Puente de la Tordera. The defile of Treinta-pasos was before them six miles in length, and St. Cyr knew that if they did not pass it that night, they must fight their way through on the morrow. He urged them forward therefore, leaving a handful of men at the entrance, to keep the Miquelets in check. The Spaniards had endeavoured to impede the way by breaking up the road and felling trees across it: but they had neglected to occupy this important pass, and by eleven o'clock the whole of the French army bivouacuated on the plain a league from Llinas.

General Vives, during the whole time that the French were before Rosas, had been occupied with the insane purpose of laying regular siege to Barcelona. From this dream he was disturbed by advices from Gerona that the firing at Rosas had ceased; and any hope which might have remained was soon put an end to by certain intelligence of its surrender from the British squadron. The Spanish Commander had taken none of the ordinary means for obtaining information of the enemy's movements; he knew as little of their strength as of their plans: he was ill acquainted with the country, and the persons by whom he was surrounded were utterly ignorant of military affairs, and might have perplexed a firmer spirit and a clearer understanding, by their contrarious and vacillating counsels. It was a moment at which a blow might have been struck not less momentous than the battle of Baylen; for the destruction of St. Cyr's army (and destruction must have been the consequence of defeat) would have drawn after it the recovery of Barcelona and Figueras, and effectual assistance might then have been afforded to Zaragoza. But the unreasonable hopes which he had long indulged were followed by an ominous prostration of mind. Fretted as well as embarrassed by want of money; alarmed by tidings of the rout at Tudela, and of the appearance of the enemy again before Zaragoza; still more alarmed by receiving no advices from the side of Madrid,

CHAP.  
XVI.  
1808  
December.  
*Indecision  
of General  
Vives.*

CHAP. and therefore with too much reason apprehend-  
XVI. ing the worst, he had no government to look to

1808.  
*December.* for orders, no reliance upon others, and none  
Dec. 11. upon himself. Four days were wasted in hope-

less indecision; then came intelligence at mid-  
night from the Junta at Gerona that St. Cyr  
was on his march, and, having sent his artillery  
to Figueras, it was evident that Barcelona was  
his object. Immediately General Reding was  
dispatched with his division, consisting of about  
4000 men, to oppose him. Succeeding advices  
left no doubt of the direction of the French; a  
council of war was held; Caldagues was of

*He marches  
against the  
French.*

opinion that the General should march against  
the enemy with the greater part of his force,  
leaving only enough to keep up the blockade:  
he took however not more than 5000 with him,  
and, having dispatched instructions to the Mar-  
ques de Lazan, followed Reding, and having  
joined him at Granollers, set out from that  
place at midnight just when the French had  
passed without opposition through the defile of  
Treinta-pasos: the Spaniards as they left Gra-  
nollers saw the fires of the enemy's bivouac.

Dec. 15.  
*Cabañes,*  
*p. 9. c. 11.*

*Rout of the  
Spaniards  
at Llinas.*

The intention was to occupy an advantageous  
position between Villalba and Llinas: the artil-  
lery and the want of order in some of the raw  
troops impeded their march; it was morning  
when the head of the column arrived at Carde-  
deu, and before Vives could reach the ground  
which he had intended to take he came in sight  
of the enemy, and his men, after a night march



of eight hours, had to draw up for battle. The French were refreshed by rest: but they had consumed their biscuit, and so much of their ammunition had been expended in skirmishing with the Miquelets, that what remained would not have been sufficient for an hour in action. St. Cyr had formed them in one column at day-break. When the Spanish artillery began to play upon the head of that column, Pino, of whose division it was composed, sent an aide-de-camp, to ask if any change was to be made in the dispositions for battle. St. Cyr's reply was, "We have neither time nor means to make dispositions. In this covered country it would take at least three hours to reconnoitre the enemy well, . . in less than two, Lazan might arrive to attack us in the rear, and Milans might fall upon our left. We have not a minute to lose; but must bring our whole force to bear upon the centre of their line." Notwithstanding these orders, the first brigade deployed, and attacking the left of Reding's division suffered considerably, and began to give way. St. Cyr, when he saw his orders disobeyed, instructed Pino to execute his original plan with the second brigade, and, changing the direction of Souham's division, sent it to turn General Reding's right. Two battalions were ordered to make a false attack upon the left of the Spanish position. Here the rout began. The centre was forced at the same time; and Vives and his staff, seeing all hope lost on that side,

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

hastened to the right, where the advantage had hitherto appeared to be with Reding. But they carried panic with them; Souham's division decided the battle in that quarter with equal celerity, and the steadiness with which some of the old troops behaved was not supported well enough to save the Spaniards from a total and scandalous defeat. It was eight o'clock when they formed for action, and before nine they were in full flight. General Vives lost his horse, and, escaping on foot across the mountains, reached Mataro, and got on board a vessel. There was an end of all order: officers and men shifted as they could, each for himself. One column alone under Colonel Ybarrola retreated unbroken; and two out of fourteen guns were brought off by a Sub-lieutenant named Uzurrun. Reding, who had been saved by the speed of his horse from close pursuit, fell in with these at Mommalo, rallied what fugitives could be collected, and retreated with them by S. Culgat, across the Llobregat to Molins de Rey. The artillery had been well served, and the French loss by their own account amounted to 600 men. Of the Spaniards 2000 are said to have been taken, of whom 800 were wounded. Their killed were about 400. The loss in men was trifling, for the fugitives dispersed in all directions, and the conquerors wasted no time in pursuit: but the most favourable opportunity which presented itself to the Spaniards during the whole war was lost, . . the

opportunity of cutting off a second French army, which would have drawn after it the recovery of Barcelona, and a second deliverance of Zaragoza.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
December.

The firing was heard at Barcelona, from whence Duhesme, seeing so large a part of the besieging force drawn off, sallied against the remainder: he was bravely received, and repulsed at all points. But when night came, Caldagues, who had been left in the command, hearing the fatal issue of the battle, withdrew behind the Llobregat, removing almost the whole of his artillery, but leaving copious magazines which Vives, with that want of discretion that characterized all his conduct, had collected at Sarrea, and which it was now impossible to save. The retreat was effected without molestation; but so miserable a scene had not for many generations been witnessed in Catalonia. The country around Barcelona was one of the most flourishing and delightful parts of the whole kingdom, bearing every mark of industry and opulence and comfort. The whole population of that vicinity followed the retreat, men, women, and children carrying upon their backs such effects as they could bear, and leaving all the rest to the spoilers. The nuns of three convents were among the fugitives: about an hundred of these poor women were so advanced in years that they were hardly able to walk, . . since childhood they had never been beyond the walls of their cloister, and now they were

*Retreat of  
the Spaniards from  
Barcelona  
to the Llobregat.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
December.

thus driven abroad into the world. Reding had reached Molins de Rey at midnight, and by great exertions restoring some order among the troops which he had collected in his flight, took a position upon the heights that command the bridge.

*St. Cyr  
marches  
against  
them.  
Dec. 17.*

St. Cyr entered Barcelona on the following morning, ill satisfied with Duhesme for not having interposed to cut off the fugitives; and still more displeased when he found that the distress of the garrison for provisions had been greatly exaggerated, and that in consequence of these false representations he had been compelled to undertake a march so perilous that nothing but the gross incapacity of his opponents could have saved the army from\* destruction. He rested his men three days, and on the fourth took a position on the left bank of the Llobregat in face of the Spaniards, that they might have no time to strengthen themselves in the advantageous post which they occupied, nor to be joined by the troops under Lazan and Milans. But these officers had no intention of joining; and Reding, upon whom

*Dec. 20.*

\* The officers were so aware of their danger, that Cabañes heard one of the staff say they should certainly have believed it was their General's intention to betray them to the enemy, . . if they had not had the most entire confidence in him. It seems indeed probable that Buonaparte, not foreseeing what the consequences of a defeat in Catalonia

would be, would have thought the disgrace or destruction of a general whom he disliked a compensation for the loss of this army.

General Duhesme perished in the flight from Waterloo: the stain of his blood was pointed out to me on the threshold of the inn at Genap, where he was cut down by a Brunswicker.



the temporary command had devolved, was less able than a Spaniard would have been to struggle with the difficulties in which he found himself. A Spanish General would neither have foreseen defeat nor have been cast down by it; he would have thought a change of fortune as likely as a change of weather; he would have relied upon the Saints and the Virgin, his good cause and the insuperable constancy of his countrymen. But Reding saw only the fearful realities of his situation; he knew that his own knowledge of the art of war was of no avail when he could depend neither upon officers nor men; and his sole hope was, that a speedy and honourable death might remove him from the sight of calamities which he deemed it impossible to avert. A more pitiable condition cannot be conceived, . . except that of the brave and honourable men employed against him, who from a sense of military duty served with their utmost efforts a cause which they knew to be infamously unjust, and acting in obedience to a merciless tyrant with miscreants worthy of such a master, aided and abetted crimes at which their hearts revolted . . sinning thus against God and man, against the light of conscience and against their own souls.

On the second day after the rout, Vives, who had landed at Sitges, appeared upon the Llobregat, and having approved of Reding's dispositions, left him in the command while he went to Villafranca to take measures with the

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

*Indecision  
of the Spaniards.  
Dec. 18.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
December.

Dec. 20.

Junta for calling out the whole peasantry of the country, and for reuniting the dispersed troops. There was the difficult task of providing for the army, .. their magazines had been abandoned to the enemy, and they were in a country which now for six months had been the immediate scene of war. They were without clothes and without shelter, and a piercing wind from the mountains swept down the valley of the Llobregat. While they were employed in felling trees and erecting huts, the alarm was given that the French were taking a position in front of them. The men were immediately placed under arms, and dispositions were made for maintaining a post strong in itself, and defended by numerous artillery. But it was soon perceived that the attack would not be made that day. St. Cyr fixed his head quarters in the centre at San Feliu, having his left at Cornella and his right at Molins de Rey. He saw by the movements of the Spaniards that they expected the main attack would be at that place, by the bridge over which the high road passes to Tarragona, and a little way beyond branches off to Zaragoza. They had in fact made such preparations that it was impossible for the French to debouch there while the point was defended with any resolution. St. Cyr therefore ordered General Chabran to draw their attention thither during the night, and not to make any real attempt till he should see both the centre and the right of the enemy turned : for the river was

CHAP.  
XVI.1808.  
*December.*

fordable in several places, and the Spaniards with strange improvidence had taken no means for rendering it impassable in those points. Indeed as soon as they were satisfied that the attack was delayed till the morning, Reding held a council of war in his tent; and all who were present agreed that considering the temper of the troops after their late defeat, it would be imprudent to hazard another engagement... Some were for retreating to Ordal, and occupying a position there; . . it was not so defensible as that which they proposed to abandon; but to men in their state of mind it seemed better, because it was at a distance: others were for retiring at once to Tarragona, where the army might be re-organized in safety. Reding himself thought it certainly advisable to retreat: but he who had no fear of death was miserably afraid of responsibility; and wanting resolution to act upon his own judgement, dispatched a courier to solicit instructions from General Vives, who was seven leagues off. Night came on; the troops were under arms, exposed to severe cold and snow; the fires of both armies were seen along their whole lines; . . an alarm was kept up at the bridge by Chabran's division, and from time to time the Spanish batteries fired where they saw any movement on the opposite bank. At midnight no answer from Vives had arrived; and Reding, not doubting that it would confirm the opinion of the council, issued orders that the troops should

CHAP.  
XVI.1808.  
December.

bè in readiness to commence their retreat as soon as it came. But Vives also sought to shift the responsibility from himself; and when his answer arrived, which was not till four in the morning, its purport was, that Reding was to retire to Ordal if he could not maintain himself on the Llobregat. Reding now felt that the night had been lost in this ruinous indecision, and finding the responsibility which he dreaded thrown back upon him, deemed it better to die where he was than commence a retreat with the certainty of being instantly and closely pursued. He made this determination known to the officers who were about his person, exhorting them to do their duty like true Spaniards, and die in defence of their country: they shook hands with him in pledge of their promise, and in this temper waited for the attack.

Cabañes,  
p. 3. c. 12.

Dec. 21.

*The Spaniards routed,  
and pursued to Tarra-  
gona.*

At break of morning on the shortest day in the year, the left wing of the French under General Souham forded the river at St. Juan d'Espi, and ascended the right bank to protect the centre, which in like manner crossed in a line from St. Feliu, opposite to the right of the Spaniards. The first brigade of the centre effected its passage before any such intention was perceived or apprehended by their opponents. The Spaniards could have given no greater proof of negligence than in leaving undefended points which were so easily defensible, and upon which the security of their position depended; but in making dispositions as soon



as they discovered the enemy's movements, they evinced a degree of skill which convinced the French that there were officers among them who would have been formidable antagonists had they commanded troops upon whom they could have relied. The first brigade, however, was in time to establish itself with little opposition upon the heights of Llors and S. Coloma; the second followed, and placed itself at the foot of those heights, masked, in column, and ready to debouch. Chabot's troops crossed at the same ford, and marched to the left of the others, with the intention of turning the Spaniards' right. The effect of these movements was, that the Spanish troops, dismayed, as their officers had anticipated, by the late reverses, easily gave way: the right was driven back behind the centre; that being attacked also, was thrown back upon the left toward the bridge; their retreat upon Villa Franca was cut off by Chabot: a detachment from the French right, which had crossed at a ford above the bridge, intercepted them also on the way to Martorell; and if Chabran had then forced the passage of the bridge, they would have been beset on all sides, and driven together for slaughter like wild beasts at a royal hunt in the East. Chabran, however, not willing to expose his men to a loss which might be spared, waited till Souham's troops arrived on the opposite bank, and then debouched from the bridge.

CHAP.  
XVI.1808.  
*December.*

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

There are no troops in the world except the Spaniards, says St. Cyr, who could have escaped from such a situation. They did it by abandoning every thing, and flying every man his own way. General Reding and the officers who had pledged themselves to die with him in maintaining the position had not even an opportunity of dying afforded them, unless they had sought it like suicides. The country being craggy, wooded, and full of ravines, favoured the fugitives, so that during an active pursuit of fifteen hours not more than some 1100 prisoners were taken. Caldagues was among them, and the good service which he had performed in relieving Gerona did not exempt him now from a suspicion of having betrayed the Spaniards in favour of his countrymen. The pursuit was followed to the very gates of Tarragona, and some of the fugitives did not stop till they reached the Ebro. All the artillery, consisting of 50 pieces of cannon, was taken; and large magazines of ammunition were found at Villa Franca, to the great relief of the French, who had not enough in Barcelona for a month's consumption. Chabran's division established itself at Martorell, Chabot's at S. Sadurni, Souham's at Vendrell and upon the left bank of the Gaya, Pino's at Villa Franca, Villa Nueva, and Sitjas. St. Cyr fixed his head-quarters at Villa Franca. Thus far he had completely succeeded in whatever he had proposed: . . there was no longer

an army in the field to oppose him ; Barcelona was not only relieved, but stored and rendered secure ; and Zaragoza (which in a moral if not a military point of view was an object of more importance) was precluded from all succour in that quarter, from whence alone an effectual effort might reasonably have been expected.

CHAP.  
XVI.

1808.  
*December.*

*St. Cyr,*  
82—88.  
*Cabañes,*  
*p. 3. c. 12.*

## CHAPTER XVII.

MOVEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY UNDER THE  
DUKE DEL INFANTADO. BATTLE OF UCLES.  
RETREAT FROM CUENCA. CARTAOJAL AP-  
POINTED TO THE COMMAND. PROGRESS OF  
THE FRENCH. SIR ROBERT WILSON ENTERS  
CIUDAD RODRIGO. NEGOTIATION CONCERNING  
THE ADMISSION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO CADIZ.

1308.

*December.*

*The Spa-  
niards not  
discouraged  
by their re-  
verses.*

SIR John Moore's movements, fatal as they were to his army and himself, and most injurious to public opinion in England, were not without some good effect, though far inadequate to the price at which it was purchased. They drew into Galicia those forces which would otherwise have taken possession of Lisbon and of Seville, and they afforded the Junta time for raising new levies and bringing new armies into the field. The spirit of the nation was in no degree abated; their numerous defeats, the loss of their capital, and the treachery of chiefs in whom they had entirely trusted, seemed rather to exasperate than dismay them; and there would have been no lack of strength had there been arms for the willing people, officers to discipline them, a government which could have provided for their support, and generals capable of directing their zeal and courage. A me-



morale instance of the national disposition was displayed in the little town of Luzena. Accord-  
 ing to a decree of the Junta, four men of every  
 hundred were to be drawn for military service;  
 all who were liable to the lot assembled, 400 in  
 number, and when the magistrate was proceed-  
 ing to ballot for sixteen, the whole 400 volun-  
 teered, and marched off that same day to join  
 the troops at Seville.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1808.  
December.

Had the British army made a stand in Gali-  
 cia, as there was every reason to expect, the  
 Duke del Infantado was to have advanced from  
 Cuenca upon Ocaña and Aranjuez, and in con-  
 junction with the army collected at La Carolina,  
 under the Marques del Palacio, to have pushed  
 for Madrid. The retreat of Sir John Moore  
 frustrated this plan; the Duke was then ordered  
 to remain on the defensive, and new levies were  
 sent to reinforce him as fast as they were raised.  
 But in the miserable circumstances of his army,  
 increase of numbers was no increase of strength.  
 Arms, clothing, and provision were wanting;  
 it was alike without resources, discipline, or  
 system; in want of efficient officers of every  
 rank, and those which there were, were divided  
 into cabals and factions. The province of  
 Cuenca was the best point which could have  
 been chosen for deriving supplies from La  
 Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia, the two latter  
 provinces as yet unexhausted by the war; but  
 it was not a military position. The city stands  
 upon high ground, where the Huecar falls into

*Condition of  
 Infantado's  
 army at  
 Cuenca.*

CHAP  
XVII.

1808.  
December.

*Infantado,  
Manifiesto,  
32—37.*

the Jucar at the skirts of Monte de S. Christobal, and it is completely commanded by the heights. All that the Duke could hope for in case he were attacked was to secure his retreat, and for this purpose he occupied some eminences on the left bank of the Huecar, leaving the road to Valencia by Moya open for his artillery. The van was stationed at Jabaya, four leagues from Cuenca, in the direction of Madrid.

The Duke had acquired some reputation in the former war with France when serving as Colonel of a regiment which he had raised himself. He had now given the highest proof of devotion to his country, in accepting a command under circumstances which rendered success absolutely impossible, and yet where any disaster would compromise his reputation, and expose him to the suspicion and fury of his own soldiers. In endeavouring to restore order among the troops, and to obtain food and clothing for them, he was indefatigable; no man could have exerted himself with greater activity and zeal. The condition of his army indeed, officers as well as men, was pitiable. The military chest having been taken to Zaragoza, they were without pay; and a great proportion of those who had endured the fatigue and sufferings of the retreat were now sinking under the effects. They lay upon straw, half-naked, in that severe season, and in the keen climate of that high country, . . . hundreds were perishing thus. The Duke established hos-

pitals, collected beds from the city and from all the places within reach, appointed officers to the sole charge of seeing that the sick were supplied, and ordered the friars to attend upon them. His authority was exerted as far as it would extend, and when that failed, he begged for their support. These exertions were not without effect; the progress of disease was stopped, men and stores were obtained, subordination was restored, and with little efficient strength there was the appearance as well as the name of an army.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1808.  
December.

*Infantado,*  
42—44.

The Spaniards were not sensible how low they had fallen as a military people. Remembering what they had been, no lessons, however severe, could make them see themselves as they were; and this error was not confined to the multitude; it was partaken by all ranks, and seemed, indeed, inherent in the national character. It was an error which exposed their armies always to defeat, and yet as a nation rendered them invincible; . . the French could have invaded no people whom it would have been so easy to rout, none whom it was so impossible to subdue. Infantado had his full share of this delusion; he planned extensive and combined operations, such as required good troops, intelligent officers, and ready means; . . he thought of relieving Zaragoza, . . of recovering Madrid; or of pursuing the left wing of that army which was then employed against the English; . . and this with men and leaders whose incapacity was

*Dreams of  
offensive  
operations.*

CHAP.  
XVII.1808.  
December.*Movement  
against the  
French at  
Tarancon  
frustrated.**Infantado,  
45—55.**Dec. 25.**Venegas  
falls back  
from Ta-  
rancon to  
Ucles.*

manifest upon every occasion. Upon intelligence that about 1500 French cavalry were scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering great part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, he concerted a scheme for surprising them at Aranjuez and Tarancon, sending Venegas with 4000 foot and 800 horse to attack them in the latter place, while D. Antonio de Senra, with an equal force of foot and 1000 horse, was to fall upon Aranjuez, overcome the enemy there, and intercept those who would retreat thither in their endeavour to escape from Tarancon. The attempt failed, wholly through mismanagement. Senra stopped short at El Horcajo, in fear of a detachment of French cavalry at Villanueva del Cardete, though that force had been calculated upon in the combinations of Infantado. The division with Venegas lost their way in the night and the snow; some went in one direction, some in another, . . the cavalry who were thus separated had no directions how to act; and the infantry, instead of surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised by them. There were, however, some good troops among them, who stood firm, and the French, being very inferior in number, retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.

This failure had the ill effect of creating discord among the Spaniards. Infantado blamed the commanders; they reproached the officers under them; and both were willing to excuse



themselves by supposing that what had failed in the execution had been planned unskilfully. Yet, as some advantage had been gained, the Duke resolved to pursue it . . The left bank being now cleared as far as Aranjuez, he hoped to take possession of that point and of Ocaña, and as in that rainy season the Tagus was nowhere fordable, his purpose was to remove the boats, break down the bridges, and place himself at Toledo. Venegas therefore was ordered to canton his troops in Tarancon, Ucles, and the neighbouring villages, preparatory to this movement, and his force was increased to 8000 foot and 1900 horse, . . the commander-in-chief retaining with himself about 10,000, of whom a third part were without arms, and a considerable number otherwise unfit for service. This was their position at the beginning of the year. Of what was passing in other parts they were ill-informed, and the false reports which abound in such times were always on the favourable side. They believed the French in Madrid were in hourly fear that this army would appear before the capital; and that Romana had entirely destroyed the enemy at Guadarama. Some movements, however, on the part of the French about Aranjuez made Venegas resolve to fall back from Tarancon upon Ucles. He apprehended that it was their intention to attack the part of his force which was stationed at this latter place, and he resolved therefore to march

---

CHAP.  
XVII.

1808.  
*December.*

---

1809.

CHAP  
XVII.

his troops thither as a better position than Tarancon, and one where he might cover the army.

1809.  
*January.*

*Rout of the  
Spaniards  
at Ucles.*

Ucles is a decayed town, where the Knights of Santiago had their chief convent in the bright ages of that military order: here their banner was kept which Gregory XI. had blessed, and which the Kings of Spain delivered to every new master on his appointment: hither the knights from all the other provinces resorted when their services were required, and from hence they had set forth for the conquest of Cordoba, and Seville, and Jaen, and Murcia. To a Spaniard of these times it was a melancholy place, for the proud as well as the mournful recollections which it recalled; for here Alonso VI. had lost his only son, in the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever suffered from the Moors since the destruction of the kingdom of the Goths. He fell in battle with the Almoravides; and because seven Counts had died bravely in defending the Infante, the African fanatics, in their insolent triumph, called the spot where they fell the Place of the Seven Swine. This ill-omened ground was now to become the scene of an action disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they were routed, and infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness with which they abused their victory.

Venegas supposed that the French were bringing forces against him across the Tagus, by the ferry at Villamanrique. His danger was

from a different quarter. Victor had marched from Toledo against Infantado's army, knowing as little of the Spaniards' movements as they did of his, but with such troops, that his only anxiety was to find the enemy, and bring them to action wherever they might be found. Victor himself, with General Ruffin's division, went by way of Alcazar, and General Villate, taking the direction of Ucles, discovered the Spaniards there on the morning of the 13th. Venegas apprehended an attack on his right, or in the rear; but the French crossed the brook, and fell upon the left wing of the Spaniards, who were stationed upon some high and broken ground, commanding the convent and the town. If the general erred in not strengthening this position, the troops allowed him no time for remedying his error; they retreated precipitately to the town, and when orders came to occupy the convent it was too late; . . the enemy were within the enclosure, and fired from thence, as under cover of a parapet. The panic presently spread, the raw levies disordered those who would have done their duty, and many officers made a brave but vain sacrifice of their own lives in endeavouring to rally and encourage the men. The fugitives in one direction came upon the enemy's artillery, under General Cenarmont, and were cut down with grape-shot; in another they fell in with Victor and the remaining part of the French army. One body, under D. Pedro Agustin Giron, seeing that all was lost, made

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
January.

their way desperately through the enemy in good order, and got to Carrascosa, where they found the Duke. It was a series of errors on the part of the Spaniards, and the consequences were as disastrous as they could be. The French boasted of having taken 300 officers and 12,000 men, . . the whole force, however, which Venegas had with him did not amount to this, but the loss was very great. The prisoners were marched to Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and exhaustion were shot by their inhuman captors.

*Rocca, p.  
79.*

*Cruelties  
committed  
there by the  
French.*

Never indeed did any men heap upon themselves more guilt and infamy than those by whom this easy conquest was obtained. The inhabitants of Ucles had taken no part in the action; from necessity they could only be passive spectators of the scene. But they had soon cause to lament that they had not rather immolated their wives and children with their own hands, like the Numantians of old, and then rushed upon the invaders to sweeten death with vengeance, instead of submitting to the mercy of such enemies. Plunder was the first object of the French, and in order to make the townspeople discover where their valuables were secreted, they tortured them. When they had thus obtained all the portable wealth of the place, they yoked the inhabitants like beasts, choosing especially the clergy for this outrage, loaded them with their own furniture, and made them carry it to the Castle Hill, and pile it in



heaps, where they set fire to it, and consumed the whole. They then in mere wantonness murdered above threescore persons, dragging them to the shambles, that this butchery might be committed in its proper scene. Several women were among these sufferers, and they might be regarded as happy in being thus delivered from the worse horrors that ensued: for the French laid hands on the surviving women of the place, amounting to some three hundred, . . they tore the nun from the altar, the wife from her husband's corpse, the virgin from her mother's arms, and they abused these victims of the foulest brutality, till many of them expired on the spot. This was not all, . . but the farther atrocities which these monsters perpetrated cannot even be hinted at without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is due to humanity. These unutterable things were committed in open day, and the officers made not the slightest attempt at restraining the wretches under their command; they were employed in securing the best part of the plunder for themselves. The Spanish government published the details of this wickedness, in order that if the criminals escaped earthly punishment, they might not escape perpetual infamy.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

*Gazeta del  
Gobierno,  
April 24,  
1809.*

Infantado was severely censured for exposing his advanced guard fourteen leagues from his head-quarters, so that support was impossible; and an equal want of judgement had been shown by Venegas in not falling back upon the main

*Infantado  
collects the  
fugitives.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

body, which he knew was actually on the way to join him. The Duke left Cuenca on the morning preceding the action, and took up his quarters that night at Horcajada. Desirous to know for what reason Venegas had retreated from Tarancon, he rode forward on the 13th with his aides-de-camp, and when he reached Carrascosa, which is a league and half from Ucles, some carriers informed him that as they were leaving that town they heard firing at the outposts. Part of his troops were at Carrascosa; they had heard nothing; and the Duke was preparing to sit down to table with their general, the Conde de Orgaz, when news came that horse and foot were approaching in disorder. Immediately he mounted and rode forward; the first person whom he met was the commandant of the light troops, D. Francisco Copons y Navia, an officer in whom he had great confidence: seeing him without his battalion, he knew that some fatal blow must have been sustained, and asking what had happened, was told that the troops at Ucles were all either killed or taken. His first impulse was to rush forward, and throw himself upon the enemy's bayonets. A timely thought of duty withheld him from this act of desperation. The troops under Giron, who had fought their way through the French, came up now in good order; with these and with such fugitives as could be brought together, he made dispositions which checked the pursuit in this direction, and retired when the evening was

closing to Horcajada. They rested there during the early part of the night, and setting forward at three in the morning, reached the Venta de las Cabrejas before daybreak.

Here, while the troops were receiving their rations, the generals held a council whether they should retreat to the borders of Valencia, and take up a position for the defence of that kingdom, which was threatened on the side of Daroca; or join the Marques del Palacio in La Mancha, and if compelled, fall back to La Carolina or Despeña-Perros; or march for Zaragoza, to attack the besiegers, and raise the siege. This was gravely proposed; but the madness of making such an attempt with an unprovided, undisciplined, routed army, dispirited by a long series of disasters, and above all, by the scandalous defeat of the preceding day, was universally acknowledged. The scheme of joining Palacio, and making for the Sierra Morena, was likewise rejected, because in the plains of La Mancha they would be exposed to the enemy's cavalry; and it was resolved without a dissentient voice to retreat into Valencia, where there were great resources for refitting and increasing the troops. This being determined, the army reached Cuenca that night, and continued its retreat on the following morning, the artillery being sent off in the middle of the night by a better road, to join them at Almodovar del Pinar. But four-and-twenty hours of the heaviest rain rendered this road also impassable; and in spite of every exer-

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

January.

*Infantado,*  
119—132.

*Retreat*  
*from Cu-*  
*enca.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

*Loss of the  
artillery.*

tion the greater number of the guns could not be got farther than Olmedilla, one league from Cuenca, by the following midnight, and there the escort left them. The Duke, who was with the artillery himself, in hope of expediting the most difficult part of their movements, had preceded them to Tortola, where a few of the guns had arrived, and whither the rest were to be brought next day, the worst part of the road being past. He sent orders therefore that one regiment of horse and another of foot should be dispatched to Tortola, for the purpose of escorting the artillery when it should be thus brought together, and went himself to join the army at Valera de arriba. On his arrival there on the evening of the 16th he found that no infantry had been sent; being barefooted and exhausted by marching in such weather, they had been deemed actually incapable of the service. Presently advice arrived that a company of the Ordenes Militares, which he had left at Tortola, had thought proper to leave the place immediately after his departure: that a party of enemy's cavalry had come up, and that the regiment of dragoons at the very sound of the French trumpets had taken flight, abandoning the guns to them. He now ordered a battalion of infantry and the Farnese regiment of dragoons to hasten and retake them: the night was dark, the distance considerable, the roads in the worst imaginable state; and when at daybreak they came to Tortola, scarcely an hundred infantry



could be mustered, the rest having lost the way, or dispersed. The dragoons behaved well, and twice made themselves masters of the guns, but to no purpose ; they were embedded in the soil too deeply to be removed at once ; and while they were vainly labouring there, reinforcements came up to the enemy, and many brave men were sacrificed before the regiment desisted from the attempt at saving these guns, which with such exertions had been brought thither from Tudela. Infantado knew that any farther effort, considering the state of his army, must be hopeless, and would moreover expose him to the imminent danger of having his retreat cut off, for one column of the enemy appeared to be taking the direction of Almodovar ; and in fact when the Duke reached that place, it was ascertained that they were within three leagues of it. After a few hours' rest therefore he ordered the retreat to be continued to La Motilla del Palancar, near Alarcon ; and being, however unfortunate as a commander, willing to perform a soldier's part to the last, took his station with his own family and his orderly dragoons, as an outpost, within three miles of the enemy. This had an excellent effect upon the troops ; so many indeed had deserted since the rout at Ucles, that few perhaps remained except those who acted upon a sense of duty, and their movements were now conducted with more composure. Infantado remained at La Motilla till he was assured that the French had turned aside from

CHAP.  
XVII.1809.  
*January.*

CHAP  
XVII.1809.  
*January.**Infantado,*  
133—141.*Infantado*  
*frustrates a*  
*movement*  
*of the enemy*  
*against the*  
*Carolina*  
*army.*

the pursuit; removing then to Albacete and Chinchilla, he gave his troops a few days' necessary rest, and issued directions for the better observance of discipline and order.

On the 25th the army moved to Hellin and Tobarra, the object being to cover Murcia, call off the attention of the enemy from Valencia, and receive reinforcements from both those kingdoms and from Andalusia. Infantado was more enterprising and more hopeful than some of the generals under his command, who would have had him retreat to the city of Murcia, there to refit his troops, or take shelter even at Carthagená. The minister at war submitted to his consideration whether it would not be advisable to take up a position between the Peñas de S. Pedro and Carcelén, for the purpose of communicating with the Sierra Morena by the Sierra de Alcaraz. This the Duke thought a bad position in itself, even if it were not in a desert, and without water; and as he had ascertained that Victor was moving upon Villarrobledo with the intention of cutting off the vanguard of the Carolina army at Villarta, he took measures for averting a blow, which, if it had succeeded, would have left the passes of the Sierra Morena open to the enemy. It had been intended that this detachment, consisting of 5000 men, should have co-operated with him in his projected movement upon Toledo, which had been so fatally frustrated at Ucles; they were therefore under his command. He now

sent orders that they should instantly retire to S. Cruz de Mudela, or to El Viso; and while he hastened thither himself to join them, sent off 500 horse, divided into four parties, to act as *guerillas* in the rear of the French. They did this with great success, imposing upon them by their rapidity and boldness: and the Duke by forced marches reached S. Cruz de Mudela in time to save the Carolina troops, the enemy having just arrived in front of them. The French, seeing a force which they had not expected, and were not in strength to attack, retired toward Toledo, leaving the open country to the Spaniards: and Infantado then communicated with General Cuesta, that he might act in concert with the army of Extremadura.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*February.*

*Infantado,*  
180—189.

The troops had now recovered heart; the advanced guard, under the Duque del Alburquerque, gained some advantage at Mora, where, by a well-planned expedition, he surprised the French; and Infantado thought that he had performed no inconsiderable service to his country, in having gathered up the wreck of the central army, and brought it into an efficient state, when he received an order from the Supreme Junta to give up the command to the Conde de Cartaojal. He obeyed reluctantly, and with the feelings of an injured man. The government at that time perhaps, like the people, attributed too large a part of their disasters to the generals, and therefore appointed and displaced them upon no better ground than that

*Infantado*  
*superseded*  
*by Cartao-*  
*jal.*

*Feb. 18.*

*Feb. 6.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*February.*

of complying with public opinion. The soldiers appear to have been well satisfied with the Duke; they indeed had seen the incessant exertions which he had made for supporting them when the government could send them no supplies: but the officers were divided into cabals, and there was a strong party against him. His offended pride did not however abate his desire of continuing to serve his country in the field, and he requested permission to remain with the army as Colonel of the Royal Spanish Guards; but he was informed that this was incompatible with his elevated rank, and therefore he was called to Seville. No inquiry concerning the rout at Ucles was instituted; the opinion prevailed that it was imputable to his error in exposing the advanced guard at such a distance from the body of his army; but the faults with which he charged Venegas were overlooked, and the government continued to place a confidence in that General, to which, in any other capacity than that of a commander, his honourable character and personal qualities entitled him.

*Feb. 12.*

*Calumnies  
against  
Castaños.*

The French, at the commencement of their revolutionary war, sent every unsuccessful general to the scaffold, the Convention in its bloody acts keeping pace with the bloodiest desires of a deceived and infuriated populace. The Central Junta contracted no such guilt, though humanity is not the characteristic of the Spaniards, and justice in state affairs had in that country for centuries been unknown. They gave



no ear to vulgar or malignant accusations; but, on the other hand, they allowed their generals no opportunity of vindicating themselves. Upon this ground Castaños, as well as Infantado, had cause to complain. The order which called him from the command of the central army during its retreat intimated no dissatisfaction at his conduct; on the contrary, it summoned him to take the presidency of the Military Junta, saying that the fate of armies depended upon the plans which were laid down for them. That restless intriguer, the Conde de Montijo, who had visited him at his head-quarters at Tudela, professed the warmest friendship towards him, and spoken of him in the language of unbounded admiration, left the army suddenly two days before the battle, and wherever he went reported that Castaños was a traitor, and had sold the country to the French. This nearly proved fatal to the General, when, in obedience to his summons, he set out to join the Central Junta, taking with him merely such an escort as his rank required: for he soon found that fifteen horse and thirty foot were not sufficient to protect him from imminent danger; the clamour which Montijo raised had spread far and wide, and they could not enter a village without preparations as serious as if they were about to engage in action. At Miguel-turra, in La Mancha, the Junta exerted themselves ineffectually to restrain the populace, who were crying out, Kill him! kill him! The members of that body, the better to secure him,

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

*Castaños,  
Representa-  
cion, 15-18.*

gathered round his person, and accompanied him on foot; the rabble pressed upon them with blind fury, and their lives, as well as that of Castaños, would have been sacrificed, if his cavalry had not charged the multitude sword in hand, and opened the way. But the danger was not over when he had been housed; the house was beset, and it was only by the exertions of the better classes, and especially of a priest, that he was enabled to leave the place before daybreak the following morning. It became necessary for them to avoid all populous places, and take up their lodging in the smallest and most retired hamlets; and yet with these precautions his life was frequently threatened. In addition to this evil there was the uncertainty of knowing whither to direct his course: three times on his journey he found that the Central Junta had changed their place of residence; and when he finally made for Seville, it was with a belief that they had removed to Puerto de Santa Maria. Upon approaching Seville, he was ordered to take up his abode in the monastery of S. Geronimo de Buenavista, and there await the farther determination of the government. Montijo had accused him as an instrument of Tilly, engaged with him in treasonable designs, and also in a scheme for rendering Andalusia independent, and making it the head of a confederacy of provinces. This was the mere fabrication of a man who scrupled at no means for promoting his own insane ambition, and as such the Junta

received it; but they deemed it expedient to treat the general as if he were under their displeasure, lest a suspicion, which in its consequences might be most fatal to the country, should be raised against themselves.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

Castaños was not aware of the accusation which had been thus preferred; least indeed of all men could he have supposed that a charge of federalism would have been brought against him, who had with so much decision and effect opposed the dangerous disposition of the provincial authorities to consult their own security alone. But he complained of the injurious restraint in which he was placed, and in an able and temperate memorial appealed to his past services, showed that the defeat at Tudela was not imputable to any error or indiscretion on his part (his opinion having been over-ruled by their representative, D. Francisco Palafox), and required that his conduct might be judged of by the circumstances in which he was placed, and the actual condition of his army, not as if he had commanded 80,000 effective men. An army in the field, he said, was like a musical instrument with many keys and many registers: if these did not answer to the touch, if many strings were wanting, and the others not in tune, the best musician would be deemed a sorry performer by those who heard the broken and jarring sounds which he produced, and knew not the state of the instrument. Still, he maintained,

*His memorial to the Junta.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

the French were far from being able to subdue Spain. Castaños was not unsupported while he thus defended himself with the confidence of an innocent and injured man. The Junta of Seville honourably espoused his cause, and the government allowed him to remove to his own house at Algeciras, there to remain while the inquiry into his conduct which he demanded should be carried on.

*Intrigues of  
Montijo.*

Montijo was one of those men who in disordered times are intoxicated with ambition and vanity. His object in seeking the ruin of Castaños was to obtain a command for himself. He represented to the Junta that the resources by which the miracle of restoring the country might be effected could only be drawn from Andalusia; but that to call them forth activity, energy, patriotism, and above all the confidence of the public were required. Under any other circumstances he should have blushed to designate himself as the person in whom these qualifications were united, and unhappily the only person who possessed the last; but in such an emergency a good Spaniard must sacrifice even his modesty. Spain might still be saved if he were commissioned to take what cavalry he could raise, put himself at the head of the forces in La Mancha, and march upon Madrid; and he pledged his sacred word of honour that he would resign the command as soon as the French should be driven back to the Ebro.



This proposal met with as little attention as it deserved ; and Montijo then joined the army of Carolina, there to sow fresh intrigues, and meet with deserved humiliation.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

The French themselves were at this time in such a situation, that the desultory and harassing warfare which the Junta of Seville advised at the commencement of the struggle might now have been pursued against them with great effect. A disposition in some of the marshals to disregard Joseph, and act without any deference to his wishes or commands, had shown itself before Buonaparte left Spain ; the attention of the French cabinet was directed toward Austria, and the affairs of Spain were left to the intrusive government, which had in fact no control over the armies by whom alone it was to be supported. But as there was no enemy in the field alert and able enough to take advantage of the fair occasions which offered, the French commanders believed the struggle was at an end, and that they had only to march over the country and receive the submission of the inhabitants. While Victor occupied Toledo, waiting only a convenient season to disperse the hasty levies which were brought together for the defence of Andalusia, General Dorneau marched against Zamora, scaled the walls of that ancient city, and put to death those inhabitants who, in the flagitious language of the French bulletin, were called the most guilty. Castille and Leon were overrun,

*Progress of  
the French  
in Castille  
and Leon.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
January.

and wherever they went those scenes of profanation, violence, and murder were exhibited, in which Buonaparte's soldiers were systematically allowed to glut the worst passions of corrupted and brutalized humanity.

*New levies  
raised by the  
Spaniards.*

Yet while the country was thus at the mercy of the French, the panic which their appearance every where excited extended nowhere beyond their immediate presence. In all places which were not actually occupied by the enemy, the local authorities acted as if no enemy had been at hand, and their own government had been as efficient as it was legitimate. The enlisting went on, and promises of speedy triumph and sure deliverance were held forth with a confidence which no reverses could shake. The fugitives from the different armies no sooner reached their own homes than they were again enrolled to be embodied, and exposed again to privations and sufferings such as those from which they had so hardly escaped. Before their strength was recruited, they were sent off to form new armies, neither better disciplined, better commanded, nor better provided than those which had been routed and dispersed. They went hungered, half naked, and cursing their fortune, without confidence in their officers, each other, or themselves, yet believing fully that the deliverance of Spain would be effected with a faith which seemed to require and perhaps very generally expected miracles for its fulfilment. Human

means indeed seem to have been provided as little as if they had not been taken into the account.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
January.

This unreasoning confidence brought with it evil as well as good. Many of those who had something to lose, and hoped that part at least might be saved by submission, took either side according as the scale inclined. When the enemy was absent, they joined the national voice, which expressed what were their real feelings: if the French appeared, they were ready to take the oaths, and act under them, as far as was necessary for their own safety or advantage, longing at the same time and looking for the day of deliverance and vengeance. In many places, the magistracy acted with no other view than that of averting from themselves and their immediate jurisdiction as much of the common misery as they could. This was particularly the case in those parts of Leon and Castille which lay most open to the enemy. The enrolment was rigorously enforced there, and men were hurried off: but any means of local defence were rather dreaded than desired. Offers of assistance were made from Ciudad Rodrigo to Ledesma and Salamanca, and both cities declined the proffered aid, as unnecessary; but in truth, because they believed it to be unavailing, and had determined not to provoke the enemy by resistance.

*Temporizing conduct of certain magistrates.*

Ciudad Rodrigo had at that time become a point of great interest, owing to a well-timed

*Sir Robert Wilson.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
January.

movement of Sir Robert Wilson's with a small body of Portugueze volunteers. This adventurous officer had been rewarded by the Emperor of Germany with the order of Maria Theresa, for a brilliant affair in which the 15th regiment of dragoons was engaged during the siege of Landrecy. He served afterwards in Egypt, and published a history of the British expedition to that country, in which work he charged Buonaparte with the massacre of his prisoners at Jaffa, and the empoisonment of his own sick and wounded. The facts were boldly denied at the time, and willingly disbelieved by Buonaparte's admirers ; they have since been substantiated by ample evidence, and by his own avowal ; but the merit of having first proclaimed them was Sir Robert Wilson's, and it marked him for an object of especial vengeance should he ever fall into the hands of the tyrant, whose true character he had been the first to expose. This rendered him more conspicuous than he would have been for his rank, which was that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Having, in pursuance of the convention, superintended the embarkation of the French at Porto, and by great exertions contributed to save them from the just fury of the populace, he applied himself with characteristic activity and enterprise to raising and disciplining a Portugueze legion in that city. The plan was entirely approved by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and zealously forwarded by the Bishop. Two thousand men presently pre-

*He raises a  
Portugueze  
legion at  
Porto.*



sented themselves, and that number might have been increased five-fold could he have relied upon resources for them ; for the alertness with which they learned our discipline, the confidence which they acquired, the pride which they felt at being displayed, and which their officers partook in displaying them, excited the emulation of their countrymen. Some jealousy was felt at Lisbon, and some obstacles were thrown in his way, upon the pretext that an invidious distinction would be occasioned between these and the other Portuguese troops. Sir John Cradock, however, when the command in that capital devolved upon him, authorised Sir Robert to act according to his own judgement. His first thought had been to embark for Carthagená, and march from thence to Catalonia. Afterwards, Asturias seemed a nearer and more important point. But after Blake's army had been dispersed, and before Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird had formed a junction, he resolved to march toward the frontiers, thinking that he might move from Miranda or Braganza, and so to facilitate the communication between them, and cover, as far as his means permitted, the approach to the northern provinces. With this intent he marched the first division of his legion, consisting of 700 men with six pieces of cannon ; they were to be followed by the second, under Baron Eben, an Hanoverian officer in the British service ; and this by the third. And Sir J. Cradock had

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

January.

*Sir Robert  
goes to Ciudad Ro-  
drigo.*

ordered a battalion of Portugueze infantry and a regiment of cavalry to join him.

When Sir Robert reached Lamego, he there found information, that a small British detachment which had been stationed in Ciudad Rodrigo, had, in consequence of the approaching danger, forsaken it. Always hopeful himself, and well aware of what importance it was that that position should be maintained, he left his troops, and hastened thither to consult with the Junta. It was a point from which he could act upon that division of the enemy who were then forcing their way into Extremadura, . . or, co-operate with any Spanish force that might take the field from Salamanca. The people, on their part, declared their determination to defend the place resolutely; his aid, therefore, was accepted as frankly as it was offered, and the legion accordingly advanced from Lamego through a country almost impracticable at that season. By dint of human exertion, carts and artillery were drawn up steeps which hitherto had been deemed inaccessible for carriages. Sometimes men and officers, breast-deep in the water, dragged the guns through torrents so formidable, that cattle could not be trusted to perform that service. Sometimes, where the carriages would have floated and have been swept away, the wheels were taken off, and they were slid over on the foot-bridges. Sometimes they were hauled along causeways and connecting bridges so narrow, that the wheels rested on

half their fellies upon the stones which were set edge upwards on the verge of the road. It was the first march these troops had ever made, but notwithstanding the severity of such labour, performed at such a season, and during incessant rain, not a man deserted, and there was no straggling, no murmuring amid all their difficulties: they sung as they went along, and reached their resting-place at night with unabated cheerfulness.

Sir Robert had plainly stated to the Junta that his legion was not to form part of the garrison, but that in every operation without the walls he should think it his duty to aid, and even in defence of the suburbs before the Salamanca gate, as long as his return over the bridge was assured. The Junta and the people of that city displayed a hearty willingness to co-operate with their allies in any manner that might appear most conducive to the common cause; and from that generous spirit they never departed during all the vicissitudes of the war. At first there was a fair prospect of acting offensively; but when the authorities at Ledesma and Salamanca declined the assistance which was offered them from this quarter, Sir Robert, instead of maintaining the line of the Tormes, as he had hoped to do, formed on the Agueda, having his headquarters at San Felices. When he had marched from the coast, it was with the hope of facilitating the plans and contributing to the success of a British army perfectly equipped and dis-

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

*He refuses  
to return to  
Porto.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*January.*

*Effect of his  
movements.*

ciplined, strong in itself, and confident in its commanders and its cause. He now learnt that that army was retreating with a speed which the most utter defeat could hardly have precipitated: at the same time he was privately advised to fall back on Porto. But though weak himself, he had already ascertained that the French in that part of Spain were not strong, that the activity and appearance of his little corps had imposed upon them a salutary opinion of his strength, and that his continuance there was of no trifling importance, not merely as covering the removal of the British stores from Almeida, but as checking the enemy's advance in that direction, counteracting the report which they busily spread and indeed believed themselves, that the English had entirely abandoned Spain, encouraging the Spaniards, and gaining time for them to strengthen the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, and for training a brave and well-disposed people.

This became of more consequence when the Junta of that city had, in their own language, "the melancholy honour of being the only one which held out in all Castille," Ledesma and Salamanca having, without a show of resistance, admitted the enemy. For him to obtain intelligence was as easy, owing to the disposition of the people, as it was difficult for the French. Having ascertained that they had few cavalry and only 1500 foot in Salamanca, that they were proportionally weak in the country about Zamora and Villalpando, and that they had not



occupied Ledesma for want of men, he entered Ledesma, carried off, in Ferdinand's name for the Junta of Rodrigo, the treasure and money which had been raised there for the French in obedience to requisition, and compelled them to seek and convoy what provisions they extorted from the country. They had given public notice that every person who disobeyed their requisitions should be punished with death. Sir Robert sent forth a counter-proclamation, declaring, that if this threat were effected, he would hang a Frenchman for every Spaniard. By incessant activity, attacking their posts in open day, he kept them perpetually on the alarm, and made them apprehend a serious attack on Salamanca itself. Upon that score their apprehensions would have been realized, if the whole force which Sir Robert had raised had been then at his command; or if even with such poor means as he possessed he had not been withheld by orders from Lisbon. But the remaining corps of his legion had been detained at Porto, and when he had applied for them, and for clothing and military stores, he had been answered that the men were wanted for the defence of Porto itself, and that, even if stores might have been spared, they could not be sent without imminent danger from the people. It was in vain for him to represent that the measures which he had taken were those which were best adapted for the protection of Portugal, by covering her weakest side; that

CHAP.  
XVII.1809.  
*January.**Part of the  
legion de-  
tained at  
Porto.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
January.

Portugal must be defended beyond her frontiers; that the service in which he was engaged was of all others that in which the troops might soonest acquire the discipline and experience in which the Portuguese soldiers were so notoriously deficient; that he wanted the men only; not provisions, those he could assure to them; not money, for if what had been received from England for the express use of the legion were withheld from it, he would apply elsewhere.

*Displeasure  
of the au-  
thorities  
there.*

Reasoning was of no avail when the danger from the side of Galicia appeared to be so near as in reality it was; and the Bishop of Porto, though he had warmly encouraged the formation of the legion, as an important measure towards restoring the military character of his countrymen, and though Sir Robert had succeeded in gaining his good opinion to a high degree, was nevertheless offended at the disrespect which seemed to be shown to him and the other Portuguese authorities, by the manner in which that officer was now acting as if wholly independent of them. From the Spanish government, however,

*Rank given  
him by the  
Spanish go-  
vernment.*

Sir Robert received as much encouragement as he could have desired in his most sanguine hopes. They gave him the rank of Brigade-General, and placed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and the troops in the province at his disposal. And this proof of confidence was given at a time when a misunderstanding had arisen between the two cabinets, which might have been fatal to the common cause, if each

party had not rendered full justice to the upright intention of the other.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
February.

As soon as the dispersion of Blake's army was known in England, the British government anticipating the disasters which would follow, considered Cadiz as the ultimate point of retreat to which the Spaniards would be driven; there, supported by that fortress on one side, and by Gibraltar on the other, they might make a stand which no force that France could bring against them could overpower. Accordingly, when Sir John Moore's first intention of retreating was communicated, government resolved that his army should immediately be transferred to the south of Spain, for it was impossible to foresee the miserable state to which the manner of his retreat would reduce it. But the representations of that general concerning the little assistance which he received from the Spaniards, and the little patriotism which he could discover, so far influenced ministers, that they thought it improper to hazard an army in the south, unless a corps of it were admitted into Cadiz. The treachery of Morla, and the danger of similar treasons, rendered this precaution advisable. Upon this subject Mr. Frere was instructed to communicate with the Junta, and as it was not apprehended that the required proof of confidence would be refused, General Sherbrooke, with 4000 men, was ordered to sail immediately for Cadiz. He was not to require the command of the garrison, . .

*Proposal  
that British  
troops  
should be  
admitted  
into Cadiz.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
February.

that might have offended the feelings of the Spaniards. If, however, the Junta should not admit him, he was then to proceed to Gibraltar, and any operations in the south were necessarily to be abandoned, though there was no intention even in that case of abandoning the cause of Spain. Sir John Cradock also was instructed to sail for Cadiz, if he should find it necessary to abandon Portugal; but he was not to take this step till he had been apprized of the determination of the Spanish government.

*Objections  
of the Spa-  
nish govern-  
ment.*

Before it was known that the Junta had quitted Aranjuez, Sir George Smith had been sent to Cadiz on a local mission, to provide for the possible case of British troops being necessary for the defence of that city, at a time when it might be impracticable to obtain the opinion of the central government. When the government was removed to Seville, his mission ceased with the necessity of it. He, however, not only considered it as still existing, but went beyond his instructions; informed the governor of Cadiz that he had authority to require that British troops should be admitted to garrison that place; and sent to Sir John Cradock, directing him to dispatch troops thither from Lisbon, . . . a measure which was not to have been taken except at the direct solicitation of the Spanish authorities at Cadiz. And this he did without waiting for their consent, and without consulting or even communicating with the English ambassador. The Junta imme-



diately conceived that some secret designs were on foot, with which Mr. Frere had not been entrusted, because he had not been thought a proper instrument; and that minister had the vexation of hearing the justice which they did to his frankness urged as a ground for unjust suspicions. “Cadiz,” they said, “was not threatened, and a measure so extraordinary as that of admitting English troops there might compromise the Supreme Junta with the nation. Many would imagine that the prognostics of Morla, which the government had considered as dreams, had assumed at least an air of reality; and however the Junta might be persuaded of the purity of the motives by which Great Britain was influenced, it would not be in their power to counteract this imagination. Spain had addressed herself to Great Britain, and had obtained succours and good offices, which would for ever redound to the honour of England. Spain had opened her heart to unbounded gratitude; but never could believe that her misfortunes obliged her to this. Let the allied troops disembark in small divisions, so as to leave room for each other, proceed without delay to occupy cantonments at Xeres, Port St. Mary’s, and the neighbourhood, and then pursue their march into the interior. It would be easy to fall back upon Cadiz if that should be necessary; but that necessity was at all events very distant.” This, as the final resolution of King Ferdinand, the Junta (govern-

CHAP.  
XVII.1809.  
*February.**Feb. 7.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
February.

ing in his name) communicated to Mr. Frere :  
“trusting,” they said, “in his discernment and  
in his religious probity, that he would feel the  
truth of their representations, and give the  
most peremptory orders for the British troops  
to abide by what had been agreed upon, and  
under no pretext whatever to remain in the  
fortress of Cadiz.”

*Troops ar-  
rive in the  
bay.*

During these discussions, the two regiments  
under General Mackenzie, which Sir George  
Smith had so precipitately ordered from Lisbon,  
arrived in the bay. About the same time Mr.  
Frere received a copy of the instructions in-  
tended for Sir John Moore, directing him, in  
case he could not keep his ground in the north,  
to embark his troops, and carry them round  
either to Lisbon or to the south of Spain. These  
the ambassador communicated to the Junta ;  
and at the same time informed them that the  
British government expected Buonaparte would  
have driven back the English army into Galicia,  
and marched himself into Andalusia to make  
himself master of Seville, and shut the door  
against every hope of succour. Expecting that  
he would pursue this plan, government, while  
it sent these instructions to Sir John Moore,  
dispatched the corps under General Sherbrooke,  
with a view of preventing at least the surrender  
of Cadiz, and ensuring to the auxiliary army

*Mr. Frere's  
representa-  
tions to the  
Central  
Junta.*

some safe landing-place. In such a scheme,  
Mr. Frere argued, there was nothing unreason-  
able ; it did not become the British ministers to

CHAP.  
XVII.1809.  
*February.*

risk their army without any place of retreat from an enemy who was less formidable for his military force than for the means of corruption which he employed, . . means which the capitulation of Madrid evinced to have been not less successful in Spain than in other countries. Should the English then expose themselves to the danger arising from the enemy's intrigues, only in deference to the injurious suspicions which that very enemy wished to excite against them in the minds of the Spanish government, . . a government to which that of his Britannic Majesty had never ceased to offer proofs of disinterestedness and of good faith? "The members of the Junta," said Mr. Frere, "will do me the justice to admit that I have never endeavoured to promote the interests of my nation, but as being essentially connected with those of their own. If, however, I have always been guided by the same sentiments and the same views which a Spanish politician might have, I do not think it is to depart from them, if I deliver the same opinion which I should give had I the honour of occupying a place in the council of your nation; namely, that the whole policy of the Spanish government rests essentially on a persuasion of perfect good faith on the part of England, and that it is important to confirm it more and more by testimonies of mutual confidence, and by avoiding the slightest appearance of distrust between government and government."

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
February.

*Reply of the  
Spanish go-  
vernment.  
Feb. 17.*

One other point Mr. Frere adverted to, which, though less important, was of great weight. The precariousness of commerce, occasioned by the supposed insecurity of Cadiz, was prejudicial to the finances of Spain. There was no longer a place in the peninsula where British goods could be deposited; and the government was therefore under the necessity of cutting off all mercantile intercourse between the colonies and the rest of the civilized world, or of affording to foreign commerce a security which it could not find in the sole protection of a Spanish garrison. On this head he appealed to the custom-house registers, and to the applications made by neutrals for permission to reship goods, which they did not deem any longer safe. A note was transmitted in reply to this, saying, that the Junta would dispatch an extraordinary courier to London, and empower their minister there to settle a point of so much importance in a manner agreeable to the interests of both nations. Meantime, the English troops which were at present in the bay, and those which should arrive there, might disembark, for the purpose of proceeding to Port St. Mary, San Lucar, Xeres, and the other places proposed for their cantonment. No misfortune which could happen to the Spanish cause could prevent the English from falling back on Gibraltar and Cadiz; and this step would prevent the inconvenience and perhaps sickness to which they might be exposed by remaining on board ship



or in Cadiz, the appointed stations being in a country the most healthy in the world.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*February.*

*Their proposal for  
employing  
the troops.*

Having thus considered the convenience of the troops, the Junta submitted two propositions to Mr. Frere, the only person, they said, alluding to Sir George Smith's interference, whom they acknowledged as the representative of the British nation. First, that the British troops should proceed to Catalonia, and garrison the maritime ports of that principality, thus enabling the Spanish army in that quarter to march to the relief of Zaragoza. Secondly, that they should co-operate with Cuesta: that general was threatened by a force not very superior in number to his own, and the assistance of the English might give him the superiority; thus Cadiz would be secured, and time given to set on foot the troops who were now only waiting for muskets from England. The note concluded by expressing a feeling of honourable pain in the Junta, that England should distrust the safety of Cadiz unless it were garrisoned by English troops. They asserted, that the constancy and valour of the Spanish nation, manifested in this arduous struggle, entitled it to the respect of Europe; and, gently hinting at what had passed in Galicia, they requested that a veil might be drawn over it. Cadiz was not situated like Coruña, the same events therefore could not possibly occur there.

Upon the receipt of this note, Mr. Frere requested a conference. They proposed to him

*Conference  
with Mr.  
Frere.  
Feb. 18.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*February.*

that he should name a governor for Cadiz. He replied, it was a responsibility with which he would not charge himself for all the world. Four months ago he should have chosen Morla, Espeleta six months before that: both had been found wanting in the day of trial, though neither had been placed in a situation so trying as that of a governor holding out in the last remaining garrison. Then replying to the argument, that the Junta could not act against popular opinion, "it must likewise be recollected," he said, "that the British government could not proceed in opposition to an opinion equally decided in England; and which of the two pretensions was the more just? England was willing to expose an English army to any hazard which resulted absolutely from the nature of things; but England would not consent that that danger should be aggravated in the slightest degree, out of deference to the caprice of popular opinion, or suspicions which were unworthy of either country. England required of Spain that it should place confidence in the British government, binding itself by the most formal engagements; Spain offered the choice of a governor and the chance of his fidelity. Our proposal was in every respect the fairest and the most rational, and it could not be expected that we should depart from a demand of right, for the sake of conferring a favour. Mr. Frere offered to propose to General Mackenzie, that he should leave 1000 men in Cadiz,

and proceed with the rest to act in concert with Cuesta for the protection of Seville, and that when General Sherbrooke arrived, 3000 should proceed to the same direction, and he should content himself with garrisoning Cadiz with 2000 men, and proceed with or forward the remainder of his own force to General Mackenzie. To this proposition the Junta had so nearly acceded, that the agreement was only broken off by their insisting that the public mind could not be reconciled to the admission of 2000 troops into Cadiz, and offering to admit half the number, a force which Mr. Frere judged altogether inadequate to a purpose for which his own government allotted four times that amount.

The conference, which was conducted on both sides with perfect moderation and temper, concluded with a fair avowal from the Junta, that they were convinced of the good faith of the British government, and of the advantage that would result to Spain from the admission of British troops into Cadiz, if that were to be the indispensable condition of their co-operation; but that their own existence as a government depended upon popular opinion; and the English ambassador could not be ignorant what numerous and active enemies were endeavouring to undermine them. The Junta of Seville, who gave themselves great credit for resisting the introduction of the English into Cadiz last year when the French were advanced as far as

CHAP.  
XVII.1809.  
*February.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
February.

Ecija, were upon the watch now, and calling the attention of the people to the conduct of the Central Junta in the present instance. Mr. Frere made answer, that he could not of course expect his opinion should be submitted to upon a subject on which their existence as a government and their personal security (for such in fact was the case) were involved. But he advised them to consider whether the responsibility to which they exposed themselves in the other alternative was not equally dangerous, and whether their enemies would not be as ready and as able to make a handle of the rejection of British assistance as of its acceptance.

*Mr. Frere  
requests  
Cuesta's  
opinion.*

Mr. Frere was aware that the uppermost feeling in the minds of some of the Junta was an apprehension of the resentment which Cuesta might entertain against them, convinced as that general must have been of their weakness by the manner of his appointment. Being desirous, therefore, of obtaining his opinion in favour of the measure which the British government proposed, or at least in such terms as would remove all fear of his declaring himself in opposition to it, he wrote to him, explaining what Great Britain was willing to do in aid of Spain, and what condition was required. That condition, he said, was to be considered as indispensable, not only in the opinion of government, but in that of the nation, the individuals of which did not at that moment consider Cadiz



as sufficiently secure even for a place of disposal for their merchandize, so that they were daily soliciting permission to re-export it; and it might easily be judged whether the nation would risk its army upon an assurance which individuals did not consider sufficient for their woollen and cotton. Lisbon had twice been garrisoned by British troops, without the smallest inconvenience to the Portuguese government. Madeira had in like manner been garrisoned: the Portuguese knew us by long experience; they knew also the internal state of England; knew that the English government never entertained a thought of abusing the confidence of its allies; and the state of public opinion was such in England, that it could not do this, even though it wished it. Under the present circumstances, the political question came before General Cuesta, both as a commander and a patriot, who, as he must be interested in any thing that might appear to injure the honour and independence of his country, so also he could not regard with indifference any thing that might derange the military plans of his government, and perhaps its political relations, by repeated acts of mistrust and mutual displeasure. 4800 good British troops might at this time march to co-operate with him upon the frontier of Extremadura, they would be followed by 1500 more as soon as General Sherbrooke arrived, and the auxiliary army would be delayed no longer than

---

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.  
*February.*

was necessary to dispose of its wounded and prisoners, and to be re-equipped. The question therefore was, whether General Cuesta could dispense with the present reinforcement, and Spain with the aid of an auxiliary army; for these were the points to be decided by the resolution of admitting or sending back the British troops, such being the alternative in which those troops were placed by the orders under which they left Lisbon.

*Cuesta's  
reply.*

Cuesta returned a reply in terms of proper respect, both for the British government and his own. He did not, he said, discover any difficulty which should prevent the British troops from garrisoning Cadiz; but he was far from supposing that the Central Junta could be without good ground for their objections, and that they should have objections was sufficient to prevent him from giving any opinion unless they consulted him. With regard to the 4300 men, there could be no doubt but that he stood in need of them; and he hoped that England would lend him much greater assistance, particularly if from any change of circumstances the Central Junta should no longer appear repugnant to the condition which the British government required. This reply did not alter the determination which Mr. Frere had made, of sending the troops back to Lisbon, considering Seville as comparatively safe, and conceiving that the principle which the English ministry had originally laid down, of not attaching small corps of British troops to

a Spanish army, was one he should not be justified in departing from, for any object less important than the security of Cadiz or the capital. He communicated this determination to Don Martin de Garay, alleging that the information which he had lately received from Lisbon rendered such a measure necessary.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

Garay's answer closed the discussion. It was meant to be at the same time conciliatory, and capable of being produced for the exculpation of the Junta. He represented, "that if any immediate attack upon Cadiz was to be feared, . . if the Spanish forces were incapable of defending that point, . . if there were no others of the greatest importance where the enemy might be opposed with advantage, the Junta would not fear to hurt the public feeling by admitting foreign troops into that fortress, because public feeling would then be actuated by the existing state of things. But no such emergency existed; the armies were strengthening themselves in points very distant from Cadiz; the enemy had much ground to pass, and many difficulties to conquer, before he could threaten it; time could never be wanted for falling back upon that fortress; it was easy to be defended, . . it was to be considered as a last point of retreat, and extreme points ought to be defended in advance, never in themselves, except in cases of extreme urgency. The army of Extremadura defended Andalusia on that side, those of the centre and La Carolina at the Sierra Morena;

*Close of the  
discussion.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.

---

the enemy for some time past had not been able to make any progress; and there if superior forces could be collected against him, a decisive blow might be struck. Catalonia too was bravely defending itself, and Zaragoza still resisted the repeated attacks of an obstinate and persevering besieger. Either in Extremadura, or with the central army or in Catalonia, the assistance of Great Britain would be of infinite service. This was the opinion of the Junta; this was the opinion of the whole nation, and would doubtless be that of every one who contemplated the true state of things. If the auxiliary troops already in the bay, or on their passage, should disembark in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and proceed to reinforce General Cuesta, they would always find a safe retreat in Cadiz in case of any reverse; but should a body of troops, already very small, leave part of its force in Cadiz, in order to secure a retreat at such a distance, the English ambassador himself must acknowledge that such assistance could inspire the Spaniards with very little confidence, particularly after the events in Galicia. But it appeared to Mr. Frere that the presence of these troops was necessary at Lisbon, and therefore he had given orders for their return. Of this measure the same might be said as of the proposed one for securing Cadiz. Lisbon was not the point where Portugal could be defended; the greatest possible number of troops ought to be employed in those advanced lines



where the enemy was posted, and where he might be routed decisively. For all these reasons the Supreme Junta were persuaded, that if the British government should determine that its troops should not act in union with theirs, except on the expressed condition, this non-cooperation could never be imputed to them. The Junta must act in such a manner, that if it should be necessary to manifest to the nation, and to all Europe, the motives of their conduct, it might be done with that security, and with that foundation, that should conciliate to them the public opinion, which was the first and main spring of their power.”

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.

---

Thus terminated the discussion concerning the admission of English troops into Cadiz. Mr. Frere warned the Junta of the ill consequences which must result to Spain, if it should appear that the efforts and offers which the King of England had made should have the effect of producing embarrassment to his government at home. It appears, indeed, as if both governments acted more with reference to their enemies at home, than from any real importance which they could attach to the point in dispute. With the Spanish government this was confessedly the case; they did not, and could not, possibly suspect the good faith of England: . . . between Spain and England, the honourable character of one country was sufficient security for the other; but they stood equally in fear of a set of men who criticised

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

all their measures with factious acrimony, because their own enthusiastic hopes of complete triumph and thorough reformation had not been fulfilled; and of Morla and the other traitors, whose aim was to excite suspicion of Great Britain. Under the influence of this feeling, they opposed a measure which they did not think otherwise objectionable, but which they opposed the more firmly because they did not perceive that it was necessary. The English ministry on their part wanted a point of defence against the opposition, who, as they omitted no means of wounding the pride and calumniating the character of the Spaniards, were continually saying that they did not desire our assistance, and that they had no confidence in us. It was against this party at home that Cadiz was wanted as a point of defence, . . not as a point of retreat upon a coast where we possessed Gibraltar, and where also we were sure of the disposition of the people in Cadiz itself, whatever might be the conduct of its governor. The governor at Coruña had failed in his duty, but still the embarkation of the English was protected by that fortress.

Mr. Frere concluded this unpleasant transaction according to his own judgement. He had the satisfaction of finding that the ministry perfectly accorded with him. They sent him Sir George Smith's instructions, authorising him, if he thought proper, to communicate them to the Supreme Junta. They recalled Sir George,

and assured the Junta that no such separate or secret commission, as they apprehended to have been given to him, ever had been, or ever would be, entrusted to any officer or other person; and that it never could be in the contemplation of the English government to select any other channel of communication than the King's accredited minister, in a transaction of such importance, much less to engage in such a transaction without the entire consent and concurrence of the Spanish government. They dispatched orders after General Sherbrooke, directing him to proceed to Lisbon instead of Cadiz. Nevertheless, if at any time the Junta should require a British force for the actual garrison of Cadiz, Mr. Frere was authorized to send to Lisbon for that purpose, and the commanding officer there was ordered to comply with his requisition.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

*Papers relating to Spain and Portugal, C.*

While this question was discussed at Seville, Cadiz itself became the scene of an insurrection, in which the popular feeling in favour of the English was unequivocally expressed. The people of that city were dissatisfied with the Central Junta; they complained that, instead of informing them of the true state of affairs, their government kept them in ignorance; and having been deceived by Morla, the slightest circumstance sufficed to make them suspect any one who had the means of betraying them. A corps of foreigners had been raised from the prisoners taken at Baylen; they consisted chiefly of Poles

*Insurrection at Cadiz.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

and Germans, who might have fought with a better will against Buonaparte than for him, but who were less to be relied on than deserters, because they had enlisted to escape confinement. This corps was ordered to do garrison duty at Cadiz ; while the volunteers of that city and of Port St. Mary's were drafted to other parts. But the people, thinking that if Cadiz wanted defenders, it could by none be so faithfully defended as by its own children, determined to oppose both measures, and on the morning of the 22d of February they broke out in insurrection. Their first act of violence was to seize a courier charged with dispatches from the Junta to the Marquis of Villedieu, a member of that body, and its representative in this important fortress. The Marquis had rendered himself suspected by setting persons at liberty who were confined for their supposed attachment to the French, and by imposing restrictions upon the public amusements. A report that he had committed women of respectable rank to the house of industry, and threatened others with the same scandalous punishment, excited indignation in the rabble ; they seized and were dragging him to the public jail, where, if he had arrived alive, it is little probable that he could long have been protected from popular fury. But P. Moguer, a capuchin friar, persuaded them to commit him to the capuchin convent, and pledged himself to produce his person, that he might suffer condign punishment, if his treason should be proved.



Luckily the confidence of the people was possessed by the governor, Don Felix Jones, and in a still greater degree by the guardian of the Capuchins, Fr. Mariano de Sevilla. The former represented to General Mackenzie, that it would tend to re-establish tranquillity if an assurance were given that the English would take no part in the tumult; for they had been called upon to land and assist against the traitors. Accordingly the British General sent some officers who could speak the Spanish language, and they, in the presence of the governor and the principal capuchin friars, distinctly declared, that the British troops would by no means interfere in any thing relating to the internal concerns of the people, but that they were ready to assist in defending the town to the last extremity. This seemed for a time to allay their agitation. In the course of a few hours they again became tumultuous; still an opinion prevailed that they were betrayed, and that measures were arranged for delivering up Cadiz to the French. They called for the dismissal of those whom they suspected, and they required that two British officers should be appointed to inspect the fortifications, jointly with two Spanish officers, and to direct the preparations for defence. General Mackenzie deputed two officers for that purpose; and all those of his staff accompanied the most active and popular of the friars to a balcony, from whence these orators harangued the people, assuring

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

*Confidence  
of the people  
in the En-  
glish.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

them of the co-operation of the British troops and the support of the British nation, and frequently appealing to the British officers to confirm by their own voices the pledges given in their name and in their presence. This satisfied the populace, and they dispersed with loud huzzas, in honour of King George and King Ferdinand.

*Proclamation of the governor.*

On the following morning the governor issued a proclamation, in which, considering the discontent which had been manifested, “and keeping in mind,” he said, “the loyalty of the inhabitants at all times, but particularly under the present circumstances, and the good and signal services which they had done, and daily were doing, he dismissed from office four persons whose discharge had been loudly demanded; and declared also, that if the people wished to have the Junta of Cadiz suppressed, their desire should be fulfilled. He assured them that no foreign troops should be admitted; but that officers of their faithful ally the British nation were invited to examine the posts and works of the city and its dependencies, and that every thing necessary for its defence should be concerted with them. He promised that the papers of the Marquis should be examined without delay; that there should be no longer any cause of complaint respecting the ignorance in which the people were kept of public affairs, for that whatever occurred should punctually and faithfully be made public; that the enlist-

ment of the inhabitants for the provincial regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo should cease till further consideration; and that no part of the volunteers, the light troops, and companies of artillery should be ordered away." Notwithstanding the popularity of Don Felix Jones, it was thought advisable that this proclamation should be countersigned by the guardian of the Capuchins.

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

Still the tumult continued. Caraffa, who had been second in command of the Spanish troops in Portugal, was confined in the Castle of Catalina, under a charge of misconduct or treachery, with the viceroy of Mexico and other prisoners, who had been sent home from New Spain. The mob proceeded thither, and demanded the prisoners, that they might put them to death. Colonel Roche, who had just arrived from Seville with another English officer, interposed, addressed the people, and succeeded in dissuading them from their purpose. But shortly afterwards they fell in with Don Joseph de Heredia, a particular object of their suspicion, who that very day had at their demand been dismissed from his office of collector of the public rents. He was stepping into a boat to make his escape to Port St. Mary's: the attempt cost him his life, and he was murdered upon the spot. The popular fury seemed now to have spent itself, and the clergy and friars, who throughout the whole insurrection had exerted themselves to pacify the people, and protect

*Murder of  
D. J. de  
Heredia.*

*The tumult  
subsides.*

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

the threatened victims, succeeded in restoring peace. To have attempted to quell the mob by force would have occasioned great bloodshed, for they had got possession of arms and of the park of artillery.

*Proclama-  
tion of the  
Central  
Junta.*

Fifty of the rabble, who had been most conspicuous for violence, were seized by the volunteers of Cadiz, and imprisoned. The Central Junta addressed a proclamation to the people of that city, reprehending them with dignified severity for their conduct. "It was absurd," they said, "to apprehend danger in so populous and so brave a city from a single battalion of foreigners, even if there could be any reason to doubt the fidelity of Poles and Germans, who had been forcibly dragged into Spain, and were in every quarter deserting from the flag under which they had been compelled to march. As little reason was there for their suspicion of the Marquis. His papers were now before the Junta, and nothing was expressed in them but zeal for the country, and diligence to promote all means for the security of Cadiz. Let the state of those means before his arrival be compared with the works projected and executed since. And had the people no other way of manifesting their disapprobation than by tumult? No one came to the Junta to complain of the Marquis's conduct; no one informed them that their commissioner at Cadiz had lost the confidence of the people. Some anonymous letters only had reached the government, some



on one side, some on the other, but all contemptible in the eye of equity. But what was the course which would have become the open and generous character of the Spaniards? To have made their complaint frankly and nobly, and the government would have done them justice.”

CHAP.  
XVII.

1809.

The Junta then warned them to beware of the insidious arts of the enemy. “It is not,” said they, “the traitors who fled with the French and returned with them who do most injury to their country; but it is the obscure agitators, hired by them or by the tyrant, who abuse the confidence and mislead the patriotism of the people. It is they who, disseminating distrust and suspicion, lead you through crooked and guilty paths to the precipice, and to subjugation; it is they who convert loyalty into rage, and zeal into sedition. The Junta have proofs enough of these infernal machinations in the intelligence which they receive every day, and in the correspondence which they intercept.” But, notwithstanding the government declared its persuasion of Villel’s innocence, it was not thought proper completely to exculpate him without such farther inquiry as might satisfy the people: this proclamation, therefore, announced that a commission would be appointed to examine his conduct, and that it would not be composed of members of the Central Junta, in order to avoid all shadow of partiality in an affair so serious. “Any person,” said the

CHAP.  
XVII.

---

1809.

---

Junta, "shall be heard who desires to accuse him, and the sentence will be adjudged according to law. He himself demands in justice that this may be done ; his honour, the estimation of the government, and the public satisfaction, necessarily prescribe it. If the Marquis be culpable, he shall be punished in proportion to his abuse of the high functions and national confidence which he has enjoyed ; but if he be declared innocent, it is necessary that the reparation made to his good name be as solemn and public as the aggression was cruel and scandalous." These proceedings satisfied the people, of whom the better sort were grieved at the excesses which had been committed ; and their suspicions against the Marquis were in some degree removed when Don Felix Jones, to whom his papers were delivered, declared that no indication of treason was to be discovered in them.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

THE Central Junta perfectly understood and truly represented the spirit of the nation, partaking in some things its blindness and its obstinacy, but also its exalted feeling, its true heroism, and its incomparable devotion to the cause of national independence. Its information concerning the real state of affairs was as imperfect as its other arrangements. In the correspondence concerning Cadiz, Garay assured the British Ambassador that Zaragoza was still holding out, not considering that by little less than miracle that glorious city could have held out so long, and not knowing that the enemy had then been eight days in possession of its ruins.

Palafox was not present at the battle of Tudela. He had embarked on the river just before the action began, little apprehending that it was so near, and believing that his presence was required at Zaragoza. This was one cause among the many which led to the misfortunes of that day ; for Castaños, who would otherwise have been with his own troops, remained with the Aragonese to supply his place, and each army was thus deprived of the General who knew the troops, and in whom they trusted.

1808.  
December.

*Castaños  
accused at  
Zaragoza  
as a traitor.*

*Representa-  
ciones, &c.  
del G. Cas-  
taños, p.  
195.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
*December.*

During the short time that these Generals had acted together, there had been no want of confidence and frankness between them : but after their separation, and the refusal of Castaños to throw his troops into Zaragoza instead of retreating toward Madrid, in obedience to the orders of the Central Junta, the disasters which had been sustained were imputed by Palafox to his errors. He had been far from apprehending, he said, that he should have to prepare for a second siege ; and never could any combination of his own have placed him under such a necessity. The charge of incapacity against Castaños was more broadly made in an official account of the action by General O'Neill, and he was publicly accused of having sold the army and betrayed his country.

*State of  
public feel-  
ing in that  
city.*

Castaños himself did Palafox the justice to believe that he had been deceived by malicious representations. The other charges proceeded from men who sought to shelter their own misconduct by appearing as accusers, or from private malice, which in such times never loses the opportunity of exerting itself with sure effect. Zaragoza was in a state of tremendous agitation ; the same spirit was still prevailing there which had so wonderfully repulsed the French, but that spirit had broken the bonds of order ; and Palafox, who was so well able to direct the popular feeling in the hour of danger, found it necessary at other times in many things to yield to it. His power was absolute while he held it ; but though



it had been confirmed to him by the Supreme Junta, it was in fact held only by the tenure of popular opinion, which among large masses of men, and more especially in perilous circumstances, is always influenced less by the considerate and the wise, than by the headstrong, the audacious, and the profligate. Victims whom he dared not interfere to save were sacrificed, and the utmost he could do in behalf of any accused persons, was to secure them in prison, and thus respite them from immediate death. During the former siege the French who resided in the city had been put under arrest; and there had been the twofold anxiety of guarding against any correspondence between them and the besiegers, and protecting them against the fatal effects of popular suspicion, which at any moment might have produced a massacre of these unfortunate persons. To prevent both the inconvenience and the danger, Palafox sent them away to distant places of confinement; but it was necessary to prepare the people for this by a proclamation, appealing to their honour, and courage, and humanity, and cautioning them against the enemy's emissaries, who were seeking to bring a stain upon their cause by exciting them to acts of murder. The prisoners and deserters were also removed. The nuns were permitted to remove to other convents not within the scene of immediate danger, where they might occupy themselves without interruption in their holy exercises. Aware that in

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
December.

*Cavallero,*  
p. 67.

*Measures of*  
*precaution.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
*December.*

so large a city there must be persons whom their own wealth would have bribed to betray their country, and who would fain have submitted for the sake of preserving their property, Palafox decreed that the inhabitants of Zaragoza, of whatever rank or condition, should consider themselves bound to devote their persons, their property, and their lives to its defence; that the rich should foster, and assist, and clothe the poor, enable them to maintain their respective posts, and remunerate them for the zeal with which they defended their lives, their estates, and their common country. If any man were unnatural enough to disregard this sacred duty, which he owed both to his native land and his religion, he should be fined in proportion to the magnitude of his offence, and the amount of the fine appropriated to the subsistence of the army. All persons who served the cause of the enemy, by pasquinades, by endeavouring to excite a want of confidence in the chiefs, the people, or the army, or by raising disturbances and riots, should be carried before the newly-appointed judge of the police, who would pass judgment according to their crimes, and suitable to the danger of the country; but before he imposed the punishment of death, he should consult the captain-general. Every house was ordered to be well supplied with vessels of water, in order to extinguish fires; and the officers of the ward were charged to superintend this important measure of preparation. Persons entering or

leaving the city were to be watched with care, because the enemy assumed the dress of the Spaniards, and, greatly superior as they were, resorted to every artifice. "All these measures," said Palafox, "should be obeyed with religious respect, because they are all directed to the good of our country, which, in happier times, will recompense all the sacrifices we make, . . . sacrifices so acceptable in the sight of God, and of the Virgin Mother of God, who is our celestial protectress."

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
*December.*

Three days were allowed for all women, all men above threescore, and all boys under fourteen, to leave the city; a general order being issued, that whithersoever they might go, they should be welcomed, and provided for. But not one of the inhabitants left the place. The sentiment of patriotism was as ardent in the women as in the men; they thought it a worse evil to seek bread and protection apart from their husbands and fathers than to abide the siege with them, and triumph or perish together: and even if this sentiment had not been so general and so strong, whither were they to betake themselves for security in a land which was every where overrun or threatened by the enemy's armies? In no place would they have imagined themselves so secure as in Zaragoza itself, which had been so wonderfully defended and delivered, and which they believed to be invincible through the protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had chosen it for the seat of her peculiar worship.

*None of the  
inhabitants  
leave the  
city.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
December.

*Supposed  
miracles.*

*Memoria de  
lo mas In-  
teressante,  
&c. 121.*

During the former siege prints of that idol had been distributed by women in the heat of action, and worn by the men in their hats both as a badge and an amulet. The many remarkable escapes and deliverances which had occurred were ascribed not to all-ruling and omnipresent Providence, but to the immediate interference of the *Magna Mater* of Zaragoza. Palafox himself had been trained up with more than common care in the superstition of the place; he and his brethren in their childhood had been taken every day to attend mass in the Holy Chapel where the image was enshrined, dressed at such times in the proper costume of the Infantes, as a mark of greater honour to the present Goddess. An appearance in the sky, which at other times might have passed unremembered and perhaps unnoticed, had given strong confirmation to the popular faith. About a month before the commencement of the first siege a white cloud appeared at noon, and gradually assumed the form of a palm tree; the sky being in all other parts clear, except that a few specks of fleecy cloud hovered about the larger one. It was first observed over the church of N. Señora del Portillo, and moving from thence till it seemed to be immediately above that of the Pillar, continued in the same form about half an hour, and then dispersed. The inhabitants were in a state of such excitement, that crowds joined in the acclamation of the first beholder, who cried out, A miracle! and after the



defeat of the besiegers had confirmed the omen, a miracle it was universally pronounced to have been, the people proclaiming with exultation that the Virgin had by this token prefigured the victory she had given them, and promised Zaragoza her protection as long as the world should endure.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.

*Do.* 11.

In many recorded instances superstition such as this has deluded men to their destruction. But the Zaragozans knew that to obtain the divine support, wherein they trusted, they must deserve it by works as well as faith, and that the manner in which heavenly aid would be manifested would be by blessing their human exertions. Palafox himself, confidently as he had expected that the army which he commanded would be successful in the field, had not been negligent in preparing to withstand a second siege. Works of considerable extent and importance had been designed, and executed as far as time and means permitted. It was impossible to convert so large a city into a good fortified place, accessible as it was on all sides, and every where commanded within reach of cannon; but with a population so resolute in defending themselves, every thing became of consequence which could impede the enemy. The houses within 700 *toises* of the place were demolished, and their materials employed in the fortifications; and the numerous and valuable plantations of olive trees within the same distance were cut down: there was reason to re-

*Works of  
defence.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1808.

---

gret that this precaution had not been carried farther. During the autumn the works had not been prosecuted with vigour, because all men of a certain age were required for military service, and those who might have been disposable for such employment were busied in the vintage, or in gathering hemp. Moreover volunteers did not offer themselves for this labour, while the danger appeared remote; and when there were so many demands upon the treasury, the expense of wages could ill be defrayed. It so happened that no mischief resulted from this dangerous economy: after the battle of Tudela there were hands enough at the General's disposal; and the French allowed time for completing all that had been intended, while they were collecting means and materials for a siege, the difficulties of which they had been taught how to estimate. The works were directed by the Commander of the Engineers, Colonel San Genis; and what was defective in them was imputable not to any want of science, but to the difficulty of fortifying the whole circuit of a great city. The Aljafaria, which had been the palace of the Moorish kings, then of the kings of Aragon, and was now called the Castle of the Inquisition, because it contained the prisons of that accursed tribunal, had been converted into a fortress by Philip V., and was now repaired and strengthened. It was a square, with four tower-bastions, surrounded by a good ditch, and communicating with the city

by a double caponiere. From thence to the bridge over the Guerva the place was protected by a long line of wall and batteries; two Capuchin convents which came into the line were fortified, and served to flank it. A ditch was carried from one of these to the bridge, and the bridge itself secured by a *tête-de-pont*. A double retrenchment extended from thence to the memorable Convent of St. Engracia, which was made a sort of citadel; and from that Convent to the Ebro the old wall had been strengthened; this part of the city being covered also by the bed of the Guerva, and by the Convent of St. Joseph on the farther bank of that river, which had been well fortified, and was the most salient point of the whole circle, serving as a strong *tête-de-pont* to protect the besieged when they sallied in the direction of Valencia. The suburb beyond the Ebro was defended by redoubts and fleches, with batteries and traverses at the entrance of the streets. The artillery amounted to 160 pieces, the greater part being four, eight, and twelve pounders: what pieces there were of larger calibre had mostly been recovered from the canal into which the French had thrown them on their retreat. Great part of the cannon balls also were what the French had fired or left behind them. To prevent all danger from the explosion of their magazines, it was determined not to prepare a stock of gunpowder, but to make it day by day as it should be wanted; and this could easily be done, because

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.

*Cavallero,*  
74—80.  
*Rogniat,*  
4—6.

*The city  
crowded  
with sol-  
diers.*

Zaragoza was the place where all the saltpetre of Aragon was refined. There was no want of musquets, either for the inhabitants or the troops and peasantry with whom the city was crowded. The stores contained corn, wine, brandy, oil, salt-fish, and pulse, sufficient for six months' consumption for 15,000 men : this ought to have been the amount of the garrison ; but fatal circumstances, and the more fatal error of supposing that the means of defence would be in proportion to the number of the defenders, had doubled it. Palafox would have had the central army, as well as his own troops, take refuge there after the battle of Tudela. Castaños indeed led away the wreck of that army in a different direction ; but there were other persons in authority who, not having the same foresight, thought the best means of succouring Zaragoza was by increasing its garrison. The Central Junta fell into this error, and ordered the Valencian government to send thither all the force it could raise, which was not absolutely required for its own safety. A Walloon battalion, which had served during the former siege, was sent from Tarragona. A proclamation was issued from Zaragoza, inviting the dispersed soldiers to repair thither, and fill up the places of their brethren who had fallen in that holy cause, and were already in glory, enjoying their reward. By these means not less than 30,000 regular troops were collected there ; as many as 15,000 peasants entered the city to share in the dangers



and merit of its defence ; and the hospitals were filled with the sick and wounded from Tudela, who had all been removed hither as the place to which they could most easily be conveyed.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.

*Cavallero,*  
82.

Except in the great and fatal error of thus crowding the city with men, the means of defence were wisely provided. That the enemy would effect an entrance was not doubted ; tra-

*Prepara-  
tions within  
the city.*

verses therefore were made in the streets which were near the wall, the doors and the windows of the ground-floor were walled up, communications opened within from house to house, and the house-tops parapeted to secure the defendants. Every householder, providing for life as well as death, laid in ample supplies. The convents were well stored. In the general fervour of national feeling men were as liberal of their means as of their lives. Nor was this feeling confined to those who could gratify it by taking an active part in military service, and by the expectation or the enjoyment of vengeance : among instances of a rarer heroism that of a physician may be noticed, Miguel Guillen by name, who came from Valencia, and, refusing all pay, devoted himself to the service of the hospitals.

Marshal Moncey, on whom the odious service of besieging Zaragoza had been imposed, fixed his head-quarters at Alagon, while he waited for reinforcements, and preparations were making to commence it. At the end of November he reconnoitred the Torrero, a point which it was

*M. Moncey  
reconnoitres  
the Torrero.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
December.

necessary to occupy before he could begin the siege; some warm skirmishes ensued, which tended to encourage the Spaniards, because the enemy, when they had well examined the ground, returned to Alagon. The importance of the Torrero seems not to have been duly appreciated by the Zaragozans; they contented themselves with throwing up some slight works there, faced with unburnt bricks. Moncey had with him 17,000 men, and was joined by Mortier with 14,000 in the middle of December. Meantime a battering train of sixty pieces was brought from Pamplona; projectiles also were supplied from the same arsenal; the country was compelled to furnish means of transport as far as Tudela, and there they were embarked upon the canal.

*The French  
appear be-  
fore the city.*

All being ready, they appeared before Zaragoza on the 20th. Gazan's division crossing the Ebro at Tauste marched to Zuera and Villa Nueva; Suchet's took a position upon the right bank of the river, within a league of the city; and Moncey, following the right bank of the canal, placed one of his divisions on the left of the Guerva, opposite the great sluice, the two others on the right.

*Rogniat, 3.*

*They take  
the Torrero.*

Buonaparte had declared that bombs and mines should bring Zaragoza to reason; and in the spirit of that declaration had prepared the fullest means for overpowering moral resistance by military force. Skilled as he was in the art of war, he did not, like a Mahommedan conqueror, reckon upon numbers for success: to

have employed a larger army (even if the Austrian war had not occurred) would have been wasting men here who might be more serviceably employed in other quarters; there was the difficulty of feeding them, and no danger could be apprehended from any efforts which might be made to raise the siege; but the number of engineers was unusually large, and the means of destruction were in proportion. General Lacoste commanded this department; he was perfect master of his profession, and having served with Buonaparte in Egypt, had acquired at the siege of Cairo some knowledge of the kind of difficulties with which he had now to contend. During the night the enemy erected a battery which commanded the Torrero, and was opened upon it at daybreak: a false attack was made upon that post in front, where the canal covered it; meantime another brigade, which under cover of the olive-yard of St. Joseph had got possession of an aqueduct the preceding evening, passed the canal under that aqueduct, and moved rapidly up the left bank with the intention of interposing between the city and the point of attack. The Spaniards were thrown into confusion by the explosion of an ammunition-cart; and the exertions of a very able officer, and the example of a few steady corps, were not able to restore order or confidence. But, considering the distance of the Torrero from the city, they had expected to lose it, and prepared accordingly; so that by blowing up the Puente

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
*December.*

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.1808.  
*December.**See vol. ii.  
p. 12.**Sebastian  
Hernandez,  
3—5.**Rogniat, 6.  
Cavallero,  
89.*

de America they prevented the cavalry from pursuit, and retreated in good order. The officer who had drawn off his men from this position during the former siege had been put to death with circumstances of great cruelty. It was fortunate for San Marc, the general of the Valencian troops, who now commanded there, that Palafox knew how to appreciate his excellent talents and distinguished worth. For being a Frenchman, he was peculiarly obnoxious to suspicion; and if he had fallen a victim to popular jealousy, the Zaragozans would have lost the ablest military man employed in their defence.

*Unsuccessful  
attack  
upon the  
suburbs.*

Meantime Gazan's division moved from Zuera and Villa Nueva, drove back a corps of Swiss, who were posted on the road to Villa Mayor, dislodged them with the loss of some 300 from the Torre del Arzobispo, and attempted to enter the suburbs by a coup-de-main. This was in conformity to Lacoste's opinion. Its success would materially have facilitated the progress of the besiegers, who might then have established breaching batteries upon the left bank of the Ebro, and opened a way into the city by demolishing the line of houses on the quay. D. Josef Manso, of the royal guards, commanded on that side; and after a severe action, repulsed the enemy: they renewed the attack with their reserve, and the Spaniards gave way. Palafox, who saw from a window what was passing, hurried across the bridge, cut down



some of the runaways, and by his voice and example changed the fate of the day. Time had been gained for San Marc to arrive there with the troops who had retired from the Torrero, and the enemy were repelled with a loss which they stated at 400 men, and the Spaniards at 4000.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1808.  
December.

*Rogniat, 7.  
Cavallero,  
90, 1.*

On the following day Moncey, who had fixed his head-quarters at the Torrero, addressed a letter to Palafox and the magistrates of Zaragoza, warning them that the city was now besieged on all sides, and all its communications cut off, and that he might now employ against it every means of destruction which the laws of war allowed. Madrid, he said, had capitulated, and thereby saved itself from the miseries which a longer resistance must have drawn on. Zaragoza, however she might confide in the courage of her inhabitants, could not possibly succeed against the means which were now brought against her, and her total destruction must be inevitable if she caused those means to be employed. He called upon them to spare the effusion of blood, and save so fine and so estimable a city, and to inspire the people with peaceful sentiments, as the way to deserve their love and gratitude. On his part, he promised them every thing compatible with his feelings, his duty, and the power which the Emperor had given him. Marshal Moncey was an upright and honourable man, unstained by any of the revolutionary crimes; what his feelings were

*Moncey  
summons  
Palafox to  
surrender.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1808.  
*December.**Cavallero,*  
92.  
*Sebastian*  
*Hernandez,*  
6, 7.*The invest-*  
*ment of the*  
*city com-*  
*pleted.*

may therefore well be supposed. Gladly would he have induced the Zaragozans to submit, that he might have saved himself from the enormous guilt of destroying the city and its inhabitants for resisting what he and every man in the French army who acknowledged the difference between right and wrong, felt in their hearts to be an insolent and iniquitous usurpation. Palafox replied to the summons, and told him it was in vain to think of appalling men by the horrors of a siege, who had endured one, and who knew how to die. If Madrid had capitulated (which he could not believe), it had been sold: and what then? Madrid was but a single place, and there was no reason why Zaragoza should yield, when there were 60,000 men determined to defend it. The Marshal had tried them yesterday, and his troops had left at the gates witnesses enough of that determination. It might be more fitting for him to assume a lofty tone, and talk to the Marshal of capitulating, if he would not lose his army before the town. The spirit of eleven million Spaniards was not to be extinguished by oppression; and they who had resolved to be free, were so. As for the blood which Marshal Moncey was desirous of sparing, it was as glorious for the Spaniards to lose it in such a cause, as it was ignominious for the French to be the instruments of shedding it.

During that and the ensuing day General Gazan completed the investment of the suburb.

One of his brigades extended on the right of the Zuera road, the other on the left, with two battalions at the bridge over the Galego on the road to Valencia. The swampy nature of the ground, upon which the inhabitants relied in some degree for their protection on that side, was favourable to the besiegers also, for it enabled them to form inundations along the greater part of their line, which secured them against any sorties. On the right bank Suchet's division, forming the left of the besieging army, extended from the Ebro to the valley of the Huerba; that valley was occupied by Morlot's; Meusnier's was encamped on the heights of the Torrero; and Grandjean's extended from thence to the Ebro on the other end of the bow, where a bridge of boats was laid, to establish their communication with the troops on the side of the suburb. It was determined to make three attacks; one upon the Castle of the Inquisition, with the view of employing the garrison on that side, which was their strongest part; one upon the bridge over the Huerba, where the name of that Pillar which was regarded as the palladium of the city had been given to the redoubt; and the third upon S. Joseph's: this was the immediate object of the enemy; they deemed it the weakest point, and thought to connect their attack against it with an attempt upon the suburb, where Lacoste still hoped that the French might establish themselves. The weather was peculiarly favourable to their operations, being

CHAP.  
XVIII.1808.  
*December.**Rogniat, 7*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1808.  
*December.**Cavallero,*  
95.*Cavallero,*  
94.  
*Rogniat, 9.**Proclama-  
tion of Pa-  
lafox to the  
people of  
Madrid.*

at once mild and dry; the nights were long and dark, and every morning a thick fog effectually covered them from the fire of the besieged, who could never see where to point their guns till it was near mid-day. Meantime they were not idle; a line of counter-approaches was commenced which compelled the enemy to prolong their works, lest they should be enfiladed; sallies were made from S. Joseph's to interrupt them, and to cut down the olive-trees and destroy the buildings which afforded them cover; and on the last day of the year the Spaniards made a general attempt along the whole line. It was every where repulsed; but Palafox, who knew of what importance it was to excite a spirit of emulation in the troops, ordered those who had distinguished themselves by some partial success to wear a red riband as a badge of honour on the breast. He addressed a proclamation also to the people of Madrid. The dogs by whom he was beset, he said, scarcely left him time to clean his sword from their blood, but they still found their grave at Zaragoza. The defenders of that city might be destroyed, but compelled to surrender they could not be: and he promised that, so soon as he was at liberty, he would hasten to the deliverance of Madrid. All Palafox's proclamations were in the same spirit; his language had the high tone, and something of the inflation of Spanish romance, suiting the character of those to whom it was directed.



At the beginning of the year Mortier received orders to move upon Calatayud with Suchet's division. It was thought that they would be more serviceably employed in keeping that part of Aragon in awe, than in forwarding the operations of the siege. The position which they left was filled up by extending Morlot's division, and securing its front by three redoubts. Moncey and Mortier, holding independent commands, appear to have been mutually jealous of each other; and Gazan, conceiving that his orders required him only to cover the siege, refused to make any farther attempt upon the suburb, after the severe repulse which he had sustained, strongly as the commandant of the engineers advised a second attack. The arrival of Junot to take the command did not put an end to this disunion: there were indeed plain indications, that if Buonaparte had died at this time, his generals, like Alexander's, would have made some atonement to mankind by taking vengeance upon each other. The works, however, went on, under a heavy fire; and on the 10th eight batteries were opened against St. Joseph and the redoubt of the Pillar. Colonel Mariano de Renovales commanded the former post, a man who made himself conspicuous throughout the whole course of the war by his activity and enterprising courage. An old brick convent, and works faced with unburnt bricks, were soon demolished; and in the night it was found necessary to remove the heavy artillery into the

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
January.*Junot takes  
the com-  
mand of the  
French.**St. Joseph's  
and the re-  
doubt of the  
Pillar taken.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
January.

town, as it could no longer be used. A brave sally was made at midnight against one of the batteries; but the adventurers were taken in flank by two guns placed at the right of the second parallel, and being exposed to a murderous fire in front, retreated with considerable loss. The next day, the convent being in ruins, and the breach practicable, an assault was made in the evening; at the same time a party of the enemy, turning the convent, effected an entrance by a bridge which the besieged had neglected to remove, and obtained possession of the ruins. The French employed three days in repairing the works and connecting them with their second parallel. It had been an easy but an important conquest; for they were now secured against the garrison on that side by the river, and by an escarp eight feet high. On the 15th they attacked the redoubt . . it was defended by the second regiment of Aragonese volunteers, and it was not till the works were reduced to ruins, and the flower of that regiment had perished, that the survivors retreated into the city, and blew up the bridge. A second parallel was then opened against the town, which had now no longer any defence on this side but its feeble wall and the houses themselves.

*Rogniat,*  
11, 14.  
*Cavallero,*  
96.

*Rumours of  
success, and  
rejoicings in  
the city.*

Meantime a tremendous bombardment was kept up upon this devoted city. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants was not abated by the loss of their outworks: from the beginning they knew that this contest must come to the knife's

point, and the event of the former siege made them look with full hope for a similar deliverance. They were encouraged also by false rumours which arrived announcing a victory over Buonaparte by the combined armies of Romana and Sir John Moore. Palafox immediately announced it in an extraordinary gazette; it was just as night closed; the people crowded into the streets and squares, the bands of all the regiments were collected, bells were rung, salutes fired, and the multitude with shouts and acclamations of joy went in tumultuous procession to the Church of the Pillar, to return thanksgiving, and join in the hymn of *Salve Regina*. The besiegers heard the music and the uproar, and ascribed to the artifices of Palafox and the other leaders what was in fact the genuine impulse of public feeling. By good fortune the bombardment was suspended at the time, but in the course of the night more than six hundred shells were thrown into the city.

The worst evil arising from the bombardment was one which had not been anticipated from that cause, and against which, had it been foreseen, it would hardly have been possible to provide. A great number of the inhabitants retired into cellars, the women especially retreated there with their children, for security from the shells. In these long low vaults, where wine and oil had formerly been kept, they were crowded together day and night, where it was necessary to burn lamps during

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
January.

*Rogniat,*  
15.  
*Seb. Hernandez,* 13.

*An infectious disease appears in the city.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

the day, and where fresh air entered as scantily as daylight. Such places soon became hot-beds of infection, and other causes contributed to extend the calamity. On the first day of the siege, when the attack was made upon the suburbs, part of the troops, exhausted by the previous exertions, were under arms for some hours in the Cozo, exposed first to a heavy snow, and then to a severe frost: this produced a catarrh, which proved infectious, and was soon followed by all the dreadful symptoms of camp contagion. The number of soldiers and of countrymen would at any time have crowded the city, but more especially now, when the inhabitants of all those houses which were prepared and blockaded for street warfare were compelled to seek quarters in the inner parts of the town. The Murcian and Valencian troops came from a country where great part of their food consisted in fresh or preserved fruits; the mere change of diet from such aliment to garrison stores was sufficient to produce disease. They had also been used to drink well water: change of water is a cause of illness as frequent as it is unsuspected; and that of the Ebro, though it is preferred by the Aragonese to any other, is thought unwholesome for those who are not accustomed to it. To these causes must be added scantiness of food (an evil consequent upon the fatal error of crowding the place with men), unusual exertions, and the impossibility of recruiting exhausted strength by needful sleep in



a city which was now bombarded without intermission; and among that part of the population who were not immediately engaged in the defence, fear, anxiety, and perpetual agitation of mind, predisposing the body for endemic disease.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
January.

Every rumour of success, however preposterous in its circumstances, and incredible in itself, was readily believed by the Zaragozans; they were too ill-informed to judge of probabilities, or to understand the real condition of their country; but this they knew, that if in other parts the Spaniards did their duty as devoutly as they themselves were discharging it, the deliverance of Zaragoza and the triumph of Spain were certain. They were always in hope that some vigorous effort would be made for their relief; and, to accelerate this, D. Francisco Palafox left the city, embarked at night in a little boat, and descending the Ebro and getting to Alcañiz, began to organize the peasantry, who lost no opportunity of harassing the enemy's communications. His situation, like that of the Marquez de Lazan, was truly pitiable; not only their brother, but their wives and families, were in Zaragoza, . . . to them more than to any other individuals the inhabitants looked for succour, from the same hereditary feeling which had made them at the beginning of their troubles turn as it were naturally to the house of Palafox for a leader. But both were ordinary men, unequal to the emergency in every thing except

*Attempts of  
Lazan and  
Francisco  
Palafox to  
succour the  
city.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

in good-will. General Doyle was in Catalonia; he had passed through Zaragoza on his way to that province, had commanded the Spanish cavalry in a spirited and successful affair at Olite a few days before the battle of Tudela, and as a complimentary memorial of that service, Palafox had formed a legion, and named it after him. From him also, as an Englishman, the Zaragozans expected aid, and if zeal and activity could have supplied the place of adequate means, their expectations would not have been disappointed. He had been indefatigable in his exertions for storing the city before the French encamped around it: he succeeded by repeated representations to the local and provincial Juntas in making them put Mequinenza in a state of defence, . . an old town with a castle which commanded the navigation of the Ebro, about half way between Zaragoza and its mouth; and he was now endeavouring to make Reding attempt something in aid of the besieged city.

*Condition  
of the army  
in Catalo-  
nia.*

St. Cyr had not known how to improve a victory so well as the Spaniards did how to remedy a defeat. As soon as the fugitives from Molins de Rey brought the first tidings of their rout to Tarragona, the populace, supposing themselves to be betrayed, rose tumultuously, and took the power into their own hands. They blocked up the gates, unpaved the streets, and removed the stones to the windows and varandas, that they might be ready for a civic defence.

They got possession of the arsenal, and distributed the arms and ammunition; they moved the artillery from one place to another, at the will of any one who fancied himself qualified to give orders; and they called out for the head of Vives, as the traitor who had been the cause of all their misfortunes. In this imminent danger Vives made a formal resignation of the command, and Reding, upon whom it devolved, was enabled to save his life by letting him be put in confinement. The superior Junta, apprehensive alike of the populace and of a siege or an immediate assault, got out of the city as soon as they could (for the people had forbidden any person to leave it), and fixed themselves at Tortosa, leaving, however, two of their members to represent them in the Junta of that district. If while this insubordination prevailed the French had attempted to carry the place by a coup-de-main, they might probably have succeeded; but St. Cyr was not so well acquainted with the inability of the Spaniards as with the difficulties of his own position. A few days after the battle a strong detachment of French appeared before the city; the generale was beaten, the somaten was sounded from the Cathedral, one of the forts fired, and the place was in the utmost confusion, when a flag of truce arrived, with a request that an aid-de-camp of M. St. Cyr might be allowed to confer with General Vives. Reding, to whom the letter was delivered, suspected that the real intent

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

---

*Reding  
takes the  
command.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*January.*

must be to discover the state of the place; he communicated it to the Junta, and two of their members, with two officers, were sent out to know the purport of the mission. It was not without difficulty that these persons could get out of the gate, so fearful were the people of being betrayed; the general opinion was, that the French had sent to summon the town, and the universal cry was, that they would not capitulate, they would listen to no such proposals, they would die for their king, their religion, and their country. It proved, however, that the aid-de-camp came only to propose an exchange of prisoners. The impolicy of agreeing to this was obvious; but Reding knew how ill the prisoners on both sides were treated, and thought it due to humanity to exchange them. The advantage was wholly on the enemy's side; they received disciplined soldiers, who had now been many months in the country, and had had opportunities since their capture of observing the state of the Spaniards, and even learning their intentions, for every thing like secrecy seemed to be despised; and they gave in return only men of the new levies, not exchanging a single dragoon or artilleryman, nor one of the Swiss troops.

*Cabanes,*  
*p. iii. c. 13.*

*The army  
reformed in  
Tarragona.*

Reding was fully sensible how injurious it was that the enemy should thus be enabled to fill up their ranks; he suffered it, however, for the sake of mitigating the evils of a war in which he considered success absolutely hopeless. From



the same hopelessness he committed the greater error of suffering himself to be surrounded by persons, some of whom were suspected by the superior Junta, and others by himself: but with this there was a generous feeling mingled; he would not, because they were unpopular, cease to employ men of whom he had a good opinion, nor would he upon a strong suspicion of guilt dismiss others as if they were guilty. His despondency was rooted in the constitution of his mind, but it did not make him omit any efforts for enabling the army again to take the field; and it was one happy part of the Spanish character, that no defeat, however complete and disgraceful, produced any effect in dispiriting the nation. The very men who, taking panic in battle, threw down their arms and fled, believed they had done their country good service by saving themselves for an opportunity of better fortune; and as soon as they found themselves in safety, were ready to be enrolled and take their chance again. Such of the runaways as had reached the Ebro, when they could get no farther, turned back, and came in troops to Tarragona. They came in pitiabie condition, and without arms: . . Reding knew not where to look but to the English for money and muskets, and a failure of powder also was apprehended, the materials having hitherto been supplied from Zaragoza. It would have been madness to have attempted punishing any of these fugitives; the better mode of impressing

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*January.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*January.*

upon them a sense of military duty was to let them see that their superiors could not behave ill with impunity: Reding therefore degraded one colonel and several inferior officers for their conduct at Molins de Rey, and made them serve in the ranks; but by posting them in advanced parties gave them an opportunity of retrieving their character and their rank. The government never acted with so much energy as when it was refitting an army after a defeat: its efforts were then such as the danger required. Two regiments arrived from Granada, a Swiss one from Majorca; supplies were sent from Valencia; men came in from all quarters as the hopes of the people rose, and by the middle of January the force in Tarragona was not inferior to that which had been so shamefully dispersed at Granollers. The men recovered heart, and acquired confidence from frequent success in the desultory warfare wherein Reding practised them. But he himself continued \* to despond; and, in sad anticipation of defeat, deferred acting, when activity and enterprise might have found or made opportunities for success.

*Cabanes,*  
*p. iii. c. 13.*

*Conduct of  
the French  
under St.  
Cyr.*

It was their victories which made the French most sensible of the difference between this and the other wars wherein they had been engaged; .. the spoils of the field were the only fruits of

\* M. Gouvion St. Cyr, who renders justice in other respects to General Reding, represents him as full of confidence at this time, and dreaming of a second

affair of Baylen. It is upon the most indisputable authority, confirmed too by his own dispatches, that I have delineated his state of mind so differently.

success. These indeed had been of signal consequence in Catalonia; they had enabled St. Cyr to relieve Barcelona, to refit his troops, and to strengthen himself with a park of field-pieces. He had profited by the first panic to dislodge the Spaniards from the pass of Bruch, which they had twice so gloriously defended; his troops had entered Igualada after the success, and the dangerous impression which his ostentation of justice and his observance of the humanities of war were likely to produce upon the wealthier classes, was seen by the conduct of the inhabitants, who seemed to think it a matter of indifference whether their houses were occupied by the national troops or by the French. But the system upon which Buonaparte carried on this wicked war rendered it impossible for any general to persist in a course of honourable conduct. The army which he had ordered into Catalonia was left to provide for itself, in a province which had now been many months the seat of war, and which never even in peace produced half its own consumption of corn. It had also to store the places of Rosas, Figueras, and Barcelona; for no attempt was made to bring provisions from France by land. . . (the pass indeed between Bellegarde and Figueras was so dangerous to the French, that they called it the Straits of Gibraltar); and it was seldom that a vessel could escape the vigilance of the British cruisers. Eleven victuallers intended for Barcelona were

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
January.

lying in the port of Caldaques under convoy of a cutter and a lugger, when Lord Cochrane landed his men, drove the French from the town, took their batteries, and captured the whole. St. Cyr, however humane by nature, however honourable by principle, was engaged in a service with which humanity and honour were incompatible: he could support his army by no other means than by plundering the inhabitants, and the Catalans were not a people who would endure patiently to be plundered. The difficulty was increased by the Moorish custom still retained in that part of Spain of preserving corn, not in barns or granaries, but in mattamores. In the towns these subterranean magazines were emptied before the French could enter; in the country they were so easily concealed, that, after long and wearying search, it was a rare fortune to discover one. And the Miquelets and Somatenes were so constantly on the alert, that frequently when the marauders had seized their booty they were deprived of it. In this sort of warfare their loss was generally greater than that of the natives, who on such occasions had them at vantage. How considerable it must have been may be in some degree estimated from the fact, that in the course of seven weeks St. Cyr's foraging parties fired away not less than two million cartridges.

*St. Cyr,*  
92—99.

*Orders to  
attempt the  
relief of Za-  
ragoza.*

But plainly as it would have been the policy of the Spaniards to confine themselves to the



slow and sure method of weeding out their invaders, till they could bring their regular troops into a fit state for taking the field, the pressing danger of Zaragoza called for immediate efforts. Francisco Palafox, looking every where for that aid which was nowhere to be found, had gone to Cuenca, and proposing that Infantado should march the central army to his brother's relief, had been present at a council where the proposal was discussed, and had seen with his own eyes how utterly incapable that army was of engaging in such an attempt, or even of attempting such a march. Orders to undertake something for its relief had been dispatched from the Central Junta to the provinces of Valencia and Catalonia. The Valencians were offended with Palafox for having detained General St. Marc with a division of their army; no man contributed more by his military talents to the defence of the city than that general, but he and his men were now cooped up to die of pestilence, when they might have effectually served the Zaragozans in the field. Want of will therefore made the Valencians take only half measures, and these so tardily as to be of no avail. Neither did Reding manifest the feeling which he ought to have partaken upon this subject, partly because the sense of his own difficulties possessed him, and partly perhaps from a personal dislike to the Palafox family. One natural consequence of thus delaying succour

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

---

*Infantado,*  
*Manifiesto,*  
87.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.

January.

*Tardiness  
in obeying  
them.*

*Defeat of  
the pea-  
santry.*

*Alcaniz oc-  
cupied by  
the French.*

*Rogniat,  
17.*

in quarters where there was most ability was to produce premature and rash attempts on the part of those who felt more generously. Palafox had written to say, that as long as provisions lasted, and there were ruins to shelter them, Zaragoza would not surrender. The place chosen for a depot was Mequinenza, and there, chiefly by the exertions of General Doyle, stores in considerable quantity were collected; but impatient of waiting, when time was so precious, till a well-concerted attempt to introduce supplies could be made, a Colonel who had several thousand peasants under his command moved to Belchite, within five leagues of Zaragoza, with a convoy under protection of this force, which was as unmanageable in a body, as it might have been efficient in its proper mode of warfare. The enemy, at the beginning of the siege, had stationed General Vathier at Fuentes with 600 cavalry and 1200 foot to command the country and collect provisions. This movement of the peasants was too near him to be concealed; he fell upon them, routed them with some slaughter, and got possession of all their stores. The pursuit led him as far as Ixar, and from thence he proceeded against Alcaniz. The peasantry whom Francisco Palafox had collected there drew up on the heights before the town, and withstood the attack with more firmness than might have been expected from such a force; but they were not equal to contend

with disciplined troops; and Vathier occupied the towns of Alcaniz and Cuspe as long as the siege endured.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

These misfortunes did not discourage the Spaniards, and the movements of the inhabitants both in Navarre and Aragon were formidable enough to excite some uneasiness in the besiegers. While the Navarrese bands interrupted their communication with Pamplona, the mountaineers of Soria threatened Tudela, and those of the Sierra de Muela endangered their hospitals and establishments at Alagon Lazan, meantime, with his brother Francisco, occupied the country from Villa Franca de Ebro to Licineña and Zuera, and sending detachments as far as Capavrosa to intercept the enemy's convoys, straitened Gazan's division in their camp. More than once the French were without meat, and upon half rations of bread; and they might have been foiled a second time before Zaragoza, more shamefully than the first, if the heroism of the inhabitants had been in any degree seconded from without, and if the want of capacity in the Spanish leaders had not been as glaring as the want of order in the field and of reason in their councils. The besiegers had felt some ill effects from the latter cause; but an end was put to jarring pretensions and contrariant views when Marshal Lasnes arrived on the 22d of January to take the command. He had previously ordered Mortier to leave Calatayud, and act with Suchet's division on the left of the Ebro; having

*Movement  
in Navarre  
and Aragon.*

*M. Lasnes  
takes the  
command.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*January.**Rogniat,*  
18, 20.*He summons Palafox to surrender.*  
*Jan. 25.**Cavallero,*  
107.  
*Seb. Hernandez,* 14,  
15.*The French enter the city, but with great loss.*  
*Jan. 26.*

dispersed the force which Francisco Palafox had collected there, they took possession of Zuera, and scouring the country as far as Pina, Sariñeña, and Huesca, secured the besiegers from interruption on that side. The French Marshal hoped that this might abate the spirit of the Zaragozans as much as it had cheered them when they saw the force of their countrymen upon the surrounding heights; and he addressed a letter to Palafox, telling him that the force upon which he had relied for relief had been destroyed, that the English had fled to Coruña and embarked there, leaving 7000 prisoners, and that Romana had escaped with them, his army with their officers having yielded to the Emperor: that Infantado had been defeated at Ucles with the loss of 18,000 men; and that if after this true statement he persisted in withstanding a force more than sufficient for effecting its purpose, the destruction of the city and of its inhabitants must rest upon his head. Palafox replied, that M. Lasnes would cover himself with glory if he were to win the city by force of manly courage with the sword, and not by bombarding it; but that the Zaragozans knew their duty, and would not surrender.

All the outworks had now been taken except the Castle of the Inquisition, which had never been seriously attacked, because its possession was of no importance to the enemy. The batteries against the city itself were completed, and on the day after the summons fifty pieces opened



their fire upon the wall, and on the morrow three practicable breaches were made. One was by an oil-mill, a building standing alone, without the walls, and close to them; the enemy had established themselves in it during the night. The second was to the left of this, immediately opposite S. Joseph's; the third in the monastery of S. Engracia. All these were attacked. A column issuing from the oil-mill presently reached the first, and the explosion of two fougades at the foot of the breach scarcely appeared to impede their progress. But they found an inner intrenchment, well constructed and mounted with two guns; and when they attempted to carry this the bell of the Torre Nueva rang, the inhabitants manned the adjacent houses, and a fire was opened from roofs and windows which it was neither possible to return nor to withstand. Profiting, however, by the cover which the exploded fougades afforded them, they succeeded in lodging themselves upon the breach. On the left they were more successful; after gaining the ramparts, they made their way into the opposite house, which the artillery had breached, and into the two adjoining ones; their progress was then stopped, but they established themselves within the walls, and repaired and lengthened for their own use a double caponier, by which the besieged used to communicate with S. Joseph's. The attack upon the third breach was more formidable. After a severe struggle the enemy entered the

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*January.*

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
January.

convent of S. Engracia, obtained possession of its ruins and of the nunnery of S. Joseph, which stood near, and of which little more than the mere shell was remaining. Piercing the walls of this, they enfiladed the curtain from S. Engracia to the bridge of the Huerba, and taking the *tête-de-pont* in reverse, became masters of the bridge, over which fresh troops joined them to follow up their success. They pushed on to the Capuchin convent of La Trinidad, which made part of the line; forty artillerymen, who were stationed there without support, as a place not in danger of attack, were cut to pieces at their guns, and the convent was taken. It was recovered by the Spaniards; but two battalions came to support the assailants, who took it a second time, and maintained their conquest, though at a dear price. The greater part of the French who occupied the curtain fell under the fire from the houses. They suffered also considerably in a vain attempt to possess themselves of a single house which defended an imperfect breach to the right of all their other attacks. Their whole loss was stated by themselves at 600, that of the besiegers at eight. The Spaniards, with better reason, believed that a much greater proportion of the enemy had fallen; and the French had in fact received so severe a lesson, that they determined not to risk any more direct attacks, but proceed always as much as possible under cover: there was danger otherwise that the troops would become

*Rogniat,*  
22, 26.  
*Cavallero,*  
102—105.

impatient of so fatal a service, and even that all their efforts might be unavailing.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*January.*

As it was now no longer necessary to carry on the false attack upon the Aljafaria, the engineers were called from thence to fortify the Trinidad convent, and establish a communication with it and with a house by the bridge; commanding in this manner the whole intermediate space. During the night the Spaniards endeavoured to recover the ruins of S. Engracia and the adjoining houses, but without success. They attempted twice also to regain the Trinidad, and once succeeded so far as to force open the church door: the enemy had formed an epaulement within of bags of earth, and fought to advantage behind that protection. A friar was at the head of the assailants, with a sword in one hand and the crucifix in the other; one of his brethren was killed in the act of administering extreme unction to a Spaniard who was mortally wounded; another took the holy oil from the slain, and continued to perform the same office to his dying countrymen. Women also mingled with the combatants, distributing cartridges to them, and bearing refreshments to their sons, their husbands, and fathers, and sometimes rushing upon the enemy when these dear relatives fell, to revenge their deaths, and to die with them.

*The enemy establish themselves in the Trinidad convent.*

*Rogniat, 25, 28. Cavallero, 105.*

The French had in vain attempted to get possession of the convents of S. Augustin and S. Monica. Having been repelled in assaulting

*Convents of S. Augustin and S. Monica won. Feb. 1.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

the breaches, they sprung a mine under the partition wall, and by that means effected an entrance, turning all the works which the Spaniards had constructed for their defence. They forced their way into the church. Every column, every chapel, every altar, became a point of defence, which was repeatedly attacked, taken, and retaken, and attacked again; the pavement was covered with blood, and the aisles and nave of the church strewed with the dead, who were trampled under foot by the combatants. In the midst of this conflict the roof, which had been shattered by bombs, fell in; the few who were not crushed, after a short pause which this tremendous shock and the sense of their own escape occasioned, renewed the fight with increased desperation: fresh parties of the enemy poured in: monks, and citizens, and soldiers came to the defence, and the contest was continued upon the ruins and the bodies of the dead and the dying. It ended in favour of the invaders, who succeeded in keeping the disputed position. Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded while the attention of the Spaniards was directed to this point, they entered the Rua Quemada, where no attack was at that time apprehended, and got possession of one side of the street to the angle which it makes with the Cozo: their sappers were beginning to pierce the walls of the houses, barricade the doors and windows, and establish traverses in the street, when the Zaragozans charged them



with redoubled spirit, drove them out with considerable loss, and recovered four houses which had been taken on a preceding day. At the same time an attack was made on the side of S. Engracia, when, after exploding two mines, the Poles got possession of some ruined houses ; but in obtaining this success, General Lacoste, the French commandant of engineers, was killed. His opponent, Colonel San Genis, had fallen the preceding day : he was succeeded by Colonel Zappino, Lacoste by Colonel Rogniat.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

Rogniat,  
27, 30.  
Cavallero,  
106.

Now that the city was open to the invaders, the contest was to be carried on once more in the streets and houses. But the French had been taught by experience that in such domestic warfare the Zaragozans derived a superiority from the feeling and principle which inspired them, and the cause wherein they were engaged. They had learned that the only means of conquering it was to destroy it house by house, and street by street ; and upon this system of destruction they proceeded. Three companies of miners and eight of sappers carried on this subterranean war. The Spaniards had officers who could have opposed them with not inferior skill ; but men were wanting, and the art of sapping and mining is not one which can be learned on the spot where it is wanted ; their attempts therefore were frequently discovered, and the men suffocated in their own works. Nor indeed had they been more expert could powder have been supplied for their consumption. The stock

*The enemy  
proceed by  
mining.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

with which the Zaragozans began had been exhausted; they had none but what they manufactured day by day, and no other cannon-balls than those which had been fired against them, and which they collected and fired back upon the enemy.

*Progress of  
the pesti-  
lence.*

The Zaragozans expected miracles for their deliverance; and they exerted themselves so excellently well, that the French, with all their advantages, would have found themselves unequal to the enterprise in which they were engaged, and other armies must have been brought up to supply more thousands for the slaughter, if the defenders had not been suffering under an evil which in their circumstances it was equally impossible to prevent or to alleviate. The consequences of that evil, when it had once appeared, were but too surely to be apprehended; and in bitter anticipation, yet while a hope remained, an Aragonese exclaimed, Zaragoza surrenders not, if God is neutral! If the seasons had only held their ordinary course, this heroic people might a second time have delivered themselves. In that part of Spain January is commonly a wet month. Had the rains fallen as usual, the enemy would hardly have been able to complete their approaches; had the weather, on the contrary, been severe, it might have stopped the contagion, and then the city would have had hands as well as hearts for its defence. But the season proved at once dry enough for the ground to be in the most fa-

*Miralles,  
Elogio de  
Zaragoza,  
p. 42.*

vourable state for the besiegers' operations, and mild enough to increase the progress of the disease, which was now more destructive than the enemy, though no enemy ever employed the means of destruction with less remorse. When once the pestilence had begun it was impossible to check its progress, or confine it to one quarter of the city. It was not long before more than thirty hospitals were established; . . as soon as one was destroyed by the bombardment the patients were removed to some other building which was in a state to afford them temporary shelter, and thus the infection was carried to every part of Zaragoza. The average of daily deaths from this cause was at this time not less than three hundred and fifty; men stretched upon straw, in helpless misery lay breathing their last, and with their dying breath spreading the mortal taint of their own disease, who, if they had fallen in action, would have died with the exultation of martyrs. Their sole comfort was the sense of having performed their duty religiously to the uttermost . . all other alleviations were wanting; neither medicines nor necessary food were to be procured, nor needful attendance . . for the ministers of charity themselves became victims of the disease. All that the most compassionate had now to bestow was a little water in which rice had been boiled, and a winding-sheet. The nuns, driven from their convents, knew not where to take refuge, nor where to find shelter for their dying

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
February.Cavallero,  
71.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

sisters. The Church of the Pillar was crowded with poor creatures, who, despairing of life, hoped now for nothing more than to die in the presence of the tutelary saint. The clergy were employed night and day in administering the sacraments to the dying, till they themselves sunk under the common calamity. The slightest wound produced gangrene and death in bodies so prepared for dissolution by distress of mind, agitation, want of proper aliment and of sleep. For there was now no respite neither by day nor night for this devoted city; even the natural order of light and darkness was destroyed in Zaragoza: by day it was involved in a red sulphureous atmosphere of smoke and dust, which hid the face of heaven; by night the fire of cannon and mortars, and the flames of burning houses, kept it in a state of horrible illumination. The cemeteries could no longer afford room for the dead; huge pits were dug to receive them in the streets and in the courts of the public buildings, till hands were wanting for the labour; they were laid before the churches, heaped upon one another, and covered with sheets; and that no spectacle of horror might be wanting, it happened not unfrequently that these piles of mortality were struck by a shell, and the shattered bodies scattered in all directions.

*Sebastian  
Hernandez,  
p. 17.  
Cavallero,  
p. 108.*

*First talk  
of surrender  
in the city.*

On the 1st of February the situation of the city appeared so desperate, that persons of approved and unquestionable patriotism came to



the Regent of the Royal Audience of Aragon, D. Pedro Maria Ric, and besought him to represent to Palafox the necessity of capitulating; but Ric, with a spirit like that of Palafox himself, could not submit to this while there was any possibility of prolonging the defence. He knew that of all examples there is none which makes so sure and so powerful an impression as that of heroic suffering; and that if Zaragoza were defended to the last gasp, the influence of its fall under such circumstances would be not less honourable and hardly less salutary than a happier termination. Nor indeed would the people have consented to a surrender; their spirit was unsubdued, and the principle which supported it retained all its force. The worst effect of their sense of increasing danger was, that it increased their suspicions, always too easily excited; and to those suspicions several persons were sacrificed, being with or without proof hung during the night in the Cozo and in the market-place. The character indeed of the struggle was such as to excite the most implacable indignation and hatred against an enemy, who having begun the war with such unexampled treachery, prosecuted it with a ferocity equally unexampled in later ages.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

D. P. M.  
Ric, *Semanario Pa-  
triotico*,  
No. 28,  
p. 214.  
*Cavallero*,  
p. 110.

Four days the French were employed in forming three galleries to cross the Rua Quemada. They failed in two; the third opened into the cellar of an undefended house; thence they made way along great part of the street from

*The contest  
carried on  
by fire.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

house to house, and crossing another street by means of a double epaulement of bags of earth, established themselves in the ruins of a house which formed an angle of the Cozo and of the Rua del Medio. Their next object was to get possession of the Escuelas Pias, a building which commanded some traverses made for defending the Cozo. The French often attacked it, and were as often repulsed; they then attempted the adjoining houses. The system of blowing up the houses exposed them to an evil which had not been foreseen, for when they attempted to establish themselves upon the ruins, the Spaniards from the dwellings near fired upon them with sure effect. They endeavoured therefore so to proportion the charge in their mines as to breach the house without destroying it; but to deprive them of the cover which they would thus have obtained, the Zaragozans with characteristic desperation set fire now to every house before they abandoned it. They began this mode of defence here, maintaining the entrance till they had prepared the building for burning; for so little wood was used in the construction, that it was necessary to smear the floors and beams with melted resin, to make them more combustible. When all was ready they then set fire to the place, and retired into the Escuelas Pias, interposing thus a barrier of flames between them and the assailants. The enemy endeavoured in vain to extinguish the fire under a shower of balls; and the time thus

gained was employed by the Zaragozans in forming new works of defence. Unable to win the Schools by any other means, the enemy at length prepared a mine, which was discovered too late for the Spaniards to frustrate their purpose, but in time to disappoint them of their expected advantage by setting fire to the disputed edifice.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

*Rogniat,*  
30, 1.  
*Cavallero,*  
121.  
*Feb. 7.*

On the same day operations were renewed against the suburbs, where the enemy, at the commencement of the siege, had received so severe a repulse. General Gazan, availing himself of an ambiguity in his orders, had, after that lesson, contented himself with keeping up the blockade; nor could any representation induce him to engage in more active operations, till M. Lasnes arrived with authority to enforce his orders. The Convent of Jesus, situated on the road to Barcelona, formed part of the defence on that side; the engineers, not having time to rase it, deeming it better that it should be occupied than abandoned for the enemy. Trenches were now opened against this building, and twenty battering pieces soon effected a breach, which was carried almost as easily as it had been made; but when the enemy, flushed with success, entered the suburbs in pursuit of the retreating garrison, they were driven out with great slaughter, as on their former attempt. They entrenched themselves, however, on the ruins of the convent, established a communication with it, and lodgements on the right and left.

*Convent of*  
*Jesus taken*  
*in the sub-*  
*urbs.*

*Rogniat,*  
34, 35.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.

February.

*S. Francisco*  
*taken.*

The attack in the centre was pursued with the same vigour, and resisted with the same desperate determination. Every door, every staircase, every chamber was disputed; the French abandoned all attacks to the left for the sake of concentrating their efforts here, that they might the sooner reach the Cozo, extend themselves along it to the right as far as the quay, and thus connect their operations with those of Gazan on the other side the Ebro: and these increased efforts were met with proportionate exertions by the Zaragozans. Grenades were thrown from one floor to another, and bombs were rolled among the enemy, when they were so near that the Spaniards who rolled them expected themselves also to perish by the explosion. Their resolution seemed, if it were possible, to increase with their danger; every spot was defended with more obstinacy than the last; and this temper would have been, as it deserved to be, invincible, if pestilence the while had not been consuming them faster than fire and sword. The sense of honour as well as of duty was carried to its highest point; the officers preferred dying upon the stations which they had been appointed to defend, rather than to live after having lost them, though every possible resistance had been made. On this side, after having occupied and been driven from the vaults of the Hospital, which had been reduced to ruins in the former siege, the enemy succeeded at length in carrying a gallery to the great con-



vent of S. Francisco; . . a countermine was prepared, which compelled them to stop before they could get under the walls of the convent. The engineer, Major Breuille, immediately charged the mine with three thousand weight of powder, and fired it, having drawn by feigned preparations for an assault as many Spaniards as he could within the sphere of destruction. The explosion was terrible, and brought down part of the building: the enemy rushed through the breach, and making way into the church, formed an epaulement there to establish themselves. Some Zaragozans who were acquainted with the building got, by passages connected with the tower, upon the cornices of the church; others mounted the roof, and broke holes in it, and from thence they poured down grenades upon the invaders, and drove them from their post. The ruins of this convent, which had been burnt during the first siege, and now shattered by the mine, were disputed two whole days, till the defenders at length were driven from the last chapel by the bayonet. For the advantage now both in numbers and in physical power was on the side of the enemy, the pestilence having so wasted the Spaniards, that men enough could not be provided to man the points which were attacked without calling up from the hospitals those who had yet strength enough to use a weapon.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

*Rogniat,*  
36.  
*Cavallero,*  
126.

From the tower of this building the French

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
February.*The French  
begin to  
murmur.*

commanded the Cozo for a musket-shot distance on either side. After many desperate attempts their miners succeeded in crossing that street ; but they were baffled in their attacks upon the University, and so many of their officers and best soldiers had fallen in this murderous struggle, that the disgust which ought to have been excited by their abominable cause was produced by the difficulty which they found in pursuing it. Not the men alone, but the officers also, began to complain that they were worn out, though they had as yet only taken a fourth part of the town ; it was necessary, they said, to wait for reinforcements, otherwise they should all be buried in these cursed ruins, before they could drive the fanatics from their last retreat. Marshal Lasnes represented to them, that destructive as the mode of war was, it was more so to the besieged than to them, whose operations were directed by more skill, and carried on by men trained to such service ; that pestilence was doing their work ; and that if these desperate madmen chose to renew the example of Numantia, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city, bombs and mines would not now be long in destroying the last of them. Marshal Lasnes was a man after the Emperor Napoleon's own heart ; with so little honourable feeling, that he regarded the Zaragozans merely as madmen ; and with so little human feeling, that he would have completed the destruction of

*Rogniat,*  
38.

the city and its last inhabitants with the same insensibility that he declared his intention of doing so.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

S. Genis had repeatedly said, "Let me never be appealed to if there is any question of capitulating, for I shall never be of opinion that we can no longer defend ourselves." In the same spirit Palafox wrote to his friend General Doyle: "Within the last forty-eight hours," said he, "6000 shells have been thrown in; two-thirds of the city are in ruins; but we will perish under the ruins of the remaining part, rather than surrender." It was not by any promises or hopes of external succour that this spirit was supported. Palafox well knew that no efforts would be wanting on the part of his brothers, or of his friends; but he knew also what divided counsels and jarring interests were opposed to them, and that willing lives were all they could have had at their command. General Doyle with great exertions got together ammunition and stores at Mequinenza, in the beginning of February; and the Marques de Lazan took the field from Lerida with a nominal force of 7000 foot and 250 horse to attempt something for the relief of the besieged city. It was soon learnt by their spies that a corps of 10,000 foot and 800 horse was ready to oppose them; and rather than make an attempt which must inevitably have ended in the utter rout of his ill-disciplined troops, Lazan waited at Monzon, to be joined by a division from Valencia,

*Not even an attempt is made to relieve the city.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

which the Junta of that kingdom had at last consented to send across the Ebro. But a French division in Aragon threatened to impede the junction: ammunition was wanted from Lerida, which the Junta of that city demurred at granting; time was consumed in miserable counsels and hopeless expectation, Lazan looking to Reding for some great exertion, and Reding deterred from attempting any thing, though with a superior force, by total want of confidence in his army, and the suspicion that whatever passed at his head-quarters was immediately communicated to the enemy; and thus while Lazan and his brother were in the most pitiable distress, knowing the state of Zaragoza, where their families were suffering under the unexampled horrors of such a siege, . . while every man in their division partook that feeling which the situation of the besieged excited in all their countrymen . . an anxiety as unexampled as it was great, . . and while every where it was expected that some efforts such as the occasion required would be made; even the most ready and devoted courage was of no avail where preparation, order, discipline, prompt judgement, and vigorous authority were all wanting; and though the province and the nation were in arms, Zaragoza was left to its fate without even an attempt to save it.

*Progress of  
the pesti-  
lence.*

Meantime pestilence was consuming the Zaragozans faster than fire and sword. The points which were not immediately threatened were



now wholly manned by men who rose from their straw in the hospitals, and sate at their posts, unable to support themselves standing, wrapped in their blankets, and shivering or panting for breath, as the ague or the hot fit of the disease might prevail. The officer whose dreadful task it was to choose out patients for the service became in his turn a victim to the contagion. Hopeless of finding relief any where, the sick resigned themselves quietly to their fate; the dying and the dead were buried together beneath the houses which were blown up, or consumed in the flames; and the French found court-yards and chambers filled with corpses, and said themselves that they were fighting now only to obtain possession of a cemetery. The ravages of the disease were such, that many, bearing up with invincible resolution to the last, fell in the streets and died. The enemy did not remit their attacks while death was thus doing their work; they profited by the weakness of the besieged, and opening a fire from their batteries on both sides the Convent of Jesus upon the suburbs, made another attempt upon the feeble works where they had twice been repulsed with such great loss. A fire from fifty pieces soon made the way open, and the bridge being flanked by some of their guns, no succour could be sent from the city. Baron de Versaje, who commanded there, and had distinguished himself in the defence, was killed in repairing to his post. A breach was made

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

---

*Rogniat,*  
39.  
*Cavallere,*  
129.

*Feb. 12.*

*The suburbs  
taken.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

in the Convent of S. Lazarus on the left bank ; the garrison, exhausted by privations and fatigue and sickness, opposed all the resistance in their power, . . the greater number dying in its defence ; and this edifice being taken, the Spaniards could neither retreat from the suburbs, nor hope to support themselves there, when they could no longer be supplied with food or ammunition from the city. Finding themselves separated by the enemy into two columns, the one body crossed the bridge with considerable loss, and effected their retreat into the town ; the other cut their way through the enemy, and endeavoured to escape in the open country along the bank of the Ebro ; they were pursued by the French horse, and after sustaining a second action till their powder was exhausted, were taken prisoners to the number of 1500.

*Rogniat,*  
41.  
*Cavallero,*  
137.

*The Uni-*  
*versity*  
*taken.*

The loss of the left bank exposed to the enemy the only part of the city which had not yet been open to their direct attacks, but had only suffered from the bombardment. On the other side, the University, after repeated attempts, had been taken, and the traverses which the Spaniards had so well defended in the Cozo. Palafox had now been seized with the disease. Capitulation had been mentioned at the last council in which he was present, and when it was asked how long the city could hold out, his answer had been, *hasta la ultima tapia* ; “to the last mud-wall.” Being now utterly disabled, he transferred all his authority, civil and military,

*Palafox*  
*transfers his*  
*authority to*  
*a Junta.*

on the night of the 18th, to a Junta, naming Ric to be the president. That noble-minded Spaniard immediately summoned the members, and they began their functions at one on the morning of the 19th. The chiefs of the various military departments were summoned to deliver their opinions. The general of cavalry represented, that there remained only sixty-two horses, and those weak and unserviceable, the rest having died of hunger. From a statement of the infantry it appeared that there were only 2822 men fit for service. Ammunition was nearly exhausted; there was none but what was manufactured in the Inquisition, and that would be destroyed if a shell should fall there. The commandant of engineers reported that the fortifications were demolished, there were neither men nor materials for repairing them, and all the cloth which could serve for bags of earth had been consumed. All the officers who had thus been consulted gave their opinion that the place ought to be surrendered, and that the Junta would be responsible to God and the King for the lives which every hour were sacrificed, if they persisted in resistance, now that it was become manifestly impossible to save the city. Having heard this melancholy representation, the Junta required General San Marc, who was one of their members, to express his judgment; the eminent talents and courage which he had displayed during the whole siege would render his opinion decisive both with them and the commander-in-chief and the people. He

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
February.

---

*Condition of  
the besieged.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

*Ric, Sem.  
Patr. 215,6.*

stated, that if the enemy made a general attack, which the preparations that were observed appeared to indicate, the loss of the city was inevitable, and would be followed by every imaginable horror. It was known with what fury the French treated every place which they conquered, and their rage would be greater here, on account of the hatred which they and their general and their bloody Emperor bore towards a city that had once put them to such shame, and now cost them so dearly. If the attacks were partial, such as those which were repeatedly made every day, they might hold out two days longer, or possibly four, provided men could be found for defence and for the works; longer than four days it was not possible to maintain the contest: San Marc concluded by declaring, that unless there were well-founded expectations of speedy relief, it was unjustifiable to sacrifice the lives which in these days must be lost, the loss of the city in that short time being unavoidable.

Upon this the Junta proceeded to make inquiry what expectations of relief there were: for this purpose the Duke of Villahermosa was sent to Palafox; but Palafox was now so ill that he could give no account of any thing, for the fever had fixed upon his brain. His secretary was applied to for any letters and documents which might be in his possession: he delivered in two, both of which were dated long back. One was a letter from Francisco Palafox, saying, that after making the utmost exertions to collect



CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
February.

troops, but in vain, he was then at Tortosa, assembling the peasantry with some soldiers from the garrisons on the coast, and that he designed to strengthen this force with some gun-boats that were to be sent up the Ebro. The other was a scrap of paper, written in enigmatical terms (for it had to pass through the enemy's lines), and, as it was supposed, by the Conde de Montijo. It said, that the writer and the Duke del Infantado wished to come to the relief of Zaragoza, but the Central Junta had ordered that the Swiss should go, and that they were to fall upon Madrid. The Swiss was understood to mean General Reding; but he was so situated that no succour could be expected from him; for he was in Catalonia, and the enemy being masters of the suburbs, it was not possible for him now to cross the bridge. Moreover there could be no doubt, that other divisions of the French gave him full employment. These papers, therefore, only confirmed the Junta in their apprehensions that the French were victorious every where, and that in the general distress of the country they could expect no relief. Ric, 216, 7.

While they were deliberating the bombardment was renewed. They knew that the city could not hold out; twenty-six members voted for a capitulation, eight, with Ric among them, that they should still continue their resistance, urging that there was a possibility of being succoured. Such was the high spirit of these brave men, that the opinion of the minority was fol- *Flag of truce sent to the French.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*February.*

lowed : for they who had voted for surrendering had done so for the sake of others, . . for themselves, there was not one among them who would not rather have died than capitulated. They agreed to send a flag of truce to the enemy, requesting a suspension of hostilities for three days, that officers might in the meantime be sent to ascertain the situation of the Spanish armies, and according to the intelligence which might thus be obtained, they would then treat for a surrender. Lasnes, when he had summoned the city, had proposed this method himself, . . he now resented the proposal as an insult, and vented the most ferocious threats against the city, unless it were immediately delivered up. The flag was remanded with a second letter, reminding him that the proposal was originally his own : he did not vouchsafe to answer in any other manner than by a shower of bombs, and by ordering the attack to be renewed.

*Ric, 217, 3.**Last efforts  
of the be-  
sieged.*

In the evening of that day the quarter of the Tanneries was lost, a part of the strand leading to the stone bridge, and the Puerto del Angel, a point of great importance. Four cannon in the battery of the wooden bridge were spiked, treacherously it was supposed, . . but there was no time for ascertaining this and punishing the traitors. The handful of men who remained were at their posts, manifesting their wonted resolution ; but they were too few for the severe service to which they were exposed, and San Marc applied to Ric to reinforce with only

200 the points which were attacked, . . more he did not ask for, knowing the deplorable state of the city. Ric had already charged Don Miguel Marraco, a beneficed priest of the Church of the Pillar, whom the general had commissioned to organise the peasantry, to provide men for the works, . . he now sent him a note which would have excited him to new exertions had there been any remissness on his part. Don Mariano Cerazo, an honourable citizen, who had distinguished himself by his zeal and his influence with the people, was called upon in like manner; and certain priests also, who had united for the purpose of training and encouraging the peasantry, were requested in this emergency to furnish men. These measures, before the pestilence had so widely extended itself, would in a quarter of an hour have produced a thousand armed men. Ric ordered also the alarm to be beaten in the New Tower, and taking advantage of a favourable moment, when the enemy were driven back by the bayonet from the Convent del Sepulcro, he sent the public crier through the streets to proclaim this success, and summon the people by sound of trumpet to complete the victory. But disease had subdued them; of the surviving population, the few who were not suffering under the disorder were attending their sick or dying friends, and neither hope nor despair could call them out, . . hope, indeed, they had none, and the dreadful duty in which they were engaged rendered them insensible to all evils but those before their eyes.

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

San Marc was joined by only seventeen men; ill tidings came upon him from every quarter; one commander complained that he was cut off at his station, another that he was on the point of being so, a third that he was undermined, . . from every quarter they called for troops and labourers and ammunition, at a time when all were wanting.

*D. P. Maria Ric goes out to treat with M. Lasnes.*

Thus situated, the Junta ordered the almoners of the different parishes to inform their parishioners of the state of the city, and report the opinion which they should form in consequence. Two-thirds of the city had been destroyed; thirty thousand of the inhabitants had perished, and from three to four hundred persons were daily dying of the pestilence. Under such circumstances the Junta protested that they had fulfilled their oath of fidelity, *for Zaragoza was destroyed*; and they dispatched a flag of truce to the French commander, requesting a suspension of hostilities for four-and-twenty hours, that they might in that time negotiate for a capitulation. A French officer came with the reply, requiring the Junta to wait upon Marshal Lasnes within two hours, and declaring that after that time was expired he would not listen to any terms. Ric instantly summoned the Junta, and as they could not all be immediately collected, he proceeded with some of them toward Marshal Lasnes, leaving some to acquaint the others with the result of the flag of truce, and to act as circumstances might require. They took a trum-



peter with them to announce a parley, because the firing was still continued on both sides; but, notwithstanding this, the Spanish deputies were fired at from one of the enemy's batteries. Ric protested against this violation of the laws of war, and refused to proceed till he was assured that it should not be repeated. An aide-de-camp of the French general had just before arrived, with instructions that the Junta should repair to the Casa Blanca, not to the suburbs, as had been first appointed; this officer went for an escort of infantry, and conducted Ric and his colleagues to the general's presence. Lasnes received them with an insolent indifference, while his despite for the brave resistance which he had found betrayed itself in marks of affected contempt. He took some turns about the room, then addressing himself to Ric, began to inveigh against the Zaragozans for not believing him when he said that resistance was in vain, .. for which, he said, they deserved little consideration from his hands. He reproached the Junta also. Ric interrupted him. The Junta, he said, had commenced their sittings on the yesterday, and therefore could not be responsible for any thing before that time. The Marshal himself must feel, that if they had surrendered without having ascertained the absolute necessity of surrendering, they would have failed in their duty. When they were informed of the actual state of affairs, they had considered of a capitulation, and addressed a letter, proposing

CHAP.  
XVIII.  

---

February.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

Ric, 229—  
231.

*Capitu-  
lation.*

measures which he himself had suggested in the summons to which he now alluded. This had offended him, and he did not condescend to notice their second letter in explanation of the first. They had then dispatched a third flag, requesting a suspension of four-and-twenty hours, because they were accountable to the people, and that time was necessary for ascertaining the public will. Zaragoza, which had so nobly distinguished itself by the manner of its resistance, must also distinguish itself in the manner of capitulating, when capitulation was become inevitable. "Acting upon these principles," said Ric, "it is my duty to declare that I bring neither powers nor instructions, neither do I know the will of the people; but I believe they will accept a capitulation, provided it be reasonable, and becoming the heroism with which Zaragoza has defended itself."

The manner and the manliness of this declaration were not lost even upon Lasnes: in spite of himself he felt the superiority of the men who stood before him, and, abstaining from farther insults, he said, that the women and children should be safe, and that the negotiation was concluded. Ric replied, it was not yet begun; for this would be surrendering at discretion, and Zaragoza had no such thought. If the Marshal insisted upon this, he might renew his attacks on the city, "And I and my companions," said the noble Aragonese, "will return there, and continue to defend ourselves; we

have yet arms and ammunition, and daggers : war is never without its chances ; and if we are driven to despair, it yet remains to be seen who are to be victorious.” This answer did not appear to irritate the French general ; he knew, indeed, that though farther resistance could not possibly save Zaragoza, every inch which he had to win must be dearly purchased, and, for the honour of France, the sooner the siege was concluded the better ; . . it had already lasted too long. There was another reason, too, why he did not refuse to grant terms, . . it would be in his power to break them. He called for his secretary, and dictated the preamble of the capitulation and some of the articles. The first stipulated that the garrison should surrender prisoners. Ric proposed that they should march out, as became them, with the honours of war ; Lasnes would not consent to make any alteration in the words of the article, but he promised that those honours should be allowed them, and that the officers should retain their baggage, and the men their knapsacks. Ric then required that Palafox might be at liberty to go whithersoever he pleased, with all his staff. It was replied, that an individual could never be the subject of capitulation ; but Marshal Lasnes pledged his word of honour that Palafox should go to any place he pleased ; and he specified Mallen or Toledo. Those places, Ric replied, would not suit him, because they were occupied by French troops, and it was understood that

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

he thought of going to Majorca. Lasnes then gave his word of honour that he might go to any place which he thought best. It was demanded that all persons, not included in the garrison, who wished to leave Zaragoza, in order to avoid the contagion, should be allowed passports. Lasnes replied, all who wished it might go out, . . he pledged his word to this ;  
*Ric, 231, 2.* but it was not necessary, he said, to insert an article upon this head, and he was desirous of terminating the capitulation.

*Farther  
conditions  
asked, and  
refused.*

While copies of the capitulation were drawing out, the French general produced a plan of the city, and laid his finger upon the part which was that night to have been blown up, telling Ric that 44,000lbs. of powder were already lodged for the explosion, and that this would have been followed by a cannonade from seventy pieces of artillery, and a bombardment from thirty mortars, which they were at that time mounting in the suburbs. The duplicates being signed, Ric and his companions returned to lay the terms before the other members of the Junta; and they, who had ascertained the opinion of their fellow-citizens, accepted, ratified, and signed the act. Some farther stipulations, however, they still thought desirable; they wished it to be stated in the articles, that the garrison were to march out with the honours of war; for, as only the written capitulation would appear in the gazettes, if this were not expressed it would not be understood. They



required also, that the peasants who had been formed into temporary corps should not be prisoners of war, urging, that they ought not to be considered as regular soldiers, and representing the injury which it would be to agriculture if they were marched away. And at the petition of the clergy, they requested that an article might be added, securing to them the punctual payment of their revenues from the funds assigned by the government for that purpose. With these proposals Ric returned to Marshal Lasnes; the two former were in every respect unexceptionable; the last was the only one upon which any demur might have been looked for. The French commander, however, broke into a fit of rage, snatched the paper out of Ric's hand, and threw it into the fire. One of his generals, sensible of the indecency of this conduct, rescued it from the flames; and Ric, *Ric, 232—* unable to obtain more, received a ratified copy <sup>4.</sup> of the capitulation, and returned to the city.

The French, by their own account, threw above 17,000 bombs during the siege, and expended near an hundred and sixty thousand weight of powder. More than 30,000 men, and 500 officers, the flower of the Spanish armies, lay buried beneath the ruins of Zaragoza; and this is far from the amount of lives which were sacrificed in this memorable and most virtuous defence, the number of women and children who perished by the bombardment, by the mines, by famine and pestilence, remaining untold. The

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

loss of the besiegers was carefully concealed; it was sufficient to cripple their army; the Paris papers declared, that one part was to march against Lerida, another against Valencia, and neither of these movements could be effected.

*Conduct of  
the French.*

On the evening of the capitulation the French troops entered. They began immediately to pillage. General Laval was appointed governor. He ordered all the clergy of the city to go out and compliment Marshal Lasnes; . . the yoke was upon their necks; they went forth to appear at this ceremony, like prisoners in a Roman triumph, and as they went, the French soldiers were permitted to rob them of their apparel in the streets. Laval, when complaint was made to him of such outrages, observed, that his troops had to indemnify themselves for the plunder which they looked upon as certain, and which they would have had in another day, if the capitulation had not disappointed them.

*Ric, 235.*

*Treatment  
of the pri-  
soners.*

When the French entered the city six thousand bodies were lying in the streets and trenches, or piled up in heaps before the churches. The people, still unsubdued in spirit, were with difficulty restrained from declaring that the capitulation was concluded without their consent, and rushing upon the invaders with the determination of taking vengeance and dying in the act. The armed peasants, instead of delivering up the weapons which they were no longer permitted to use, broke them in pieces with generous indignation. General O'Neill

died before the surrender; St. Marc was one of the many hundreds whom the pestilence carried off within a few days after it. P. Basilio escaped from the danger of the war and of the contagion. He was a man of exemplary life and great attainments; and having been tutor to Palafox, and fought by his side in both sieges, remained now at his bedside, to wait upon him in his illness, and administer, if need should be, the last offices of religion to his heroic and beloved pupil. There the French found him, as they had ever found him during the siege, at the post of duty; and they put him to death for having served his country with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his strength. P. Santiago Sass suffered a like martyrdom. The officers received orders to come out of the city, on pain of being shot if they remained there after four-and-twenty hours. Immediately upon forming without the town for their march, they were, in contempt of the capitulation, plundered of every thing, stripped of the devices of their different ranks, and pushed in among the common soldiers as leaders of insurgents. It was affirmed in the French bulletin that 17,000 men laid down their arms: there were not more than four-and-twenty hundred capable of bearing them; the rest were in the hospitals, and this, with five-and-twenty hundred taken in the suburbs and during the siege, was the number which was marched off for France. Two hundred and seventy of these

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
February.

Feb. 22.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

men, who from fatigue and weakness could not keep up the pace which their ferocious guard required, were butchered and left on the road, where their companions in the next division might march over their bodies. Augustina Zaragoza was among the prisoners. She had distinguished herself in this siege as much as in the former. At the commencement she took her former station at the Portillo, by the same gun which she had served so well; "See, general," said she, with a cheerful countenance, pointing to the gun when Palafox visited that quarter, "I am again with my old friend." Her husband was severely wounded, and she pointed the cannon at the enemy, while he lay bleeding among his companions by her side. Frequently she was at the head of an assaulting party, sword or knife in hand, with her cloak wrapt round her, cheering the soldiers, and encouraging them by her example; constantly exposed as she was, she escaped without a wound: yet once she was thrown into a ditch, and nearly suffocated by the dead and dying who covered her. At the close of the siege she was too well known by the French to escape notice, and they made her prisoner. Fortunately, as it proved, she had at that time taken the contagion, and was removed to the hospital, where, as she was supposed to be dying, little care was taken to secure her. Feeling herself better, she availed herself of this, and effected her escape. Another heroine, whose name was Manuella Sanchez, was shot



through the heart. Donna Benita, a lady of distinction, who headed one of the female corps which had been formed to carry provisions, bear away the wounded, and fight in the streets, escaped the hourly dangers to which she exposed herself, only to die of grief upon hearing that her daughter had been killed. During the siege six hundred women and children perished, not by the bombardment and the mines, but in action, by the sword, or bayonet or bullet.

Marshal Lasnes had pledged his word of honour that Palafox should be at liberty to go wherever he would, as soon as he should be able to travel; in contempt of that pledge, he was immediately made prisoner, surrounded entirely by French, and left even in want of necessary food. Ric, who was ever ready to exert himself when any duty was to be performed, remonstrated against this treatment both verbally and in writing. He could obtain little immediate relief, and no redress. Arrangements were concerted for his escape, and so well laid, that there would have been every prospect of success, if he had been sufficiently recovered to make the attempt. They were not, however, altogether fruitless; for M. Lasnes having extorted from him, by threats of immediate death if he refused, orders to the governors of Jaca, Benasque, Monzon, and Mequinenza, to deliver up those places to the French, he found means to advise his brother, the Marques de Lazan, of the iniquitous proceeding, and to direct that no obedience

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

*Treatment  
of Palafox*

*He is compelled by  
threats of  
death to sign  
orders for  
delivering  
up other  
fortresses.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

should be given to orders so obtained. Unfortunately Jaca and Monzon had been entrusted to commanders who waited only for an opportunity of betraying their charge, and they opened the gates to the enemy. Before Palafox had recovered he was hurried away into France, a country from which and to which, while it was under the iron yoke of Buonaparte, no prisoner returned. On the way he was treated with insolence and barbarity, and robbed even to his very shirt. Buonaparte, who, feeling no virtue in himself, acknowledged none in others, had already reproached him as a coward and a run-away in the field; he now, with contradictory calumny, reviled him for having defended Zaragoza against the will of the inhabitants. "The people," it was said in the French papers, "held him in such abhorrence, that it was necessary to station a guard before his door, for otherwise he would have been stoned. An idea of the detestation in which he and the monks of his party were held could only be formed by remembering the hatred with which those men were regarded in France, who governed by terror and the guillotine." Yet while they thus asserted at one time that Palafox defended the city against the will of the people, at another they affirmed that the Spanish troops would have surrendered long before, being perfectly sensible that resistance was unavailing after the French had entered the city, but it did not depend upon them, . . they were obliged to sub-

mit to the wills of the meanest of the inhabitants. Any one who should have expressed a wish to capitulate would have been punished with death: such a thought could not be uttered till two-thirds of the city were lying in ruins, and 20,000 of its defenders destroyed by disease. . . No higher eulogy could be pronounced upon Zaragoza than was comprised in the very calumnies of its unworthy conqueror.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

Before the main body of the French made their entry they demanded of Ric 50,000 pair of shoes, 8000 pair of boots, and 1200 shirts, with medicines and every requisite for an hospital. Several of the officers demanded for themselves double equipage and linen, curtains, pens, paper, and whatever they wanted, insisting that plenty of every thing should be supplied them, and the best of its kind, at the expense of the city. A service of china was required for Junot; and this merciless oppressor, who had escaped the proper punishment of his crimes in Portugal, insisted that a tennis-court should be fitted up for his amusement, in a city of which two-thirds were then lying in ruins, beneath which so large a proportion of the inhabitants lay buried! Ric resisted demands which it was impossible for the city to supply. The French generals, provoked at his refusal to engage for the maintenance of their household, threatened to send in a squadron of hussars. He replied, that well they might, since the gates of the city were demolished and in their power,

*Demands of  
the French.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

Ric, 245—  
9.

*Lasnes  
makes his  
entrance.*

*Baseness of  
the suffra-  
gan bishop.*

but that from that moment they would not advance a foot of ground till they had moistened it with French blood. Another member of the Junta, who had less courage, undertook that these ruffians should be satisfied as far as was possible. Ric, who was too true a Spaniard to live under the government of the Intruder, renounced the high office which he held, and, not being considered a prisoner, obtained his liberty.

Lasnes made his entrance on Sunday the 5th of March; his approach was announced by the discharge of 200 cannon, and he proceeded in triumph through that part of the city which remained standing, to the Church of the Pillar. The wretched inhabitants had been compelled to adorn the streets with such hangings as could be found, and to witness the pomp of festive triumph, and hear the sounds of joy and exultation. The suffragan bishop of the diocese, a traitor who had fled from the town when it took arms, and now returned thither to act as the instrument of the oppressors, met Lasnes at the great door of the church, and conducted him in procession, with the crucifix and the banner, to a throne prepared before the altar, and near the famous idol, which had escaped destruction. Then the wretch addressed a sermon to his countrymen upon the horrors of war! "They had seen," he said, "in their unhappy city, the streets and market-places strewn with dead, parents expiring and leaving their children



helpless and unprotected, babes sucking at the dry breast of the famished mother, palaces in ruins, houses in flames, dead bodies heaped at the doors of the churches, and hurried into common graves without any religious ceremony. And what had been the cause of all this ruin? I repeat it," said the villanous time-server, "I shall always repeat it, your sins and your seditious spirit, your forgetfulness of the principles of the gospel. These horrors have ceased: and to whom are you indebted for this unexpected happiness? To God in the first place, who raises and destroys monarchies according to his will; after God, to the Virgin of the Pillar, who interceded for us; and in the next place to the generous heart of the great Napoleon, the man who is the messenger of God upon earth to execute his divine decrees, and who is sent to punish us for our sins. Nothing can equal his power except his clemency and his goodness! He has granted us the inestimable favour of peace; oh that, at the expense of my tears and my blood, I could render it eternal! It is fitting, O my God, that for this great and unexpected mercy, this signal mercy, we should all exclaim, *Te Deum Laudamus!* We praise thee, O God!" Such were the blasphemies which this hoary traitor uttered over the ruins of his heroic city! It is not possible to record them without feeling a wish, that some one of the noble-hearted Zaragozaans, who at that hour of bitterness were wishing themselves in the grave, had smitten

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

him upon the spot in the name of his religion and his country.

1809.  
February.

*Language  
of the  
French.*

The oath of obedience and allegiance was then administered to those persons who either retained or accepted office under the Intruder's government. A superb entertainment followed, at which Lasnes and his chief officers sate down to a table of four hundred covers, and at every health which was drunk to the family of Buonaparte the cannons were discharged. The transactions of the day furnished a fine topic for the journalists at Paris. "All the people," they said, "manifested their joy at so sudden and happy a change in acclamations of 'long live the Emperor!' they were edified by the behaviour of their conquerors during the religious ceremony; that ceremony had melted the most obdurate hearts, the hatred of the French was eradicated from all breasts, and Aragon would soon become one of the most submissive provinces in Spain!" At the time when these falsehoods were circulated in France, Junot issued a proclamation, declaring, that every Aragoneze found in arms should be punished with death. Upon this the Supreme Junta addressed an order to their generals, requiring them to apprise the French commanders to whom they might be opposed, that every Spaniard who was capable of carrying arms was a soldier, so their duty required them to be, and such the Supreme Junta declared them: "This," they said, "was not a war of armies against

*Decree of  
the Central  
Junta.*

armies, as in other cases, but of an army against a whole nation, resisting the yoke which a tyrant and usurper sought to force upon them; every individual, therefore, of that nation was under the protection of the laws of war, and the general who should violate those laws was not a soldier, but a ruffian, who would provoke the indignation of Heaven, and the vengeance of man. The Junta well knew," they said, "that the French, when they were victorious, ridiculed principles which the observance and respect of all nations had consecrated, and that they did this with an effrontery and insolence equal to the affectation with which they appealed to them when they were vanquished. The Spaniards were, however, in a condition to enforce that justice which they demanded. Three Frenchmen should suffer for every Spaniard, be he peasant or soldier, who might be put to death. Europe would hear with admiration as well as horror, that a magnanimous nation, which had begun its struggle by making 30,000 prisoners, was forced, in opposition to its natural character, to decimate those prisoners without distinction, from the first general to the meanest in the ranks. But it was the chiefs of their own nation who condemned these unfortunate wretches, and who, by imposing upon Spain the dreadful necessity of retaliation, signed the death of their own countrymen when they murdered a Spaniard."

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

The Junta pronounced the funeral oration of

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.

*February.*

*Address to  
the nation.*

Zaragoza, in an address to the people. "Spaniards," said they, "the only boon which Zaragoza begged of our unfortunate monarch at Vittoria was, that she might be the first city to sacrifice herself in his defence. That sacrifice has been consummated. More than two months the murderous siege continued ; almost all the houses were destroyed, those which were still standing had been undermined ; provisions were nearly exhausted, ammunition all consumed ; 16,000 sick were struggling with a mortal contagion, which every day hurried hundreds to the grave ; the garrison was reduced to less than a sixth part ; the general dying of the pestilence ; O'Neill, the second in command, dead ; St. Marc, upon whom the command then devolved, prostrated by the fever : so much was required, Spaniards, to make Zaragoza yield to the rigour of fate, and suffer herself to be occupied by the enemy. The surrender was made upon such terms as the French have granted to other towns, and those terms have been observed as usual by the perfidious enemy. Thus only were they able to take possession of those glorious precincts, filled only with demolished houses and temples, and peopled only with the dead and the dying ; where every street, every ruin, every wall, every stone, seemed mutely to say to the beholder, Go, tell my king, that Zaragoza, faithful to her word, hath joyfully sacrificed herself to maintain her truth.

" A series of events, as mournful as they are



notorious, frustrated all the efforts which were made to relieve the city; but the imagination of all good men accompanied her defenders in their dangers, was agitated with them in their battles, sympathised in their privations and efforts, and followed them through all the dreadful vicissitudes of their fortune; and when strength failed them at last through a continued resistance, which they had prolonged almost beyond belief, in the first moment of grief it seemed as if the light of liberty had been at once extinguished, and the column of independence overthrown. But, Spaniards, Zaragoza still survives for imitation and example! still survives in the public spirit which, from her heroic exertions, is for ever imbibing lessons of courage and of constancy. For where is the Spaniard, priding himself upon that name, who would be less than the Zaragozans, and not seal the liberty of his country, which he has proclaimed, and the faith to his king, which he has promised, at the cost of the same perils and the same labours? Let the base, the selfish, and the cowardly be dismayed by them; not the other towns of Aragon, who are ready to imitate and to recover their capital; not the firm and faithful patriots, who see in that illustrious city a model to imitate, vengeance to be exacted, and the only path of conquest. Forty thousand Frenchmen, who have perished before the mud walls of Zaragoza, cause France to mourn the barren and

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
*February.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
*February.*

ephemeral triumph which she has obtained, and evince to Spain, that three cities of equal resolution will save their country, and baffle the tyrant. Valour springs from valour; and when the unhappy who have suffered, and the victims who have died there, shall learn that their fellow-citizens, following them in the paths of glory, have surpassed them in fortune, they will bless their destiny, however rigorous it has been, and rejoice in the contemplation of our triumphs.

“Time passes away, and days will come when these dreadful convulsions, with which the genius of iniquity is now afflicting the earth, will have subsided. The friends of virtue and patriotism will come to the banks of the Ebro to visit those majestic ruins, and beholding them with admiration and with envy, Here, they will say, stood that city which in modern ages realised, or, more truly, surpassed those ancient prodigies of devotement and constancy, which are scarcely credited in history! Without a regiment, without other defence than a weak wall, without other resources than its courage, it first dared to provoke the fury of the tyrant: twice it withstood the force of his victorious legions. The subjection of this open and defenceless town cost France more blood, more tears, more slaughter, than the conquest of whole kingdoms: nor was it French valour that subdued it; a deadly and general pestilence prostrated the strength of its defenders, and

the enemy, when they entered, triumphed over a few sick and dying men, but they did not subdue citizens, nor conquer soldiers.”

CHAP.  
XVIII.

1809.  
February.

This address was followed by a decree, declaring “that Zaragoza, its inhabitants, and garrison, had deserved well of their country, in an eminent and heroic degree: That whenever Palafox should be restored to liberty, to effect which no efforts on the part of the government should be wanting, the Junta, in the name of the nation, would confer upon him that reward which might seem most worthy of his unconquerable constancy and ardent patriotism: That every officer employed in the siege should be promoted one step, and every private soldier enjoy the rank and the pay of serjeant: That all the defenders of Zaragoza, and its inhabitants, and their heirs, should enjoy personal nobility: That pensions, conformable to their rank and circumstances, should be granted to the widows and orphans of all who had perished there: That the having been within the walls during the siege should be considered as a claim in future pretensions: That Zaragoza should be exempt from all contributions for ten years, from the time when peace should be established; and that at that time the rebuilding of the public edifices, with all possible magnificence, should be begun at the expense of the state, and a monument erected in the great square of the city, in perpetual memory of the valour of the inhabitants and their glorious defence: That in all

*Honours  
decreed to  
the inha-  
bitants.*

CHAP.  
XVIII.1809.  
February.

the cities of the kingdom an inscription should forthwith be set up, relating the most heroic circumstances of the two sieges, and a medal be struck in its honour, as a testimony of national gratitude. Finally, the Junta promised the same honours and privileges to every city which should resist a like siege with like constancy, and proposed rewards for the best poem and best discourse upon this memorable event; the object being not only to hold up the virtues of the Zaragozans to the present generation and to posterity, but to inflame the hearts of the Spaniards with the same ardent patriotism, the same love of freedom, and the same abhorrence of tyranny.”

*Falsehoods  
of the  
French go-  
vernment.*

The capitulation was published by the Intruder's ministers in the Madrid gazette, and inserted in a French journal printed in the same capital. That journal was suppressed by order of Buonaparte as soon as he was informed of this; and it was stated in his bulletin that Lasnes would allow no capitulation, and had only published certain provisions as his \* pleasure; and that the French possessed themselves of the whole town by force. Had the facts been thus,

\* Baron Rogniat also in his relation of the siege says, *le Maréchal exigea que la ville se rendît à discretion* (p. 44), and omits to say that terms of capitulation were required and granted. Baron Rogniat declares that one of his motives for publishing this relation, which he was not permitted to do during the reign of

Buonaparte, was to celebrate the glory of his comrades. For a man of honour and humanity to have been in the course of military service involuntarily engaged in effecting such a conquest, would be the greatest of all misfortunes; but to look back upon it with complacency, and record it as glorious, is a crime.



it would not have derogated in the slightest degree from the heroism of a people who had discharged their duty to the uttermost. But the falsehood is worthy of notice, not only as showing Napoleon Buonaparte's systematic disregard of truth, but as exemplifying also that want of generosity which peculiarly characterized him, and made him incapable of doing justice in any one instance to the principles, virtues, talents, or even courage, of those by whom he was opposed.

---

CHAP.  
XVIII.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

## CHAPTER XIX.

## INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MARSHAL SOULT.

1809.

*Portugal  
threatened  
by the  
French.*

THE conquest of Portugal was announced by Buonaparte not less confidently than his sentence of subjugation against Zaragoza; and no difficulty was expected in effecting it. It was stated in the bulletins that the rage of the Portuguese against the English was at its utmost height; that they were as indignant at the perfidy of their allies as they were disgusted by their difference of manners and religion, by their brutal intemperance, and by that arrogance which made these islanders odious to the whole continent; that bloody affrays between them were occurring every day, and that the British garrison of Lisbon had embarked in order to abandon a people whom they had deceived and outraged. The real state of things gave some plausibility to these falsehoods; for the French were well informed of the alarm that prevailed in Lisbon, which was indeed such as seemed to justify their vaunts, and might easily enable them to accomplish their purpose. Preparations had been made for evacuating that capital; transports were collected in the Tagus, and notice officially given to the British merchants to hold themselves in readiness for im-

*Prepara-  
tions by the  
English for  
evacuating  
Lisbon.*

mediate embarkation in case the enemy should advance towards them. These measures were taken early in January, before it was known that Sir John Moore was retreating. As soon as intelligence of his retreat was received, the Regency communicated it to the people. "Portuguese," they said, "the governors of the kingdom do not mean to deceive you. They themselves announce that the armies of Moore and Romana have retired to the interior of Galicia, leaving our frontiers uncovered; that those frontiers, from their great extent, are exposed to invasion; that the Emperor of the French is accustomed to employ his whole force when he attacks a nation; that his rapid marches give no time for the reunion of troops to act against him on the defensive; and that he presses on to the capital, endeavouring to surprise the government, and to spread anarchy and confusion. This mode of warfare exposes some cities and towns to the ravages of invasion; but such partial ravages are not the ruin of a state. It was in the centre of Portugal that our ancestors sealed our independence with their blood. Knowing this, the governors have directed their measures accordingly; strong passes, formed by nature to be the bulwarks of our liberty, and deep rivers, which cannot without danger be crossed, will be defended in a military manner; and if, in spite of this, the enemy of Europe should proceed to Lisbon, he will find around

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*February.*

*Address of  
the Regency  
to the Por-  
tuguese.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*State of  
public feel-  
ing at Lis-  
bon.*

it a determined people, who will cause the glorious deeds of those times to be remembered, when the walls of that city were the scene of their heroism and their triumph."

This was wise language, and though it proceeded from a government on which they had little reason to rely, the Portuguese answered the appeal with enthusiasm. The squares were filled, the streets lined with volunteers, practising their evolutions with a zeal deserving better teachers than it found. In these ranks the old man and the stripling stood side by side, .. all pedantry of inches and proportion was forgotten; the strength to carry arms, and the heart to use them, were the only qualifications required. Some were armed with fowling-pieces, some with bayonets screwed upon poles, some with pikes and halberds, which for centuries had hung idly in the hall; bullets were piled up in heaps at every stall, with flints and ram-rods; and rusty weapons of all kinds were brought out from the dust to answer the general demand for arms. The children with their flags and wooden guns were playing at soldiers, imitating the discipline of their fathers with that spirit which, if well fostered and directed, would render any country invincible. There was no want of courage, of enthusiasm, or of patriotic feeling; but the people had none to direct and train them, none to whom they could look with confidence.



It was the beginning of February before the news arrived of Sir John Moore's death, and that his army had withdrawn from Spain. Fourteen thousand English troops had been left at Lisbon when that army began its march. Some regiments had advanced to the frontiers, that they might be near the commander-in-chief if he should require to be reinforced, or find it expedient to fall back upon them. These, learning that he had retreated by a different route, and that superior forces were hastening against them, returned by forced marches to the capital. Every thing was in confusion there. One day the cavalry was embarked, the next it was relanded. The sea batteries were dismantled, and their guns shipped for Brazil; those at Fort St. Julien alone were left mounted, as a defensible post if the British troops should be forced to embark precipitately. The women belonging to the army were sent on board. These preparations exasperated the people: they were eager to do whatever should be required of them in the defence of their country: that their own governors wanted courage or ability to stand by them was nothing more than what they expected; but from the English, the old and faithful friends of the Portuguese, they looked for that assistance which England had never refused to Portugal in its time of need. The feeling which this intended abandonment produced was rather anger than fear; and they resented it more as if they felt ashamed for

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

Feb. 24.

allies long trusted, and always found worthy, than alarmed for the consequences to themselves. A party of the armed populace seized the English Ambassador's baggage, which was packed up for removal. The government affected to consider this as the work of French emissaries, though it was evidently a manifestation of the general temper. Threats of condign punishment were denounced against any person who should again offer insult to a British subject; and the people were assured it was only by the powerful assistance of the British army that their national independence could be maintained.

*M. Soult  
ordered to  
enter Por-  
tugal from  
Galicia.*

The bulletins had announced that Marshal Soult would cross the Minho from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Porto by the 20th, and Lisbon by the 28th. His instructions were to march along the coast, as the shortest and most convenient line, where, though there was no high road, there were no mountains, and the ways every where practicable for carriages; he was to govern the country as Junot had done, and induce the people as soon as possible to request from Napoleon a King of his appointment. The nominal force allotted him was 50,000 men, and the staff might have sufficed for twice that amount; but the efficient numbers fell far short. They had suffered much in the battle of Coruña; they had suffered also by their rapid advance through so difficult a country in the severest weather: and in means also they were deficient;

for though it was their system to take whatever they required, they were now in a province where little was to be found. Plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, whatever marketable plunder Galicia afforded, these dealers in wholesale rapine shipped from Coruña for France. Articles of immediate necessity were not so readily obtained. The military hospitals were in want of every thing, even rags for the wounded, for linen here was a luxury not in general use. The mills of that country (which are of the simplest construction, working by a single horizontal wheel) were so small that ninety of them could not supply more flour in a day than was required for the daily consumption of the invading army; and as the invaders could find no Spaniards to serve them, they were obliged to draw not only millers, but bakers and butchers from the regiments. Grain was scarce, Galicia being a grazing province, which at no time produced more than a third of what its own inhabitants required. The summary mode of stripping them by requisitions, to which the French as usual resorted, was in this instance impeded by their own people: for the detachments who were stationed in different parts to keep the communication open, finding how scanty the resources were, and apprehending that if food were sent away they should be left without it, suffered the orders of the commissariat to be neglected, and took care of themselves alone.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Difficulty of  
providing  
for the  
French  
army.*

*Mém. sur  
les Opéra-  
tions du M.  
Soul, 56,  
60.*

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
*February.**His confidence of success.**Intercepted letter to Joseph.  
Feb. 4.**Combined plans of the French.**Oper. du M. Soult, p. 50.*

Marshal Soult, however, entered upon his expedition in full confidence of success. He believed that a great proportion of the British troops had perished by shipwreck during the heavy gales which had prevailed after their embarkation; that they had determined as soon as he should approach Lisbon to blow up the magazines and arsenals, and abandon the place; that they talked of nothing more enterprising than a landing at Quiberon; and that this was a mere vaunt, for certainly it would be long before their army would be again in a condition to show itself.

The plan which had been laid down for him was well concerted. Marshal Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajoz, and send a column in the direction of Lisbon to facilitate the operations against that city. Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida, occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march upon Abrantes as soon as Soult should have reached Porto, and when that general was master of Lisbon, Lapisse was then to join Victor, and enter Andalusia, the conquest of the south of Spain as well as Portugal being considered certain. Ney, meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the army of Portugal. Leaving him in command of this province, which was said to be subjugated, Soult removed his head-quarters to Santiago, and ordered General Lahoussaye from Mellid to march upon Riba-



davia and Salvatierra, obtain intelligence of Romana's movements, and ascertain what means might be found there for crossing the Minho. General Franceschi at the same time was dispatched with his light cavalry to take possession of Tuy, and examine whether the passage might not best be effected near that city ; and General Merle with a division of infantry was sent from Betanzos to Pontevedra to support them. Franceschi fell in with a body of Spaniards at Redondela, and took from them four guns. Profiting by the panic which the fugitives were likely to impart, he sent a detachment to summon Vigo, and the governor was weak or treacherous enough to surrender a fortified and well-provided town at the first summons of a division of cavalry. Tuy also, which in former wars had been a place of great importance, the strongest upon that frontier, was entered without resistance. Somewhere below this city it was resolved to attempt the passage, and there accordingly the main body of the army was collected.

Two rivers, the Lama and Tamboga, which rise in the north-east part of Galicia, unite and form the Minho ; but the Sil, which joins it with an equal body of waters, is believed to have been the Minius of the ancients. It is the boundary between Spain and Portugal along a considerable line ; upon that line it is never fordable, except at one place above Melgaço, and there only after an unusual continuance of dry weather. There is no bridge over it below the city of Orense,

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Vigo and  
Tuy occu-  
pied by the  
French.*

*Prepara-  
tions for  
crossing the  
Minho be-  
low Tuy.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*February.*

*Feb. 10.*

and the Portugueze had been sufficiently aware of their danger to remove all the boats to their own side of the river. Just at its mouth it is joined from the Portugueze side by the river Coura; each stream has formed a bar, and upon an island between these bars the Portugueze had a fortress and a small Capuchine convent. On the Spanish side, immediately at the mouth of the river, Mount St. Thecla rises, a place of great local celebrity, because of an annual pilgrimage, and known to sailors as a sea-mark. On the other side of this mountain is the little port and town of S. Maria de la Guardia, and thither Soult went with the captain of a French frigate and some seamen who had been prisoners at Coruña, to reconnoitre and consult concerning the passage. Means of transport were found in the fishing-boats of Guardia; but it would have been difficult to double the point in them when laden as they must have been for that service, and they would have been perilously exposed to the fire of the island. He determined, therefore, to carry the boats overland a distance of about three miles to a lake or broad, from which the little river Tamuga issues, and enters the Minho above the village of Campos Ancos. There was great difficulty in removing them, and still more in conveying two pieces of artillery to the same place. Means, however, for transporting three hundred men at once were collected, and the troops appointed for this service were exercised in embarking and

disembarking on the lake, where it could be done in safety. The attempt was to be made at high-water, and under favour of the night, though little danger was apprehended from the old frontier fortress of Caminha, in the face of which they were to cross; for the works, originally ill planned and ill situated, had long been neglected, and the French held in equal contempt the place and the people by whom it was garrisoned. However, in order to deceive them, the troops were withdrawn from the opposite shore, and a feint made of marching up the river. The flotilla descended the Tamuga easily and in good order; but when they came into the great stream the want of sailors was felt. The boats separated; those that were best manned reached the shore; but the Portuguese were upon the alert. General Bernardim Freire, who had been appointed to the command of Porto and of that province, had sent a detachment with two six-pounders to this point. They kept up a fire with good effect; the tide turned; the other boats unable to stem it, or approach the shore, where they could assist their comrades, found it necessary to return; some were sunk, and about forty men were made prisoners.

Four days had been consumed in preparations for this vain attempt. It was impossible to wait till the river should have fallen so as to render the passage practicable, for the troops could not be supplied where they were, and they were beginning to suffer from inaction. Soult there-

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Failure of  
the attempt.*

Feb. 15.

*Soult  
marches  
by way of  
Orense.*

CHAP. fore left General Lamartiniere to command at  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

Tuy, with 350 men, besides 900 who were on the sick list. Some public money had been found in that city, and six-and-thirty field-pieces were left there, besides some guns and ammunition which had been brought from Vigo. It was thought a position of some importance at this time, and this force sufficient to maintain it. He then marched for Orense, making this long circuit to cross the river with less unwillingness because he had received intelligence from Lahoussaye that the peasantry were in a state of insurrection in consequence of Romana's proclamations.

*Operations  
du M.  
Soult,  
73, 80.*

*Romana  
rouses the  
Galicians.*

*Feb. 13.*

Romana indeed had not been inactive during the short respite which had been allowed him. Had the French rightly appreciated his unconquerable spirit, and apprehended the effect which such a man was capable of producing upon a brave and generous peasantry, they would have deemed his single destruction of more importance to their cause than the capture of Ferrol and Coruña. By this time he had collected some 9000 men; to form an efficient army was in his circumstances impossible, utterly destitute as he was of means; but what was of more consequence, he had roused the country; his presence was infinitely important there, and his name and his example hardly less so in other parts of Spain, for in every part the people were encouraged by a persuasion that their countrymen elsewhere were more fortunate than themselves. Every



where except upon the spot it was believed by the Spaniards that Romana was at the head of a formidable army; when his troops were so broken, a victorious enemy so close upon him, and his condition so hopeless in all human appearance, that he himself must have considered his escape from captivity, and the death to which he would then have been condemned, as manifestly providential. The Galicians at Lisbon (in which city there were always some thousands of those industrious men) were at that time embodied for the purpose of marching to join him; and the Spanish minister wrote to desire that he would send officers to discipline and take charge of them. The dispatch found him on the Portuguese frontier: he represented in reply that his own force consisted chiefly of new volunteers, so that none of his officers could be spared: he could only send some who belonged to the provincial regiments of Tuy and Compostella. But of men there was no want; for even if they had been less willing to take arms for their country and their cause, mere desperation would have driven them to it. Had the French been better disposed to observe what for the last century at least had been the common humanities of war, it would not have been possible when they were to support themselves as they could by preying upon the countries which they invaded. Free licence in one thing led to it in all, and when resistance was provoked by the most intolerable outrages, it was punished with fire and sword.

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
February.*Opinion  
of his  
strength.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Villages  
burnt by the  
French.*

*Intended  
plan of co-  
operation  
between Ro-  
mana and  
Silveira.  
Feb. 24.*

The little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelinos and S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets, were burnt by the invaders, and more than 2000 persons, who were thus reduced to ruin and deprived of shelter, fled into the Portuguese territory, hoping to find refuge there.

The Portuguese General, Francisco da Silveira, had taken the command upon that frontier; his force consisted of 2800 regular troops, 2500 militia, and only fifty horse. Romana had an interview with him at Chaves, while the enemy were preparing for their vain attempt to pass the Minho; and they had resolved upon attacking the French at Tuy, when they learnt that Soult was advancing up the river. They then took up a position for the defence of Chaves, the Spaniards upon the right bank of the Tamega from Monterrey to that fortress, Silveira from the bridge of Villaça to Villarelho. The Portuguese were elated by the failure of the French in their attempt to cross the Minho, which indeed had in some degree dispirited the invaders; and Romana, though fully aware of the inefficiency of his own force, had yet an entire reliance upon the national character and the spirit which had been raised. The secular clergy as well as the monks were zealously aiding him; the monks of S. Claudio, of S. Mamed, and of S. Maria de Melon, and the parochial priest of the latter place, distinguished themselves especially in this good work. His orders were, that all should take arms who were capable

of using them, and that the remaining part of the population wherever the French came should abandon their houses, and carry away all provisions.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

These orders were very generally obeyed. The small parties of the French were harassed or cut off wherever they appeared; and when Soult approached Ribadavia a brave resistance was made in the village of Franzelos and before the town. The peasantry were not dispersed till great carnage had been made among them; and the invaders upon entering the town found only about a dozen persons remaining there. Detachments were dispatched against the peasantry on all sides, and the greater part of the artillery was sent back to Tuy, as much because of the opposition which was experienced, as owing to the state of the roads. At Orense part of the people remained, and the magistrates \* submitting of necessity, came out to meet the French. Here Marshal Soult received dispatches from Ney; the contents were kept secret, but it was reported that Ney advised him not to pursue his intention of entering Portugal. The report considerably affected the superior officers, and those especially who, having be-

*Difference  
between M.  
Soult and  
M. Ney.*

*Operations  
de M. Soult,  
92—99.*

\* The veracious historian of Marshal Soult asserts that Romana had compelled the Bishop to withdraw, knowing how much the example of his submission would influence the Galicians; as if he thought that to make a man sacrifice any thing to a sense of patriotism and of duty compulsion was necessary! and as if he were utterly ignorant of the part which that excellent Prelate sustained throughout these troubles. See vol. i. p. 409, for the character of the man who is thus traduced.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Rout of  
Romana's  
army.*

longed to Junot's army, understood the horrible sort of war in which they were again to be engaged. The two Marshals were upon ill terms with each other, and a spirit of dissension was thus introduced into the army.

After remaining more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march for Portugal, by way of Monterrey and Chaves. In this line he expected to find a road practicable for artillery, and he thought Romana would be so effectually crushed, that he should meet with no enemy capable of molesting him in that quarter. He had sent a trumpet to that general's outposts, requesting permission for an officer to pass with a letter to the Marquis. It was granted. The letter merely contained an offer of honours and employments in the Intruder's name, if Romana would acknowledge him as King, and bring over his troops. Romana having glanced at the contents, bade the bearer return, and say that the only answer to be given to such proposals was from the mouth of the cannon: but the real object of the overture was, that the officer who had been selected for this service might reconnoitre the position; and this the Spaniards, unaccustomed as they were to military precautions, gave him full opportunity of doing. On the following day General Franceschi was ordered to attack their right, which was posted to the south-east of



Monterrey, on the heights of Orsona. The rout was so complete, that the actual loss did not amount to more than some 300 slain, and as many prisoners: the French considered the dispersion of the army which ensued as its destruction, and believed that Romana had fixed upon so remote a point as Asturias for the rallying place. While Franceschi was thus employed on the right, Laborde attacked the vanguard of the Portuguese at Villaça, who retired \* at night, after a good resistance, losing one of their two guns.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

The French had left 200 sick and wounded at Ribadavia; they had removed them to Orense, where nearly 500 were added to the number, and now the whole were ordered to Monterrey, in so insecure a state did Soult consider the country which he was leaving. The old works at Monterrey, he thought, might be so repaired as to render that place tenable, and make it serve as a base for his line of operations. There and in the little town of Verin, on the opposite

*The French  
remove their  
sick to Mon-  
terrey.*

\* Marshal Soult's historian represents this affair as of great importance, because it removed the impression which their failure in crossing the Minho had made upon the army. What is more curious, he finds in it a justification for their invasion of Portugal! *Les Portugais avaient fait trois lieues sur les terres d'Espagne pour venir attaquer l'armée Française engagée avec les Espagnols, mouvement hostile concerté avec la Romana pour fa-*

*ciliter sa retraite, et qui justifiait l'entrée que nous allions faire en Portugal.*—P. 106. If any thing can be more detestable than the avowed and exultant profligacy of these men during their season of triumph, it is the manner in which they have afterwards attempted to gloze over actions which public opinion (and still more the event) has made them feel are too nefarious to be openly defended.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Operations  
de M. Soult,  
107—111,  
115.*

*Chaves.*

side of the Tamega, which contained about 2000 inhabitants, scarcely twenty persons had remained; and the French began to doubt the saying of Buonaparte, that men with bayonets could want for nothing. The fugitives, however, had left wine in Verin; and in order to pay some part of his establishment, Soult raised a few thousand pounds by a loan from the troops, . . part of the money which had been thrown away in Sir John Moore's retreat. General Merle was left to collect his division there, forming the reserve, and the rest of the army advanced down the Tamega, to enter Portugal, before any effectual preparations could be made for resisting them. Marshal Soult was so apprehensive lest the troops should suffer in health, that when they crossed the river by a ford little more than knee deep, he erected two temporary bridges there for the infantry.

Chaves is the frontier town of Portugal on that side, as Monterrey is that of Spain; both are on the Tamega, a river which, rising in the Sierra de S. Mamed, and watering the fertile vales of Monterrey and Oimbra, enters Portugal at Chaves, turns again into Galicia among the mountains of Barroso, and re-entering *Tras os Montes*, joins the Douro at *S. Miguel de Entre ambos os Rios* with a stronger and larger volume of waters than is borne to it by any other of its tributary streams. Chaves is known to have been the *Aquæ Flaviæ* of the Romans, so named because of its hot springs, and in

honour of its founder Vespasian. The baths, when flattery in course of nature was out of date, supplanted the memory of the Emperor; and the place then obtained the more appropriate name of *Aquæ Calidæ*, which in process of time was abbreviated and corrupted into Chaves. The springs are said to be more efficacious than any other in Portugal; but the buildings which formerly served to accommodate invalids who came to seek relief from these waters were demolished by the Conde de Mesquitella, toward the close of the seventeenth century, in order that the guns might command the approach on that side without impediment: he has been censured for this as having committed a certain mischief for the sake of a frivolous precaution. At that time Chaves was considered a place of importance. The walls were now in many places fallen to decay, and though the citadel was in better repair, both it and the town were commanded from several points, and at short distances.

Whatever hopes Silveira might have entertained of opposing the French with the assistance of Romana's army, he was fully sensible after the rout of the Spaniards that he could neither stand his ground in the vale, nor defend the dilapidated works of the town with men of whom the greater number were half armed and wholly undisciplined. On the day therefore when the enemy entered Monterrey he gave orders for evacuating Chaves, and withdrew to

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
February.

*Silveira retires from Chaves.*

*March 7.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*Some mu-  
tinous of-  
ficers re-  
solve to de-  
fend it.*

*Diario Of-  
ficial, Cor-  
reio Bra-  
ziliense,  
t. iii. p. 110  
—11.*

*Surrender  
of Chaves.*

March 10.

the heights of Outeiro Joam, and S. Pedro de Agostem. Small as the regular force was which he commanded, Portugal, he well knew, could ill afford to lose it; opportunity for seriously annoying the invaders was likely to occur, but to expose his men now would be vainly and wantonly to sacrifice them. Thus he reasoned; but the spirit of insubordination was abroad. The peasantry, in ignorant but honest zeal, insisted upon defending the place, and they were supported by certain of his officers, who were actuated some by mere presumption, others by the intention of ingratiating themselves with the enemy, whom they thus should serve. To Chaves therefore these persons returned, and the vanguard which, having been stationed at Villarelho to observe the French, he had ordered to follow him, joined with this party, and prepared to defend the town, in contempt of his authority. If Silveira's character had been any ways doubtful, or if he had been less esteemed and less beloved by the soldiers, he must at this time have fallen a sacrifice to popular suspicion. Part of the enemy's advanced guard came in sight of Chaves the next day. On the following Silveira went into the town, and endeavoured, but in vain, to convince the refractory officers that it was not possible to oppose any effectual resistance. Again on the morrow he entered it, summoned all the superior officers to a council of war, and protested against the resolution which had been taken, explaining at the



same time the grounds of his opinion. All the officers agreed with him except those who by aid of the populace had taken upon themselves the command. By this time the place was invested on three sides, and Soult summoned the general to surrender. Silveira returned a verbal answer, that he had nothing to do with the defence of Chaves, but only with the army which he commanded; he then retired to the Campo de S. Barbara. A letter from Marshal Soult followed him, requiring him to retain the army and govern the province in the Emperor Napoleon's name, and spare the effusion of blood which must otherwise follow. Silveira replied by word of mouth, that one who had the honour to command Portuguese could give ear to no such proposals; and that he would never listen to any except that of Marshal Soult's surrender. Meantime a fire was kept up from the place with as little effect as judgement, and the French suffered some loss from the peasantry and from small parties who were on the alert to seize every occasion. A second summons was now sent in; by this time the ardour of the refractory troops had begun to cool, and the self-elected commandant dispatched a messenger to Silveira, requesting orders. Silveira's reply was, that he who had taken upon himself to defend Chaves contrary to his orders must act for himself. He desired, however, that the officers who were in the place might be directed to bring off the troops during the night, saying that he would

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*Diario Off.*  
*Cor. Braz.*  
112.

*The French  
establish  
their hospi-  
tal there.*

cover their retreat by bringing down a greater force upon Outeiro Joam. The movement was made on his part ; but he looked in vain for any attempt on the part of the garrison, and on the following morning they surrendered prisoners of war.

It was now seen what motives had influenced the promoters of this mock defence, for all the staff-officers offered their services to the Emperor Napoleon; the troops of the line followed their example, but with a very different intention, and took the first opportunity to escape. Marshal Soult could spare no force for marching off his prisoners, nor for securing them at Chaves; he therefore required an oath from the militia and peasants that they would never again bear arms against the French, and dismissed them. This conduct excited murmurs among those who would rather, after the example of their Emperor, have made sure work. If Junot had commanded the army, they said, the place would have been stormed as soon as they appeared before it. Marshal Soult was not a jot more scrupulous than his predecessor; but at this time the treasonable disposition which had been manifested by a few officers led him to suppose that it might be more easy to conciliate the Portuguese than he had found it to coerce their neighbours, and under this persuasion he established his hospital at Chaves; accordingly the sick and wounded were once more removed, and about 1400 were left there with

a small force for their protection under the *chef de bataillon* Messenger. The Marshal then announced his appointment as Governor-general of Portugal, . . the rank which Junot (whom the Portuguese called the Duke *in partibus*) had held, and proceeded on his march.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

Operations  
de M. Soult,  
118—124.

His effective force consisted at this time of 21,000 men, the country through which he had to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe, nor would it be possible any where to find a peasantry better disposed to defend their hearths and altars, nor better able, had there been common prudence to direct their willing strength. But the military profession had fallen in Portugal to the lowest point of degradation; and governments which weaken every thing for the miserable purpose of rendering a corrupt and anile despotism secure, find themselves powerless and helpless at the first approach of danger. The Portuguese in these provinces were aware that invasion would be attempted, though they knew not on what side; and the effect was to produce tumults among the people, insubordination in the soldiers, apprehension, vacillation, and confusion among the chief officers and rulers, and a state of suspicious excitement which predisposed the public mind equally for impulses of furious cruelty or of unreasonable panic. The Bishop of Porto applied to the Regency for succours; but Lisbon at that time was itself as likely to be attacked, nor indeed had the government any troops upon whom the slightest confidence could be placed. How capable the

Prepara-  
tions for  
defence at  
Porto.

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

Portugueze were of becoming good soldiers, though well understood by those who knew the people, and indeed not to be doubted by any who had any knowledge of human nature, had not yet been tried: with excellent qualities and the best disposition they were perfectly inefficient now. The Bishop had been offended with Sir Robert Wilson for having passed into Spain with a body of Portugueze troops. The consequences of Sir Robert's movement to Ciudad Rodrigo had been more important than he himself could have anticipated, and yet in leaving Porto he lost one of the fairest occasions that was ever presented to an active and enterprising spirit. Acting as he did there with the full concurrence of the Bishop, and possessing his confidence, there was time to have disciplined a force which might have impeded the passage of Soult's army through the strong defiles it had to pass, and have presented a resistance at Porto as successful as that of Acre, and more fatal to the enemy. The means of defence were in abundance, order and intelligence for directing them alone were wanting. The population of the city may be estimated at 80,000, and there were 2000 troops of the line there, 3000 militia, and 15,000 *ordenanças*; the latter half armed, and the greater part without discipline. A line of batteries was erected round the city and suburbs, extending from the Castle of Queijo on the coast to the village of Freixo on the Douro; the line was about three miles in extent, and between two and three hundred pieces



of artillery were mounted there in thirty-five batteries. Had it been well constructed, a large force would have been necessary to defend it: but there had been as little skill in the formation as in the plan; the batteries were without parapets, and the houses and trees which might afford cover to an enemy were not taken down.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

Soult meantime, as soon as he had entered Chaves, thought to cut off Silveira; but that general frustrated his intent by retiring first to the mountains of Oura and Reigaz, and then to Villa Pouca, where he took a position with the determination of defending it. The French, however, did not think this little force of sufficient consequence to delay their march; and sending out parties in different directions, in the hope that the report of their entrance spreading on all sides, might reach the Generals who were to co-operate with them, but with whom they had no means of communicating, they proceeded by the Braga road. The resistance which they found evinced the brave spirit of the people, and the incapacity of those who commanded them. The villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off, they were fired upon by the peasantry from the heights and the cover of crags or trees; any military attempt to impede them was conducted with so little skill or order, that it served only to confirm their contempt for the nation upon whom they had brought and were about to bring such unutterable miseries; but

*Advance of  
the French  
from  
Chaves.*

*March 13.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

*Operations  
de M. Soult,  
128.*

*Tumults at  
Braga.*

*Dialogo en-  
tre Braga e  
o Porto,  
19—21.*

sometimes a handful of Portugeeze stood their ground with a spirit like that of their ancestors; and sometimes an individual would rush upon certain death, so he could make sure of one Frenchman, knowing that if his countrymen would act upon the same principle of life for life, the kingdom would soon be delivered from its unprovoked invaders.

Bernardim Freire, not knowing whether the enemy would take the way by Braga or by Villa-real, had given orders to secure the positions of Ponte de Cavez and Salto on the latter road, Ruivaens and Salamonde on the other: his headquarters were at Braga, a city which had long been in a state of strange confusion. The clergy with whimsical indecorum had embodied themselves to serve as a guard of honour for the Primate till their services should be needed for the defence of the place; and part of the exercise of this ecclesiastical corps was with one hand to take off the hat at the Ave Maria bell, and present arms with the other. Men lose their proper influence when they go out of their proper sphere; and the extraordinary circumstances which justified the clergy in taking arms, and even increased their authority while they acted individually either in the ranks or in command, did not save them from ridicule when they thus exposed themselves to it as a body. At any time this would have been an evil; it was especially so when the bonds of authority had been loosened, and envy, cupidity, and

hatred were under no restraint. General Freire had neither the talents nor the character to command respect; and on his return from inspecting the positions at Ruivaens and Salamonde he had been insulted and menaced by the rabble at S. Gens. On the following day, having received intelligence that the enemy were on the way to Ruivaens, he went to the heights of Carvalho d'Este, with the intention of occupying a strong position there, not indeed in any expectation of defeating the enemy, for having just military knowledge enough to see all the difficulties of his situation, he knew himself and the men under his command too well to entertain any hope; but time he thought might be gained for removing the stores from Braga, and whatever else could be saved. It was soon understood that the pass of Ruivaens had been forced, and this intelligence was presently followed by the fearful tidings that the French had won the defiles of Salamonde also. His only thought now was of retiring upon Porto; and having dispatched in the night an order written in pencil to his adjutant-general for removing the military chest from Braga, and advising Parreiras, who commanded at Porto, of the enemy's approach, he entered the city in the morning, and found it in a state of complete anarchy. His dispatches had been seized and opened by the mob, and some of his messengers murdered. Conceiving that his only course now was to provide for the defence of Porto,

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
March.

March 15.

March 17.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*Sentença  
sobre as  
Atrocida-  
des, &c.  
Corr. Braz.  
iv. 521—  
531.*

*General  
Freire mur-  
dered.*

he gave orders accordingly. The populace were of a different opinion; they thought the position at Carvalho d'Este ought to be defended, and considered it either an act of cowardice or of treason to let the French advance without resistance. Freire, however, left the city without receiving any injury, and took the high road to Porto. At the village of Carapoa the peasants detained him as a traitor; he was rescued by the timely arrival of a commandant of brigade, and proceeded with a guard of twenty men for his protection; but falling in presently with a party of *ordenanças*, they seized him, and insisted upon taking him back to Braga.

Meantime the peasantry from all sides had flocked to that city, some retreating before the French, some hastening to meet them; some armed with pikes, those who had fowling-pieces looking for ammunition, all demanding to be embodied and led out against the enemy. At this juncture Baron d'Eben arrived on his retreat, in obedience to the General's instructions. This Hanoverian nobleman, who was then a major in the British service, and equerry to the Prince of Wales, commanded the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and after Sir Robert Wilson's departure for the frontier had continued to train his men with a diligence and success which won the confidence of the people. The populace crowded round him, seized the reins of his horse, exclaimed that they were determined to defend the city, reviled the Ge-



CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
*March.*

neral for not leading them against the invaders, and insisted upon his taking the command. Baron d'Eben promised to assist their patriotic exertions in the best manner he could, but said it was necessary that he should first speak with the General. By thus complying with their wishes he hoped to obtain an ascendancy which might enable him to prevent excesses; and for the moment he seemed to have succeeded, for they allowed him to leave the city for that purpose with an escort of an hundred *ordenanças*. They had not proceeded far before they met Freire on foot between two ruffians, who held him by the arms, and followed by a ferocious mob, who threatened to fire upon D'Eben when he attempted to interfere. Yielding to a rabble whom he was unable to oppose, he turned his horse toward Braga; the rabble then cheered him, and when he reached the house where his quarters were, thither the unfortunate General was brought. Freire called upon him for protection; but when the Baron endeavoured to lead him into the house, one of the infuriated multitude thrust at the General with a sword, and wounded him slightly under D'Eben's arm. He got, however, within the door, and D'Eben hoping to save him by employing the people, went out and ordered the drum to beat, and the *ordenanças* to form in line. The mob continued to fire upon the house where Freire was sheltered; and D'Eben then, as the only means of saving him, proposed that he should be put in

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

prison. This was done : and seeing him as he thought safe there, he yielded to the clamours of the people, who required to be led against the enemy. Accordingly he formed them in such order as he could, and set out. Presently a firing was heard in the city, and he was informed that the rabble had dragged out the General from the prison, and murdered him with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. Men, like wild beasts, when once they have tasted blood, acquire an appetite for it. The cry of treason, while it served as a pretext for old enmities and private designs, deceived the ignorant and inflamed the furious ; and several persons of rank, as well as many of Freire's officers, were butchered in the city and in the neighbouring villages.

*The Portuguese routed before Braga.*

The command was now a second time forced upon Baron d'Eben by acclamation, and to him the papers of the murdered General were brought. He sealed them up, dispatched them to Porto, and prepared as well as he could to put his tumultuary force in order. The bells from all the churches were ringing the alarm, and the *ordenanças* were coming in at the call : no preparation had been made for supplying them with food when they were ordered to their stations, nor were there any cartridges which would fit their pieces. A single mould was at length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would allow.

Meanwhile the French vanguard under Generals Franceschi and Laborde, with the brigade of General Foy, arrived before the position of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks were made, and the Portuguese kept their ground. By this time the other divisions of the French had come up, and D'Eben had collected about 23,000 men; 2000 consisted of regular troops, the legion and the Braga militia; of the remainder only 5000 were armed with fire-arms, and most of these had only three rounds of ammunition. Such a multitude was little able to withstand the well-concerted and well-sustained attack of a disciplined force nearly equal in numbers. They were presently routed, and the French having found one of their fellow-soldiers horribly mutilated by some ferocious persons into whose hands he had fallen, showed little mercy in the pursuit. D'Eben and some of his officers attempted in vain to rally the fugitives, that they might defend the city; the answer to all his exhortations was, that there was no ammunition. The last act of the rabble was to murder those remaining objects of their suspicion whom D'Eben had hoped to save by putting them in prison.

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
March.

March 20.

*Operations  
de M. Soult,*  
142.*The French  
enter Braga.*

The French might impose upon the world by representing the dispersion of this tumultuous assemblage as a splendid victory; but they could not deceive themselves concerning the temper of the nation, when upon entering the city they

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

found it deserted by all its inhabitants, and stripped of every thing which could be carried away. If their light vanity could be elated with the vaunt that in the course of eleven days they had won many battles, taken two towns, and forced the passage of a chain of mountains, there was enough to abate their pleasure, if not their pride, in the fact that empty houses were all that they had gained; that they were masters of no more country than their troops could cover, and only while they covered it; and in the ominous apprehension excited by knowing how deeply and how deservedly they were hated by the people whom they had invaded. They consoled themselves with the thought that the rich merchants of Porto would not abandon their property as the people of Braga had done their dwellings; and Marshal Soult was not sparing of professions, that it was with regret he had been compelled to employ force, when his only object in entering Portugal was to deliver that fine country from the ruinous yoke of the English, the eternal enemies of her prosperity. Some of the inhabitants were induced to return, and one was found timid or traitorous enough to take upon himself the office of Corregidor by Marshal Soult's appointment. The most important business which this wretched instrument of the enemy was called upon to perform was to provide them with food; for which purpose he was instructed to assure his countrymen that if they did not bring in provisions, the French would take them;



that in that case the officers could not control the men; it would therefore be for their own interest to act as they were required to do, and for all which they supplied they should receive receipts, payable in a manner afterwards to be explained.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

Operations,  
§c. 146  
—8.

After resting his army three days, and leaving 700 sick and wounded in the hospitals, Soult proceeded on his march. One division, which found the bridge over the Ave at Barca da Trofa broken down, and the ford guarded too well to be passed without loss and difficulty, succeeded in winning and repairing the Ponte de S. Justo over the same river, higher up. The Ponte de Ave also was forced by Colonel Lallemand in a second attempt; and the officers who defended it were murdered by their men, who, feeling in themselves no want of courage or of will, imputed every reverse to treachery in their leaders. Without farther opposition the enemy advanced upon Porto, and the Marshal sent in a summons to the Bishop, the magistrates, and the General, in the usual French style, protesting that the French came not as enemies to the Portugueze, but only to drive away the English; and that the rulers of the city would be responsible before God and man for the blood that would be shed, and the horrors which must ensue, if they attempted to oppose an army accustomed to victory. It was not without danger that the summons could be delivered; and General Foy, who either being deceived by the gestures of a

*They appear before  
Porto.*

*March 24.*

*March 28.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*Operations,*  
§c. 159—  
168.

*Oliveira*  
*murdered.*

*Vol. ii. p.*  
64.

party of soldiers, or mistaking them, advanced to receive their submission, was surrounded and carried into the city. A cry was set up that they had taken Loison; and Foy would have been torn to pieces, in vengeance for Loison's crimes, if he had not possessed presence of mind enough to lift up both hands, and thus prove to the people that he was not their old one-armed enemy.

The persons in authority had sufficient influence to save his life, and put him in confinement for security; but they were unable to protect Luiz de Oliveira, who having been deservedly thrown into prison in June, had been left there as if forgotten, with that iniquitous neglect of justice which had long been usual in Portugal. He was murdered and dragged through the streets by the rabble; and a few other victims perished in this last explosion of popular fury. The Bishop, who appears to have been at that time in the battery of S. Francisco encouraging the troops, saw now what had been represented to him vainly, though in time, that the works were too extensive, as well as too weak. He had been advised to strengthen them by throwing up works *en flèche*, to place 1500 of the best troops in their rear, as a reserve for supporting the point which should be attacked, and to throw up a second line close under the suburb, and have the houses loop-holed, in preparation for that sort of defence which the inhabitants were in a temper to have maintained,

had there been spirits to have directed them, as at Zaragoza. None of these things had been done ; and the Bishop, sensible when too late of the errors which had been committed, and the value of the time which had been lost, and perceiving also too many proofs of that confusion which insubordination always produces, crossed to the left bank of the Douro during the night, leaving the ill-planned and ill-constructed works to be defended by an inadequate force and an inefficient general. All night the bells of all the churches were ringing the alarm ; the churches were filled with supplicants, the streets with a multitude, who wasted in furious demonstrations that strength which should have been reserved for the defence of their streets, and houses, and chambers. At midnight a storm of wind and rain and thunder broke over the city, and while the lightnings flashed above, a useless discharge of cannon and musketry was kept up by the Portuguese along the line, at which the enemy gazed as at a spectacle, for not a shot could reach them. Soult had given orders that the works should be attacked at six on the ensuing morning, which was Good Friday. Napoleon and Glory was the word. The storm ceased about three, and the attack was postponed till seven, that the soil might have time to dry, so as not to impede the troops in their movements.

General Parreiras before the attack was made had lost all hope of opposing a successful resistance. Yet when the enemy attacked the

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*The bishop  
leaves the  
city.*

*Operations,  
&c. 168-9.*

*Porto taken.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
March.

---

Prelada, a *quinta*, or country-seat, about a mile from the city, where the lines formed an angle, they did not force it without a loss of 500 men, including two *chefs de bataillon*. Having forced it, they flanked the greater part of those troops who did their duty. The right and left were attacked also; a panic soon spread: in less than an hour after the commencement of the action, the General seeing that all was lost, had crossed the bridge, and the French were in the town. A tremendous carnage ensued; the cavalry charging through the streets, and slaughtering indiscriminately all whom they overtook: for an officer who accompanied General Foy the preceding day had been killed, having attempted to defend himself when the General surrendered, and the circumstance of his death was made a pretext for this butchery. But the greatest destruction took place in the passage of the river; the inhabitants rushed to the bridge of boats in such numbers, that the first pontoon sank under their weight; the crowd from behind still pressed on, forcing those who were foremost into the stream, and themselves in like manner precipitated in their turn; the French meantime keeping up a fire of grape-shot upon the affrighted and helpless fugitives. From three to four thousand persons are supposed to have perished thus; and not satisfied with this, the enemy kept up a fire from the most commanding points upon those who were endeavouring to cross in boats. Of the numbers



who were thus killed a large proportion consisted of women and children. But in this miserable day neither sex, age, nor innocence could obtain mercy, nor manly and heroic courage command respect from the inhuman enemy. The men, and they were not few, who did their duty, singly or in small parties where a handful of brave Portugueze had got together, were put to the sword. About two hundred, whom the French praised in reality when they intended to depreciate them by calling them the most fanaticised, collected near the Cathedral, and fought till the last man was cut down. The scenes which ensued were more odious and more opprobrious to humanity than even the horrors of this carnage; the men, however, were not allowed to commit enormities of every kind till they were glutted, as they had been at Evora. Marshal Soult exerted himself to check their \* excesses with an earnestness which, even

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

Col. Jones's  
Acc. of the  
War, i. 195.

\* Marshal Soult's historian expresses himself upon this subject in a manner altogether worthy of such a writer: "*Le Français, si passionné pour la beauté, sacrifia ses plaisirs à l'honneur de protéger les femmes qui réclameraient son appui.*"

I believe that no other portion of history was ever so entirely and audaciously falsified as that of the peninsular war has been by the French. This writer asserts that few days have been so brilliant for the French arms as that on which Porto was taken; that they were astonished at their own success when they saw how

many obstacles they had overcome; for that *des officiers du génie Portugais et Anglais s'étaient occupés à réunir à l'avantage de la position, tout ce que l'art a inventé pour la défense d'un camp*; and that these formidable works were manned by 70,000 men determined to defend them to the last extremity. Pp. 159—60—77.

There is another statement of this writer's which deserves notice. He says that the former campaign in Portugal had been distinguished by cruelties on the part of the inhabitants (p. 56); and that in the present "*pour*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

if it proceeded from mere motives of policy, must be recorded to his honour. And he had some officers to second him with true good will in this good work; for though the miscreants were with him who had disgraced their country and their profession by the atrocities which they had perpetrated or permitted at Evora and Leiria, there were others who abhorred the iniquitous service in which they were engaged, and who were members of a secret society, the object of which was to throw off Buonaparte's yoke, and restore peace to France and Europe.

Soult re-  
mains at  
Porto.

Complete as his success had hitherto been, and little as it had cost him, Marshal Soult did not find it advisable to push on for Lisbon. He now knew what was the spirit of the nation, and he was without any intelligence from Lapisse and Victor, whose movements were to be combined with his. He applied himself therefore to securing what he had won, and endeavoured to conciliate the Portugueze, and raise a party among them in favour of the ambitious designs which, like Junot, he appears now to

*animer le peuple contre les Français, on avait répandu les bruits les plus absurdes. La haine les peignait aux yeux de la superstition et de la crédulité, comme des hérétiques qui foulaient aux pieds tous les principes religieux, comme des barbares qui au mépris des lois divines et humaines, dévoraient les enfans, livraient le sexe à tous les outrages, et envoyaient les hommes dans le nord pour renforcer leurs*

*armées.*"—(P. 119.) The charges against which this contemptuous indignation is affected are true to the very letter, with the exception of that of eating the children, which, be it remembered, was never made. They did not eat children; . . . they only butchered them sometimes, and sometimes (as will be shown hereafter) let them die of hunger before their eyes.

have formed. For this purpose a newspaper was published at Porto a week only after its capture, and the first number opened with a panegyric upon the conqueror because he had not totally destroyed the city. While the streets were yet stained with the blood of the carnage, and there was mourning in every house, and bodies were every day cast up by the river and along the sea-beach, . . while it was stated officially in the Madrid Gazette that the whole garrison had been put to the sword, . . Marshal Soult was panegyricized for clemency! The dreadful catastrophe which Porto had suffered, said his writers, might serve as a warning for all who undertook great enterprises without calculating the means, or looking on to the end. But amid the horror with which so severe an example affected every feeling heart, there was abundant matter of consolation for minds capable of weighing things in the balance of philosophy. Towns carried by assault had invariably, among the most civilized nations, paid with their total destruction the penalty of their contumacy. This was the fate which Porto had had to apprehend; and from this it had been spared by a hero who always listened to the voice of mercy, and in whose heart valour and humanity contended for the ascendance!

The Portuguese are not so light a people as to be thus easily deceived. They had seen the tender mercies of the French too recently to be duped by their professions, and not more than a

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*April.*

*Disposition  
of the inha-  
bitants.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

*Operations,*  
§c. 183.

*Do.* 206.

*Operations,*  
§c. 205.

*Marshal  
Soul't's  
views re-  
specting the  
Liberals  
and the  
Jews.*

sixth part of the inhabitants remained in Porto under their government. If this proof of their disposition augured ill for the French, it lessened the difficulty of providing for the city, which was an object of no small anxiety to the captors. They who had undertaken to supply the troops went into the country by night to make their bargains with persons whom they could trust, and the supplies were brought in darkness at a stated hour to a stated place ; for if any person had been seen engaged in thus administering to the enemy, his life would have been the penalty of his treason. When the English property was put up to sale, not a person would bid for it : an individual at last ventured to offer about a third part of its value for certain goods, but before four-and-twenty hours had elapsed he absconded, either for the fear of being marked as one who had dealt with the French, or unable to bear the shame of having been the only Portuguese in Porto who had thus disgraced himself.

There were, however, in Portugal, as in every country, men who have no other principle than the determination of promoting their own interest by any means ; and there were some few who entertained that abject and superstitious faith in Buonaparte's fortune which his partizans and flatterers every where endeavoured to promote. Some also there were who, in their vehement abhorrence for the besotted despotism and the filthy superstition which degraded their country, had renounced their national feeling



and their Christian faith. The scheme of Soult's policy was to make such persons (whom he supposed more numerous than they were) stand forward as a party, engage them in the irre-missible offence of swearing fidelity to Napoleon and obedience to his representative, and employ them in corrupting their countrymen, and in watching and subjugating those whom they could not seduce. For this purpose he had his emissaries in the capital and in the provinces to spread disaffection by representing the abuses and evils both of the civil and ecclesiastical system, . . abuses which it was hardly possible to exaggerate, and evils which in themselves and in their consequences were only more tolerable and less pernicious than the iron tyranny which Buonaparte would have substituted in their place. Marshal Soult had also conceived the strange intention of making the Jews, whose number in Portugal he estimated at 200,000, avow their religion under the protection of France, and hold upon an appointed day a general feast for the success of the Emperor's arms. It is probable that he overrated them as greatly as he mistook their character; but if they had been mad enough to act in conformity to his wishes, a general massacre would have been the certain consequence. For the old in-human prejudice against this persecuted race, when yielding to wiser laws and the spirit of the age, had been revived by the manner in which Buonaparte courted them. It was ob-

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
April.

*Campaign  
of 1809 in  
the Penin-  
sula, 15.  
Do. Appen-  
dix A.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

served by some of the Spanish journalists, that when the Turks were the terror of Christendom, they had derived their information from the Jews, who were their instruments every where ; and the promise of Buonaparte to abolish the Inquisition provoked only from the Spaniards the remark that this measure must have been suggested by some Israelite of the Sanhedrim.

*His hopes  
of becoming  
King of  
Northern  
Lusitania.*

Among the Portuguese who, from the perversion of good feelings, or the original prevalence of base ones, were open to corruption, persons were found to forward the design which Soult had now formed of becoming King of Northern Lusitania. Buonaparte's formation of new principalities and kingdoms for his brothers and favourites had made the generals of this new Alexander suppose that his conquests would be divided among them, and a petty kingdom under this title had been carved out in the secret treaty of Fontainebleau. A deputation of twelve principal inhabitants of Braga, as they were represented to be, waited upon the Marshal, and published in his gazette an account of their interview with him, and an address in consequence to the Portuguese people. They assured their countrymen that Marshal Soult had conversed with them at great length upon the produce, commerce, and interests of the province between the rivers, in a manner which formed a striking contrast to the conduct of their old government. That government, they said, had been indifferent about all things except the raising of its

revenues. The flight of the Prince Regent amounted to a voluntary abdication of the throne, and a happy futurity might now be anticipated under a better dynasty. The House of Braganza, said these traitors, no longer exists. It is the will of Heaven that our destinies should pass into other hands; and it has been the peculiar favour of Divine Providence to send us a man exempt from passions, and devoted to true glory alone, who desires to employ the force entrusted to him by the great Napoleon only for our protection and deliverance from the monster of anarchy which threatened to devour us. Why do we delay to assemble round him, and proclaim him our father and deliverer? Why do we delay to express our anxiety to see him at the head of a nation, of whose affections he has made so rapid a conquest? The sovereign of France will lend a gracious ear to our supplications, and will rejoice to see that we desire one of his lieutenants for our King, who, in imitation of his example, knows how to conquer and to pardon.

Such an address could not have been published in a journal which was under French superintendence unless it had been in unison with Soult's designs. On another occasion, when he gave audience to a second deputation from Braga, and to the civil, religious, and military authorities of Porto, the obsequious traitors requested that till the supreme intentions of the Emperor should be ascertained they might be

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

*Col. Jones's  
Hist. of the  
War, i. 199,  
note.*

*He visits  
the church  
of N. Sen-  
hor de Bou-  
ças.*

allowed to swear fidelity to his most worthy representative, who had so many claims upon the love, respect, and gratitude of the Portuguese. The Marshal expatiated as usual in reply upon the felicities which were about to be showered upon Portugal under a French master: "As to what concerns myself," he added, "I feel obliged by the frank expressions which you have used relating to my person; but it does not depend upon me to answer them." He had, however, depended so much upon realizing this dream of ambition, that proclamations were prepared, announcing him as King. It was fortunate for the parties concerned that they went no farther; for one of his staff, who was supposed to be a principal agent in the scheme, was recalled to Paris, and Buonaparte, addressing him by name at a grand levee, said to him, "Take care how you draw up proclamations! My empire is not yet sufficiently extended for my generals to become independent. One step farther, and I would have had you shot."

Expecting no such impediment to his hopes, the "worthy representative" of Buonaparte proceeded, as his master had done in Egypt, to show his attachment to the religion of the people whom he came to govern. There is a famous crucifix, known by the name of Nosso Senhor de Bouças, in the little town of Matosinhos, upon the coast, about a league from Porto. According to tradition it is the oldest image in Portugal, being the work of Nicodemus; and



though the workman neither attempted to represent muscle nor vein, it is affirmed that there cannot be a more perfect and excellent crucifix. Antiquaries discovered another merit in it, for there has been a controversy concerning the number \* of nails used in the crucifixion, and in this image four are represented, agreeing with the opinion of St. Gregory of Tours, and the revelation made to the Swedish St. Bridget. The sea cast it up, and its miraculous virtue was soon attested by innumerable proofs. One of the arms was wanting when it was found; the best sculptors were employed to supply this deficiency; but in spite of all their skill not one of them could produce an arm which would fit the place for which it was designed. One day a poor but pious woman, as she was gathering shell-fish and drift-wood for fuel, picked up upon the beach a wooden arm, which she, supposing that it had belonged to some ordinary and profane image, laid upon the fire. The reader will be at no loss to imagine that it sprung out of the flames, . . . that the neighbours collected at the vociferations of the woman, . . . that the priests were ready to carry it in procession to the church of N. Senhor; and that the moment it was applied to the stump whereto

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

*D. Rodrigo  
da Cunha,  
Cat. dos  
Bispos do  
Porto, pp.  
393, 4.*

\* The matter is of more importance than may be immediately perceived by a protestant. For more than three of these nails are shown as relics in different churches; and, therefore,

if only three, according to the prevailing opinion, were used, the fourth must be spurious, and thus, as all cannot be genuine, a doubt would be cast upon the authenticity of each.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

*Corografia  
Portu-  
guesa, t. i.  
361.*

it belonged, a miraculous junction was effected. Our Lord of Bouças became from that time one of the most famous idols in Portugal; and on the day of his festival five-and-twenty thousand persons have sometimes been assembled at his church, coming thither in pilgrimage from all parts.

To this idol Marshal Soult thought proper to offer his devotions. He and his staff visited the church, and prostrating themselves before the altar, paid, says his journal, that tribute of respect and reverence which religion requires from those who are animated with the true spirit of Christianity. "There cannot," continued the hypocritical traitor who recorded this mummary, . . "there cannot be a more affecting and interesting spectacle, than to see a Great Man humbling himself in the presence of the King of kings and Sovereign Disposer of empires. All the inhabitants of Matosinhos who were present at this religious solemnity were wrapt in ecstasy!" The French Marshal testified his great concern at hearing that the plate and jewels and ornaments of the church had been carried off; and he promised the rector that he would offer two large silver candlesticks to Nosso Senhor, and dedicate a silver lamp to him, and assign funds to keep it burning night and day, and, moreover, that he would double the stipend of the rector and the sacristan. "Let this fact," said his penman, "be contrasted with what we have been told respecting

the irreligion of the French troops and their leaders! It is time to open our eyes, and to acknowledge the hand of Providence in the events which have befallen us. How fortunate are we that Heaven has destined us to be governed by a hero who possesses a heart disposed to be deeply and warmly impressed with the majesty of our holy religion, and who aspires only to make it shine forth with new and never-fading splendour! Let the calumniators be confounded, and the timid be tranquil! Our hopes ought to be re-animated now that they have obtained a support, which, resting on religion, and lifting its head above the storms, promises them entire realization.”

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*April.*

Not a word of restoring the spoils of the church had been said by Marshal Soult; . . his promise of the lamp and the funds for the oil, and the increase of salaries, was confirmed by a decree in which he dedicated the lamp, assigned a revenue of sixteen milreas for its support, and doubled the incomes; as far as the decree went he performed his promise . . and no farther. His situation, indeed, was becoming too perilous to allow him time for the farce of superstition. On one hand the events in Galicia alarmed him, . . on the other he learnt that the English, instead of evacuating Lisbon, were expecting a fresh army there; and that General Beresford was already arrived, with the title of Field-marshal conferred upon him by the Prince of Brazil, to take the command of the Portu-

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

gueze army, and reorganize it. He had experienced the courage and the patriotism of the Portugueze, and knew that discipline was all they wanted to make them as formidable in the field as their forefathers. From the centre of Spain he could expect little assistance, so rapidly had the Spaniards re-formed their armies; . . and from France itself no reinforcements were to be looked for, for Buonaparte was even obliged to withdraw troops from the Peninsula, that he might march against the Austrians.

*Chaves re-  
taken by  
Silveira.*

The first ill news which reached him was from Chaves. Bernardim Freire had directed Silveira, as soon as the enemy should enter Portugal, to retire by the passes of Salamonde and Ruyvaens, and so join the main force assembled for the defence of Portugal. The spirit of insubordination which broke out at Chaves seems to have frustrated this purpose. Silveira waited till the last in the vicinity of that place, hoping to bring off the garrison when they should feel that it was untenable: failing in that hope, he found it necessary to fall back before the French in a different direction to Villa Pouca. The enemy, believing that his little army was what they called demoralized, had contented themselves with making a strong reconnoissance there under General Lorges, for the double motive of deceiving the Portugueze with regard to their intended march, and intimidating the country; then pursued their way, holding the force which they left behind them



in as much contempt as that which they advanced to attack. But no sooner had Silveira ascertained their movements than he returned to his position at S. Barbara; and when the last party of the enemy's cavalry had withdrawn from observing him to follow the main body, he entered Chaves, easily overcoming the little resistance which the garrison were able to make. Messenger, the commandant, withdrew into the fort, where the Portuguese, having no artillery, blockaded him for four days: on the fifth they prepared to take it by escalade; the French then proposed to capitulate, on condition of marching out with arms and baggage to join Marshal Soult. Five minutes were allowed them to determine whether they would surrender prisoners at war, and they were glad to secure their lives by submitting to that condition. About 1300 men were thus taken, and 114 Spaniards whom Soult had left there as prisoners were restored to liberty. Silveira then followed the steps of the enemy. Hearing that they had entered Braga, his intention was to cut off their garrison there, as he had done at Chaves; but while he was arranging measures for this, he learned the fate of Porto, and marched in consequence toward Villa Real. On the way he was informed that the enemy intended to enter Tras os Montes by way either of Canavezes or of a little town known by the awkward name of *Entre ambos os rios*, from its position near the point where the Tamega falls into the

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
March.

---

March 20.

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
March.*Diario Of-  
ficial. Corr.  
Braz. iii.  
113, 115.**Proceed-  
ings at  
Coimbra.**Operations,  
&c. p. 199.*

Douro. Immediately he occupied both places, repulsed the French in two attempts upon the former, and reaching Amarante himself just as a party of the enemy, having burnt the villages of Villa Meam, Manhufe, and Pildre, were advancing to take possession of it, he made them retire to Penafiel, and entered that city the next day on their withdrawing from it.

Silveira's activity raised the hopes of the Portuguese: it was said in Porto that he would soon take his coffee in that city, and this was repeated to Soult, who desired Silveira might be assured that he would provide him with sugar for it. The jest is said to have kept up the spirits of those Portuguese who had consented to serve the French interest. But the cup which they had prepared for themselves was one which, drug it as they might, nothing could sweeten. Every sacrifice and every success on the part of their countrymen, every act of heroism and virtue, every manifestation of the old national spirit, was a reproach to them; and tidings which would have elated and rejoiced their hearts if they had not fallen from their duty, brought to them feelings only of fear, and shame, and self-condemnation. The Portuguese were so persuaded of their own strength, and the experience even of the preceding year had so little abated that persuasion, that they had considered it impossible for the French to enter Porto, or had expected at least that the city would have made a long and glo-

rious resistance. And yet the tidings of its capture, with all the shameful and all the dreadful circumstances that attended it, occasioned no consternation. That miserable event was known at Coimbra on the following day; it was known also that no means had been taken for removing the boats and destroying the bridge; that the part which had been broken by the crowd of fugitives had speedily been repaired by the enemy, and that their advanced parties had proceeded as far as Grijo. It was considered certain that they would lose no time in occupying so important a city as Coimbra and the intermediate country, one of the finest and most fertile parts of the kingdom. Colonel Trant, who commanded there, knew how inadequate his means were to prevent this; but he knew that efficient aid might soon be expected from England, that much might sometimes be done by mere display, and by the judicious use of a scanty force, and that if the evil could be but for a little while delayed, it might ultimately be averted.

The force at his disposal consisted of the Coimbra militia and a detachment of volunteers who had enlisted for the army, in all 500 men; but to these an academical corps of 300 was immediately added, the students offering themselves with that alacrity, and displaying that promptitude and intelligence, which belong to youth in their station. The people began to recover confidence when they knew that one

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

party from this little force took the road to Aveiro and another that to Sardam, the two directions in which Coimbra might be approached from Porto. Report magnified the designs of Colonel Trant and the means which he possessed; and the double good was produced of encouraging the Portuguese and delaying the progress of the French, who, if they advanced to Coimbra, would have commanded the resources of a fertile country, have approached nearer to the armies with which their operations were to be combined for effecting the conquest of the kingdom; and moreover, in case of failure, would have had an easier retreat open through Beira. A most timely supply was obtained from the magistrates of Aveiro, who having consulted the Camara of Coimbra, placed the public money which had been collected in their city at Colonel Trant's disposal, and also a considerable magazine of maize and other grain, . . both being thus secured from the enemy, into whose hands they must otherwise have fallen, if even a slight detachment had been sent thither. The fugitives from Porto and from that part of the country which the invaders occupied found in Coimbra all the assistance that could be afforded, and were thus prevented from carrying the panic farther; and the soldiers who had escaped the butchery were refitted and re-embodied as they came in. Colonel Trant offered the command to Baron d'Eben; but the Baron knew by experience what it was to command a hasty and



tumultuous force, and chose rather to employ himself in re-collecting his battalion of the Lusitanian Legion. It was offered also to the Portuguese Brigadier Antonio Marcellino da Victoria; but he had witnessed the fate of Freire, and desired to accompany Trant as a simple volunteer. In addition to the force which was thus augmenting, two squadrons of regular troops unexpectedly arrived in Coimbra, with their commander, the Visconde de Barbacena: they had been ordered in a different direction; but being mostly natives of the Campo de Coimbra, they had insisted upon going to defend their own immediate country, and the Viscount deemed it better to obey their inclinations than withstand a spirit of insubordination to which he might too probably have fallen a sacrifice. Colonel Trant removed them as soon as possible out of the city, and separating them from the other troops, stationed them in advance at Mealhada. The Commander-in-chief being duly apprized of what had occurred, gave orders that these troops should remain under his command; and the men, whose intentions had been good when their conduct was most irregular, were thus brought again into the line of duty.

With this motley force, a week after the capture of Porto had been known, Colonel Trant set forth. Taking the students' corps under his own command, he advanced toward Aveiro, and effected the important purpose of securing the boats and provisions in that port. The right

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

*Col. Trant  
takes a position upon  
the Vouga.  
April 6.*

CHAP. column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell  
XIX. (who had escaped from the carnage at Porto),  
1809. he sent to the bridge of Vouga. That river  
*April.* (the Vacca of the ancients) rises in the Serra de Alcoba, and having received the Portuguese Agueda, which brings an equal volume of waters, enters the Lake of Aveiro, and forms a harbour there not less beautiful than singular: it is separated from the sea by two long wings of sand, and if the entrance were but good, would be perhaps the most commodious and capacious in Europe. A party of the enemy had crossed by the bridge of Vouga, and recrossed by that of Marnel, leaving in all the intermediate places the accustomed marks of their sacrilegious barbarity. They were part of a considerable cavalry force, under General Franceschi. For having taken Porto, and being masters of the Douro, the French, accustomed to consider military posts and the course of rivers as every thing, and the people as nothing in the scale, held that the country as far as the Mondego was already theirs by right of conquest; and Franceschi's division would have advanced to occupy Coimbra if he had not thought that the force opposed to him was respectable both in numbers and quality. Its number, which the enemy supposed to be from ten to twelve thousand, did not in reality exceed 2000, even after two companies of grenadiers had joined them from Guarda. They had been stationed there under Camp-Marshal Manoel Pinto Bacellar's command; but

choosing to act upon their own judgement, in those days of general insubordination, they compelled their officers to conduct them to the Vouga, as the place where they might soonest be enabled to act against the invaders of their country. With regard to the quality of this little force, the French supposed that there were English troops with it, and a great proportion of English officers. A panic seized Campbell's men; they fled towards Coimbra; some of the fugitives joined Trant, and added in no slight degree to the anxieties of his situation by the alarm which they communicated. The academical corps indeed, under his immediate command, was one in which he placed just confidence; but the fatal consequence of exposing the flower of a nobility and gentry like ordinary lives had been severely felt in England during the great rebellion; and the Portuguese remembered an example still more ruinous of the same prodigality, when with their King Sebastian they lost every thing except their honour. He addressed them therefore on this occasion; told them they would have to contend against superior numbers, and hinted, at the reproaches which he might bring upon himself if he should lead so large a portion of the illustrious youth of Portugal to destruction. The address produced the animating effect for which it was intended, and they answered him with a general exclamation of *Moriamur pro Rege nostro*.

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

---

1809.  
April.

---

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

*Cruelties of  
the French.*

Fortunately the enemy gave him time ; they were delayed by the expectation of Victor's advance, by Silveira's movements, and by ill news from Galicia ; and Trant profited by their inactivity to guard the bridges, remove the boats, and bring over the flocks and herds of that pastoral country from the northern bank, the owners assisting in this the more readily when they saw some of their cattle seized by the French. Whether it were that Marshal Soult despaired of conciliating the people whom he came to invade and enslave, or if the system of severity was more congenial to his own temper as well as to that of the tyrant whom he served, he endeavoured at this time to intimidate them by measures as atrocious as those which his predecessor Junot had pursued. Such Portuguese as he suspected of communicating either with Trant or Silveira were hung from the trees along the road side, with or without proof, and their bodies left to putrefy there, all persons being forbidden to bury them. Deep as was the detestation of such enemies which this conduct excited, there were other actions at this time which excited, if possible, a stronger feeling of indignant abhorrence. A party of disbanded militia, with a Portuguese Lieutenant-Colonel at their head, surprised a *chef d'escadron* near the village of Arrifana, and killed him and three dragoons of his escort. He was one of the Lameth family, so noted in the first stage of the French revolution ; and having been



Soult's aide-de-camp, had served in the Peninsula with a zeal which could never have been employed in a worse cause. Having been a favourite with the commander and his staff, it was determined to take vengeance for his death; it had taken place in a part of the country of which they had military possession, and they thought proper therefore to consider it as an action not conformable to the laws of war. General Thomieres, who had been accustomed to such services, was sent to inflict what the French called an exemplary and imposing chastisement, . . not upon the individuals concerned, for they were doing their duty elsewhere in defence of their country, but upon the people of Arrifana indiscriminately. A French detachment accordingly entered the village at day-break, seized twenty-four of the inhabitants, marched them into a field, and, having tied them in couples back to back, fired upon them till they were all killed. The rest of the villagers, . . brethren and sisters, parents, wives, and children, were compelled to be spectators of this butchery; the village was then set on fire, and many of the women and girls carried into an Ermida or chapel, and there\* violated.

Satisfied with keeping the country north of the Vouga in subjection, and believing that Trant's corps consisted of ten or twelve thousand men, the enemy made no attempt to pass

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

See vol. i.  
p. 161,  
and vol. ii.  
p. 134.  
*Operations,*  
&c. p. 196.

April 17.

*Positions of  
the French  
and Portuguese  
on  
that side.*

\* This is the substance of a declaration upon oath by one of the eye-witnesses.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
April.

that river; Franceschi, who commanded the cavalry, having his head-quarters at Albergaria Nova, and Thomieres at Villa de Feira, where, and at Ovar and Oliveira d'Azemeis, the infantry were stationed. Trant, cautious of exposing his real weakness, advanced only his scanty cavalry to the Vouga; the foot were quartered in Sardam and Agueda, flourishing and industrious villages, which are separated only by the Agueda, a small but navigable stream. The road from thence toward Porto passes through a pine forest, and there, profiting by the broken ground, he had fortified a position, where the enemy could have derived no advantage from their cavalry if they should pass the Vouga. From hence he communicated with Silveira, and even with Porto itself, where there were some citizens ready to expose themselves to any hazard in the hope of serving the national cause.

*Romana  
captures the  
garrison at  
Villa-  
franca.*

To gain time in this quarter while a British force was soon and surely expected, was to gain every thing: and Marshal Soult was not in a situation to turn his undivided attention in that direction. Tidings for which he was little prepared, even after what he had experienced of the Galician spirit, came upon him from Galicia. The news of Romana's defeat before Monterrey had been circulated over that province with such exaggerations as were deemed likely to intimidate the people. The French affirmed that Romana himself had been taken

prisoner; they fired salutes and made rejoicings for their victory, and proceeded even to the mockery of offering thanksgiving in the churches. Romana meantime collected and rested his harassed troops at La Puebla de Sanabria: in spite of all the enemy's artifices his real situation was soon known to the Spaniards, and deputations from some town or village came every day to this faithful General, assuring him that the Galicians were and would continue true to their country. Some 3000 new levies from Castille joined him there, and finding himself more secure and more hopeful than at any time since he had taken the command, he resolved upon striking a blow against the enemy upon the line of posts which they occupied from Astorga to Villafranca. The walls of the former city, ancient as they were, were not to be won without artillery; but Villafranca had no other fortress than the old castle or palace of the Marqueza de Astorga, which the French had occupied; and there he determined to attack them, moving first upon Ponferrada, where he made some prisoners, and recovered a good quantity of corn, several four-pounders, and one dismounted twelve-pounder, part of his own stores and artillery. Having remounted the larger gun, Romana dispatched his Camp-marshal D. Gabriel de Mendizabal to attack the garrison at Villafranca. That officer's first care was to get between them and Galicia, while the commander-in-chief intercepted their retreat towards As-

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
*March.*

CHAP. torga: for this purpose he proceeded to Caca-  
XIX. belos, and sent one detachment round by the  

---

1809. right to occupy the bridge at the other end of  
*March.*  

---

March 17. the town, while another filed round by the left  
to join it there; every horseman taking up a  
foot soldier behind him to ford the Valcarce,  
and the smaller river which falls into it. Mendizabal, with the remainder of the troops, advanced along the road. His advanced parties drove in the French at all points, till they retired to the castle. The twelve-pounder was brought up; but the Spaniards found that the French fired securely from the old fortification while they themselves were exposed; upon this they entered, and, with fixed bayonets, advanced to storm the castle. Mendizabal was at their head; a ball passed through his clothes without wounding him. He summoned the enemy to surrender, and upon their hesitating what answer to return, repeated the summons with a threat, that if they refused, every man should be put to the sword. The white flag was then hoisted, and a negotiation begun, which the French were conducting with a view to gain time, till the Spanish commander cut it short, by allowing them a quarter of an hour to surrender at discretion. Upon this they submitted; Mendizabal then, as an act of free grace, permitted the officers to keep their horses and portmanteaus, and the men their knapsacks; and the colonel-commandant of the French, in returning thanks for this generosity, complimented



him upon his good fortune in having captured the finest regiment in the Emperor Napoleon's service. The prisoners were about 800. The Spaniards lost two officers and thirty men, eighty-two wounded. The result of the success was, that the Bierzo was cleared of the French, who fell back from the neighbouring part of Asturias upon Lugo, there to make a stand, supported by their main force, which was divided between Santiago, Coruña, and Ferrol.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

Marshal Ney had still a predominant force in Galicia after Soult's army was departed; there were garrisons in every town which was sufficiently important, either for its size or situation, to require one, and the French had military possession of the province. But they had yet to subdue the spirit of the people; and the Galicians, who had no longer an example of panic and disorder before their eyes, carried on the war in their own way. Captain M'Kinley in the *Lively* frigate, with the *Plover* sloop under his command, arrived off the coast to assist them. He discovered none of that apathy for their own country, none of that contented indifference who was to be their master, none of that sullen and ungrateful dislike of the English, of which the retreating army had complained so loudly; he heard from them only expressions of gratitude to the British government and praise of the British nation; he perceived in them the true feelings of loyalty and patriotism, and saw in all their actions honest, en-

*Efforts of  
the Gali-  
cians.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

thusiastic ardour, regulated by a cool and determined courage. The invaders attempted, by the most unrelenting severity, to keep them down. On the 7th of March a party of French entered the little towns of Carril and Villa Garcia, murdered some old men and women in the streets, set fire to the houses of those persons whom they suspected of being hostile to them, and then retreated to Padron. To lay waste villages with fire, abandon the women to the soldiery, and put to death every man whom they took in arms, was the system upon which the French under Marshals Ney and Soult proceeded. Such a system, if it failed to intimidate, necessarily recoiled upon their own heads; and the thirst of vengeance gave a character of desperation to the courage of the Galicians. About an hundred French were pillaging a convent, when Don Bernardo Gonzalez, with two-and-thirty Spaniards, fell upon them, and did such execution while the enemy were in disorder and encumbered with their plunder, that only sixteen escaped. During three days the French attempted to destroy the peasants of Deza and Trasdira; the men of Banos and Tabieros came to aid their countrymen, and the invaders at length retreated with the loss of 114 men. A party from Pontevedra entered Marin: here the Lively and the Plover opened their fire upon them, and as they fled from the English ships, their officers fell into the hands of the peasantry. In this kind of perpetual war the

March 9.

French were wasted; a malignant fever broke out among them, which raged particularly at their head-quarters in Santiago, and many who had no disease died of the fatigue which they endured from being incessantly harassed, and kept night and day on the alarm.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

D. Manuel Garcia de Barrios, who held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, had arrived in Galicia early in March with credentials from the Central Junta authorising him to take such measures as he might deem expedient for its recovery, . . and this was all with which the government could furnish him. He had, however, two brave and able officers under him, D. Manuel Acuña and D. Pablo Morillo, then a young man, who had already distinguished himself upon the Tagus. These officers took the coast and the interior in this military mission, while Barrios took the southern part of the province; and they communicated with Romana and Silveira. Barrios was with the latter General when the French approached Chaves, and, being prevented by an accident from leaving the town with him, was shut in there during its short siege. Aware that if the enemy recognised him they would probably put him to death, or at best compel him to choose between imprisonment and taking the oaths to the Intruder, he escaped over the walls when they entered the place, and remained for some days secreted in a cottage, suffering severely from a fall and from want of food, and having lost

*Barrios sent  
into Galicia.*

*Vol. ii.  
p. 460.*

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

every thing, even his papers. He made his way, however, to the Valle Real de Lobera, where he thought Romana would have taken some measures for raising men; and there he found the spirit which he expected. His report of himself and of his commission was believed, though he had no credentials to produce: a Junta was formed, volunteers were raised, and there, in a confined district, where they were half blockaded by the enemy, plans were laid for the deliverance of Galicia, Barrios having for his coadjutors the abbots of S. Mamed and Couto. Their communication with Romana was impeded by the French at Lugo; but they received tidings of co-operation in another quarter where they had not looked for it, and prepared with all alacrity to take advantage of the opportunity that offered.

*The Portu-  
guese and  
Galicians  
blockade  
Tuy.*

March 10.

While Soult was before Chaves a party of Portuguese, under Alexandre Alberto de Serpa, crossed the Minho near its mouth, and were joined at Guardia by the peasantry; in a few days some thousand men had collected; the Mayorazgo, D. Joaquin Tenreiro, put himself at their head, and their parish priests acted as officers. The two Abbots, who had taken the title of Generals, and disputed which should be called Commander-in-chief of Galicia, compromised their difference by electing Barrios commandant-general of the province of Tuy and division of the Minho, and they set out with all the force they could muster to join one



party of these insurgents who blockaded the French in Tuy, while Morillo and Acuña were directed to join the others, who, officered as they were, undisciplined and ill equipped, had proceeded to besiege the enemy's garrison in Vigo. It had been Soult's intention, neglecting all points of less importance, to concentrate in Tuy all the troops belonging to his army whom he had left in Galicia. But when a column of about 800 men, under the *chef d'escadron* Chalot, bringing with it the heavy baggage of the general officers and the military chest, was on the way thither from Santiago, General Lamartiniere ordered them to Vigo, where the resources were greater both for the men and horses.

The town of Vigo is situated in a bay, which *Vigo.* is one of the largest, deepest, and safest in the whole coast of the peninsula. It is built upon a rock; but, notwithstanding the severe loss which the Spaniards, during the War of the Succession, suffered in that port, no care had been taken to fortify it; it had merely a wall, a fort flanked with four bastions on the land side, and an old castle, equally dilapidated, toward the sea. The neighbourhood of Ferrol has made it neglected as a naval station, and Galicia is too poor a country for foreign commerce. There was, however, a manufactory of hats there, which were exported to America; and a fishery was carried on so extensively as to afford employment for thirty mercantile houses. It derived some importance also from being the seat of

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

government for the province of Tuy. The population amounted to 2500. Sir John Moore had at first fixed upon this port as the place of his embarkation, and ordered the transports there; and the delay occasioned by waiting till they came round Cape Finisterre to join him at Coruña gave time for the French to come up, and for that battle, which, while it redeemed the character of the army, proved fatal to himself.

*The Spaniards appear before Vigo.*

Captain Crawford, in the *Venus* frigate, was off the port, and he wrote to Captain M'Kinley, who was then at Villa Garcia, in the *Lively*, telling him how much the presence of his ship would contribute to the success of the Spaniards. Meantime Morillo arrived to examine the state of the siege. He learnt that a reinforcement of 1800 French were at this time in Pontevedra, about four leagues off. They had to cross the bridge of St. Payo, over a river which discharges itself into the head of the Bay of Vigo, and Morillo immediately took measures for defending the passage. From Don Juan Antonio Gago, an inhabitant of Marin, who was at the head of 500 peasants, he obtained two eight-pounders, and from the town of Redondella one twenty-four and two eighteen-pounders. With these means of defence he entrusted this position to Don Juan de O'Dogherty, a lieutenant in the Spanish navy, who had the command of three gun-boats. While he was taking these necessary measures, part of Romana's army, which

Soult boasted of having destroyed a fortnight before, drove the enemy back from Pontevedra, and took possession of the town. Morillo joined them; and being of opinion that the reduction of Vigo was the most important object which could then be undertaken, they proceeded to that place.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
March.

The French governor Chalot, a *chef d'escadron*, had replied to every summons which Tenreiro sent him, that he was not authorised to surrender to peasantry. Captain M'Kinley having now arrived, he was again summoned to surrender, and negotiations were begun, which continued till the third day, when Morillo joined the besiegers with the force from Pontevedra, consisting of new levies and retired veterans, 1500 of whom had come forward to assist in the deliverance of their country; a council of war was held, by which Morillo was appointed commander-in-chief, and requested to assume the title of colonel, for the sake of appearing of more consequence to M. Chalot, whose complaint it was, that he was not summoned by an officer of sufficient rank. Having been thus promoted to accommodate the *chef d'escadron*, he sent him a summons in due form to surrender within two hours. Chalot replied, that he could not possibly capitulate till he had heard the opinion of the council of war, of which he was president; the members were at present dispersed, and he required twenty-four hours to

Recapture  
of that  
place.

March 26.

March 27.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

collect them. Morillo returned a verbal answer, that he granted him another two hours, and the French, after ineffectually attempting to prolong the term, delivered in their proposals of capitulation, which were, that they should march out with arms, baggage, the whole of their equipage, and with the honours of war; that they should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest French port, on parole not to bear arms against Spain or her allies till exchanged, or till peace should have taken place; that the money belonging to the French government, and destined for the payment of the troops, should remain in the hands of the paymaster, who was accountable for it; and that the papers relating to the accounts of the regiments should be preserved; finally, that the troops should not lay down their arms, nor the town and forts be delivered up, till the moment of embarking. Morillo, with the three French officers who brought these proposals, and two Spaniards, went on board the *Lively*, to lay them before Captain M'Kinley, and answer them with his concurrence. The answer was in a spirit becoming England and Spain. The garrison were required to ground their arms on the glacis, and surrender themselves prisoners of war, the officers being allowed to retain their swords and wearing apparel, nothing more. The demand respecting the money was refused; the place was to be taken possession of as soon as the French



grounded their arms, and if these articles were not ratified within an hour, hostilities were to recommence.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

The officers who were sent to negotiate agreed to these terms, but the ratification was delayed beyond the hour allotted; and the Spaniards, who were prepared to execute what they had threatened, began the assault between eight and nine at night; while those who had muskets kept up a fire upon the enemy, others began to hew down the gates. An old man particularly distinguished himself at the gate of Camboa, by the vigour with which he laid on his strokes, splintering the wood, and when a ball went through him, by the composure with which he died, happy to have fallen in the discharge of his duty, and in the hour of victory. D. Bernardo Gonzalez, the commanding officer of the detachment from Pontevedra, sprang forward, and taking up the axe of the dead, continued the same work, notwithstanding he was thrice wounded; till a fourth wound disabled him, and he was borne away: seven Spaniards fell at this point. Meantime Morillo was informed that the capitulation was now ratified, and forcing his way through the ranks amidst the fire, with great difficulty he made himself heard, and put a stop to the assault.

On the following morning, when Morillo had made preparations to enter and occupy the place, information was brought him from the little town of Porriño, that a reinforcement from Tuy was on the way to the French. Porriño is about

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

a league to the eastward of the road between these two places, and equidistant about two leagues from both. News, therefore, could not be brought so soon but that the troops must closely follow it. Morillo instantly sent off a part of his force as secretly as possible to intercept them, and he remained hurrying the embarkation of the French, by telling them that he could not restrain the rage of the peasantry. How well they had deserved any vengeance which the peasantry could inflict the garrison were perfectly conscious, and were therefore as eager to get on board as Morillo was to see them there. In this haste, the baggage could not be examined conformably to the capitulation, for the hurry of both parties was increased by hearing a firing from the town. The troops from Tuy had arrived under its walls, and, to their astonishment, a fire was opened upon them. They were attacked, routed, and pursued with such vigour, that out of 450, not more than a fifth part escaped; seventy-two were taken prisoners, and sent on board to join their countrymen; the rest were either killed or wounded. The military chest, containing 117,000 francs, had been delivered up according to the terms; but an examination of the baggage was thought necessary; about 20,000 more were discovered; and the whole of both \* sums was distributed

\* It is said that there were some articles of very great value in the baggage, particularly some jewels of which General Lahous-

saye had possessed himself at the Escorial, and which Chalot was supposed to have secreted.—Campaign of 1809, p. 20.

among the troops and peasantry. Never had a more motley army been assembled: . . . men of all ranks and professions bore arms together at this time in Galicia; among those who distinguished themselves were soldiers and sailors; D. Francisco Sanchez Villamarin, the Alferez of a band of students from Santiago; the Abbot of Valladares, and the first preacher of the Franciscans, Fr. Andres Villagelvi.

CHAP.  
XIX.

1809.  
*March.*

The French had at this time 5000 men at Santiago, where they were fortifying themselves. Morillo hastened to place Pontevedra in a state of defence against them, and to secure the bridge of S. Payo, that they might not be able to form any farther junction; for they were now calling in all their smaller detachments, and General Lamartiniere had then collected about 3300 men in Tuy, including some 1200 invalids. A fire which was opened against that place across the river from Valença was soon silenced, and the efforts of the disorderly besiegers were not more effectual. Report magnified their numbers to 20,000; but when Barrios arrived to recompose the dispute between the General-Abbots, by taking the command, he found only a fifth part of the estimated force, and only a fourth of these provided with muskets. Having obtained six pieces of cannon from Salvatierra and Vigo, and a scanty supply of ammunition from the same places, from Bayona, and from his Portugueseze neighbours at Valença and Monçam, he carried on the blockade in spite of all the efforts of the garrison.

*Blockade of  
Tuy.*

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
*April.**The Portu-  
guese re-  
cross the  
Minho.*

Marshal Soult was under no small anxiety for this place; he had recommended it to Ney's especial care; but he had reason to fear that Ney would have sufficient employment for all his force; and he knew what effect the fall of a second garrison would produce not upon the people of the country alone, but also upon his own men; for he was not ignorant that the better spirits in his army detested the service upon which they were employed, and that many even of the worst dreaded it. After entering Braga he dispatched a party of horse in that direction, for of the many messengers whom he had sent to Tuy since he marched from thence on his expedition into Portugal, not one had returned. They learnt at Barcellos that it was blockaded, that it had thrown shells into Valença, and that the garrison were strong enough to sally and incommode the besiegers. Soult could take no measures then for their relief, and he supposed that the news of his success in Portugal would alone relieve them to a considerable degree, by drawing off the Portuguese from the blockade: so in fact it proved; they recrossed the Minho as soon as they heard of his entrance into Braga, and it was their departure which enabled Lamartiniere to make his unfortunate attempt for relieving Vigo.

*The French  
in Tuy re-  
lieved and  
withdrawn.*

Having removed his sick and wounded from Braga to Porto, for they were safe nowhere but under the immediate protection of the army, the Marshal sent Generals Graindorges and Heudelet to relieve Tuy and subdue the inter-



mediate country, where the Portuguese General Botelho had put the Corregidor of Barcellos to death for having welcomed the French on their former reconnoissance from Braga. They entered Ponte de Lima after some resistance; the weak and dilapidated fortress of Valença was surrendered to them, and Barrios, who upon tidings of their movements had made an unsuccessful attack upon Tuy, retired during the night to S. Comba. The French boasted that Lapella and Monçam, Villa Nova and Caminha had opened their gates to them, and that the fort of Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho, had capitulated: the names carried as lofty a sound as if the places were of any strength, or possessed any importance, or could have been defended against them, or held by them. But in fact the only advantage expected or derived from the expedition was that of removing with all speed the garrison and all the moveable effects first from Tuy to Valença, that they might be on the safer side of the Minho, and then with the least possible delay to Porto. In that city Marshal Soult remained, unable to prosecute his plans of conquest, and not more in hope of co-operation from Lapisse and Victor, than in apprehension that a British force might anticipate their tardy movements.

CHAP.  
XIX.1809.  
April.

April 8.

April 10.

## CHAPTER XX.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA.  
BATTLES OF CIUDAD REAL AND MEDELLIN.1809.  
March.

MARSHAL SOULT imputed the failure of his expedition to a deviation from the plan which Buonaparte had prescribed, in not taking possession of Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse had been prevented from doing this when it might have been done without difficulty, by the unexpected appearance of Sir Robert Wilson in that quarter; and Victor, who might have taken the place in spite of any resistance which could then have been opposed, was employed in operations more likely to gratify the pride of the French, but of much less importance to the iniquitous cause in which they were engaged.

*Plans of the  
intrusive  
government.*

Reasons, however, were not wanting for this change of plan. The danger from the spirit of the people in Galicia and in Portugal had either not been foreseen, or disregarded; while the French, well knowing in how short a time men of any nation may be made efficient soldiers by good discipline, and seeing with what celerity, after so many severe defeats, the armies of La Carolina and Extremadura had been brought into the field, deemed it necessary to attack those armies before they should become formi-

dable, and destroy them, as far as their destruction could be effected by the most merciless carnage, . . . for such Buonaparte's generals, to whose pleasure the government of Spain was in fact entrusted, were determined to make. They had been trained in the school of the Revolution, and the temper which they had acquired there fitted them for the service of such a master; and Joseph's miserable ministers, who had penned their edicts of extermination in the hope of intimidating their countrymen, had the misery of knowing that those edicts were acted upon to the letter. Wrung with compunction their hearts were, for some of them had begun life with good hearts, generous feelings, and upright intentions; but having allowed themselves to be engaged in an evil cause, they were now so far in blood, that one deadly sin drew on another, in dreadful and necessary series.

By the letters which were intercepted at this time it appeared that mothers and wives in France congratulated themselves if the objects of their affection were employed in Spain, rather than in the Austrian war, so little did they apprehend the real and dreadful character of such a service. The armies in La Mancha were not better supplied than those in Galicia; weeks sometimes elapsed in which they received neither bread for themselves nor barley for their horses, having to subsist as they could by chance and by plunder. This mode of life had given them the ferocity and the temper of banditti,

CHAP.  
XX.

---

1809.  
March.

---

*Effect of the  
war upon  
the French  
soldiery.*

CHAP. and would have led to the total subversion of  
XX. discipline among any soldiers less apt for discipline than the French. The infantry sometimes murmured under their privations, delivered their opinions freely, and held sometimes towards their officers a language which might be deemed insolent; but a jest produced more effect upon them than a reprimand, a good-humoured reply brought them into good humour; and the prospect of action giving them a hope of discharging their ill feelings upon the Spaniards, always animated them, and made them alert in obedience. The cavalry had better means of providing for themselves, and more opportunities of plunder; they therefore were always respectful as well as submissive to their officers, lest they should be dismounted and deprived of these advantages. The character of the service in which they were incessantly employed gave both to men and horse a sort of Tartar-like sagacity which perhaps had never before been seen among the troops of a highly civilized people. Savages could scarcely have been more quick-sighted in discovering a pass, detecting an ambush, or descrying a distant enemy. And the attachment between horse and rider became such, that if a trooper waking from sleep saw by the condition of his beast that in a fit of drunkenness he had over-ridden or any ways abused it, he would in the first emotions of self-reproach abjure wine and shed tears, with imprecations upon himself, go on



CHAP.  
XX.1809.  
*March.*

foot whenever he could to spare the horse, and give him the bread which should have been his own portion. And yet this humanizing feeling did not render them more humane toward their enemies. Since the religious wars in France no contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides. That cruelty which in the middle ages was common to all nations had been continued among the Spaniards by the effects of the Inquisition, and by their bull-fights, . . among the French by the inhuman character of their old laws, and afterwards by the Revolution; on both sides it was called into full action, retaliation provoking retaliation, and revenge revenge. Even the cheerfulness of the French, which is their peculiar and happy characteristic, which if not a virtue itself, is connected with many virtues, and without which no virtue can have its proper grace, . . even that quality was corrupted by the dreadful warfare in which they were engaged. Light minds go beyond the point of fortitude in that disregard of death which the continual presence of danger necessarily induces. That which the wise and good regard with silent composure is to them a theme for bravados and heart-hardening mockery. It became common for the French, when they recognised a com-  
*Rocca, 84, 87.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

*Temper of  
the Spanish  
generals in  
La Mancha  
and Extre-  
madura.*

dered more intolerable, and their cruelties more devilish, because they were exercised mirthfully.

The armies under Cartaojal and Cuesta were at this time in such a state that they deserved to have been better commanded, if the government had known where to look for better commanders. With all Cuesta's good qualities, his popularity among the troops, his sure integrity, his courage, and the enterprising energy which in spite of age and infirmities he was capable of exerting, caprice, obstinacy, and a desperate rashness which no experience could correct, made him a most unfit man to be trusted with such a stake in such times. All his desire was to meet the enemy in fair battle, where he could draw out his men in full display; and if all his men had been as thoroughly brave as himself, the old man's system would not have been erroneous. Cartaojal, on the contrary, was so convinced that discipline was every thing, and that the best thing which could be done with his troops was to drill them, that he let slip fair opportunities of exercising them in successful enterprise. It seems almost as if a fatality overruled the councils of the Spaniards, both in the cabinet and in the field; and that if these generals had merely been interchanged, Cartaojal's caution might have saved the Extremaduran army, and Cuesta's enterprise have seized the advantages which were presented to that of La Carolina.

If severe measures could have restored discipline, they were not wanting; and they were used with such effect as for a time to stop desertion. One essential reform was introduced. All the infantry officers were till this time mounted, and this practice occasioned a great consumption of forage when forage could hardly be obtained for the cavalry; it led also to these farther inconveniences, that the march of the columns was never conducted as it ought, for want of the immediate presence and attention of the officers; and that in case of retreat the mounted officer had a facility for expediting his escape which might operate as a dangerous temptation upon such officers in such times. No general could have ventured upon this needful reformation without drawing upon himself the ill-will of those whom it affected; the Junta, however, sent orders that no person in the infantry under the rank of major (except the adjutant) should be allowed a horse. This was done by British advice; and if there had been no more jealousy of the British in inferior agents than existed in the Central Junta, the cordial co-operation of the two nations would have met with no obstruction.

The most efficient arm of Cartaojal's force was the cavalry. It had been under the Marquez de Palacios, who had the reputation of being the best cavalry officer in Spain, and was at this time commanded by the Duque de Alburquerque, D. Jose Maria de la Cueva. This no-

CHAP.  
XX.  
1809.  
March.  
*Reforms in  
the Spanish  
army.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

bleman, then in his thirty-fifth year, united in his own person many of those names which are most illustrious in Spanish history, and he had inherited also in no diminished portion the best and noblest qualities of that proud ancestry. His education had been neglected, so that his mind was not stored like Romana's, neither was it equally under self-government. But his military talents were such as to impress upon all who knew him the belief that if experience and opportunity had been afforded, he would have ranked among the great captains of the age: for he was ardent without being incautious, capable alike of planning with clear forethought and executing with celerity, far-sighted, prompt in decision, and above all endowed with that true and rare nobility of soul which is essential to true greatness.

*He proposes  
offensive  
operations.*

A man of this stamp wins the love of the soldiery as certainly as he obtains their confidence. Hope became their ruling passion when Albuquerque was present; and their success in some enterprises, and the skill with which their commander baffled the movements of the enemy in others, gave the fairest prospect of success if the system of enterprise were persevered in. In pursuance of that system, and with the intention of making a diversion in favour of Cuesta, against whom there was reason to believe that the French were preparing a serious attack, the Duke proposed to advance upon Toledo, where they had 4000 foot and 1500 horse,



with 12,000 or 15,000 infantry, 4000 horse, and twenty pieces of horse artillery; and perceiving but too well that his reputation and popularity were regarded with jealous eyes, he advised that the expedition should be not under his own command, but that of a superior officer; and he represented to Cartaojal that the object of forming and disciplining the raw troops would be carried on more certainly and securely while that part of the army which was fit for service occupied the enemy by harassing and keeping them on the alarm. The plan was too bold for one of Cartaojal's temper; he saw the necessity of training the army, and did not consider that enterprise is the best training, and the only, that can be carried on within reach of an active enemy. He ordered him, however, to advance with 2000 horse and four pieces of artillery; and the Duke felt that, as an attempt made with such a force could only end in a precipitate retreat, the intention must be to wreck his reputation by exposing him to certain failure.

His representations, however, to the Junta were so well seconded, that instructions came for advancing upon Toledo with all the disposable force of the army. But when Cartaojal communicated this to the Duke, he ordered him to deliver up the command of the vanguard to D. Juan Bernuy, and march himself immediately with Bassecourt's and Echavarri's divisions of 3500 men and 200 cavalry for Guadalupe, to reinforce Cuesta. It was sufficiently morti-

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

*They are  
undertaken  
when too  
late.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

*The Duke  
sent to join  
Cuesta.*

fying for the Duke to be removed from the cavalry which had acquired credit and confidence while he was at their head, and this too at the moment when the measure which he had so strenuously urged was about to be undertaken; but it was more painful to know that the attempt had been delayed till there was no longer any reasonable prospect of success. With the little body of new-raised infantry which was now placed under his command he began his march for Extremadura, and the ill-fated army of La Carolina commenced its operations at a moment when it was thus deprived of the only General who possessed its confidence.

*Cartaojal  
advances  
against the  
French.*

The head-quarters of that army were at Ciudad Real, the cavalry occupying a line from Manzanares to that city through Damiel, Torralva, and Carrion, and the infantry in the towns to the left and in the rear of Valdepenas. Cartaojal thought this a most advantageous position, having the Sierra Morena behind him as a sure refuge if he were defeated, whereas the enemy, were they to be repulsed in an attack, would be exposed in the open plains, and have to cross the Zeucara and the Guadiana in their flight. Having advanced to Yebenes, and found the French ready to advance themselves, Cartaojal retreated upon Consuegra; that place, to his surprise, was occupied by the enemy in great strength: he fell back, therefore, to his former position, in the advantage of which he trusted, .. and there, eight and forty hours after he had

commenced this useless and harassing movement, the French appeared in pursuit, drove in his cavalry, and prepared to attack him in force on the following morning. They were commanded by General Sebastiani, who had superseded Marshal Lefebvre. The action which ensued is, even upon their own accounts, disgraceful to both parties; to the Spaniards, because they were successively driven from every point where they attempted to stand, and pursued to the entrance of the Sierra; to the conquerors, because Sebastiani stated in his official report that the Spaniards fled on the first charge without resistance, and that he had sabred more than 3000 of them in their flight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, and 4000 prisoners, including nearly 200 officers, were, according to the same report, taken. The fugitives felt a confidence in the Sierra which they had not done in their General, and collected in considerable numbers at Despeñaperros, Venta Quemada, and Montizon; head-quarters were established in the village of S. Elena, two leagues in advance of Carolina, and the French, without pursuing them into the mountains, halted at Santa Cruz, awaiting there the success of Victor's operations against Cuesta.

Marshal Victor's corps, leaving La Mancha about the middle of the preceding month, occupied a line upon the Tagus from Talavera to Almaraz; his head-quarters were at the latter place, where he was preparing materials for a

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

*Rout of the  
Carolina  
army at  
Ciudad  
Real.*

March 17.

*Operations  
of Marshal  
Victor.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

floating bridge, Cuesta having blown up the arches of the Puente de Almaraz. A bridge was necessary here, because, though they could have crossed the river at two other points, there was no road from either of those points practicable for artillery. But the bridge could not be constructed while the Spaniards occupied a post which effectually commanded the passage. Cuesta was aware of these preparations, and also that there was an intention of passing over a detachment higher up to attack him on that flank; accordingly he reinforced it, and removed his head-quarters from Jaraicejo to Puerto de Miravete, that he might be near the scene of operations.

*The French  
cross the  
Puente del  
Arzobispo.*

March 16.

The French detachment, as he had foreseen, effected their passage at Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop's Bridge, so called from its founder, D. Pedro Tenorio. A wooden bridge which existed in his days had been swept away by a flood; and as it was there that pilgrims from the western side of the river passed to pay their devotions to the famous image of our Lady of Guadalupe, he built the present edifice of stone, and founded an hospital for their accommodation, and a town, which he named Villa Franca, but which soon took its appellation more conveniently from the bridge. It became a point of considerable importance in the campaigns of this year. The enemy crossed with little or no resistance, and the advanced

March 17.

parties of the Spaniards fell back upon the di-



vision which was stationed at La Mesa de Ibor, and thence, after an unsuccessful stand, to the village of Campillo, but in good order; their whole conduct having been such as to satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who occupied a strong position, and expected that he should well be able to repel this division of the enemy, while Camp-Marshal Henestrosa, with the vanguard, would prevent their main body from establishing their bridge at Almaraz.

But the French, who had crossed at Arzobispo, after dislodging the Spaniards from their positions at Mesa de Ibor and Fresnedoso, divided into two columns; the one proceeded by the circuitous way of Deleitosa and Torrecillas, with the intent of getting into Cuesta's rear, between Jaraicejo and Miravete, and thus to cut off his communication and supplies; the other marched by Valduña toward the bridge of Almaraz, to dislodge Henestrosa, and thereby free the passage of the river. Cuesta's army consisted of about 16,000 men; the French were little if at all superior in numbers, but he believed that they had 20,000 foot and 3000 cavalry; and learning that Henestrosa, under the belief that his right was threatened by a superior force, had withdrawn from his post, and that the enemy had already begun to cross the Tagus, he determined to retreat toward Truxillo, lest he should be attacked at the same time both in the front and in the rear. This brave old man was cautious when he ought to

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

*Cuesta retreats from the Puerto de Miravete.*

*March 18.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

have been bold, and rash in enterprise when he ought to have been cautious. Had Henestrosa been supported in time (for there had been time enough to support him), the ground was so strong, and the Spaniards in such a temper, that the French could hardly have reached the position at Miravete without sustaining a loss severe enough to have crippled them. In pursuance of this unwise resolution, on the night of the 18th he began his retreat, with the intention of forcing his way through the French corps, which he expected to fall in with, and of taking up the best position he could find for his own subsistence, and for covering the frontiers of Andalusia. But by thus abandoning an excellent position, he left Extremadura open to a hungry enemy.

*Skirmishes  
at Truxillo  
and Mia-  
jadas.*

When the Central Junta were informed of these movements, they imputed the disastrous measure to Henestrosa's abandonment of his post, and ordered Cuesta to proceed against him with all the rigour of the law. But the old General, though disposed at first to condemn him, was too generous to do this. He replied that the Camp-Marshal had in all other cases behaved well, and with a courage amounting to rashness, and that in this he had acted only under an error of judgement. He met with no enemies on his night march, and halting in the morning beyond the Rio Monte, learnt that the detachment which he had expected to encounter was taking a direction for Truxillo.

To Truxillo he proceeded on his retreat, and, leaving Henestrosa to cover that city, took up a position at the Puerto de Santa Cruz, forty miles from the stronger pass whence he had retreated. There it was his intention to wait till it should be seen whether Alburquerque's division could effect its junction, and whether it would make him equal to the enemy. On the following morning Henestrosa was attacked, and driven to a little bridge on the other side of Truxillo: there he repulsed the enemy, and the skirmishing continued all day, with equal loss on either side, the Spaniards behaving in such a manner as to increase the General's confidence in his troops. Cuesta expected now to be attacked on the morrow, either in front or on his left toward the village of Abertura, and had made up his mind to abide an action. But Cuesta's resolutions were sometimes changed with as little consideration as they had been taken, for he was a man who acted more frequently upon the impulse of the moment than upon reflection. The whole of Victor's force was collected at Truxillo; his advanced parties kept the Spaniards upon the alarm as well as the alert, and Cuesta then began to apprehend that the Puerto de S. Cruz was not defensible against the superior force that would be brought against him, especially as the ground was not favourable for cavalry. In the morning, therefore, he recommenced his retreat, evidently not knowing whither, and with no determined pur-

CHAP.  
XX.1809.  
March.

March 20.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

Rocca, 93.

pose, but in good order and in good heart, for, injudicious and ruinous as all the late movements had been, the men were not yet dispirited. While he was halting near Miajadas to refresh the troops, the *chasseurs* of the enemy's advanced guard approached near enough to expose themselves; the advantage was well taken, and the French Colonel tore his hair in an agony of grief when he saw some hundred and fifty of his finest men cut down. This success was obtained by the regiments of Infante and Almanza. It raised the spirits of the men, a feeling of useful emulation was showing itself, and Cuesta formed the wise resolution (if he had been steady enough in his purposes to have kept it) of exercising them in various movements from one position to another, without exposing them in battle, and thus detaining the enemy till Cartaojal's advance upon Toledo should operate as a diversion in his favour. That same evening, therefore, he retired to Medellin; and the next day, thinking it probable that if he remained the French would attack him on the morrow, he marched for Campanario, to join Alburquerque, who with his little division was coming by way of Aguda and Garbayuela. He did not, however, remain there till the junction was effected, but moved to Valle de la Serena, chiefly for the sake of facilitating his supplies. Some magazines had fallen into the enemy's hands at Truxillo, one of the ill consequences arising from his rash retreat; there was no want of food



in that as yet unravaged country, but he complained to the government of the incapacity and irregularity of all the persons employed in that department, and protested that unless this evil was remedied it would be impossible for him to maintain discipline, or prevent dispersion.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

The information which Cuesta received at this time, that a train of heavy artillery had been sent from Madrid toward Extremadura, made him apprehend the chief object of the enemy was to lay siege to Badajoz. The possession of that fortress was so important toward the success of their operations against Portugal, that this design had been apprehended as soon as they became masters of the field, and the Governor had been repeatedly charged to omit no means for putting it in a good state of defence. Forming a new plan in consequence of this, Cuesta informed the Central Junta that he should annoy the besiegers, and cut off their communication with Madrid. But he had no sooner effected his junction with Alburquerque than he determined upon seeking the enemy, and offering battle in the first favourable situation. It was not the addition of strength which induced him to this measure, for he had expected to meet 6000 men, and had found little more than half that number ; . . but long irresolution usually ends in some rash resolve.

*Junction  
with Albur-  
querque's  
division.*

Having forsaken that strong ground, which, if it had been defended as well as it was wisely chosen, would have covered Extremadura, it

*Cuesta of-  
fers battle  
at Medellin.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

was as much Cuesta's policy to have avoided an action now as it had been then to have stood an attack, for he knew that he might expect a British army to co-operate with him. Sometimes as facile and vacillating as he was obstinate and impracticable at others, no man was more unfit to command an army in critical times; and yet the honest originality of his character, his fearless and buoyant spirit which nothing could cast down, his energy which neither age nor infirmity had abated, and the warmth of his heart as well as his temper, had won for him in no common degree the attachment not of the soldiers alone, but of those even who perceived and lamented his errors. The enemy at this time occupied Merida and Medellin: the latter town, memorable as having been the birth-place of Hernan Cortes, stands on the left bank of the Guadiana, in a wide and open plain, without tree or cover of any kind.

*March 28.* On that plain Cuesta formed his whole force in one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, disdaining all advantage of ground, as if he had desired nothing but a fair field and mere individual courage were to decide the day. His army consisted of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The vanguard, under Henestrosa, and the Duque del Parque's division, formed the left, which Cuesta took under his own charge, as being placed on the highest ground, from whence he could overlook the field. The centre was under D. Francisco de Trias. D. Francisco

de Eguia, who was second in command, was with the right wing, which consisted of the Mar-  
ques de Portago's division and Alburquerque's, the Duke having with him his own horse. The cavalry were on the left, that being the point where the French presented the greatest force.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

Victor's army consisted of about 18,000 foot and 2500 horse. He had collected his whole force there, for the purpose of striking an efficient blow, and destroying, if that were possible, the Spanish army, in pursuance of the murderous system upon which he had been instructed to act. They were formed in an arc between the Guadiana and a cultivated ravine which extends from Medellin to the village of Mengabril; Lasalle's division of light cavalry on the left, the division of German infantry in the centre, in large close columns; the dragoons under General Latour-Maubourg on the right, the divisions of Villate and Ruffin in reserve; their front was covered by six batteries of four guns each. The action began about eleven o'clock. These batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who were ordered by Cuesta to charge with the bayonet and take them. The order was bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot, and were repulsed with loss: the German division formed itself into a square, and resisted with such difficulty the resolute attack of the Spaniards, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory, and

*Battle of  
Medellin.*

CHAP.  
XX.1809.  
March.*Misconduct  
of the  
Spanish  
cavalry.*

Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of his reserve succeeded in enabling his infantry to keep their ground. The Spaniards on the left had taken the first battery; a strong body of horse, protected by a column of infantry, advanced to recover it, and at that moment the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the left took panic, and without facing the foe, without attempting to make the slightest stand, fled in the greatest disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues. Instances of such scandalous panic were but too frequent in the Spanish armies during the war, but in no instance was it more fatal or more unaccountable than in this; for the day was going on well, the infantry were in good heart, the advantage was on their side; and the regiments which at that crisis disgraced themselves, and betrayed their country, had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus, and had distinguished themselves in the affair near Miajadas.

*Cuesta  
thrown,  
and wound-  
ed.*

Cuesta, who was at the other end of the wing when he saw this shameful abandonment, clapped spurs to his horse in the hope of rallying them; his staff followed, . . but in vain; the enemy, quick in seizing opportunity, turned the left, which was thus exposed, and as there was no second line or reserve, defeat then became inevitable. The old General was thrown, and wounded in the foot, and not without great difficulty rescued and saved from capture by the



exertion of his two nephews and some other brave and faithful officers. But the day was irrecoverably lost; and the French, having routed the left wing, turned upon the centre and the right.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

The right wing of the Spaniards, meantime, had made the enemy give ground, and were following up their success; but Alburquerque, seeing what had occurred in the other flank, proposed to form in close columns of battalions, and begin their retreat. Eguia overruled this, saying he had no instructions to that effect, and not daring even in this evident emergence to act upon his own responsibility. Indeed it is affirmed, that not one of Cuesta's officers knew his intention of giving battle an hour before the action began. Affairs were every moment growing worse, and Eguia having left the right of the line, the Duke gave the necessary command; but it had been delayed too long; the whole force of the French artillery was concentrated upon these columns, who were now the only troops that remained unbroken; a total dispersion took place; and the enemy, forming a chain of cavalry all round the routed army, executed their orders, which were to give no quarter. They had suffered enough in the action to make them obey this atrocious command with good will. They had themselves 4000 men killed and wounded, . . . nearly a fifth of their whole force; their official statement of the Spanish loss made it 7000 killed; other accounts carried it to

*Dispersion  
of the Span-  
ish army.*

CHAP. 12,000. Cuesta could only state that it was very  
 XX. great, and ascertain that a hundred and seventy  
 1809. officers of infantry and ten of cavalry were killed,  
 March. wounded, or missing.

*No quarter  
 given.*

Weariness, rather than compunction, on the part of the French, at length put a stop to the carnage, and the account of prisoners is variously stated from three thousand to seven; but it is certain that not two ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought into the room where Victor was at supper, and the French Marshal said to him, "If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been here." Those orders had been obeyed too well. The dragoons that night in the French camp were rubbing their sword arms with soap and spirits, to recover the muscles from the strains of that day's slaughter. Their cruelty was not satiated even with this success. A peasant in one of the near villages had a son who was in Cuesta's army, where he had served for some time. When the army drew near Medellin, this Juan went to his father's house, and his conversation induced his two brothers, Antonio and Carlos, to go with him as volunteers. Juan was never seen after the battle; but the father upon searching the field found Antonio's body, and the other brother, wounded, and weeping over it. He removed the dead son and the living one to his cottage, that the one might receive Christian burial, and the other such help as might have restored him. A party of the French, in their

work of pillage, entered the house, and finding a wounded Spaniard there, deliberately shot him, before his father's face.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
*March.*

When the dispersion of his columns took place, the Duke of Alburquerque found his retreat completely cut off. Four officers were with him; with these he advanced upon the French cordon of cavalry, and when at the distance of about an hundred yards, turning to one of his companions, he said, "You see that officer of chasseurs so gaily caparisoned? I will have him down in a moment." He then spurred his horse, and rode at him full speed: of course his companions followed; . . the French officer was startled, and moved rapidly on one side, several of the chasseurs imitated his movement, and Alburquerque with his friends got through the opening they had thus made. D. Miguel de Alava was one of those friends; he had behaved with distinguished gallantry that day, and just before the dispersion of the last battalions, sword in hand, singly retook a Spanish nine-pounder from two French dragoons who had taken possession of it. Soon after they had broken through, and were still hotly pursued, a wounded artilleryman besought Alava to save him from the general massacre. "Get up behind me," was the answer, "and I will carry you off, or we will perish together." This little party, happily for Spain, effected their escape. About midnight they arrived at a lone farm-house, far enough from the field to feel themselves in safety;

*Escape of  
Alburquerque.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

and having got some wood upon the fire, and lighted their cigars, they agreed unanimously that the loss of the battle was of no \* importance. Such was the spirit of the Spaniards; a spirit which no misfortunes could abate, which no defeats could subdue.

*The re-  
mains of  
the Spanish  
army col-  
lect.*

The battle itself, most unfortunate as it was, afforded Cuesta some vindication for the error which he had committed in risking it. It had been fought so well by the infantry, that they had obtained, and that for a considerable time, a decided advantage, till the horse took fright, and abandoned them. But it was after the defeat that the strength of the old man's character appeared with full effect; and certainly on that memorable occasion both the General and the government proved themselves worthy of their country and their cause. The advance of the French was impeded by the weather, a storm of wind and heavy rain having raged uninterruptedly for three days after the battle, and swollen the brooks so as to render them like rivers. A mishap also had befallen them at Almaraz, where their bridge gave way while some ammunition carts were passing: many lives were lost, and the operations of the army were delayed in consequence. They collected, however, in and about Merida, and their advanced parties appeared at Almendralejo and

\* *Que la perdida de la batalla* in Spain was the General *no im-*  
*nada importaba.* The French *porta.*  
used to say that the best General



Villa Franca. This seemed to indicate an intention of entering Andalusia; and Cuesta was of opinion, that, knowing the total dispersion of his army, they would not hesitate at dividing their own force, and execute this design with one part, while they laid siege with the other to Badajoz, which was not in a state for making a long military defence. He urged the government to send all the disposable force in Andalusia to S. Olalla without delay; between that place and Ronquillo, he said, was the only position where they could resist the enemy with good probability of success, provided there were troops, and artillery and subsistence.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
March.

He had appointed Llerena as the rallying point for the fugitives. The infantry came slowly in, but when Cuesta arrived he found that the cavalry had collected there with little diminution. He thanked the army in his general orders for their good conduct at Medellin, excepting by name the horse regiments which had so disgracefully taken flight, and thereby occasioned that to be a defeat, which, if they had done their duty like the foot, would have proved a most glorious and important victory. For this offence he suspended three Colonels from their rank. It does not appear that any heavier punishment was inflicted:..the fault had been too general to fix it upon individuals; ..and if recourse had been had to lot, it might have fallen upon men who, with the best heart and will, had not been able in that precipitate

*Cuesta disgraces those who had behaved ill.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

movement to check either their companions or their horses. The privates were disgraced by having one of their pistols taken from them, till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had lost.

*The Junta  
act wisely  
and gene-  
rously upon  
these de-  
feats.*

It was reported that the Central Junta upon the first intelligence of the defeat had fled from Seville. The danger was considered so imminent, that they had deliberated concerning their removal; and the Junta of Seville, who had been consulted, proposed that if such a measure were adopted, absolute power should be left in their hands. But the government did nothing precipitately, and on no occasion throughout the war did it display more magnanimity or so much energy as at this time of trial. The same day brought them tidings of the defeat at Ciudad Real and of that at Medellin; the same gazette communicated both to the people. There was nothing to qualify the disgrace and loss which Cartaojal had sustained; he was therefore quietly removed from the command. Whatever errors the Central Junta may have committed, no other government ever exercised its power with such humanity in such times, no other government ever made such just and humane allowances for inexperience and weakness, nor dealt so generously with the unfortunate. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances, and a badge of distinction to those corps which

the General should commend; and they promoted all the officers who had distinguished themselves. They pronounced that the General and the body of the army had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed by his fall, they required him in all his dispatches to report the state of his own health; and though they appointed D. Francisco de Venegas to succeed Cartaojal, they placed both armies under Cuesta's orders, giving him the rank of Captain-general. In the preamble to this decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Hernan Cortes might have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said, might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should be the worthy rival and successor of those famous *Tercios* which under the best captains in the world had supported the glory of Spain in Flanders and in Italy and in Germany.

The Junta felt it necessary to defend themselves at this time against the base enemies who charged the late calamities upon their misconduct, and who were agitating the people of Seville by false alarms, reporting that the French were within five leagues of that city, and that the nation was betrayed and sold by its Government. In reply to these senseless accusations

CHAP:  
XX.

1809.  
April.

*Their appeal to the people.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

*Tribunal  
of public  
safety.*

the Junta appealed to the fact, that in the course of two months it had set on foot two armies for the defence of the Andalusias, consisting of 50,000 men and nearly 12,000 horse. This they had done beside the assistance which they had afforded to other provinces; and when was it known that the injuries which the ship sustains in a storm had been imputed to the pilot? The Junta had issued an abominable edict, whereby, after denouncing the punishment of death against all persons who should endeavour to raise distrust of the existing Government, or to overturn it by exciting popular commotions, they invited informers to denounce such persons to the Tribunal of Public Safety which they had instituted, holding out the promise of secrecy and reward. When this decree appeared Mr. Frere saw to what an atrocious system of tyranny it might lead. Judging of the Junta by their individual characters, he felt assured that they would each have shrunk from carrying such measures into effect; but he was well aware how little the personal characters of any men placed in such circumstances are to be relied on, and apprehended that after some natural hesitation the majority might either yield to the guidance of one or two members, more violent and less scrupulous, or abandon themselves to the direction of this Tribunal of Public Safety; the very name of which, he said, must remind us of the worst revolutionary horrors. But though the State Papers of the Junta were on most occa-



sions wiser than their actions, in this instance their conduct was better than their language; and it now appeared, most honourably for the national character, that, notwithstanding this public encouragement to the nefarious practice of delation, not a single secret information had been laid. If any person, said the Junta, had complaint to make, or suspicion to allege against any of the public functionaries, let him lay his proofs before this Tribunal. But this has not been done, and all the processes which that Tribunal has instituted have been public prosecutions, not one upon the accusation of an individual.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

The Intruder and his partizans hoped at this time that the defeat and dispersion of two armies on two succeeding days would break the spirit of the Government, if not of the nation, and that the Junta might be induced to secure themselves and their own possessions by submission. Accordingly a Spanish traitor, by name Joaquim Maria Sotelo, addressed a letter from Merida to the vice-president, saying, that the greater number of the provinces of Spain had sufficiently suffered from the effects of war and conquest, and now the rest were threatened with the same calamities. Filled with consternation, he said, at the defeats of Cartaojal and Cuesta, the honourable Spaniards at the court of Madrid, who could not contemplate without the most poignant grief the desolation of their country, had implored the King to alleviate the distresses of such

*Correspondence  
on the In-  
truder's  
part with  
the Junta.*

*April 12.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
*April.*

provinces as were occupied by the French troops, and to prevent them in those which were not yet in their possession. To these prayers the King had attended, had ordered him to announce his compliance to the Junta, and authorized him to confer with such deputies as the Junta might appoint, on the best means of fulfilling his wishes. He could not suppose that they would refuse to take steps on which the salvation of Andalusia and the happiness of the whole kingdom depended. And, as the business was most important and most urgent, Sotelo represented, that it would be improper to conduct it in writing, but that all the disputes and irregularities and doubts which it would otherwise cause might be obviated by a personal conference. On this ground, he hoped that deputies would be named to confer with him.

The Junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. "They had not forgotten," they said, "the character with which they were invested, and the oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes of the nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently extensive to treat for the restitution of their King, and for the immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops, let him publish them in the usual form, and they would be announced to the allies of Spain. The Junta had no authority to listen to any treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the basis of eternal justice. Any other prin-

ciple of negotiation, without benefiting the empire, would only tend to degrade the Junta, which had entered into the most awful engagements to bury itself beneath the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people." This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the Intruder's agent, and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however, of what importance the safety of the government was to the national cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no place was secure, they published a decree upon this subject. It began by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide immediate remedy for the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and Extremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by remaining at Seville. But having provided for the reinforcement and equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were requisite for the defence of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state; that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into their hands was the first of their obligations; and that they could not again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong to the nation which had confided it to them. The speed with which the tyrant of Europe advanced

CHAP.  
XX.1809.  
*April.**April 18.*

CHAP.  
XX.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

against Madrid in November, and sent troops towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his policy was to strike a blow at the government, and, seizing the body which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and thus throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects: trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading the nation also, and reducing it to that servitude, which, in the insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain. To frustrate these aims, they decreed, that, whenever the place of their residence might be threatened, or when any other reason should convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the accidents of the war might be, the Junta would never abandon the continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they could establish themselves for defending the country against the force and fraud



of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do. CHAP.  
XX.

When the news of Cuesta's defeat at Medellin reached Paris, it was affirmed in the *Moniteur*, that by this battle Seville was laid open to the French armies, and that probably by that time Lisbon also was once more in their possession, . . . so confident was the French government of speedy and complete success. In the same confidence, and with the hope of subduing the spirit of the Aragoneze, the French Governor of Zaragoza ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of the Pillar, for the capture of Lisbon and Seville, as events which had taken place. Soult would undoubtedly have advanced upon the Portuguese capital, if he could have relied upon Victor's movements; but that General found that the battle of Medellin had rather raised the hopes of the Spaniards than depressed them. His views were upon Badajoz. Aware of this, the Government, with that promptitude which characterised all their measures at this crisis, supplied the place with money and arms, and addressed public letters to the Junta of that city and the Governor, reminding them that Zaragoza had held out two months not against the enemy alone, but against hunger and pestilence; and that her defenders would be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance, while the names of those who had so basely delivered up Coruña would be handed down for lasting infamy from generation to generation. To the

1809.

*April.**Measures  
for securing  
Badajoz.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

General, D. Antonio Arce, they said, that true glory was to be gained by overcoming great dangers, and an opportunity for such glory was now afforded him. The Extremadurans were not less brave than the Aragoneze, and Badajoz possessed a defence in her fortifications which had not existed at Zaragoza. The soldier fought with best hope, and sacrificed himself with most alacrity, when he saw his commander set the example; and such an example would not be wanting in one whose ancestors filled a distinguished place in the annals of their country. At all times Extremadura had produced heroes. There had the Pizarros, and there had Cortes been born, to be examples now for their countrymen.

*A crusade  
proclaimed  
there  
against the  
invaders.*

Marshal Victor sent to summon Badajoz, though he was not prepared to lay siege to it; but the pitiable state of the country rendered it always possible that a governor might be found weak enough in principle or in mind to betray his trust. A spirit however such as the time required prevailed there, and the parties which he sent out in that direction were attacked at advantage and driven back with loss. The Junta informed the Government, that, in consideration of the sacrileges which the enemy committed wherever they went, they were enlisting the peasantry under the banner of the Crusade with which the misbelievers in old times had been pursued and conquered. The Government approved this measure, saying that

if their forefathers had proclaimed crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land, with much more reason now might they have recourse to the same means for defending their religion in the bosom of their own country against profanations more impious than had been heard of in the darkest ages or among the most barbarous people. And they directed that the persons who should be embodied in these new corps should be distinguished by wearing a red cross on the breast. The Central Junta entertained a thought that this might be extended with good effect; but it did not spread; the feeling and the enthusiasm denoted by such a badge would not have been partaken by the officers, and it might have raised a temper in the men unfavourable to any expected co-operation with their British allies.

CHAP.  
XX.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

Another measure which the Government adopted at this time was intended to lessen the ill effect that the dispersion of so many monks and friars was likely to produce. The same calamities which had set them loose in every part of the country which the enemy had overrun, deprived them also of their accustomed means of subsistence; and it was but too probable that among those who took arms, as was very generally done by those who were able to bear them, the licence of a military life might lead to scandals which on every account it was desirable to prevent. A Junta therefore was formed of persons holding high stations in the

*Regulations  
concerning  
the ejected  
Religioners.*

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

different Religious Orders, the Prior of Zamora, who was one of the members of the Government, being appointed President. The business of this Junta was to dispose of those Religioners who, having been driven from their cloisters (the edict said), were crying night and day before the throne of a terrible God to revenge the blood of their innocent brethren, which had so wantonly been shed. They were to be distributed in towns, hospitals, and armies, as they might be deemed most qualified; and the Generals were instructed not to receive any persons of their profession unless they produced credentials or commissions from this board.

*Plans of the  
Intrusive  
Govern-  
ment.  
April 9.*

Six thousand men had been detached from La Mancha to reinforce Victor after the battle of Medellin. His instructions were to remain between Merida and Badajoz till he should receive advices of Soult's movements, and till Lapisse should join him. The Intrusive Government persuaded themselves that the struggle would soon be over, and Joseph waited only to hear from Marshal Ney of the total destruction of Romana's army, to give orders for marching against Valencia. But the tide had now turned in Galicia; there came no intelligence from Ney but what was disastrous; and Soult could neither communicate with Victor nor with Lapisse, neither could they at this time communicate with each other. Soult's communication was cut off by Silveira on the Tamega, by Trant on the Vouga, . . and Sir Robert Wilson, by his



position at Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off Lapisse equally from co-operating with his countrymen in Portugal or in Extremadura.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

Of how great importance that position was likely to become Mr. Frere had perceived as soon as Sir John Moore's army began their dolorous retreat; and he had obtained from the Spanish Government such reinforcement for the garrison as could be spared at a time when demands for aid came upon them from all quarters. The command which they conferred upon Sir Robert Wilson, disposed as the Spaniards were to act heartily with him, was of more consequence than any succour which they could then afford. He meantime had spared no exertions for increasing his little force, and continuing to impose upon the enemy that useful opinion of its strength which they were known to entertain: for it was seen by their intercepted letters that they had applied for reinforcements under the fear of being attacked by him in Salamanca, where, they said, the inhabitants were as much to be dreaded as the enemy. Sir Robert circulated addresses inviting the Germans and Poles and Swiss in the French service to abandon an iniquitous cause into which they had been forced, and in which they had no concern. There was no press in the city, but the parochial clergy throughout the line of country which he occupied multiplied copies by transcription: many men were brought over by these means, and the enemy suffered not only

*Sir Robert  
Wilson's  
conduct at  
Ciudad  
Rodrigo.*

CHAP.  
XX.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

from this continual drain, but from the suspicion and inquietude which was thus produced. Some stragglers from Sir John Moore's army, and some prisoners from it who had effected their escape, joined him, having every where received from the peasantry every possible assistance and kindness; for that retreat had not lessened in the Spanish people their sense of gratitude towards Great Britain, nor their respect for the British character. Some convalescents also from Almeida were added to his numbers, and he obtained two reinforcements, each of a more extraordinary kind. A captain of banditti, with five-and-twenty followers, who had exercised their vocation in the country about Segovia, repaired to him, as men who preferred risking their lives in a legal and honourable way, and were desirous of doing good service in a good cause. The other party told a sadder tale. They were South Americans from the Plata, who having been made prisoners at Montevideo in the ill-advised and worse conducted expedition of the English to that province, had been landed in Spain, there to be neglected and left destitute by their own government. More than 200 had perished through want and misery, and the survivors were almost naked and pitiably emaciated with the privations and sufferings which they had endured. There were seven officers among them, who were all men of polished manners; and the soldiers were willing and well disposed, though deeply sensi-

ble of the cruelty and injustice with which they had been neglected.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
*April.*

*Attempt to  
surprise  
that fortress.*

Suspecting that the enemy would endeavour to reach Extremadura, get in Cuesta's rear, and menace Portugal on that side, Sir Robert occupied the Puerto de Baños with a small force under Colonel Mayne. This was effected just in time, Lapisse having marched the greater part of his force to Alva de Tormes on the way thither, but finding it occupied, and not knowing in what strength, the French returned. This was a month before the battle of Medellin, at which time Sir Robert had gone to confer with General Cuesta, no one except the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo being informed of his absence. Immediately after his return the French, having been reinforced at Salamanca, attempted to surprise Ciudad Rodrigo. A plan had been

*March 2.*

concerted with some traitors in the town, who, from an outwork that might easily be stormed, had thrown a bridge to the body of the place, so solidly constructed that Sir Robert had remonstrated against it as promoting their own destruction in case of an assault. Timely advice, however, came from the Corregidor of Salamanca; and the enemy, apprehending from the movements of Sir Robert's troops that a counterplot had been formed with the intent of attempting Salamanca, and cutting off their retreat, fell back hastily, and not without loss. Treachery there had been; but as there was no proof who had been the traitors, Sir Robert

CHAP. took measures for removing the suspected per-  
 XX. sons without discrediting them.

1809.  
 April.

*The French  
 summon it.*

After it was known that Cuesta had fallen back from the Tagus to the Guadiana, and before tidings of his defeat had arrived, Sir Robert, who had been urging him to form a corps on the Tietar, and thereby preserve from the enemy a fertile part of the country which had not yet been overrun, withdrew his troops from the Puerto de Baños to collect them at Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse now brought together the whole remaining force under his command, which had been reduced to about 7000 men, advanced against that city, and summoned it. The officer by whom the summons was sent wished to enter the place with it, but a detachment of the Lusitanian Legion with four guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, had been stationed outside the works, and he was not permitted to proceed. Before the Governor's answer could be given, the French, in disregard of the custom of war, continued advancing toward the gates, upon which a fire was opened upon them, and continued with effect till they halted. The Governor's reply was, that he should not think of surrendering, even under a greater necessity than then appeared to exist. Some skirmishing took place, to the advantage of the garrison, and on the following day the enemy retreated, with some loss both in men and in reputation.

This movement of the French had been so



little serious, that it was supposed they had expected some co-operation from Soult's army. Soon afterwards, however, a second summons came in the name of the Intruder, holding out threats to the garrison and inhabitants if they suffered themselves longer to be misled by a few British officers, and promising them King Joseph's favour if they would open their gates. A verbal reply was returned, stating that the proper answer to such a summons was from the cannon's mouth, and there the enemy would receive it if they chose to advance. At this time the peasantry, encouraged by the example of this brave garrison, had risen throughout a wide extent of country; and the situation of Lapisse was becoming critical, when by a movement which ought not to have been unexpected, he moved rapidly toward the Puerto de Perales. That pass he could hardly have forced, if it had been occupied; but Colonel Mayne could not reach it in time after the intention of the enemy was ascertained, and all that Sir Robert could do was to dispatch advices into Portugal, and harass their march by pursuing them with all speed, in the hope that when they arrived at Alcantara, where they must cross the Tagus, they would find it occupied by a sufficient force of Portuguese.

CHAP.  
XX.1809.  
April.*March of  
Lapisse to  
unite with  
Victor.**April 7.**The French  
enter Alcan-  
tara.*

The bridge at that point, which was then one of the durable monuments of Roman magnificence, has given name to a city of some renown, as the chief seat of one of the military

CHAP.  
XX.

---

1809.  
April.

---

ordérs famous in old times. The town is on the left bank, and the inhabitants, aware of danger, thought to avert it by defending the entrance of the bridge with a kind of *abbatis*, and breaking up the road to a depth of eighteen or twenty feet. These rude works not being defended by any regular force, nor with any skill or military means, were soon forced, and the town was entered. Lapisse had marked his whole route by the most wanton cruelties, in return for which every straggler who fell into the hands of the peasantry was put to death. He remained only during the night in Alcantara; but that night was employed in plunder, and in the commission of every crime by which humanity can be disgraced and outraged. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Don Carlos d'España (officers whose names appear often during the war, and always honourably), arrived near the town with a small body of cavalry in pursuit during the night, and entered it in the morning just after the enemy had left it. They found the houses in flames, and the streets literally obstructed with mutilated bodies, some lying in heaps, and others thrown upon piles of furniture and valuable goods, which the ruffians, having no means of removing, had brought out in front of the houses and set on fire. Dogs had been murdered like their masters, swine butchered for the mere pleasure of butchery, and their bodies heaped together in mockery with those of the human victims. The churches

had been polluted as well as plundered, images mutilated, pictures, the value of which was not suspected by these destroyers, cut to pieces, graves opened in the hope of finding money or plate concealed there, even the very coffins violated, and the dead exposed.

CHAP.  
XX.

1809.  
April.

*Campaigns  
of the Lusi-  
tanian Le-  
gion, 65—  
68.*

Victor's force, after he had been joined by this division, amounted to 23,000 foot and 5800 horse. It was apprehended from some intercepted letters that he would immediately make for Seville, and Cuesta had formed his plan of defence accordingly. Portugal, however, was the object of the French, as a point of more importance at that time; but they had let the hour go by, and the English were now once more in the field.

*Junction  
with Victor.*

## CHAPTER XXI.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATING TO THE  
WAR.

1809.  
*January.*  
*Conduct of  
the Opposi-  
tion in Eng-  
land.*

DURING the first success of the Spaniards, the enemies of Government either were silent or joined faintly in the expression of national feeling which was heard from all parts of the united kingdoms. No sooner had the prospect begun to darken than their real wishes were disclosed, and, true to their belief in the omnipotence of Buonaparte, they expatiated upon the folly and insanity of opposing one against whom it was impossible that any resistance could be successful. They dwelt upon the consummate wisdom of his cabinet, the unequalled ability of his generals, the inexhaustible numbers of his armies, and their irresistible force; but they neither took into this account the character of the Spanish people, nor the nature of their country, nor the strength of moral principles and of a righteous cause, being ignorant alike of all. That faith in English courage, by which the fields of Cressy, and Poitiers, and Agincourt were won, and which in our own days we had seen proved, not only upon our own element, our empire of the seas, at the mouths of the Nile and at Cape Trafalgar, but before the walls



of Acre, and in Egypt, and at Maida, and in Portugal; . . that faith which should ever be the first article of an Englishman's creed, for while it is believed, so long is it true; . . that faith these men had abjured, and substituted in its place a political heresy, baneful as it was false, that upon land nothing could withstand the French. The world was made for Buonaparte, and he had only to march over it, and take possession. When they were reminded of this Tyrant's guilt, they thought it a sufficient reply to tell us of his greatness, and would have had us fall down and worship the Golden Image at the very time when the Spaniards were walking amid the burning fiery furnace.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

They began by predicting the failure of all our efforts, and the total ruin of the Spanish cause; laying down as "a proposition too plain to be disputed, that the spirit of the people, however enthusiastic and universal, was in its nature more uncertain and short-lived, more liable to be extinguished by reverses, or to go out of itself amid the delays of a protracted contest, than the steady, regular, moderate feeling which calls out disciplined troops, and marshals them under known leaders, and supplies them by systematic arrangements." That it was in the power of England to assist the Spanish people with such troops, such leaders, and such arrangements, they had neither heart to feel nor understanding to perceive. They ridiculed the "romantic hopes of the English nation;" hopes,

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

they said, which had been raised by “the tricks of a paltry and interested party.” Could any man of sense, they demanded, any one “above the level of a drivelling courtier, or a feeble fanatic, look at this contest, without trembling every inch of him for the result?”

But the baseness of party went beyond this. Not only were ministers blamed for what they had done in assisting Spain, and counselled to withdraw their assistance as speedily as possible, but the Spaniards themselves were calumniated and insulted. They had neither courage, nor honour, nor patriotism; no love for their country, nor any thing in their country worth defending. What mattered it to them whether their King were called Joseph or Ferdinand, a Buonaparte or a Bourbon? God would dispense sunshine and showers upon the peninsula, whoever was his vicegerent there; the corn and the olive would ripen, and the vine and the fig-tree yield their fruits. What folly then to contend for a feeble and oppressive government, of which the loss was gain! The Emperor of the French had rid them of this wretched government; he had abolished the Inquisition, reduced the monastic orders, and would suppress them and all other remaining grievances as soon as the obstinacy of the people would allow him leisure. And indeed the people were sensible of these benefits: . . a few chiefs, the overgrown aristocracy of the land, had for a while misled them; but those chiefs had only a

little hour to strut and fret ; and for the people, whose detestation of the French government had been carried to a pitch wholly unauthorized by its proceedings toward them, their eyes were opened now ; they saw that Buonaparte was doing good ; while, on the other hand, they regarded the English as heretics ; and nothing could overcome the antipathy which this feeling occasioned.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

The circumstances of Sir John Moore's retreat, and the return of his army, were matter of triumph to the journalists of this shameless faction. "The dismal news," they said, "was at last arrived ! the truth of the bulletins was established to its utmost latitude ! the pledge of throwing the English into the sea was almost to its literal meaning fulfilled ! The Spanish Junta and their allies, after six months' trifling, blundering, and vapouring, were now finally defeated ! the spirit of patriotism, both in Spain and Portugal, was extinct ! the majority of the Spaniards had all along been indifferent respecting the dynasty by which they were to be governed ; yea, many were more attached to the Buonapartes than the Bourbons. The triumphs of France, the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies, wherever they were attacked, the retreat and discomfiture of the British forces, . . these were the melancholy events which concluded the fatal campaign of 1808, the fifth year of the war, . . this most unjust and unnecessary war, into which England, in

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

*Return of  
the army  
from Co-  
ruña.*

violation of its own treaty with France, had rushed with equal eagerness and frenzy, and which she was now carrying on with the professed object of the preservation of the most corrupt branch of the Romish church !” Such was the language, not of the revolutionary propagandists alone, but of political faction and puritanical bigotry ; while the condition in which the troops arrived, and the tale which they related, excited the feelings of the people, and rendered it easy to mislead them. Never had such a scene of confusion and distress been witnessed at Plymouth as on the arrival of this miserable fleet. Above 900 women were landed, all ignorant whether their husbands were dead or living ; they were searching through the transports, and officers and men in like manner looking after their wives, children, and friends. Of the wounded there were some whose wounds had never been dressed : many were brought on shore dead : some died in the streets, on their way to the hospitals. They who had escaped from any farther evil, having lost all their baggage, were, even the officers, covered with filth and vermin. Letters were written from the Medical Transport Board to all the surgical lecturers in London, requesting that their pupils would repair to the ports, and assist during the immediate emergency. The form of having passed the Hall was dispensed with, and nothing more required than a certificate from the lecturer whom they had attended.



The people of Plymouth behaved on this occasion with the characteristic activity and beneficence of the English nation. A committee of gentlemen was immediately appointed, who sat night and day, providing food, clothing, and assistance. The ladies of the place attended the sick and wounded, and assisted in dressing the wounds: thus supplying the want of a sufficient number of medical men. Many a woman gave her only second garment to her who had none. A charitable fund was raised, and 1400 women and children belonging to the expedition received immediate relief. The inhabitants of Portsmouth had a less mournful task. That part of the army which landed there had not embarked from the field of battle; and they who were well enough to partake of festivity were feasted in the Town-Hall. The troops brought back with them a pestilential fever, which spread through the military hospitals, and raged for some months before it could be subdued.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Dr. Neale's  
Travels, p.  
217.*

Parliament met before the issue of Sir John Moore's campaign was known, but it was understood that he was hastily retreating toward the coast with the intention of embarking, and intelligence was hourly looked for with fearful expectation. The King's speech was in a spirit suited to the times. He had given orders, he said, that the overtures from Erfurth should be laid before both Houses, and he was persuaded they would participate in the feelings which he

*Jan. 19.*

*The King's  
speech.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

*Lord Sid-  
mouth.*

had expressed when it was required that he should consent to commence the negotiation by abandoning the cause of Spain. So long as the people of that country remained true to themselves, so long would he continue to them his most strenuous assistance : and in the moment of their difficulties and reverses he had renewed to them the engagements which he had voluntarily contracted at the outset of their struggle. He had called his Parliament in perfect confidence that they would cordially support him in the prosecution of a war which there was no hope of terminating safely and honourably except through vigorous and persevering exertions. The various grades of opposition were distinctly marked in the debates which ensued. Lord Sidmouth said, that there prevailed among the people a feeling of dissatisfaction which was most honourable to them, because it arose from their zealous loyalty and generous desires. They were neither contented with the extent of the exertions which had been made to support the Spaniards, nor with the manner in which those exertions had been directed. Something, he trusted, would be done to allay this laudable discontent, while he avowed his full belief that it behoved us to prosecute the war with vigour. Such language was consistent with the constant tenor of Lord Sidmouth's conduct ; a man who never in a single instance allowed either personal or party feeling to prevail over his natural integrity. Earl St.

Vincent agreed in the necessity of carrying on determined hostilities against the common enemy, but he condemned the ministers alike for what had been done, and what had been left undone. They had brought upon us, he said, the greatest disgrace which had befallen Great Britain since the Revolution. It appeared as if they had not even a geographical knowledge of the Peninsula, insomuch that they ought to go to school again, to make themselves masters of it. Why had there been that disgraceful delay before our troops were sent to Spain? Why had not some of our Princes of the blood been appointed to lead our armies? all those illustrious persons had been bred to arms, and for what purpose, if they were not to be employed? Why had not the Portugueze been called into action? He knew them well; they were as brave a people as any upon the continent of Europe, and under British officers would have presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Ministers ought to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was inexcusable. If the House of Lords did its duty, they would go to the foot of the throne, and there tell the Sovereign the bold truth, that if he did not remove those ministers he would lose the country.

Lord Grenville said there was but one opinion in the country concerning the base and treacherous, the atrocious and cruel invasion of the Spaniards; but one opinion as to the cause wherein they were fighting against the Tyrant

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

Earl St.  
Vincent.

Lord Gren-  
ville.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

who unjustly and cruelly attacked them ; but there had been no prospect which should have induced reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain, though fleets with troops on board, to hover about the coast, and take advantage of every favourable opportunity, might be of essential service. We had injured our allies instead of serving them. We had forced the Junta of Seville to abandon the excellent system of defence which they had arranged, and, by sending an army into the heart of the country, compelled them to engage in pitched battles with regular troops. Care must now be taken not to waste our resources in Quixotic schemes which it was impossible to accomplish. Our army, brave as it was, well-disciplined, and capable of doing every thing which men could be expected to perform, would find employment enough in securing our own defence. If the country was to be saved, its salvation could alone be effected by maintaining a force upon a scale commensurate with the increasing dangers of our situation. But, said he, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be my most decided opinion, that if the system hitherto acted upon be farther pursued, and the whole armed force of the country sent into the interior of Spain, the destruction of this monarchy is inevitable ; and that we shall soon be reduced to the same condition with Prussia and the conquered states of the continent. To these speakers it was replied by the Home Se-

*Earl of  
Liverpool*



cretary, who had now upon his father's death become Earl of Liverpool, that it would ill become us to be dismayed by those reverses which were from the beginning to be expected, and to renounce that system of support to which the nation was solemnly pledged, and in which those very reverses made it a more sacred duty to persevere. He entreated those who were inclined to despond that they would call to mind the lessons of history. There it would be found, that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded in securing the object for which they strove. It was difficult to conceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of ultimate success than that of Spain. The people were unanimous in their resistance to the invader; and it was the only instance since the French revolution in which a whole people had taken up arms in their own defence. The territory of Spain was as large as that of France within its ancient limits, and the country possessed many local advantages for defence, . . . advantages, the value of which the Spanish history in former times ought to teach us duly to appreciate. The cause itself was most interesting to the best feelings of the human mind: it offered the last chance of salvation to the continent of Europe; and if it were considered in a selfish and narrower point of view, our own immediate security was in

CHAP.  
XXI.1809.  
*January.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

some degree involved in its fate. Was there then nothing to be risked in support of a generous ally? . . nothing for the re-establishment of the general tranquillity? . . nothing for our own safety and independence?

*Mr. Ponsonby.*

The opposition in the Lower House betrayed a wish to shake off the Spaniards and withdraw from the contest in whatever manner we could. Never, said Mr. Ponsonby, since Great Britain attained its present rank, has its public force been directed with so little skill, so little foresight, or so little success; though, in the expenditure of public money, he believed none would accuse his Majesty's counsellors with ever having been wanting in vigour. It was their duty now to examine whether they ought to risk an army in Spain, or confine their assistance to supplies. Elizabeth, under circumstances sufficiently like the present, took care to possess cautionary towns, and thereby assured herself of a retreat, and gained a safe point whither to send reinforcements, as well as a security that the United Provinces should not abandon her in the contest wherein they were engaged. He should not indeed think of abandoning the Spaniards in the hour of misfortune, but he could not admit that the present obligations were to be considered in the light of a solemn treaty; they had been entered into in a moment of hurry and precipitation; they had not been laid before Parliament, and were therefore unauthorized by it, and Parliament might

approve or disapprove, grant or refuse the supplies for carrying them into effect. Mr. Whitbread declared that if the recent disasters should appear to have proceeded from the misconduct of ministers, the House ought to demand condign punishment on their heads. It was now doubtful whether we had not been proceeding upon false information both with respect to Spain and Portugal. Were our troops agreeable to the people of Portugal? or were we not obliged to keep a certain force there for the purpose of keeping that people quiet, that is, to strike terror into our friends instead of our enemies? Were our troops, or were they not, welcome to the people of Spain? He had reason to doubt that fact. He was fearful that a multitude of Spaniards wished success to Buonaparte rather than to us. Although we must condemn the injustice of Buonaparte in his attack upon Spain, yet his measures were extremely judicious. He abolished the Inquisition, feudal rights, and unequal taxation. This was certainly holding out some temptation to the people to acquiesce in the changes which he wished to introduce, and unquestionably it had produced great effect. The government which England supported was not connected with any thing like a promise of the reform of any of the evils of the old system, nor with any thing like a melioration of the condition of the Spaniards. God forbid that we should abandon their cause while it was possible to support it with any prospect

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

*Mr. Whitbread.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

of success ; but he was far from being sure that the time might not come when we should have to treat with France after she had totally subdued Spain. Ministers were justified in refusing to treat on the terms offered at Erfurth ; indeed they must have been the basest of mankind if they had accepted such a preliminary. But he could not avoid regretting that the country had lost so many fair opportunities of negotiating a peace, and that it had at length been reduced to so foul a one that it could not have been accepted without eternal disgrace. Mr. William Smith said, with a similar feeling, that though he concurred in the propriety of rejecting the last offer of negotiation, he by no means meant to declare that the country ought never to commence another while Spain was in the hands of the French government.

This first debate made it apparent that the cause of the Spaniards, in which all Britain had appeared to partake so universal and generous a sympathy, was now regarded by a party in the state as a party question ; and that because ministers, true to the interest of their country, and to its honour (of all interests the most important), were resolved to continue faithful to the alliance which they had formed with Spain, there were men who felt little concern for what Europe and liberty and human nature would lose if Buonaparte should succeed in bowing the Spaniards beneath his yoke, and who looked on with ill-dissembled hope to the advantage which



such a catastrophe might give them over their parliamentary opponents. Their disposition was more broadly manifested when the overtures from Erfurth were discussed, and an address moved approving the answer which had been returned. They admitted that the overtures were insincere, and could not possibly have led to peace, and yet they took occasion to carp and cavil at what they could not in common decency oppose.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

*Debates on  
the Over-  
tures from  
Erfurth.*

Jan. 26.

In the Upper House a feeling of utter hopelessness was expressed with sincere regret by Lord Grenville and Lord Auckland: the former asserted that Buonaparte went to Spain with the moral certainty of effecting its subjugation, the most important object of any that he had yet had in view; and that in the course of two months he actually had attained that object. The latter affirmed, that what we called the Spanish cause was lost, for the present at least, and without any rational hope that it could be soon revived. To such opinions Mr. Canning alluded, saying, it was said that whenever Buonaparte declared he would accomplish any measure, his declaration was to be received as the fiat of a superior being, whom it was folly to resist! *He* never pledged himself to any thing but what he could accomplish! *His* resolves were insurmountable! *His* career not to be stopped! Such, said the orator, is not my opinion, nor the opinion of the British people. Even were the ship in which we are embarked sink-

*Lord Gren-  
ville.*

*Lord Auck-  
land.*

*Mr. Can-  
ning.*

Jan. 31.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

ing, it would be our duty still to struggle against the element. But never can I acknowledge that this is our present state. We are riding proudly and nobly buoyant upon the waves! To the argument that we ought, as Buonaparte had done, to have held out a prospect of political reform to the Spaniards, he replied we had no right to assume any dictatorial power over a country which we went to assist. We were not to hold cheap the institutions of other countries because they had not ripened into that maturity of freedom which we ourselves enjoyed; nor were we to convert an auxiliary army into a dominating garrison; nor, while openly professing to aid the Spaniards, covertly endeavour to force upon them those blessings of which they themselves must be the best judges. If the Spaniards succeeded, they would certainly be happier and freer than they had hitherto been; but that happiness and freedom must be of their own choice, not of our dictation. The Central Junta was not indifferent to this prospective good, for it called upon all literary men to contribute their assistance in suggesting such laws as might best be enacted for the good of the state. If the suggestion of such laws were to accompany a subsidy, he doubted much whether it would meet with assent: and sure he was that the Spaniards could not but dislike them, if dictated at the point of the bayonet. In these enlightened days, said he, the imposition of a foreign dynasty is not regarded with

so much abhorrence, as it is considered what useful internal regulations the usurpers may introduce! So detestable a mode of reasoning is confined to only a few political speculators; the general sense and feeling of mankind revolt at it. There is an irresistible impulse which binds men to their native soil; which makes them cherish their independence; which unites them to their legitimate princes; and which fires them with enthusiastic indignation against the imposition of a foreign yoke. No benefit to be received from a conqueror can atone for the loss of national independence. Let us then do homage to the Spanish nation for their attachment to their native soil; an attachment which in its origin is divine; . . and do not let us taunt them with being a century behind us in civilization or in knowledge, or adhering to prejudices in religion, in politics, or in arts, which we have happily surmounted.

The more moderate opposition members, such as Mr. Ponsonby and Lord Henry Petty, agreed that the government had taken a proper course in demanding an explanation with regard to Spain before any negotiation was commenced. But Mr. Whitbread said he lamented that the offer had been so abruptly put an end to. Even in breaking with France it was better to break with her in a spirit of as little acrimony as possible, . . for let gentlemen say what they would, we must ultimately treat with France, . . to this complexion we must come at last; and it would

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

---

*Lord H.  
Petty.*

*Mr. Whit-  
bread.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*January.*

not be easy to say when we might calculate upon even as good terms as we had been offered in the late overture. With respect to Spain, the hopes he once had were nearly gone; and the various reports from different quarters, from some of the want of wisdom in the government, from others of want of energy in the people, were not calculated to revive them. Perhaps before this Portugal was reconquered. Buonaparte was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies. If ever we wished for peace, with this man probably we must make it, and it was always wrong to use insulting language towards him; the least price of peace would be for us to use something like decorous language to a power which was perhaps the greatest that had ever existed on the face of the world. And it was extraordinary indeed that a government which had committed the attack upon Copenhagen should call the usurpation of Spain unparalleled! It really carried with it an air of ridicule. Why should we talk of atrocity? Why should we blasphemously call on our God . . . we, the ravagers of India, . . . we who had voted the solemn thanks of the House to the despoilers of that unhappy, persecuted country?

Thus did Mr. Whitbread attempt, . . . not indeed to justify Buonaparte, few of his admirers had at that time sufficient effrontery for this, . . . but to defend him by the yet viler method of recrimination; to apologize for his crimes by the false assertion that England had perpetrated



crimes as great; to stand forth as the accuser of his country; and to disarm it, as far as his ability and his influence might avail, of its moral strength, and of its hope in God and a good cause. Six months before he had prayed God to crown the efforts of the Spaniards with success as final as those efforts were glorious. “Never,” he then said, “were a people engaged in a more arduous and honourable struggle. Perish the man,” he then exclaimed, “who would entertain a thought of purchasing peace by abandoning them to their fate! Perish this country rather than its safety should be owing to a compromise so horridly iniquitous!” It was now apparent that the sympathy which had been thus strongly expressed had not been very deep. He moved as an amendment upon the address, that though we should have witnessed with regret any inclination to consent to the abandonment of the cause of Spain, it did not appear that any such disgraceful concession was required as a preliminary by the other belligerent powers. The stipulation, therefore, on our part, that the Spaniards should be admitted as a party, was unwise and impolitic; an overture made in respectful terms ought to have been answered in more moderate and conciliatory language, and immediate steps taken for entering into negotiation on the terms proposed in that overture. The amendment concluded by requesting that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to avail himself of any opportunity which

CHAP.  
XXI.1809.  
*January.**Vol. i. p.*  
449.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
January.

might offer of acceding to, or commencing a negotiation for the restoration of the blessings of peace, on such terms as the circumstances of the war in which we were engaged might render compatible with the true interests of the empire, and the honour of his Majesty's crown.

*Mr. Croker.* The proposed amendment provoked a severe reply from Mr. Croker. He exposed the inconsistency of the mover, who in his letter to Lord Holland, when he had stated his opinion that it became the Government at that time to negotiate, recommended that "the complete evacuation of Spain by the French armies, the abstinence from all interference in her internal arrangements, and the freedom of the Royal Family, should be the conditions of the negotiation." Mr. Croker commented also with just indignation upon the strain of argument which Mr. Whitbread had pursued. "He has set out," said he, "by doing Buonaparte the favour of trying to find a parallel for his attack on Spain; and he boasts of having found many. But in the registers of British discussion, in the recollections of British feeling, I defy the honourable gentleman to find a parallel for his own speech, . . . a speech calculated only to plead the enemy's cause. I do not mean to represent him as intentionally their advocate; but I will assert that, whether intentionally or not, he has taken that course by seeking for examples which might keep the French government in countenance. But even if he were not so deeply to blame for

this, . . supposing even that this course was necessary to his argument, . . even then he had been in error: he had produced no parallel instance; the history of the world did not furnish one; and he had fruitlessly gone out of the path to weaken the cause of his country."

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

Mr. Whitbread's amendment was so little in accord with the feelings even of his colleagues in opposition, that it was not put to the vote. But his speech was so favourable to Buonaparte, and so suited to the furtherance of his purposes, that the French government availed themselves of it. A very few omissions adapted it to the meridian of Paris; it was translated, inserted in the provincial papers as well as those of the capital, and circulated through France and those countries which were under its dominion or its influence. To deceive the French and the people of the continent by the official publication of false intelligence was part of Buonaparte's system; but no fabrication could so well have served his purpose as thus to tell them that an English statesman, one of the most eminent of the Whigs, of the old advocates of liberty, a leading member of the House of Commons, had declared in that House that the overtures of peace made by France were unexceptionable, and had been unwisely, impolitically, and unnecessarily answered with insult; that Buonaparte, wielding the greatest power which had ever existed, was hastening to fulfil all his prophecies; that England must be reduced to

*Mr. Whitbread's speech circulated by the French government.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

treat with him at last, and therefore that the King of England ought to be advised by his Parliament to commence a negotiation as soon as possible upon such terms as circumstances might permit!

*Debates on  
the Portu-  
guese cam-  
paign.*

The debates upon the campaign in Portugal and the Convention of Cintra terminated in confirming by the sense of Parliament the opinion which the Court of Inquiry had pronounced. Events indeed had followed in such rapid succession, that the Convention having been regarded only as to immediate interests, not with reference to principles which are of eternal application, seemed like a subject obsolete and out of date. Ministers derived another advantage from the manner in which they were attacked. No man could blame them, except in the mere spirit of opposition, for having sent an expedition to Portugal; the public sense of what had been lost by the armistice sufficiently proved the wisdom of its destination; and that the force had been sufficient for its object we had the decisive authority of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the complete evidence of the victory which he had gained. The discussions upon the expedition to Spain were more frequent

*Both parties  
agree in ex-  
tolling Sir  
J. Moore.*

and more angry. Both parties, however, as soon as the subject was brought forward, agreed in voting the thanks of Parliament to the army for their services, and a monument to the General. It had been the intention of Government to make a provision for the female part of



Sir John Moore's family; but upon an intimation of their wish that it might be transferred to a male branch, a pension of a thousand pounds was granted to his elder brother. This was a becoming act of national generosity; but the opposition eagerly consecrated, and as it were canonized, the memory of Sir John Moore, that they might impute the whole misconduct of the campaign, with all its loss and its disgrace, to Government; and the ministers, always willing to avert a harassing investigation, were well pleased that their opponents should thus preclude themselves from pressing it upon military grounds.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

Inquiry, however, was called for, not upon that reasonable ground, but in the avowed hope that it would prove the ministry guilty of that utter misconduct for which their enemies so loudly and exultingly arraigned them. Lord Grenville said it was indeed a sinking country if such mismanagement were suffered to continue in the midst of our unexampled perils and difficulties. The hand of Providence appeared to be on us. Within three years we had lost the two great statesmen in whom the nation reposed its confidence, an admiral who had carried our navy to a pre-eminence which it never before enjoyed, and now a great military chieftain, whose talents were of the first order. "Was it possible," Lord Erskine asked, "to deplore the loss of friends whom we loved, and of men whose lives were precious to their country, without

*Inquiry  
into the  
campaign  
in Spain  
called for.*

*Lord Gren-  
ville.*

*Lord  
Erskine.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

lamenting in bitterness that they were literally immolated by the ignorance and folly of those who now wished to cover their own disgrace by the just and natural feelings of the public towards men who had died for their native land? But for their immortal renown, it would have been better for them, certainly much better for their country, to have shot them upon the parade of St. James's Park, than to have sent them, not to suffer the noble risk of soldiers, in a practicable cause, but to endure insufferable, ignoble, and useless misery, in a march to the very centre of Spain, where for them to attack was impracticable, and to retreat only possible, by unparalleled exertions: and what sort of retreat?... a retreat leaving upon the roads and in the mountains of Spain from 8000 to 9000 of our brave men, dying of fatigue, without one act of courage to sweeten the death of a soldier. What could, then, be a more disgusting and humiliating spectacle, than to see the government of this great empire, in such a fearful season, in the hands of men who seemed not fit to be a vestry in the smallest parish?"

Feb. 24.

Mr. Pon-  
sonby.

Mr. Ponsonby insisted that it was the duty of ministers, before they engaged in such a contest, to have ascertained the real state of Spain. It was not sufficient to know that monks could excite some of the poorer and more ignorant people to insurrection. The disposition and views of the upper classes, who from their rank and property possess a natural influence, ought

to have been ascertained ; and, above all, the inclination of that middle class which is every where the great bond and cement of connexion between the higher and lower orders. Some information too they might have collected from history before they ventured upon sending an army into Spain : for, as far as history went, they would not find much to encourage them in relying upon the character of the Spaniards for cordial or active co-operation in such a contest. “ I am not disposed,” said he, “ to speak disrespectfully of the Spaniards ; but history does not represent them as remarkable for that daring, enthusiastic, high-spirited disposition which prompts and qualifies men to make a great struggle for freedom and independence. The most powerful principles to excite mankind have uniformly been religion and liberty : have either been found materially to operate upon the recent movements of the Spanish people ? These are the only principles which have ever served to excite the noble daring, the heroic resolution to conquer or die ; and it was necessary therefore to inquire whether they were actuated by both, or by either, to calculate upon the probability of their success in the war. If they were influenced by neither of these motives, how could any reflecting man look for energy, zeal, or perseverance among them ? Let me not be misinterpreted. I do not desire that they, or any people, should become wild or mad, and destroy society itself in order to improve its

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

condition; that in order to remove abuses they should tear away all their ancient institutions; that in order to reform religion they should destroy Christianity itself; but I do say, while the Inquisition existed, that if the Spaniards were not sensible of the multitude of abuses which pressed upon them, if they felt not a wish to reform abuses and to restore their rights, and were not willing, for that reformation and restriction, to encounter all the dangers and endure all the difficulties inseparable from the species of warfare in which they were engaged; I say, that if this people were not actuated by the wish for, and encouraged by the hope of an improved condition, it was impossible for any statesman, for any man of common sense, to suppose that they would fight with success. If they were insensible of the cause of their degradation, and indifferent as to its removal, it was in vain for England to calculate upon materially exciting the spirit, or effectually aiding the exertions of such a people."

Then, after intimating a belief that Sir John Moore had acted against his own judgment, and in consequence only of Mr. Frere's repeatedly urging him to advance, he asked whether the Spaniards had been found willing and cordial in their assistance to the British army? whether they had received them as deliverers and guests, or with jealousy and fear? "Perhaps," he continued, "ministers may say that the Spaniards did not discover all that cordiality which was



expected. But can it be permitted that they shall say this after they have involved the country in such a ruinous, unproductive, and inglorious struggle? For let us not forget this, that, although we have obtained renown for our military bravery, England has for ever lost its character as a military nation. Were you to propose to send your soldiers again, as an encouragement and aid to other foreign powers, what would be the answer? It would be, 'No! Your troops are good; your officers are skilful and courageous; but there is something in the councils of England, or in the nature and manner of the application of her force, that renders it impossible ever to place any reliance upon her military assistance.' When you appeared in Holland and Germany as auxiliaries, you failed; true it is, your force in these cases was comparatively small, and the question remained undecided. The problem is solved, however, by what has passed in Spain. You professed to send forth the largest army that ever went from England, for the purpose of meeting the force of France; and what has been the result? A shameful retreat before the armies of France, and a disgraceful desertion of the power you wished to assist. This campaign, I say, will have an influence upon the character of England long after all of us shall cease to live. I ask the House, then, to institute an inquiry. I call upon the country to seek for one, in order to show how much distress, difficulties, dangers, and perils

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP. unexampled, our soldiers have endured in this  
 XXI. fruitless and inglorious struggle. I call upon  
 1809. you, by the gratitude you owe to those who were  
 February. thus shamefully sacrificed at Coruña, . . by that  
 which you owe to their companions in arms, who  
 are still in existence, and able and willing to  
 defend their country ; I call upon you, by the  
 interest you take in those who yet remain, to  
 institute this inquiry, in order that they may  
 not be sacrificed by similar misconduct upon  
 a future occasion. I call upon you, as you value  
 the glory of our country, the preservation of  
 our future power and reputation, as well as our  
 interest, by every thing that can excite the ex-  
 ertions of brave men, to institute this investiga-  
 tion.”

*Lord Cas-  
tlereagh.*

Lord Castlereagh, in his reply to this speech, observed with sarcastic truth, there could not be a greater mistake than to suppose they who called for inquiry meant that they wanted information. It happened, however, that by pronouncing upon facts of which he was imperfectly informed, Mr. Tierney was led into a course of argument most unfavourable to the intentions of himself and those who acted with him. Why, he demanded, had not the 10,000 men who were embarked been sent forward with all speed to Sir John Moore's assistance? On board the transports they were, and Lord Castlereagh took them out. Had they been sent, Sir John might have been still alive, and a real diversion then have been effected ; for our army might for some

*Mr. Tier-  
ney.*

time have maintained itself in Coruña, and have obliged the enemy to turn their whole attention to that quarter. The loss which we had sustained in our retreat, he said, was carefully glossed over, but he understood that it was at least from 8,000 to 10,000 men. Such a scene of woe, indeed, had scarcely ever been heard of. Think of blowing up the ammunition, destroying three or four hundred waggons, staving the dollar casks, leaving the artillery to be cast away, and the Shrapnell shells to the French, who would thus discover their composition ! He meant not to ascribe these disasters in the smallest degree to the General : all might have been avoided, if only 10,000 men had been sent to his support. Inquiry, therefore, was more than ever necessary ; and by the result of that night's debate Great Britain would judge of the character of the House of Commons. That House ought to convince the army that, though they might be exposed to unavailing exertions, and useless hardships, by the mismanagement of ignorant councils, they had protection in Parliament, who would never be slow in attending to their interest and their comforts. Unless the officers of the army had this support to look to, all would with them be absolute despair ; for, with the exception of some of the connexions of ministers, there was not an officer who came home from the expedition who did not vent execrations against the authors of it...there was not a man engaged in that retreat of unparalleled hardship who did

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP. not curse those who placed them in such a  
XXI. situation.

1809.  
February.

The fact was as Mr. Tierney stated it;.. he was only mistaken in imputing it to the government. Four regiments and two troops of horse artillery were actually on board, and had been disembarked. Five more regiments of cavalry were under orders for Spain, and would have been dispatched as soon as the transports could return for them. Nor had Mr. Tierney overstated the advantages which might have been expected had they arrived at the scene of action. On the contrary, far more important results than that of maintaining Coruña for a time must have ensued, if the British army had found these reinforcements there, even if it could be supposed that the retreat would have been made with such desperate precipitance, the General knowing he had such support at hand. He would then have retreated like one who was falling back upon his reinforcements, not flying to his ships. Broken in strength as the army was by severe exertion and excessive sufferings, broken in spirit too and almost in heart by the manner of its retreat, it had beaten the pursuers in fair battle, and 10,000 fresh troops would have turned the tide. Galicia would have been delivered from the enemy, Portugal saved from invasion, and Soult's army have been cut off, unless they could have crossed the mountains faster in flight than they had done in pursuit. Ministers would indeed have deserved the im-



putation so confidently cast on them by their opponents, if these advantages had been lost by their misconduct. Mr. Canning stated in their defence, that the reinforcements had been countermanded by the Generals, and empty transports sent out in conformity to their distinct requisition. "It was an afflicting circumstance," said he, "to send out empty, for the purpose of bringing off the army, those ships which had been filled for the purpose of reinforcing it. Among all the decisions to which I have been a party, no one has ever in the course of my life occurred which gave me more pain than this; . . . every dictate of the understanding was tortured, every feeling was wrung by it. But his Majesty's ministers had no choice. They felt that it would excite dissatisfaction in England and dismay in Spain; and yet they had no alternative."

Mr. Canning then proceeded to examine the more general arguments of Mr. Ponsonby. "It had been argued," he said, "that before the assistance of this country had been given to Spain, we ought to have ascertained whether or not the Spaniards were instigated by the monks; whether they were encouraged by the higher ranks; whether they were wedded to their ancient institutions, or disposed to shake off the oppression of their former government; to abjure the errors of a delusive religion; and to forswear the Pope and the Grand Inquisitor. The policy of his Majesty's government was

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

*Mr. Can-  
ning.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

different. They felt that the Spanish nation wanted other and more aids than lectures on municipal institutions; they were content that a British army should act in Spain, though the Grand Inquisitor might have been at the head of the Spanish armies; though the people might have been attached to their ancient monarchy, and with one hand upheld Ferdinand VII., whilst with the other they worshipped the Lady of the Pillar. God forbid we should be so intolerant as to make a conformity to our own opinions the price of our assistance to others, in their efforts for national independence; to carry the sword in one hand, and what we may choose to call the Rights of Man in the other! But the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was not pretended; what they had in their mouths, they felt in their hearts: they were enthusiastically determined to defend their country to the last extremity, or to perish under its ruins. The cause was not desperate; the spirit of the people was unsubdued; the boundaries of French power were confined within the limits of their military posts; the throne of Joseph was erected on sand, and would totter with the first blast; and Buonaparte, even should he succeed, instead of a yielding and unrepublishing ally, would have an impatient, revolting, and turbulent nation to keep down. The cause was not therefore desperate, because our army of 30,000 or 40,000 men had been obliged to withdraw; and it was not just to the country, or to the army, which

he hoped would again prove the stay and bulwark of Europe, to assert that its honour was in consequence gone for ever. All the energy of liberty, and all the sacredness of loyalty, still survived; and the Spanish revolution was, he trusted, destined by Providence to stand between posterity and French despotism, and to show to the world, that, amidst the paroxysms of freedom, a monarch might still be loved. If, therefore, ministers could show that these were the feelings by which they were influenced, and that they had acted up to these feelings, their justification would be complete; and he was convinced that the liberal and disinterested measures of his Majesty's government towards Spain were more congenial to British feeling, and more honourable to the national character, than if they had set out in their career of assistance by picking up golden apples for ourselves. For himself, as an humble individual of the government, and having a share in these transactions, the recollection would be a source of gratification which he should carry with him to the grave. If we had been obliged to quit Spain, we had left that country with fresh laurels blooming upon our brows; and whatever failure there had been upon the whole might still be repaired. If that was to be brought forward as the ground for accusation, he stood there for judgement. The object of the motion was to take the reins of government out of the hands of those who held them; and upon that

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

ground he desired that the present ministers might be judged by comparison. Was it the pleasure of the House that Spain should be abandoned? Was it a principle agreed upon, that the direction of government should be committed to other hands? Was it then a settled opinion, that there was something fatal in the will, and irresistible in the power of Buonaparte? and was the world to submit to his tyrannous resolves, as to a divine infliction? Whatever might be the fruits of Buonaparte's victories in other respects, the spirit of the Spanish nation was yet unsubdued. His fortune, no doubt, had been augmented; but still it was fortune, not fate; and therefore not to be considered unchangeable and fixed. There was something unworthy in the sentiment that would defer to this fortune, as to the dispensations of Providence; looking upon it as immutable in its nature, and irresistible by human means:—

‘Te

Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cœloque locamus.’”

This was a triumphant reply. The arguments of the opposition had been so misdirected, that there was no occasion of subterfuge, sophistry, or the shield of a majority to baffle them: they were refutable by a plain statement of facts, where they relied on facts, . . by an appeal to principles and feelings, where they pretended to philosophy. Mr. Canning spoke from his



heart. There was nothing which he was required to extenuate or to exaggerate; all that was needful was a manly avowal of what had been done, and of the reasons why it had been done. He had a good cause to plead, and he pleaded it with a force and eloquence worthy of the occasion. The same cause was in effect pleaded by Mr. Windham, though he took his place in the opposition ranks, and voted for the inquiry as an opposition question. "Our expedition to Spain," he said, "had been so managed as to produce what was much worse than nothing. What we called our best army had retreated from the field without striking a blow, on the mere rumour of the enemy's advance. We had shown them that our best troops could do nothing, and therefore that there was little chance of their undisciplined peasantry succeeding better. There were two courses which might have been pursued, either that of striking a blow upon the Ebro while the enemy were weak and their attention distracted, . . . or, if this were hopeless, of proceeding at once upon some general plan with a view to the final deliverance of the Peninsula. The first was a mere question on which few but those in office could have the means of judging. But if the force sent to the Ebro had (as it ought to have been) been chiefly cavalry (which the enemy most wanted, and we could best spare), such a force, even if it had been found insufficient for its immediate object, could have retired in safety to that

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
February.

---

*Mr. Windham.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

part of the Peninsula where, at all events, and in every view, the great mass of our force should be collected . . the neighbourhood of Cadiz and Gibraltar. These were the only two places from which a large body of troops, when pressed by a superior army, could hope to get away; and there was no other part of Spain to which a British army, large enough to be of any use, could with propriety be trusted.

“ There, therefore,” Mr. Windham continued, “ I would have collected the greatest force that this country could by any possibility have furnished. There was no reason why we might not have had an army of 100,000. An hundred thousand men, with Gibraltar to retreat upon, was a far less risk to the country than 30,000 in the situation in which the ministry had placed them; nay, than 30,000 in the very situation spoken of; because a general must be miserably deficient in knowledge of his business, who, in such an abundant country, and with such a fortress behind him, would, with an army of that amount, suffer himself to be prevented from making good his retreat, by any force which the enemy could bring against him. For when we talked of Buonaparte’s numbers, we must recollect where those numbers were to act. To meet in the south of Spain a British force of 100,000, Buonaparte must bring over the Pyrenees a force of not less than 200,000; to say nothing of the demand that would be made upon him by the Spanish army which might

be raised in that part of Spain, to co-operate with the British, and which the presence of such a British force would help to raise. Buonaparte would have a whole kingdom, which he must garrison, behind him, if he would either be sure of his supplies, or make provision against total destruction, in the event of any reverse. He must fight us at arm's-length, while our strength would be exerted within distance, with an impregnable fortress at hand, furnishing a safe retreat in case of disaster, and a source of endless supply, by means of its safe and undisturbable communication with this country. And let it not be said, that while the army continued in the south, Buonaparte might continue master of the north. What mastery could he have of any part of Spain, while such an army could keep on foot in any other? And why, in case of success, did the security of its retreat require that it should never advance? There was never any thing so demonstrable, therefore, as that the only way of carrying on effectually a campaign in Spain, whatever else you might have done, was to collect your army in the south. A force raised to the greatest possible amount to which the mind and means of the country, . . . then elevated above itself, and exalted to something of a preternatural greatness, . . . could have carried it, should have been placed where it would have been safe from the risk of total loss, and would not have been kept down by the idea that the deposit was too great for the country to hazard. This should have been the great foundation,

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

the base line of the plan of the campaign. On this the country might have given a loose to all its exertions, with the consolatory reflection, that the greater its exertions, the greater its security, . . . the more it made its preparations effectual to their purpose, the less was the risk at which it acted."

Mr. Windham then censured in strong terms the neglect of those opportunities which our command at sea had offered upon the eastern coast of Spain; "a coast," he said, "which was placed as the high road for the entry of troops from France, which was every where accessible for our ships, and which was inhabited by the race of men who fought at Gerona and Zaragoza. Total forgetfulness could alone explain this most unaccountable neglect. But the great and pregnant source of error in ministers," he observed, "besides the fault of not knowing better, was that which they had in common with many other ministers, and which he had signally witnessed in some of his own time, . . . that of mistaking bustle for activity, and supposing that they were doing a great deal, when they were only making a great deal of noise, and spending a great deal of money. They looked at every measure, not with a view to the effect which it was to produce abroad, but to the appearance which it was to make at home." He then spoke of the campaign in Spain more fairly than either party had ventured to represent it. "He could not," he said, "help perceiving in the conduct of this war,



and certainly in much of the language held about it, a certain mixture of that error which prevailed in many years of the last, of looking to other powers for what ought to have been our own work. We did not set our shoulders to the wheel, as people would who estimated truly what the exertions of this country could do, when fairly put forth. In this point there was a want of confidence in ourselves; .. in another there was a want, not merely of generosity, but of common justice toward our allies. There could be nothing more fallacious than to estimate the feelings of a country towards any cause by the feelings excited in that part of it which should be exposed to the immediate pressure of an army. If the scene of war lay in England, and we had an army of allies, or even of our own countrymen, acting for our defence, they would not be very popular in the places where they were quartered or encamped; and there would not be wanting complaints among the farmers whose provisions were consumed, whose hen-roosts were plundered, whose furniture was stolen, whose ricks were set on fire, and whose wives and daughters might not always escape insult, that the French themselves could not do them greater mischief. Now, if this were true, as infallibly it would be, of English troops upon English ground, might we not suppose that a good deal more of the same sort would happen when English troops were on Spanish ground, where every cause of dissatis-

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

---

1809.  
*February.*

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*February.*

faction must be aggravated a thousand-fold, by difference of habits and manners, and the want of any common language, by which the parties might understand one another? It must be confessed, too, he was afraid, that we were not the nation who accommodated ourselves best to strangers, or knew best how to conciliate their good will: and when to all this was added, that we were a retreating army, and an army compelled to retreat with extraordinary rapidity, and much consequent disorder, it would not be surprising if neither we appeared to the people, nor they to us, in the most advantageous form. Nor were the inhabitants of the towns and villages on the line of our march to be considered as a fair representation of the feelings and sentiments of the mass of people in Spain. On many occasions the soldiers, at the end of a long march, had nothing provided for them to eat, and were obliged to help themselves. The inhabitants, whether they staid or had fled, had locked up their houses, and nothing was to be got but by breaking them open; and when once soldiers, whether from necessity or otherwise, began to break open houses, farther irregularities must be expected. Galicia was probably an unfair specimen of what was to be looked for from the rest of Spain; not so much from the character of the inhabitants, as from the state of society there, where the gentry were few, and of little influence; and where there was almost a total want of those classes which

might direct and methodize the exertions of the lower orders. But to talk of the Spaniards generally, as wanting in zeal, or courage, or determination to defend their country, was more than any one would venture, after such examples as Zaragoza. A defence had there been made, so far exceeding what was to be expected from a regular army, that a general in this country would have been made a peer for having surrendered Zaragoza, in circumstances far short of those in which its inhabitants defended it.”

There was an English spirit in this speech, such as might have been looked for from Mr. Windham : for if sometimes he seemed to delight in making with perverse ingenuity the worse appear the better reason, and treated as a sport for the intellect subjects which deserved a serious and severe feeling, no political views or enmities ever betrayed him into an unworthy act, or sentiment inconsistent with his natural generosity. The motion for inquiry was rejected ; but whatever papers were called for were granted, though Lord Liverpool warned his opponents, that if they insisted upon making some of these documents public, they would perceive the impropriety when it was too late. They found in these papers what they wanted, . . an assertion broadly made by Sir John Moore, “that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. To convince the people of England, as

CHAP.  
XXI.1809.  
March.*Sir John  
Moore's  
dispatches.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

well as the rest of Europe, of this," he said; "it was necessary to risk his army, and for that reason he made the march to Sahagun. As a diversion," he continued, "it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow me, without a single movement being made to favour my retreat. The people of Galicia, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through the mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind: and when our horses or mules failed, which, on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed or abandoned." This was a heavy charge against the Spaniards, and it was triumphantly repeated by those who, being the opponents of ministry, became thereby the enemies of the Spanish cause. Yet it might have occurred to them that it was neither generous nor prudent to reproach an undisciplined peasantry for not attempting to defend defiles through which the finest army that had ever left England, with a man who was supposed to be their best general at its head, was retreating faster than ever army had retreated before. If these passes were not defensible, why should the Galicians be con-



demned for not defending them? If they were, why did the British army run through, leaving their baggage, stores, and ammunition, their money, their horses, their sick, their dying, and their dead, to track the way?

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*March.*

This accusation against our allies the opposition had expected to find; but they had not looked for a heavier charge against the army itself from the same authority, . . a charge too which, if any thing more than the consternation and flight of the British force had been required to excuse the Galicians, would have supplied it. For the General added in this unhappy dispatch, "I am sorry to say, that the army whose conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty." "Of what nature," it was asked, "was this misconduct with which General Moore so roundly accused a whole army, almost with his dying breath? Did the officers behave ill, or the men, or both? Did they refuse to fight, or did they refuse to fly? What had they done, or what had they omitted to do?" These questions were asked by the wiser part of the public, and the narratives of the campaign, which were afterwards published, amply answered them. It then appeared that the army, from the hour in

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
March.

which it was turned into a rout, considered themselves like sailors after a shipwreck, released from all discipline by the common ruin ; . . that they plundered, burnt, and destroyed before them ; . . that while many of the officers murmured against the conduct of the commander, the men cried out loudly against the disgrace of running away ; . . that order, discipline, temperance, and even humanity, were laid aside by them in their desperation : but that they had never forgotten the honour of England ; and that whenever a hope of facing the enemy was held out to them, order was instantaneously restored, they were themselves again, and, in spite of all their fatigues and sufferings, manifested that invincible courage which, happily for themselves and for their country, they were allowed at last to prove upon the French at Coruña.

Such consequences, however, humiliating as they were, were inevitable in a retreat so conducted. But Sir John Moore's dispatch contained a more startling avowal, for it was then first made known that he had been advised to propose terms to the enemy, that he might be permitted to embark quietly. It was indeed an unexpected shock to learn that there were officers, and of such rank as to offer advice to the General, who were for asking leave of the French to embark, and purchasing by such dishonour that safety which the army, broken-hearted as it was, without horse, and almost without ar-

tillery, won gloriously for itself. From this incalculable evil, this inexpressible disgrace, Sir John Moore had saved us. But who were the men who had so little confidence in British valour, that they would not have fought the battle of Coruña? Who were they who, instead of relying upon their own hearts and hands, would have proposed terms to Marshal Soult, and set the Spaniards an example to which every traitor or every coward among them might have appealed as a precedent for any baseness? This question was not asked in Parliament; nor was any pledge required from Government, or given, that these men should never on any future occasion be trusted with command. Not a single remark was made in either House by either party upon this subject, nor upon any of the information contained in a dispatch which had been loudly called for as of such great importance. It furnished no matter of reproach against the ministry, and therefore it was not the kind of information which their opponents wanted. And ministers themselves could make no use of it in their own justification, for, having it in their hands, they had passed a vote of thanks to the officers and men of whose previous misconduct they possessed these proofs; and instead of defending their own measures by arguing that the campaign might probably have turned out well, and beyond all doubt less disastrously, if the Commander had acted with more vigour and more discretion, they had as-

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.

March.

*Mr. Frere's  
correspond-  
ence with  
Sir John  
Moore.*

serted that every thing had been ably executed, as well as wisely planned.

Some matter, however, for accusation the opposition thought they had found in Mr. Frere's correspondence with Sir John Moore. They affirmed that the fatal event of the campaign had been caused by his interference, he having been the sole cause of the army's advance. To have his conduct fairly and impartially considered is what no agent of the British government expects from a party in opposition to the government, the just and honourable feelings of private life being so commonly cast aside in political warfare, that the wonder is when a trace of them is found remaining. But Mr. Frere was attacked with peculiar acrimony, as the intimate friend of Mr. Canning; this being motive enough for virulence when a spirit of faction prevails. He was charged in the most unqualified terms with folly, ignorance, and presumption; it was declared that his incapacity had given Buonaparte the same advantage as that Emperor was accustomed to derive from corruption and treason; and it was announced that an address would be moved for his immediate recall. That intention was not pursued when it was understood that Marquis Wellesley would be appointed to succeed him in the embassy; and upon every point except that of having desired that Colonel Charmilly might be examined before a council of war, his conduct was fully vindicated and



approved by the ministers. In so doing they thought he had adopted an improper course ; but they proved from the documents which had supplied the grounds of the accusation, that Sir John Moore had not been guilty of the gross fault which his admirers, in their desire of criminating another, imputed to him : he had not made a forward movement which endangered the army contrary to his own judgement, and in deference to an opinion which he disapproved ; but upon his own plans, and in consequence of the information which he obtained from an intercepted dispatch.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
April.

In the course of these debates Earl Grey complained that only 2000 cavalry had been sent to Spain, though we had 27,000, and though that description of force was peculiarly necessary in that country ; and he contrasted the conduct of the British government with that of Buonaparte, “the consummate general whose plans they had to oppose. In rapidity of execution,” said his lordship, “he is only equalled by his patience in preparing the means. He has all the opposite qualities of Fabius and Marcellus, whether you consider the country in which he acts, the people with whom he has to contend, or the means by which he is to subdue them. He rivals Hannibal in the application of the means, and is exempt from his only fault, that of not improving by past experience. The means provided by Buonaparte for the accomplishment of his purposes are so well combined,

Earl Grey.  
April 21.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*April.*

and his objects so ably prosecuted, as generally to give him a moral certainty of success; and whatever may be thought of his total disregard of the justice of those objects, it is impossible not to admire the ability and wisdom with which he combines the means of accomplishing them. In order to maintain against such an antagonist the ultimate contest which is to decide for ever the power and independence of this country, the true policy of those who govern it must be, to pay a strict attention to economy, to be actuated by a determination to concentrate our means, not to endanger them in any enterprise or speculation in which the event is doubtful; but pursuing the economical system of husbanding our resources, by which alone we could enable ourselves to continue a contest, the cessation of which does not depend upon us, but upon the injustice of our enemy."

*Earl of Liverpool.*

The Earl of Liverpool remarked, in reply, how singular it was that every one who censured the plan which ministers had followed with regard to Spain had a plan of his own, and that none of those plans should have a single principle of agreement with each other. This at least, he said, showed the difficulty which government must have felt in forming its measures, though it afforded a facility in defending them. As to the accusation of not sending a sufficient force of cavalry, he stated that as much tonnage was required for 5000 horse as for 40,000 foot; and moreover that vessels of a different descrip-

tion were necessary, of which a very limited number could at any time be procured. Yet from 8000 to 9000 horse had been sent, and there would have been not less than 12,000, had not the General countermanded the reinforcements which were ready. Weak as Earl Grey might be pleased to deem the ministers, they had not been so foolish as to expect that the first efforts of the Spaniards would meet with uninterrupted success; they were not yet guilty of calculating upon impossibilities; they had not supposed that such a cause as the cause of Spain, to be fought for with such an enemy as the ruler of France, could be determined in one campaign. Reverses they had met; but those reverses were not owing to the indifference or apathy of the Spaniards; they were imputable to their want of discipline, and to an ill-judged contempt for the French, a proof in itself of their zeal and ardour. And what would have been the general sentiment in that country and in this if our army had retired without attempting any thing? If, when after all her repeated disasters, the spirit of Spain was unsubdued, and her capital bidding defiance to an immense army at the very gates; if a British army, so marshalled and equipped, and after a long march to the aid of their ally, had in that hour of trial turned their backs upon her danger, what would have been thought of the sincerity of our co-operation? "I believe in my conscience," he continued, "that that movement of Sir John-

CHAP.  
XXI.1809.  
*April.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*April.*

Moore saved Spain. There are some, perhaps, who may be startled at the assertion: it is my fixed and decided opinion, and as such I will avow it. After the destruction of Blake's army, the defeat of Castaños, and the dispersion of the army of Extremadura, . . . after the capitulation of Madrid, which promised to emulate the glory of Zaragoza, and would have done so, had not treachery interposed; if at that crisis Buonaparte had pursued his conquests, by pushing to the southern provinces, the Spanish troops would never have had time to rally there. But that time was given by Sir John Moore's advance in their favour. Never was there a more effectual diversion. Sir John Moore himself said, that as a diversion it had completely and effectually succeeded. Nor was the moral effect of thus re-animating the spirit of the nation to be overlooked. Let the final issue of the contest be what it may, France has not yet succeeded in subduing Spain. I admit that Buonaparte has 200,000 men in that country; that his troops are of the bravest, and his generals among the most skilful in the world; and, above all, that he has been himself at their head: and yet, with all this, he has not got possession of more territory than he had last year: he only holds such parts as in every war fell to the lot of whichever brought the largest army into the field. I am far from saying, regard being had to the man and the circumstances of the case, that the Spaniards must ultimately



succeed ; but, at the same time, looking at the spirit they have evinced, and the actions that have happened, particularly the defence of Zaragoza, I cannot feel lukewarm in my hope that their efforts will be crowned with ultimate success. In that fatal contest with America we gained every battle ; we took every town we besieged, until the capture of General Burgoyne ; and yet the Americans ultimately succeeded, by perseverance, in the contest. In the present struggle, do not the extent and nature of the country afford a hope of success ? does not its population forbid despair ? We have not lost the confidence of the Spanish people ; we know that every true Spanish heart beats high for this country ; we know that whatever may happen, they do not accuse us. Submission may be the lot they are fated to endure in the end ; but they do not impute to us the cause of their misfortunes : they are sensible that neither the thirst after commerce, nor territory, nor security, is to be imputed to us, in the assistance we have afforded to them upon this important occasion. Whatever may be the result, we have done our duty ; we have not despaired ; we have persevered, and will do so to the last, while there is any thing left to contend for with a prospect of success."

Mr. Canning also declared, that considering Sir John Moore's advance in a military point, in his poor judgement he could not but think it a wise measure ; but in every view which en-

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
April.

Mr. Can-  
ning.

May 9.

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
May.

May 9.

nobles military objects by exalting military character, he was sure it was so. With all its consequences and disasters, he preferred it to a retreat at that time. Of those disasters he would not say a word: the battle of Coruña covered every thing; but the retreat itself, and the precipitancy of it, he could never cease to regret. This single expression was the only hint even of censure as to the conduct of the retreat which was heard in Parliament. In the course of the debate an extraordinary confession was made by Mr. Canning. "During the whole time," he said, "that these events were passing, government had no means of arguing from the past: the occasion was without precedent, and such as it was impossible to lay their hand on any period of history to parallel, either from its importance with regard to individuals, to this happy country and to Europe, or the difficulty that arose from there being so little knowledge to guide their steps in the actual scene of their operations. Why should government be ashamed to say they wanted that knowledge of the interior of Spain, which they found no one possessed? With every other part of the continent we had had more intercourse: of the situation of Spain we had every thing to learn." With what contemptuous satisfaction must Buonaparte and the French politicians have heard such a confession from the British secretary of state for foreign affairs! With whatever feelings the government might make this avowal, it was

heard with astonishment by the thoughtful part of the people, and not without indignation. To them it was a mournful thing thus to be told that their rulers laid in no stock of knowledge, but lived, as it were, from hand to mouth, upon what they happened to meet with! Is there a country or a province in Europe, it was asked; is there a European possession in any part of the world, of which the French government does not possess maps, plans, and the most ample accounts of whatever may guide its politics, and facilitate its invasion? Even respecting Spanish America, such a confession would have been disgraceful, because it would have betrayed an inexcusable negligence in seeking for information; but as regarding Spain itself, it became almost incredible. Did there not exist faithful and copious accounts of that kingdom, both by foreign and native writers? Had we not still living, diplomatists who had resided for years at the Spanish court; consuls and merchants who had been domesticated, and almost naturalized in Spain; and travellers who, either for their pleasure, or on their commercial pursuits, had traversed every province and every part of the Peninsula? Was not information always to be found, if it were wisely and \* perseveringly sought?

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
*May.*

\* When Clarkson wanted evidence respecting the manner in which slaves were obtained up the rivers Calabar and Bonny,

he heard, by accident, that there was one person who could give it, but he neither could obtain his name, nor learn the place of

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.  
May.

The truth was, that though we had means adequate to any emergency, troops equal to any service, and generals worthy to command them, Government had the art of war to learn: it had been forgotten in the cabinet since the days of Marlborough and Godolphin. The minds of men expand with the sphere in which they act, and that of our statesmen had long been deplorably contracted. The nation, contented with its maritime supremacy, hardly considered itself as a military power; and had well nigh acquiesced in what the French insultingly proclaimed, and the enemies of the Government sedulously repeated, that we had ceased to be so. We had been sinking into a feeble, selfish policy, which would have withered the root of our strength; its avowed principle being to fix our attention exclusively upon what were called British objects; in other words, to pursue what was gainful, and be satisfied with present safety, regardless of honour, and of the certain ruin which that regardlessness must bring on. The events in Spain had roused the country from a lethargy which otherwise might have proved fatal; and ministers, as undoubtedly the better

his abode: . . all that was known was, that he belonged to some ship of war in ordinary. That indefatigable and admirable man immediately set out in search of him: he went on board every ship in ordinary at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, and Sheerness, . . above an hundred and sixty vessels, . . but in vain. He

boarded above an hundred more at Portsmouth, equally in vain, and fifty-six at Plymouth, with as little success. In the fifty-seventh he found his man, after a labour of three weeks; obtained the knowledge which he wanted; and established by that evidence a point of main importance to the abolition of the slave trade.



part of their opponents would have done had they been then in office, heartily participated the national feeling: but when vigorous measures were required, they found themselves without precedent and without system. They had entered, however, into the contest generously and magnanimously, with a spirit which, if it were sustained, would rectify the errors of inexperience, and work its way through all difficulties.

CHAP.  
XXI.  
1809.

Earl Grey took occasion in one of his speeches to notice an opinion, that it was of no consequence by which party the administration of affairs was directed. “How can it,” he asked, “be seriously urged, that it is the same thing whether the government be entrusted to incapable persons, or able statesmen? I am really astonished at the absurd extravagance of the doctrine into which men of general good sense and good intentions have been recently betrayed upon this subject.” But no person had ever pretended that it was the same thing whether the government were administered by weak heads or by wise ones. What had been maintained was, that the party out of place was in no respect better than the party in, and in many respects worse: that they did not possess the slightest superiority in talents; that a comparison of principles was wholly to their disadvantage; and that the language respecting the present contest held, even by those among them whose attachment to the institutions of their

*Earl Grey.*  
*April 21.*

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.

country could not be doubted, was such as left no hope for the honour of England if it were committed to their hands. The existing ministry acted upon braver and wiser principles, and, whatever errors they committed in the management of the war, to the latest ages it will be remembered for their praise, that in the worst times they never despaired of a good cause, nor shrunk from any responsibility that the emergency required.

*Expedition  
to the  
Scheldt.*

An error, and one most grievous in its consequences, they committed at this time, by dividing their force, and sending a great expedition against the Isle of Walcheren, as a diversion in aid of Austria, instead of bringing all their strength to bear upon the Peninsula. It was a wise saying of Charles V. that counsels are to be approved or condemned for their causes, not for their consequences. When the causes which led to this unhappy resolution are considered, it will appear imputable in part to the conduct of the Spanish government, still more to that of the opposition in England. By refusing to put us in possession of Cadiz as a point of retreat and safe depôt, the Spaniards afforded their enemies in England an argument in support of their favourite position, that these allies had no confidence in us. The opposition writers did not fail to urge this as an additional proof that they were unworthy of our assistance; and the impression which they laboured to produce was strengthened by persons whose hearts were

with their country, but who thought by heaping obloquy upon the Spaniards, and making their very misfortunes matter of accusation against them, to excuse the manner of Sir John Moore's retreat. To the effect which had been thus produced on public opinion ministers in some degree deferred. They deferred still more to the pitiful maxim that the British government ought to direct its efforts towards the attainment of what were called purely British objects: now there were ships at Antwerp and at Flushing, and it was deemed a British object to destroy the naval resources of the enemy.

CHAP.  
XXI.  

---

1809.

Men in England regarded the commencement of the Austrian war with widely different feelings, each party expecting a result in conformity to its own system of opinions. Those journalists who taught as the first political commandment that Buonaparte was Almighty, and that Europe should have none other Lord but him, as from the commencement of the troubles in Spain they had represented the cause of the Spaniards to be hopeless, so they predicted now that that resistless conqueror was only called a while from his career of conquest in the Peninsula to win new victories upon the Danube, after which he would return to the Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear down every thing before him there. Others, who had too sanguinely expected immediate success from the Spaniards, with equal but less excusable credulity rested their hopes now upon Austria, . . there, they said, the

CHAP.  
XXI.

1809.

battle was to be fought, and the fate of Spain as well as of Germany depended upon the issue. The wiser few looked for little from the continental governments, though they knew that much was possible from the people; but from the beginning of this new contest, it appeared to them important chiefly because it effected a diversion in favour of the Spaniards; especially they hoped that England would seize the opportunity, and by meeting the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers, secure a certain and decisive victory.

*Troops sent  
to Portugal.*

Great and unfortunate as the error was of dividing their efforts, the Government acted with a spirit and vigour which have seldom been seen in the counsels of a British cabinet. At a time when they expected that not Spain alone, but Portugal also, would be abandoned by our troops, they made preparations for sending thither another army with all speed, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, who consequently resigned his seat in Parliament, and his office as Chief Secretary in Ireland. Sir John Craddock, who had then the command in Portugal, being a much older officer, was appointed Governor of Gibraltar.

*Earl of  
Buckinghamshire.*

*April 10.*

The Earl of Buckinghamshire complained of this, as being an ill reward for those exertions in collecting the scattered British force, and preparing it for resistance, to which it was owing that the determination of embarking from Lisbon was abandoned. This complaint drew from the Earl of Liverpool a just tribute to Sir John



Craddock's merits, and some remarks not less just upon the impropriety of bringing such a subject before Parliament, as at once trenching upon the prerogative, and virtually destroying that responsibility which ministers possessed.

Lord Buckinghamshire was of opinion that we had acted unwisely in reinstating the Portuguese Regency; that it became the duty of ministers to form a provisional government in that country till the subject could be submitted to the Prince of Brazil's decision; and that when Marquis Wellesley went out as ambassador to Seville, he should take with him powers for making those changes in Portugal which could not be delayed without most serious injury to the common cause of that kingdom and of Spain, and to the security of Great Britain and Ireland. To this it was replied, that what had been done was done because it was presumed to be most in accord with the sentiments of the government in Brazil, at the same time that due regard was paid to the feelings and even the prejudices of the people. Lord Buckinghamshire strongly recommended that we should avail ourselves of the strength of Portugal as a military position, and of the excellent qualities of the Portuguese, which, under good discipline, whenever they had had it, made them among the best soldiers in the world. Such measures for that great purpose had at that time been taken as the Earl of Buckinghamshire wished. That nobleman spoke more wisely

CHAP.  
XXI.  

---

1809.

May 1.

CHAP. upon the affairs of the Peninsula than any other  
XXI. member of the opposition, and without the  
1809. slightest taint of party spirit. There were some,  
of whom it would be difficult to say whether  
their speeches displayed less knowledge of facts,  
or less regard of them.

## CHAPTER XXII.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S SECOND CAMPAIGN IN  
PORTUGAL. PASSAGE OF THE DOURO, AND EX-  
PULSION OF THE FRENCH. DELIVERANCE OF  
GALICIA.

THERE were members who boldly asserted in 1809.  
Parliament that the Portugueze did not like the *Feelings of*  
English. A more groundless assertion had sel- *the Portu-*  
dom been hazarded there. The connexion be- *gueze to-*  
tween England and Portugal was not an ordinary *ward the*  
one, built upon immediate interests, and liable *English.*  
to change with the chance of circumstances.  
There were nations with whom, during the long  
struggle against Buonaparte, we were in league  
one day, and at war the next, the hostility being  
without anger, and the alliance without esteem.  
Our friendship with Portugal was like our enmity  
to France, founded upon something deeper. From  
the day when Portugal first became a kingdom,  
with the exception of that unfortunate period  
when the Philips usurped its crown, England had  
been its tried and faithful friend. When Lisbon  
was conquered from the Moors, English cru-  
saders assisted at the siege; . . English archers  
contributed to the victory of Aljubarrota, which  
effected the first deliverance of Portugal from  
Castille; . . an Englishwoman, a Plantagenet,

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

was the mother of that Prince Henry, whose name will for ever remain conspicuous in the history of the world; . . the Braganzan family, when it recovered its rights, applied, and not in vain, to its hereditary ally; . . and when Lisbon was visited by the tremendous earthquake of 1755, money was immediately voted by the English parliament for the relief of the Portuguese people; and ships laden with provisions were dispatched to them in a time of scarcity at home\*. These things are not forgotten . . if there be a country in the world where the character of the English is understood, and England is loved as well as respected, it is Portugal. The face of its rudest mountaineer brightens when he hears that it is an Englishman who accosts him; and he tells the traveller that the English and the Portuguese were always . . always friends.

*Sir A. Wellesley's instructions.*

That old and honourable friendship was now once more to be tried and approved. An expedition sailed in March for Portugal. The commander's instructions were, in case he should find that Lisbon had been evacuated by the British troops, to proceed to Cadiz, and land the army there, if the government would admit them into the garrison. Mr. Canning stated in his advice to Mr. Frere, that the delicacy of this point was felt and acknowledged, and the former

\* While the Americans carried over ready-built houses for sale; and the French sent a frigate, by which the *Grand Monarque* ex-

pressed his condolence for what had happened, and requested to know if he could be of any use.



refusal had been received without the least resentment or surprise. But circumstances were now materially changed. The security of Cadiz was impaired while the French possessed Portugal, and it was thought advisable to give the Junta one more opportunity of reconsidering the question. Permission would now undoubtedly have been granted had it been required; fortunately it was not needed.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

The Prince of Brazil, perceiving the necessity of forming an efficient Portuguese army, and the impossibility of remedying the old and inveterate evils which had ruined the existing establishment, without the assistance of officers trained in a better school, had appointed General Beresford commander-in-chief with the rank of Marshal. Immediately upon taking the command that General published an address to the army, saying that no person had studied the disposition and military character of the nation more than himself, and that no one could be more thoroughly convinced of the good qualities of the Portuguese soldiers, who were now what they always had been, if not the best in Europe, equal to the bravest. His care would be to give their qualities that efficiency which could only be derived from discipline. They were loyal to their Prince, obedient to the legitimate authorities who represented him, patient under privations, and they had recently given proofs of patriotism, energy, and enthusiasm worthy of their illustrious ancestors. He was proud,

*General Beresford appointed commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

therefore, of identifying himself with such a people: he was now a Portuguese officer, and he pledged himself that desert should be the only passport to his favour, and that he would avail himself of every occasion for promoting the comfort, honour, and advantage both of the officers and men.

*He begins  
to reform  
the army.*

The Portuguese army was indeed in the most deplorable state; but Marshal Beresford, in appealing to the national pride, did not exaggerate the good points of the national character; and had it been as easy in an army which had been so long and so thoroughly debased to form good officers as good men, his task would not have been difficult. With the aid of a certain number of British officers, who volunteered into that service, retaining their rank in their own, he commenced the task with indefatigable zeal. The capture of Porto excited great alarm in Lisbon, which was increased when the refugees from that unfortunate city arrived, and related the horrors that had been committed there. The spirits of the people, however, were encouraged by the expectation of British aid, confirmed by a well-timed order of Sir John Craddock's for the army to advance, giving proof thereby of a determination to defend the country, and of confidence in the means for defending it. The reinforcement which had arrived rendered his force respectable, and he collected part in front of Santarem, and part upon the road to Coimbra, to be ready either against Soult or Victor, on

whichever side the attack might be made. Beresford announced the fall of Porto in his general orders, and took that opportunity of delivering a wholesome monition to the army. "Porto," he said, "defended by four-and-twenty thousand men, and two hundred pieces of artillery, had fallen an easy conquest, notwithstanding both the people and the troops were brave and loyal, because the enemy had been able to produce a general insubordination under the appearance of patriotism." He warned them against the French partizans; whatever reports such men propagated were to be received with distrust, seeing they were undoubtedly paid by the enemy to promote confusion and distrust. "Let the troops," he pursued, "be subordinate to their officers; let them observe strict discipline, and the country will have nothing to fear. The enemy is in possession of Porto; so he was of Chaves; but that place he has lost with more than 1500 men. Recollect, soldiers, that when General Silveira saw the necessity of retiring from Chaves, where, from the nature and number of his forces, he was incapable of resisting the French, there were pretended patriots who raised a cry of treason against him, and induced a great number of the despisers of discipline to attempt the defence of that place, which they surrendered without firing a gun, and the troops with it, who had been deceived by them. The firmness of the General saved the rest of the army, and placed it in a

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
*April.**April 8.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

situation to acquire greater glory, and merit the thanks of his country. The Marshal," he concluded, "cannot sufficiently warn the people and the troops against those who, while they assume the appearance of patriotism, are in reality leaders of sedition; nor can he sufficiently recommend union and confidence, for every thing may be hoped from the loyalty, valour, and enthusiasm which animate the Portuguese in defence of their country." And he assured them that he should always inform them of the disasters which might occur, as well as of the successes, being convinced that their zeal would be in proportion with the services which might be required, and that they would display a courage equal to the exigency of the times, and worthy of the Portuguese character.

*Intercepted  
letter from  
General  
Kellermann  
to Soult.*

Marshal Beresford soon had occasion to announce something more encouraging. Troops were marched from Spain to be employed in the war against Austria; they knew not whither they were going till they had left the Peninsula, nor even that a continental war had recommenced, so completely had the all-pervading despotism of the French government cut off all private intelligence, as well as withheld all public. The commanders alone were of necessity made acquainted with the real state of affairs, and Beresford now published an intercepted letter from Kellermann to Soult, communicating this news. The war in Germany, said he, produced by the intrigues and gold of England, renders our situ-



ation extremely critical. Such he represented his own situation to be, in what he called Upper Spain, where he occupied the plain country with a considerable cavalry force, watching the Asturian army and Romana, and doing all he could to keep down the people between Valladolid and Madrid. He told Soult that he could expect no reinforcement unless it were from Marshal Ney, of whose ability to co-operate with him Kellermann could not judge, not having any communication with him, because the whole of Galicia was in a state of insurrection. Marshal Soult was at this time spreading a report that Buonaparte was about to arrive at the head of 80,000 men. Thus it is, said the Portuguese address, that Marshal Soult, who calls himself Governor of Portugal, endeavours to conceal their danger from the unfortunate troops whom he is sacrificing to the ambition of a tyrant. And when it is thus ascertained that a general publishes falsehoods in one case, his army and the people will know how to appreciate his accounts in others.

The French general at this time felt the difficulties of his situation, though far from apprehending as yet the vigour and ability of the enemy with whom he was soon to contend. His immediate object was to open a communication with Lapisse and Victor, and this was not possible while Trant defended the Vouga, and Silveira the Tamega. The latter enemy, who was near enough to disquiet him, had

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

*Laborde  
sent to at-  
tack Sil-  
veira at  
Amarante.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

*State of  
Penafiel  
when the  
French en-  
tered.*

broken down all the bridges over that river except at Amarante. Laborde was sent against him with a considerable force; he had Loison's division together with his own, and was to be joined by Lahoussaye's. Silveira, in advancing to Penafiel, had supposed that Soult, instead of tarrying at Porto, would have marched upon Lisbon without delay; in which case he would have entered Porto, and, by occupying the Douro, have effectually excluded the enemy from the province between the rivers. Upon the approach of this force he withdrew to the Campo de Manhufe. When the enemy entered Penafiel the scene was such as to make them sensible how deep was the feeling of abhorrence which they had excited and deserved. The whole city was deserted; all food and every thing that could have been serviceable to the invaders had been either carried away or destroyed. Every house had been left open; the churches alone were closed, that the Portuguese might not seem to have left them open to pollution. The very silence of the streets was awful, broken only when the clocks struck; and now and then by the howling of some of those dogs who, though living, as in other Portuguese towns, without an owner, felt a sense of desertion when they missed the accustomed presence of men. The royal arms upon the public buildings had been covered with black crape, to indicate that in the absence of the Braganza family Portugal was as a widow. Of the whole popu-

lation one old man was the only living soul who remained in the town. Being in extreme old age, he was either unable to endure the fatigue of flight, or desirous of ending his days in a manner which he would have regarded as a religious martyrdom; he placed himself, therefore, on a stone seat in the market-place; there the French found him in the act of prayer, while the unsuppressed expression of his strong features and fiery eye told them in a language not to be misunderstood that part of his prayer was for God's vengeance upon the invaders of his country. This was in the true spirit of his nation: and that spirit was now in full action. It had reached all ranks and classes. The man of letters had left his beloved studies, the monk his cloister; even women forsook that retirement which is every where congenial to the sex, and belongs there to the habits of the people. But it was not surprising that in a warfare where women were not spared, they should take part. Nuns had been seen working at that battery which defeated the French in their attempt at crossing the Minho; and here a beautiful lady, whose abode was near Penafiel, had raised some hundred followers; and in the sure war of destruction which they were carrying on, encouraged them, sword in hand, by her exhortations and her example.

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

---

*Naylies,*  
102.

*Naylies,*  
107.

After some skirmishing for two days, Silveira, understanding that a division of the enemy was moving from Guimaraens to take him in the

*The bridge  
of Amarante.  
April 18.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
*April.*

rear, and place him thus between two fires, gave orders for retiring to Amarante, and there defending the passage of the bridge. Antiquaries have maintained that this bridge was the work of Trajan ; but a tradition too long established, and too fondly believed to be shaken by any historical arguments, has ascribed its foundation to St. Gonçalo de Amarante, a Saint, who, having taken up his abode there in a hermitage, and commiserating the numerous accidents which happened in passing the river, determined to build a bridge. The alms which he obtained would have fallen short of the necessary charges for feeding his workmen, if the Saint had had no other resources ; he, however, by making a cross upon the water, drew as many fish to his hand as he pleased to take, and then supplied his labourers with a fountain of oil from the rock for the purpose of dressing them, and another of wine, that their hearts might be gladdened, as well as their countenances made cheerful. The bridge consists of three arches, the middle one being so large as to appear very disproportionate ; but through this the Saint is believed to have guided with his staff a huge oak which the flood was bringing down, and which, if it had struck the pier, must have demolished it, . . a miracle so necessary, that he rose from his grave to perform it. Portugal has never been ungrateful to such benefactors : near as Compostella is, the shrine of St. Gonçalo was preferred by the Portuguese to that of



Santiago; whole parishes went thither in procession, and not a day passed in which some joyous party of devotees was not to be met on every road leading to Amarante, travelling with music, and increasing their noisy mirth by firing off sky-rockets in the face of the sun. It is the custom for every pilgrim to offer a small wax taper, and these tapers have amounted to more than twelve hundred weight on the day of his annual festival, at which sometimes more than 30,000 persons have assembled from all parts.

The town, which contained about five hundred families, stands on the right bank, consisting chiefly of one long and narrow street, leading down a steep descent to the bridge. Hither the Portuguese retreated: a retrograde movement, in the presence of an active and adventurous enemy, tries the best troops; to the ill or the undisciplined it is usually fatal. Silveira's rear-guard fell back in disorder, . . . the confusion spread, and the enemy, when they entered Amarante pell-mell with their despised and broken opponents, thought themselves sure of winning the passage, and destroying a force upon which they were eager to wreak their vengeance. This expectation might probably have been fulfilled, if Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, a British officer who had come out with Beresford, had not been present. Short as the time was which he had been with the Portuguese, it had been long enough for him to become acquainted with their character; and rallying a handful of men, who

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick killed in defending it.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

required only such a leader to be fit for any service, he posted himself at the head of the bridge. The example became as contagious as the previous disorder, and the Portugueze, who, despairing to maintain the passage, had begun to withdraw toward Mezam-frio, rallied and reformed. The enemy persisted in the attack, knowing the importance of the passage; but the defendants stood their ground, and actually entrenched themselves in the street with the dead bodies of their enemies; they occupied the houses also, and the Convent of St. Gonçalo, one of the finest which the Dominicans possessed in that kingdom; and from thence they kept up a most destructive fire, till the enemy were driven out of the town with considerable loss. But Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick received several wounds, was carried off exhausted with loss of blood, and died within a few days, after having performed a service for which it is to be hoped a monument will one day be erected to his memory on the spot.

*The French  
endeavour  
to throw a  
bridge over  
the river.*

The French set fire to the town before they abandoned it. On the following day, having been joined by Lahoussaye's division, they won the Convent, after a brave resistance: they were now masters of the town; but the suburb of Villa Real, on the other side the river, was occupied by the Portugueze, who had barricaded the bridge, and planted batteries which commanded the approach to it. They kept up a fire also from some houses in the suburb upon

those who approached to reconnoitre, and killed, among many others, Loison's aide-de-camp, and his chief officer of engineers. The loss was so severe in these attempts, that Laborde despaired of forcing the passage, and gave directions for forming a wooden bridge some quarter of a mile from the town. When the materials were prepared, the best swimmers from the different regiments were ordered to be upon the spot at midnight, as soon as the moon had gone down ; but they found the water so deep, that no diver could touch the bottom in the mid stream, and so rapid, that no one could reach the opposite shore ; this project, therefore, was abandoned.

Captain Bouchard, of the engineers, who was present at this attempt, had been sent by Marshal Soult to form an opinion upon the spot concerning difficulties which both Laborde and Loison represented as of the most formidable kind. In reconnoitring the Portuguese works of defence from the church tower, which was close to the bridge, he discovered a string so placed as to leave no doubt in his mind that it was fastened to a trigger, which was to fire a mine and blow up the farther arch in case the entrenchments should be forced : at the same time he was convinced that there was no other possible means of effecting the passage than by forcing them. Ten days had been occupied in vain attempts, which had discouraged not only the men, but their commanders ; more ammunition and artillery had been sent them from

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
*April.*

*Repeated  
attempts to  
effect the  
passage.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
April.

Porto, and another division was placed at La-borde's disposal, and positive orders given that the passage must be attempted and won, and the opposite bank cleared of the enemy. A plan of Bouchard's was then tried, against the opinion of the Generals, and the troops were held in readiness to act in case of its success: this plan was to demolish the entrenchments on the bridge by four barrels of powder placed against them under cover of the night.

*Plan for  
demolishing  
the Portu-  
guese  
entrench-  
ments.*

To call off the attention of the Portuguese guard, some twenty men were stationed to keep up a fire upon the entrenchments, so directed as not to endanger the sappers who had volunteered for the real service of the hour. It was a service so hopeful and hazardous as to excite the liveliest solicitude for its success. The barrel was covered with a gray cloak, that it might neither be heard nor seen, and the man who undertook to deposit it in its place wore a cloak of the same colour. The clear moonlight was favourable to the adventure, by the blackness of the shadow which the parapet on one side produced. In that line of darkness the sapper crept along at full length, pushing the barrel before him with his head, and guiding it with his hands. His instructions were to stop if he heard the slightest movement on the Portuguese side; and a string was fastened to one of his feet, by which the French were enabled to know how far he had advanced, and to communicate with him. Having placed the barrel,



and uncovered that part where it was to be kindled, he returned with the same caution. Four barrels, one after the other, were thus arranged without alarming the Portugueze. The fourth adventurer had not the same command of himself as his predecessors had evinced. Possessed either with fear, or with premature exultation, as soon as he had deposited the barrel in its place, instead of making his way back slowly and silently along the line of shadow, he rose and ran along the middle of the bridge in the moonlight. He was seen, fired at, and shot in the thigh. But the Portugueze did not take the alarm as they ought to have done; .. they kept up a fire upon the entrance of the bridge, and made no attempt to discover for what purpose their entrenchments had been approached so closely.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

Four hours had elapsed before the four barrels were placed: by that time it was midnight, and in another hour, when the Portugueze had ceased their fire, a fifth volunteer proceeded in the same manner, with a saucisson fastened to his body; this he fixed in its place, and returned safely. By two o'clock this part of the business was completed, and Laborde was informed that all was ready. Between three and four a fog rose from the river, and filled the valley, so that the houses on the opposite shore could scarcely be discerned through it. This was favourable for the assailants. The saucisson was fired, and the explosion, as Bouchard had expected, threw

*The French  
win the  
bridge.  
May 2.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Operations  
de M. Soult,  
209—222.*

*Situation of  
the French.*

down the entrenchments, and destroyed also the apparatus for communicating with the mine. The French rushed forward; some threw water into the mine, others cleared the way; the fog increased the confusion into which the Portuguese were thrown by being thus surprised; they made so little resistance that the French lost only nine men; and Silveira, saving only four pieces of artillery, but preserving order enough soon to restore the spirits of his countrymen, retired upon Entre ambos os rios.

The advantage which the enemy had gained would have been great, if it had been earlier; it was too late to profit by it now. Loison had been ordered to establish himself in Villa-Real after the passage should have been won, .. he only came in sight of it, and returned to Amarante. On the way the post from Lisbon was intercepted, and in that mail the intelligence which had been so carefully concealed from the enemy was found, that hostilities had recommenced in Germany. The superior officers knew now the whole danger of their situation, and began to think only of how to \* secure the booty they had acquired by such flagitious means. The soldiers partook the spirit of their leaders; .. they were now in fact a body of freebooters, retaining still the form, and unhappily the strength of an army, but with the feelings

\* M. de Naylies says (p. 120), *d'une troupe, pour sauver le fruit J'ai vu compromettre le salut des concussions et du pillage.*

and the temper of banditti; and it was in vain for Marshal Soult, after the system of pillage in which all ranks had indulged, to appeal to any principle of honour, and call upon men to exert themselves for the good of the service, whose sole care was how to enrich themselves. Loison's division had to fight for the resources which were within their reach, on the left bank of the Tamega; . . if they got sight of a peasant, a cry was set up as if a beast had been started, and they hunted him till he was slain. One Portuguese who was thus brought down among the crags by a shot which broke his thigh held fast his fowling-piece when he fell, raised himself on the other knee, and with an unerring aim killed a French officer before he himself was put to death. Another gray-headed old man, armed with a musket and bayonet, posted himself to such advantage among the rocks, that, refusing quarter, he wounded three men and four horses before he could be cut down. Every day made the French generals more sensible of the difficulties of their situation. In any other country, they said, with a fourth part of the means of every kind which were employed here to obtain intelligence, and without success, they should have been informed of every design of their enemies, even the most secret thoughts. All that they could learn now with all their means amounted only to the certainty that Sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived at Lisbon, and that Ge-

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.*Naylies,*  
117-8.*Operations,*  
&c. 229.

CHAP. neral Beresford had begun to discipline the  
XXII. Portugueze army.

1809.  
May.

*Sir Arthur  
Wellesley  
lands at  
Lisbon.*

Sir Arthur had landed on the 22nd of April.

A general rejoicing was made for his arrival, and every town throughout the kingdom, where the French were not in possession, was illuminated three successive nights. The Prince of Brazil had appointed him Marshal-General of the Portugueze army, thus enabling him to direct its movements, while Beresford was continued in the command. He would at once have proceeded into Spain, there in co-operation with Cuesta to have struck a blow against the French in Extremadura, had it not been that the part of Portugal which the enemy occupied was fertile in resources, and also for the importance of the city of Porto. Therefore he determined to drive Soult out of the kingdom, leaving such a force about Abrantes as might secure Lisbon against any attempt on the part of Victor; and he resolved not to pursue him into Galicia, because he was not certain that he should, singly, be equal to the French there, and because the appearance of a British army in that province would make the French collect their force, and thus suspend the war of the peasantry, which was at this time carrying on in a way that harassed and wasted the enemy, and materially impeded their plans: Galicia, he thought, might be more certainly and permanently relieved by striking a blow against Vic-

*He communicates his  
plans to  
Cuesta.*



tor, than by following Soult. This plan he communicated to Cuesta, requesting him not to undertake any thing against Victor till the expedition to Porto should be concluded, when he would come down upon Elvas, and co-operate with him. Cuesta was not well pleased with these intended operations. Little or nothing, he thought, would be gained by driving Soult toward the Minho, for in that case he would be able to re-enter Galicia and complete its subjugation, neither the peasantry nor Romana being able to prevent him. "The object of Sir Arthur," he said, "ought to be to surround the French in Porto, or get between them and the Minho, so as to cut off the resources of Soult and prevent his retreat. But," he added, "the system of the British is never to expose their troops; and it was owing to that system, that instead of ever gaining a decisive action by land, they sacrificed their men in continual retreats and precautions, as General Moore had done, for not having attacked the enemy in time."

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

---

1809.  
*May.*

---

In this opinion the brave but ill-judging old man wronged the English, as much as he underrated the exertions of Romana and the Galicians: and he recommended a plan which was impossible, unless Soult should remain quietly at Porto, and allow the enemy to get in his rear. Sir Arthur's plans were well formed and vigorously pursued, nor were they altered in any degree by the intelligence that the passage of the Tamega had been effected, and that Lapisse had

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

crossed the Tagus at Alcantara to form his junction with Victor. He stationed two dragoon regiments, two battalions and a brigade of infantry, with about 7000 Portugueze under Major-General Mackenzie, to defend the fords of the Tagus between Santarem and Abrantes, and the mountain passes between that city and Alcantara. The latter place was occupied by 600 of the Lusitanian Legion, 1100 Portugueze militia, and a squadron of Portugueze cavalry under Colonel Mayne. In case Victor, now that the junction had been effected, should enter Alemtejo, which Sir Arthur thought was not impossible, he advised that Cuesta should follow him; but his opinion was, that the French in that quarter would make no movement till they should hear of Soult.

*Views of  
the Phila-  
delphes in  
Marshal  
Soult's  
army.*

Marshal Soult, in conformity to Buonaparte's system, had endeavoured to keep his army ignorant of the continental war. But copies of Marshal Beresford's address, which contained the intercepted letter from Kellermann, were carried to Porto by a brave inhabitant of that city, Manoel Francisco Camarinho by name, and means were even found of fastening it upon the walls of Soult's own quarters. This intelligence raised the hopes of those officers who, under the appellation of Philadelphes, had formed a plan for overthrowing the military despotism under which France, as well as her conquests, was suffering, and restoring peace to Europe. The restoration of the Bourbons made no part of the

scheme, for the leaders had grown up in those republican opinions which it is the tendency of youthful studies to promote, and which are congenial to a generous mind till time and knowledge have matured it. The end whereat they aimed, as far as they saw the end, was meritorious; . . the means had a fearful character, such as is common to all secret societies, but which no circumstances can \* justify.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

\* It is curious to observe in how many points this secret society resembled the system of the monastic orders. The person who was admitted to the higher grades changed his name, and was bound to keep a journal of all his actions, that the *Censeur* might at any time see what his moral conduct had been in all its details. *L'homme qui y était admis cessait d'être autre chose, au moins quant à ceux de ses devoirs particuliers qui auraient contrarié les devoirs de l'institution. Il sortait de la société générale pour devenir l'instrument aveugle de la société spéciale à laquelle il s'était dévoué, et cet engagement étendait son obligation bien au-delà de l'obligation de la vie. On ne crut pas pouvoir isoler le Philadelphie de ce grade par trop de moyens divers; et le seul de ces moyens que je puisse écrire fut l'abnegation de nom. Il fallait un nouveau baptême pour un dévouement de sang. L'influence de ces noms était si puissante, qu'elle s'étendait visiblement sur la vie privée. Caton, Themistocles, et Cassius sont morts par le suicide comme leurs patrons.* —Hist. des Sociétés Secrètes de l'Armée, pp. 36-8.

The author of this singular history (who is no common writer)

has a very proper note upon this part of the statement. *Il y a quelque chose d'effrayante dans cette idée, qui jette un homme hors de toute la société, et qui le dépouille, jusqu'à un certain point, non-seulement de son existence civile, mais encore de son propre caractère, et de son identité morale, pour le modeler sur la vie d'un autre. Il ne me serait pas difficile de donner des exemples très-remarquables de la singulière influence que cette métamorphose exerçait sur l'esprit ardent de quelques adeptes, dans lesquels on voyait s'opérer une véritable métempsychose historique. Mais il est naturel de conclure aussi, de ces simples aperçus, qu'une institution pareille entraînerait quelques inconvéniens dans l'état ordinaire et naturel de la société. Tout ce que tend à isoler les citoyens de l'ordre des choses dans lequel le hasard de leur naissance les a placés, pour les transporter dans un ordre factice et idéal, ne saurait être évité avec trop de soin.* —Hist. des Soc. Sec. &c., p. 180.

The founder and chief of the Philadelphes was Colonel Jacques Joseph Oudet, a native of the Jura, . . homme de vingt-cinq ans, ivre de jeunesse, fou de plaisir, inconsequent dans ses manières,



CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.

The plan had proceeded to a great length in Soult's army, and some of the general officers were engaged in it. The more dangerous part was taken upon himself by the Sieur D'Argen-

*frivole dans ses goûts, créature légère, inconstante, mobile, qui paraissait ne devoir exciter d'autres soupçons que ceux d'un père sage ou d'un mari défiant, et qui tenait d'une main le fil des intrigues les plus vaines, et de l'autre celui des conjurations les plus sérieuses.*—(P. 33.)

The description of this person is so characteristic, that no language except its own could do justice to it. *La nature, en le formant, le destinait à tout ce qu'il y a de bon et de beau. Il aurait été à son choix poète, orateur, tacticien, magistrat: l'armée entière l'a proclamé brave; personne ne l'a égalé en éloquence; il faudrait l'âme d'une ange pour se faire une idée de sa bonté, si on ne l'avait pas connu. Jamais on n'a rassemblé des qualités si contrastées et cependant si naturelles; il avait la naïveté d'un enfant, et l'aisance d'un homme du monde; de l'abandon comme une jeune fille sensible, de la fermeté comme un vieux Romain: de la candeur et de l'héroïsme. C'était le plus actif, et le plus insouciant des hommes; paresseux avec délices, infatigable dans ses entreprises, immuable dans ses résolutions; doux et sévère, folâtre et sérieux, tendre et terrible, Alcibiade et Marcus.*—(P. 13.) Oudet aimait les femmes avec fureur, les aimait toutes, les trompait toutes, et n'en abandonnait aucune de pensée, de souvenir, d'affection. Son cœur était devenu un abîme de tendresse, où se fondaient les sentimens les plus contradictoires. Il

*n'y avait pas un moment de sa vie où l'on ne pût lui tirer des larmes pour la première femme qu'il avait trahie; pas un où il ne méditât, peut-être malgré lui, d'en séduire une autre. Il était né Werther, et le monde l'avait fait Lovelace.*—(P. 17.)

The writer more than insinuates that Oudet, who was killed on the night after the battle of Wagram, fell, not by the Austrians, but by a premeditated act of Buonaparte. The fact is likely, and the fate not an unfitting one, . . where life was the stake, and the game Catch who can. *Ses funérailles ressemblerent à celles d'Othon*, for some of his fellow-soldiers killed themselves.

But the most extraordinary part of the book is its brave assertion that the army never was the passive instrument of Buonaparte (which indeed in one sense is true, for it was always an active one); that it always detested his tyranny, and was the only body which restrained it; that the love of liberty and of legitimate rights always was cherished in it; and that the restoration of the Bourbons was owing to it: *Je ne sortirai pas de cette question sans rappeler que c'est encore à l'armée que le bienfait de la restauration est dû, puisqu'elle l'a appelée par ses vœux, secondée par ses efforts, par le concours des supérieurs, par le bon esprit des soldats, et qu'elle l'aurait opérée d'elle-même quelques jours plus tard. Il n'y a pas un officier Français qui en doute.*—(P. 43.)



ton, who was then Adjutant-Major, and had formerly been Soult's aide-de-camp. It is one of the worst evils of revolution, that in such times good and honourable men are forced into situations where nothing can enable them to act innocently and uprightly except that unerring religious principle which it is the sure tendency and undisguised intent of modern revolutions to destroy. D'Argenton was worthy to have fallen on better times, for he was a man of kind and generous affections, at once firm of purpose and gentle of heart. When the French entered Porto, no individual exerted himself more strenuously in repressing the excesses of the troops; and many families in those dreadful days were beholden to him not only for their lives and properties, but for preservation from evils more dreadful than ruin and death. This officer undertook to open a communication with the British army, and finding his way to Colonel Trant's head-quarters, was sent by him to Sir Arthur. Several interviews took place; and he went backward and forward by the French posts with such ease, and so little apprehension of danger, as naturally to excite a suspicion that he was acting under Soult's instructions, and endeavouring to dupe the British Commander. There were no means of ascertaining this; but the manner in which his overtures were received was that which would have been equally proper whether they were sincere or treacherous. He was assured by Sir Arthur that no change in the

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.

---

*The Sieur  
D'Argen-  
ton goes to  
Sir Arthur  
Wellesley to  
explain  
their views.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

French army, either in contemplation or actually carried into effect, would induce him to delay his operations as long as it continued in Portugal; .. he should march against it with equal activity whether revolutionized or counter-revolutionized. D'Argenton, however, well knew that if the army declared unequivocally against Buona-parte, an arrangement with the British Commander must of necessity follow, and he asked for passports from the Admiral for the purpose of communicating with the army in Germany. Sir Arthur warned him of the danger to which he exposed himself by having such documents in his possession; but he was particularly solicitous to obtain them, and accordingly they were given him.

*Advance of  
the British  
army  
towards  
Porto.*

The movements of the troops, meantime, were continued without any reference to the politics or projects in the French army. On the 5th of May the whole of the British force which was intended to march against Porto was assembled at Coimbra. On the same day Beresford advanced from that city toward Viseu, with about 6000 Portugueze, a brigade of British infantry, and a squadron of British horse, to act upon the enemy's left, in the hope that he might so disconcert their plans as to make them retreat by Chaves into Galicia, rather than by Villa Real in a direction which would enable them to effect a junction with Victor. Trant was still on the Vouga, where the students had now the proud feeling that they formed the advanced post of

that army which was about to deliver their country. He had taken measures for collecting provisions, whereby one difficulty that might have impeded the advance was lessened. A strong division under Major-General Hill proceeded to Aveiro, and there, in boats which Trant had got together for that service, embarked for Ovar, which is upon the northern creek of that singular harbour. The main body proceeded by the high road, and began their march on the 7th. They halted the next day, to allow time for Beresford's movements.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

At this time Soult was informed that there existed a conspiracy in his own army. A general officer, to whom D'Argenton had just opened himself without being sufficiently sure of his man, gave the information. D'Argenton was instantly arrested, and all doubt concerning the truth of the accusation, if any there could have been, was removed by discovering Admiral Berkeley's passports among his papers. He was not a man who held his life cheap, for he had a wife and children in France whom he loved; but he valued it at no more than it was worth, and had made up his mind how to act in case of such a discovery. He avowed that he had been both to Lisbon and to Coimbra, and had communicated with Generals Wellesley and Beresford, who, he said, would in two days' time open the campaign upon the Vouga with 30,000 men. If the French army of Portugal would declare, what they well knew, that the

*D'Argenton  
is arrested.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

Peninsular war in which they were employed was unjust, the British, he said, would unite with them, march in concert with them toward France, compel the different corps in Spain to join them, and when they had passed the Pyrenees, they would find there an expedition of 60,000 English. Officers would be sent to the armies in Italy and Germany, inviting them to follow the example, and an English ship would be dispatched to bring home Moreau from America, and place him at the head of the army and of the government. The English would supply funds for all this; and if Marshal Soult refused the splendid invitation to act the part which became him, the intention was to secure his person, and give the command to another.

*Soult prepares to retreat from Portugal.*

The principle upon which D'Argenton acted was that of saying nothing which could compromise his associates, and any thing that might assist their purpose. He was sent to prison, and two officers upon whom the Marshal's suspicions fell were placed under arrest. But Soult was alarmed, as well he might, by what he had heard; and though the general officers whom he convened assured him they knew of no discontent in the army, it was certain that all those who retained any moral or religious feeling, any respect for humanity and justice, any sense of right and wrong, had abundant reason to be discontented with a service so flagrantly iniquitous as that wherein they were engaged. Not knowing how far he could depend upon the fidelity



of his army, and certain that such of them as had been present at Roliça and Vimeiro had not forgotten the lessons which they received there, he thought no longer of conquering Portugal, but of escaping out of it without delay. He informed Loison, therefore, who was at Amarante, that he should retreat by that road, and so by Braganza upon Zamora; and he ordered the troops from Viana to march upon Amarante, by way of Guimaraens, while he remained at Porto to secure their movements.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Operations,*  
§c. 239.

On the day that this determination was taken, the British attempted to surprise the advanced guard of the enemy under General Franceschi. Some troops crossed the Vouga on the preceding evening, others during the night. They proceeded silently and in darkness, along rocky passes where there was sometimes room only to march in single file: but the fidelity of Portuguese guides was not doubted, and they were led safely to an open heath, where about sunrise they came in sight of the enemy's videttes. The French were not taken by surprise, as had been hoped, .. they were formed in line with a pine wood in their rear; but they were beaten out of the field, and driven through the wood with the loss of their cannon; and having then to pass a deep ravine, the artillery came up in time to play upon their rear-guard. Such of the wounded as they were not able to bear away, the Portuguese peasantry dispatched, and miserably mutilated in their vengeance. The

*The French  
driven from  
Albergaria.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

French had provoked them by their barbarous usage of the militia who fell into their hands, . . for the peasants had found their bodies hanging there, and marks upon them of the cruelties which they had endured before death. The villages of Albergaria Velha and Nova, which the enemy had lately occupied, bore proofs of the atrocious temper in which this war was carried on by the invaders. They had destroyed in mere wantonness and malignity every thing that was destructible, . . broken open every house, burnt the furniture and the thatch, staved all the liquor which they could not drink, slaughtered the cattle, and pigs, and poultry which they could not carry off, strewn about their limbs, and trampled them in the road. And in this manner they acted along the whole of their retreat to Porto. The inhabitants, who were thus reduced to ruin, welcomed the British with tears of joy as their deliverers, and followed them with prayers that they might overtake and punish these unprovoked invaders, who had brought such unutterable evils upon Portugal.

*Military  
Chronicle,  
vol. iv. 193.  
General  
Mackin-  
non's Jour-  
nal, p. 13.*

*They are  
driven from  
their posi-  
tion at  
Grijo.*

The enemy retired first upon Oliveira de Aze-meis, then upon Feira. On the next day their outposts were driven in, and soon afterwards the two divisions of Franceschi and Mermet were seen strongly posted on the heights above Grijo, their front covered by woods and broken ground. Here they were attacked by Brigadier-General R. Stewart; Major-General Manners, with a brigade of the German Legion,

turned their left; they were dislodged and pursued till night, when the British army halted, their advance on the heights beyond Carvalhos, and the rear at S. Antonio da Arrifana, the former about seven miles from the Douro, the latter about twenty-five. The enemy continued their retreat, and having crossed the bridge in the night, set fire to it, and completely destroyed it. At daybreak the British troops were again in motion, in full expectation and hope of again bringing the enemy to action; but before they could be reached there was a river to be crossed, more formidable than ever general had attempted to pass in the presence of a respectable foe.

The Douro, which has the longest course of any river in the Peninsula, and rolls a larger volume of waters than the Tagus to the sea, is about three hundred yards wide at Porto, its deep and rapid stream being contracted between high and rocky shores. Soult had prepared for leaving the city, but he did not dream of being driven out of it. Having stood upon the quay from midnight till four in the morning, and seen not only the breaking up of the bridge, but the pontoons consumed as they floated down, and having previously given orders that all boats should be brought to the Porto side of the river, and collected at one place, that they might be the better guarded, he is said to have supposed that the English would avail themselves of their maritime means, embark their troops, and attempt a landing near the mouth of the Douro;

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Measures  
of Marshal  
Soult to pre-  
vent the  
passage of  
the Douro.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

and in that belief he went to his head-quarters, which were between the city and the sea, expecting that he could remain another day in perfect safety, which would allow time for the movements of the troops from Viana. Franceschi was instructed to guard the coast with the rear-guard; Laborde was to support him; Mermet to station one brigade at Val-longo, and two at Baltar, and to have frequent parties on his right to observe the river, and destroy all boats that could be discovered. Orders were also dispatched to Loison, requiring him to keep his ground at Mezam-frio and at Pezo da Ragoa, to prevent the enemy from crossing at either of those points. Every thing was prepared for retreating, biscuit distributed to the troops, the money from the public treasury delivered over to the paymaster, and a battalion was stationed on the quay, with the artillery. But the French were so possessed with the notion that the English must make a maritime descent, that this whole battalion was stationed below the bridge, and not a single post placed above it.

*Operations,*  
§c. 241—  
246.

*Passage of  
that river.*

Sir A. Wellesley knew how important it was, with reference to Beresford's operations, that he should cross the Douro without delay. In the morning he sent Major-General Murray up the river, to send down boats if he could find any, and endeavour to effect a passage at Avintes, about five miles above the city, where it might be possible for the troops to ford. The Guards,



CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
*May.*

under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, were to cross at the ferry below the city as soon as boats could be obtained, and he himself directed the passage of the main body from the Convent of S. Agostinho da Serra, which stands in the suburb of Villa Nova upon the most elevated spot on that side. It was certain that the enemy would have taken all common precautions for securing the boats, but it was equally certain that the inhabitants would do every thing in their power to assist their deliverers. Two boats were brought over by them to the foot of the eminence on which the Convent stands, and two more were sent down the stream to the same spot. There was a large unfinished building on the opposite side, designed for the Bishop's palace, which afforded a good position for those who should land first till they could be supported; and some guns were placed in the Convent garden, where they were masked by fir trees, in a situation to bear upon the enemy with effect.

Four boats only had been collected when the passage was begun; but more were presently on the way, for the inhabitants were on the alert to promote their own deliverance. Lieutenant-General Paget crossed in one of the first, and took up a position with the Buffs as fast as they landed and reached the summit. They were attacked in great force, and stood their ground most gallantly till the 48th and 66th and a Portuguese battalion arrived successively to sup-

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

port them. General Paget lost an arm early in the action, and the command devolved upon Major-General Hill. The most strenuous exertions were made by the inhabitants for transporting the troops, while this contest was maintained, in which sure hope and British resolution counterbalanced the great inequality of numbers. About two hours after the commencement of the action General Sherbrooke, with the Guards and the 29th, appeared on the enemy's right, having crossed at the lower ferry; and about the same time General Murray was seen coming from the side of Avintes in the opposite direction. If any thing could be needed to animate the spirit of Englishmen at such a time, they had it that day. Hastening up the steep streets of Porto as fast as they could be landed and formed to support their countrymen, they were welcomed by the inhabitants with such demonstrations of joy as might have warmed colder hearts than those to which they were addressed. Handkerchiefs were waved from every balcony, and blessings breathed upon them, and shouts of triumphant gratulation and convulsive laughter mingled with the tears and prayers that greeted them.

*Military  
Chronicle,  
vol. iv. p.  
28.*

*Stothen's  
Narrative,  
p. 41.*

*Deliverance  
of Porto.*

The French had been completely surprised. The very boldness of the attempt, for history has recorded no passage of the kind so bold, was its security; till they saw that it was accomplished they did not believe it would be attempted. A *chef de bataillon* told one of the

generals that the English were passing, and his report was disregarded. Soult was assured by the French governor of the city that it was only some stragglers of their own people who had tarried behind till the bridge had been destroyed, and that the boatmen had gone to bring them across, but that he had forbidden the passage of boats on any pretext to the left bank. The Marshal was satisfied with this; and the report that the enemy were coming was not believed till General Foy, going upon the high ground opposite to the Convent, from whence Sir Arthur was directing the operations, saw the troops crossing, and Portuguese upon the walls making signals to them. In the confusion that ensued among the French General Foy was wounded, and narrowly escaped being taken, for the enemy thought only of retreating as fast as possible, when they saw troops on either side arriving to support General Hill. It was about five in the afternoon when the action was terminated by their flight. The British were too much fatigued to follow up their victory that evening, when they might have completed the destruction of an enemy not less thoroughly dispirited than discomfited. But in the last four days they had marched over fourscore miles of difficult country. So complete and signal a success against an equal enemy was perhaps never before obtained at so little cost; the loss at Porto consisted only of twenty-three men killed, ninety-six wounded, and two missing, and in the preceding affairs at

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Operations,*  
§c. 245-7.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

Albergaria and Grijó of 102 in all. That of the enemy was very considerable; they left behind them five pieces of cannon, eight ammunition tumbrils, many prisoners, and about a thousand men in the hospitals.

Porto presented an extraordinary scene that night; every house was illuminated, while the gutters were still red with blood, and the streets strewn with dead bodies both of horses and men. There had been three hours' fighting in the suburbs, and before night the French who had fallen were stripped and left naked where they lay;.. they had their plunder about them for removal, and they had provoked by the most intolerable wrongs a revengeful people. Sir Arthur the next morning issued a proclamation, requiring the inhabitants to comport themselves with humanity toward such of the French as might be made prisoners; they were entitled to his protection by the laws of war, he said, it was his duty to afford it, and it would be inconsistent with the magnanimity of the Portuguese nation to revenge the outrages which it had suffered upon unfortunate individuals. He prohibited any person from appearing armed in the city, unless he belonged to a military corps; and appointed Colonel Trant to be commandant, provided the nomination should be approved by the Portuguese government. D'Argenton\*

\* He was sent to England, Government; but soon venturing over to France for the purpose of humanity provided for by the bringing back his wife and chil-



escaped during the night, as much through the good-will of those who guarded him, as by the services of his fellow Philadelphes.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

On the following morning Sir Arthur commenced the pursuit, the Hanoverian Legion, under Major-General Murray, moving to Valongo, from whence the enemy had commenced their retreat during the night, in the direction for Amarante. But Beresford had moved with more celerity than even the British Commander had relied on; driving back the enemy's posts at Villa Real and Mezam-frio, he followed up his success, and drove them from the left bank of the Tamega; and Loison, not venturing to defend the bridge that had been so gallantly defended against him, retired from Amarante under cover of the night, in some apprehension that Silveira or Beresford might have crossed the Douro, and that thus he might be prevented from rejoining Soult. The intelligence of the loss of Porto reached him about the same time that Soult was apprised of his retreat, and that the point which would have opened the surest

*Soult and  
Loison ef-  
fect a junc-  
tion on their  
retreat.*

dren, he was apprehended, and shot. Nothing could be drawn from him to criminate any of his confederates, but he affirmed that Marshal Soult was engaged in the design; and this he had determined to do in case he should be discovered. It cannot be doubted that the intentions of this unfortunate officer were good; and that he was a man of good and generous feelings was proved both by his conduct at Porto, and by

the motive which induced him to venture into his own country, under the certainty of being put to death if he should be recognized there. And yet he made a false accusation, and persisted in it at his death. The best and purest intentions will not preserve a man from guilt, if he engages in one of those secret societies where he is required to deliver his conscience out of his own keeping.

CHAP. way for escape was occupied by the allies. They  
 XXII. met, however, within a few miles of Penafiel, and  
 1809. it was matter of congratulation that the junction  
 May. had been effected. Soult's determination was  
 promptly taken. There were officers who were  
 heard to say that the English treated their prisoners well, and that a passage to England in British transports was no great evil. Loison himself is said to have advised another convention like that of Cintra; but the Marshal well knew that the circumstances were widely different, and that nothing remained for them but flight, with the utmost speed, and by the most difficult road, abandoning every thing that might encumber them. As the treasure could not be transported, every one was allowed to take what he could of it; but there was too much haste and alarm for either officers or men to profit largely by this licence; some chests which could not readily be forced open were abandoned by the soldiers, and the greater number were so placed as to be blown to pieces when the guns were burst.

*Naylies,*  
 123.  
*Operations,*  
 &c. 249—  
 255.

*Sir Arthur*  
*pursues the*  
*French.*

May 14.

As soon as Sir Arthur was informed of the rapidity and success of Beresford's movements, he directed that General upon Chaves, to intercept the enemy should they turn to the right. Beresford had anticipated this order, and had already dispatched Silveira to occupy the passes of Salamonde and Ruyvaens; but the French were flying too fast for this to be executed in time. Their flight, however, was conducted

with great presence of mind and judgement. Marshal Soult, when all his divisions were collected, made a display of them near Lanhoso, not to the pursuers, but for the sake of his own men, that they might see their own numbers, and acquire some confidence in their strength. Dispirited as they were by the abandonment of their artillery and baggage and the loss of their plunder, *this* had a good effect; and the retreat would have been honourable to Marshal Soult if it had not been disgraced by such cruelties as leave an uneffaceable stigma upon the commander of any troops by whom they are perpetrated. Marshal Soult's soldiers plundered and murdered the peasantry at their pleasure: many persons, when the English arrived, were found hanging from the trees by the way-side, who had been put to death for no other reason than that they were not friendly to their insolent invaders; and the line of their retreat might every where be traced by the smoke of the villages which they burnt. They suffered for this as was to be expected: whatever stragglers fell into the hands of the peasantry before the advanced guard could come up to save them were put to death with as little humanity as they had shown. Some of them were thrown alive amid the flames of those houses which their comrades had set on fire.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Sir Arthur  
Wellesley's  
dispatch,  
May 18.*

On the evening of the 14th Sir Arthur thought it certain, by the enemy's movements about

*Sufferings  
of the enemy  
in their  
flight.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

May 16.

Braga, that they intended to retreat either upon Chaves or Montalegre; and he sent orders to Beresford, in case they should take the latter direction, to push on for Monterrey, so as to stop them if they should pass by Villa del Rey.

At Salamonde the pursuers came up with their rear-guard, and drove them out of the town, which they had destroyed. The pursuers slept on the ground that night, and dressed their food and dried their clothes by the fires which the enemy had lighted for their own use. The sufferings of the French during the retreat were only not so severe as those of Sir John Moore's army, because it was in a milder season; . . but it was made under a fear of the pursuers which the British soldiers had never felt; the rain was heavy and incessant, and time enough for necessary rest was not allowed, . . their danger was so imminent. They who halted at ten at night were on the march again at three in the morning, and in the few intervening hours the cavalry had to seek both provisions and forage, and the infantry to provide for themselves as they could. The greater part of the men had nothing for eight days except parched maize; very many died of want and exhaustion, and not a few lay down by the way to take the chance of life or death, as they might fall into the hands of the British troops or of the peasantry. Their track was strewn with dead horses and mules, who had either been driven till they fell, or killed, or more barbarously



hamstrung, when it was not possible by any goading to make them proceed farther.

A bridge over the Cavado had been occupied by the armed peasantry, but mistaking some Swiss troops who were clothed in red for British, they allowed them to pass; but many hurrying over in the darkness, fell into the torrent and were lost. A greater destruction took place at the Puente de Misarella, a bridge with a low parapet over a deep ravine, and so narrow as not to admit two horsemen abreast. The enemy had driven away the peasants who were attempting to destroy it, but a fire was kept up upon them by others from the crags of that wild and awful pass; and upon the report of some cannon fired by the advanced guard of the pursuers upon their rear, the French were seized with panic; many threw down their arms and ran; they struggled with each other to cross the bridge, losing all self-command; and the British advance, when they arrived at the spot, found the ravine on both sides choked with men and horses, who had been jostled over in the frantic precipitancy of their flight. Here the papers of the army, and the little and more precious part of the baggage, which had hitherto been saved, were lost.

Marshal Soult was guided in this retreat by an itinerant Navarrese, who, in the exercise of one of the vilest callings (that of hangman alone excepted) in which a human creature can be employed, had acquired a thorough knowledge

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Loss of the  
French at  
Puente de  
Misarella.*

*Naylies,  
126.  
Operations,  
&c. 262.*

*The pur-  
suit given  
over at  
Montalegre.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

May 18.

of the country. This man conducted him by cross roads and mountainous paths, where neither artillery nor commissariat could follow. Sir Arthur continued the pursuit as far as Montalegre, and then halted, finding that the enemy had gone through the mountains toward Orense by roads impracticable for carriages, and where it was impossible either to stop or overtake them. He estimated that Soult had lost all his artillery and equipments, and not less than a fourth of his men, since he was attacked upon the Vouga. "If," said he, "an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and every thing that can strengthen it and enable it to act together as a body, and if it abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress, it must obviously be able to march through roads where it cannot be overtaken by an enemy who has not made the same sacrifices."

*Movement  
of troops  
from Ara-  
gon.*

When the British Commander was commencing his operations from Coimbra, he received information from the Ambassador at Seville that a French division of 15,000 men had certainly left Aragon, with the intent, it was believed, of joining either Ney or Soult. It became, therefore, a grave question for his consideration, whether to return, in pursuance of his plan of co-operating with Cuesta, when he should have driven the enemy out of the north of Portugal, . . or push with greater eagerness for the entire destruction of Soult's army,

instead of leaving him to retreat, unite with Ney, and become again formidable by the junction of this force from Aragon. Upon mature deliberation he determined not to vary from his first purpose, because, though the intelligence was announced as indubitable, no tidings of this division had been transmitted from Ciudad Rodrigo, Braganza, or Chaves, quarters where it might have been expected to be known, and because his instructions enjoined him to make the protection of Portugal his principal object. If it were not necessary, therefore, to remain for that object in the northern provinces, he conceived that he should act in the best manner both for Portugal and Spain, by joining Cuesta with all speed, and commencing active operations against Victor. Thus he had determined before he advanced from Coimbra, and therefore he now desisted from the pursuit, satisfied with having done, if not all that he wished, all that was possible, and more than he had expected. Had the Portuguese at Chaves been active in obeying their instructions, and occupying the defiles near Salamonde, the French, who had abandoned their ammunition and their guns, must have been irretrievably lost; the very cartridges which the men carried, and which constituted their whole stock, were rendered useless by the rain, and they could no otherwise have escaped the fate they deserved from the hands of the Portuguese than by surrendering to the British. As it was, they had

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
Muy.

---

*Reasons for  
not continu-  
ing the pur-  
suit.*

*Naylies,*  
128.

*Col. Jones,*  
*vol. i. 204-*  
7.

CHAP. lost not less than a fourth of their army since  
XXII. Sir Arthur attacked them on the Vouga.

1809.  
May.

*Victor enters Portugal by way of Alcantara, and speedily retreats.*

If Sir Arthur had not made this previous determination, and if it had been possible for the commissariat, imperfect as it then was, to have kept up with a longer pursuit in a country which could supply neither food, nor carriages, nor beasts of draught, the tidings which he now received of Victor's movements would probably have recalled him toward the south. That Marshal, having been joined by Lapisse, had at length made the movement which Soult had so long and anxiously expected ; he had broken up from the Guadiana, and marched for the Tagus at Alcantara. Colonel Mayne occupied this important point with 600 of the Lusitanian Legion, 1100 Portuguese militia, and fifty Portuguese cavalry. With this far inferior force he withstood 10,000 infantry and 1000 horse for six hours, and then effected his retreat without losing a single gun, though not without a heavy loss in killed and wounded, the Legion alone losing 170 men. He had endeavoured to blow up the bridge ; the attempt failed, and the enemy, being thus masters of the passage, advanced a little way into Portugal in the direction of Castello Branco. But no sooner had Victor learnt that Sir Arthur had recrossed the Douro, than he retired by the same course, evacuated Alcantara, and concentrated his army between the Tagus and the Guadiana, in the neighbourhood of Caceres.



When Soult's army had re-entered Spain, and found that the pursuit was not continued, their hopes rose, and they rejoiced in the thought of communicating with the other corps of their countrymen. The red uniform of the Swiss again led to a serviceable mistake, . . they were taken for British soldiers at Allariz, and the inhabitants, under that delusion, hastened to bring them provisions and wine, blessing them as their deliverers. On the following day they reached Orense, and there learnt that the French in Lugo were at that time besieged, and that both Ney and Romana had marched into Asturias.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Soult  
reaches  
Orense.*

May 19.

*Naylies,  
132.*

Romana, after he had succeeded in surprising the enemy at Villa Franca, had received information that Ney was collecting a considerable force at Lugo for the purpose of attacking him. Upon this he turned into Asturias, crossing the mountains at the passes of Cienfuegos, and descending upon Navia de Suarna; there he left his army under the command of D. Nicolas Mahy, and went himself to Oviedo, in the hope of rendering the resources of the principality more efficient than they had hitherto been found. The Junta of that province had received larger assistance of every kind from England than any other provincial government, and were said to have made less use of it in the general cause. They were accused of looking only to the establishment of their own indefinite authority, their own interest and that of their followers,

*Romana  
enters As-  
turias, and  
displaces  
the Junta.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

and the destruction of all who were not subservient to them. Complaints to this tenor had reached Romana in Galicia, and he found upon inquiry that the greater part of the supplies which they had received were consumed in the support of idle and ostentatious offices; and that the corps which were raised, and which he wished to serve as a nursery for his army, drafting volunteers from them to fill up his regiments from time to time, were rendered useless by the want of capacity or conduct in the officers, who either remained in their houses, or did not support with any firmness the points to which they were ordered. Abuses of every kind were complained of in the misapplication of money, the disposal of offices, the contempt of public orders, the neglect of the laws, and the interception not only of private correspondence but of official papers. Romana was persuaded that these accusations were well founded; and by virtue of the authority of which he believed himself possessed, as Captain-General of that province, he dismissed the members of the Junta, as unworthy of their station, and nominated others in their place, among whom were the first deputies who had been sent to England, D. Andres Angel de la Vega, and the Visconde Materosa, now by the death of his father Conde de Torenó.

May 2.

*Combined  
movements  
of the  
French  
against  
Romana.*

In consequence of this movement of Romana's, a combined operation was concerted between the French generals Ney, Kellermann,

and Bonnet, for the purpose of cutting off him and his army, and subjugating Asturias. Proclamations in French and Spanish were printed at Coruña, wherein Ney assured the Asturians that almost all Spain had now submitted, Zaragoza having surrendered after losing three-fourths of its inhabitants, Valencia having opened its gates without resistance, and the Central Junta having taken refuge in Cadiz, which could not long serve as an asylum. He bade them rely upon his word, that their persons and their property should be respected, and prayed Heaven to enlighten them, that he might not be under the necessity of putting in force against them the terrible rights of war. Having sent abroad these threats and falsehoods, he, who had collected about 12,000 men at Lugo, entered Asturias by the Concejo de Ibias, a traitorous priest guiding him by roads which were unsuspected because they were almost impassable. Bonnet at the same time advanced along the coast from the east, and Kellermann with some 6000 men entered by Pajares.

This was an occasion upon which the Spaniards acted with as much alertness as their enemies. Mahy was apprised in time of Ney's approach, and effectually disappointed one part of his scheme by returning into Galicia, there to profit by his absence. When the Marshal reached Navia de Suarnia he found the troops had escaped him; but deeming the single person of Romana of more importance than his army,

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

May 8.

*Romana  
escapes by  
sea.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
*May.*

*May 19.*

*Ney re-  
turns into  
Galicia.*

and learning that he was in Oviedo, he hastened toward that city with such celerity, and by such a route (the priest still guiding him), that the enemy were in Salas and Cornellana as soon as it was known in Oviedo that they were on the march. Not an hour was to be lost. Romana sent the single regiment which was with him to join Ballasteros at Infiesto, withdrew to Gijon, and there embarked for Galicia with his staff and the Bishop of St. Andero. Before he had embarked the French had entered Oviedo; having pillaged that city, they proceeded to Gijon, but too late for securing the prey of which they were most desirous.

But though Romana had been thus nearly surprised, the Asturians, under Generals Worster and Ballasteros, prevented the enemy from deriving any benefit from their transient success. Barcena, who commanded a division of the corps under Worster, by rapid marches upon Teberga and Grado, prevented the French from uniting their forces, and defeated them in three partial actions. Worster then collecting his whole army, advanced toward Oviedo; but Kellermann, perceiving that he could not maintain possession of the city, evacuated it in time, and retreated precipitately into Leon. Ballasteros meantime, who was on the eastern frontier of the principality, finding that Bonnet was between him and Worster, turned rapidly upon St. Andero, chiefly with a view of drawing Bonnet out of Asturias. He attacked the



French garrison in that city, killed 800, made 600 prisoners, and won the place. The ill conduct of part of his army, which he had stationed in the passes near, deprived him of the fruits of his victory; they suffered themselves to be surprised by Bonnet's whole force; the remainder of his men in consequence had no other alternative than to abandon the city and disperse, while he himself, like Romana, had just time to escape by sea. These movements on the part of the two Asturian commanders compelled Ney to hasten his return to Galicia, where indeed he rightly judged his presence was necessary. He retreated therefore along the sea-coast by Castropol, and found in that province intelligence of a nature which more than counterbalanced the temporary triumph he had obtained.

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

---

Mahy, when he turned back from Asturias, hastened toward Lugo, where the greater part of the French then in Galicia had been left. At first the enemy despised his ill-provided numbers, and relying upon their artillery and discipline, went out against him; but having been baffled in two skirmishes, and suffered considerable loss at Puente-nuevo, where many of the Germans deserted, they were glad to take shelter within the walls of Lugo, which, old as they were, were an effectual defence against men who had neither scaling ladders nor cannon. There, however, he blockaded them; and the French must soon have been

*The French  
in Lugo re-  
lieved by  
Soult.*

*May 19.*

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
*May.*

compelled to surrender, if Soult had not arrived to their relief. That commander, knowing their danger, allowed his troops only one day's rest at Orense, and hastened for Lugo, sending a detachment forward to reconnoitre the besiegers, and assure the garrison of speedy support. Mahy then, in pursuance of Romana's system, withdrew; but the appearance of the French was such, after the sufferings which they had endured, that the garrison suspected a stratagem, and could not be persuaded that any French troops could appear in so miserable a state of clothing and equipments, till some of the officers were personally recognized.

*Mahy re-  
tires to  
Mondoñedo.*

The force with Mahy consisted of about 10,000 men. Knowing that the troops before whom he retired had been driven from Portugal, he counted with reason upon the speedy deliverance of the province, and withdrew toward Mondoñedo, to receive supplies and reinforcements, and be ready for acting as opportunity might offer, against Coruña or Ferrol. The remainder of the regular forces then in Galicia consisted of 8000 men at Vigo under Brigadier D. Martin de la Carrera, to whom Barrios had given up the command. That officer, as soon as he received advices of Soult's arrival on the frontier with the intent of joining Ney, took the field in the hope of intercepting him and preventing the junction. But finding when he reached Pontevedra that Soult had hastened on toward Lugo, and was two or three days' march

*May 21.*

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.

distant, he perceived that pursuit must be un-  
availing; and resolving to profit by the time, he  
advanced upon Santiago to strike a blow against  
the French in that city, prevent them from  
joining their countrymen, and distract the at-  
tention of the enemy.

The garrison consisted of about 1900 men  
and 200 cavalry. Aware of the approach of the  
Spaniards, and despising them as usual, they  
advanced to meet them on the Campo de  
Estrella. The Spanish vanguard, under D. Ambrosio de la Quadra, withstood them, till  
Morillo arrived to charge their right flank; the  
reserve came to the support of the van; Carrera  
advanced against them in front; they were twice  
driven from the positions where they attempted  
to make a stand; and a reinforcement of 800  
men arrived in time only to share their defeat.  
They were driven into the city, and through it,  
and pursued more than a league beyond it, till  
night came on: the loss of the Spaniards was  
130 in killed and wounded; the French had  
more than 400 killed, . . . they left only thirty-  
eight prisoners, of whom the most part were  
wounded; but very many wounded were carried  
to Coruña. The conquerors did not fail to  
remark, that this success had been obtained on  
the day of Santiago's apparition, and on the field  
where his body had been discovered by the star  
which rested on his grave.

*The French  
driven from  
Compo-  
stello.*

*May 23.*

This was the intelligence which Marshal Ney

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

*Combined  
operations  
of Marshals  
Ney and  
Soult in  
Galicia.*

*Naylies,*  
134.

*Opérations  
de M. Soult,*  
276.

found when he reached Lugo on his return from Asturias; and though Lugo itself had been saved by the unexpected arrival of the army from Portugal, the appearance of that army, and the recital of its adventures, were alike discouraging. The two Marshals had not parted upon good terms, they met upon worse, and the ill feeling that existed between them extended to their troops. Ney's soldiers talked of the Portuguese campaign in terms which provoked resentment, and quarrels arose, in which the officers took part. This, however, was no time for reproaches and bickerings; all fear of pursuit from the English being over, a plan was concerted for destroying Romana's army, and recovering what had been lost in Galicia. For this purpose Ney was to act against Carrera and Morillo, and having defeated them, and retaken Vigo, to send a column upon Orense; while Soult was to pursue Romana's army in the valley of the Sil, and disperse it, after which he was to march upon the Puebla de Sanabria, and there observe the Portuguese frontier, threatening to re-enter it, and keeping up a communication with Ney by Orense, and with the corps under Mortier by Zamora. In pursuance of this plan Ney hastened to Coruña; and Soult, having been supplied from that fortress with field pieces and stores, commenced a pursuit little resembling that from which he had so recently escaped.



The day on which Carrera drove the enemy from Santiago Romana \* landed at Ribadeo, and joined his army at Mondoñedo. Here he was informed of Soult's arrival at Lugo, and apprehending immediately that an effort would be made by the two Marshals to enclose him, he marched by the Valle de Neyra to Orense, and there took up a defensive position, covered by the Minho and the Sil. The Conde de Noroña, D. Gaspar Maria da Nava, had just at this time arrived in Galicia, with the appointment of second military and political chief, and had taken the command at Santiago: him he directed to withdraw from that city and retire upon Pontevedra, and he applied to Silveira for assistance; but the Portuguese general could not move without orders from Marshal Beresford. It was believed by the Galician army, that if the Portuguese had continued the pursuit two days longer, even without the British, Soult's men were in so helpless and miserable a state, that they would gladly have surrendered, Lugo must have fallen, and the remainder of the enemy have been shut up in Coruña. If the event was less advantageous to the common cause, it was more honourable to the Galicians.

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.*Romana  
rejoins his  
army.*

Soult had remained eight days at Lugo, and had sent off for France 1100 men, who were

*Proceedings  
of Soult.*

\* The historian of Marshal Soult's campaigns in 1809 describes Romana's *land journey* from the Asturias (p. 276) with a precision worthy of notice . . . because it shows what credit is due to such a writer. My statement is taken from Romana's own letters.

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

---

---

1809.  
*May.*

---

completely broken down by the sufferings of the campaign. Still his troops were in such a state that when he reached Monforte it was found necessary to give them some days more of rest. They were in one of the finest parts of Galicia, and in the most delightful season of the year; but there was the dreadful feeling for those whose hearts were not completely hardened, that every inhabitant of that country was their mortal foe. Into whatever town or village they entered, not a living soul was to be found, except those who from infirmity were unable to follow their countrymen. They who had arms were gone to join the army; the others, with the women and children, had taken refuge in the wild parts of that wild region, and were on the watch for every opportunity of weakening their invaders by putting a straggler to death. During the five days that they halted, the French suffered considerable loss; and when they attempted to cross the Sil, they found it not so practicable for them to effect a passage in the face of an enemy, as it had been for the English at Porto. That sort of war was kept up which, under the circumstances of Spain, tended to the sure destruction of the invaders. The Spaniards never exposed themselves, and never lost an opportunity of harassing the enemy. They availed themselves of their perfect knowledge of the country to profit by every spot that afforded cover to their marksmen; and leaving their fields to be ravaged, their property to be

plundered, and their houses to be destroyed, they applied themselves, with a brave recklessness of every thing except their duty, to the great object of ridding the country of its invaders. Wherever the French bivouacked, the scene was such as might rather have been looked for in a camp of predatory Tartars than in that of a civilized people. Food, and forage, and skins of wine, and clothes and church vestments, books and guitars, and all the bulkier articles of wasteful spoil, were heaped together in their huts with the planks and doors of the habitations which they had demolished. Some of the men, retaining amid this brutal service the characteristic activity and cleverness of their nation, fitted up their huts with hangings from their last scene of pillage, with a regard to comfort hardly to have been expected in their situation, and a love of gaiety only to be found in Frenchmen. The idlers were contented with a tub, and if the tub were large enough, three or four would stow themselves in it.

---

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
May.

---

*Naylies,*  
147.

The utmost efforts of the French were ineffectual against the spirit which had now been raised in Galicia. It was in vain that detachments were sent wherever the Spaniards appeared in a body: accustomed as the invaders were to the work of destruction, they were baffled by a people who dispersed before a superior force could reach them, and assembled again as easily as they had separated. The task of burning villages, erecting gibbets, and executing, as

*Cruelties  
exercised by  
the French.*

CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
May.

if in justice, such Spaniards as fell into his hands, was assigned to Loison, who discharged it to the utmost of his power with characteristic remorselessness. But it is not upon Loison, however willing and apt an agent of such wickedness, and however much of the guilt he may have made his own, that the infamy of these measures must be charged; it was the system of the French government, and the French Marshals had consented to act upon it; and that they were as ready to have acted upon it toward the British army, if fortune had enabled them, as toward those whom they called the Spanish insurgents, was evinced by their putting to death a handful of stragglers near Talavera, and by the manner in which the bulletins announced an act as disgraceful to the army which permitted it, as it was repugnant to all the laws and usages of war.

*See vol. ii.  
p. 451.*

*Defeat of  
the French  
at the bridge  
of S. Payo.*

While Soult was thus employed in the interior of the province, laying it waste with fire and sword, always in pursuit, but always baffled, and harassed always by a people whom his cruelty served only to exasperate, Ney proceeded to execute his part of their concerted operations, with a force of 8000 foot and 2500 horse. Upon his approach the Conde de Noroña retreated from Pontevedra to the Bridge of S. Payo, where, immediately after the recovery of Vigo, Morillo had broken down two of the arches, and thrown up works for defending the passage. In this position, which had thus in



CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
*June.*

good time been strengthened, Noroña resolved to make a stand for covering Vigo, from whence the Spaniards now received their stores. Boats were procured from Vigo and Redondela to form a bridge for the passage of the troops; enough could not be found to construct one in the usual form, and it was necessary to moor them broadside to the stream, fasten them together head and stern, and then lay planks along, torn from the neighbouring houses. The narrowness of this bridge considerably lengthened the time employed in passing, nevertheless the passage was effected before the enemy appeared. The troops were formed on the southern bank; they were now increased to between 6000 and 7000 men, besides 3000 who were without fire-arms; they had 120 horse, and nine field-pieces, and a battery of two eighteen-pounders planted on a height above the bridge. Captain M'Kinley, who was still in the port of Vigo, was informed of this on the evening of the 6th of June. Very early the following morning he went up in his barge to S. Payo, and while he was conferring with Carrera, the French appeared on the opposite bank. The Galician troops had undergone great fatigue, having been constantly exposed to continued and heavy rain: nothing, however, could exceed their spirit; it required all the efforts of their officers to prevent them from pushing across and attacking an enemy whom they had such cause to hate. Ney posted his troops in the houses on the right

CHAP.  
XXII.

---

1809.  
*June.*

---

bank and in a wood a little below, and kept up his attack the whole day. During the night he erected a battery; some of his men also laid ladders upon the first breach, and got upon the brink of the second; but when daylight appeared they were soon driven back.

Captain M'Kinley passing safely within gunshot of the enemy's field-pieces, returned to Vigo as soon as the action commenced: with the assistance of Colonel Carol, he provided for the security of that place, and the Spanish commodore sent up three gun-boats to assist in the defence. One of these Captain Wynter manned under charge of Lieutenant Jefferson. A Spanish schooner and a Portugueze one went also upon this service. At daybreak the French battery opened both upon the troops and the boats; but the latter, taking advantage of the tide, got near, and destroyed the battery. When the tide fell, the enemy made two desperate attempts with horse and foot to cross above the bridge; the Spaniards steadily resisted, and both times drove them back with great slaughter. Baffled here, a detachment went up the river, thinking to cross at the ford of Sotomayor; Morillo was sent to oppose them, and after they had vainly persevered in their attempt for an hour and half, compelled them to retire. They made another attack under cover of a thick fog; this also was as unsuccessful as the former, and Ney being thus defeated by a new-raised army of inferior numbers, nearly half of whom

were unarmed, retreated during the night, leaving some of his wounded, and 600 dead.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
June.

Marshal Ney had acted upon the same infamous system of cruelty as his brother Marshals. The peasantry from the beginning repaid their inhumanities: and although it was long before the Spanish officers could resolve upon resorting to the dreadful principle of retaliation, they also were at length compelled to it. It was not to be supposed that they could see their countrymen murdered without using those means of prevention and punishment which were in their hands. At Lourizon thirty religioners and forty-nine of the principal inhabitants had been hung by the French, who then set the place on fire: in return for this barbarity 130 prisoners taken at the Bridge of S. Payo were put to death. Barrios, while he commanded, had repeatedly remonstrated with Ney upon the atrocious system of warfare which he pursued; his representations were treated with contempt, and at length he executed the threats with which he had vainly endeavoured to enforce them, and threw at one time 700 Frenchmen into the Minho.

*The Spaniards retaliate upon the French.*

These terrible examples were not lost upon the enemy: if they did not make them abate of their barbarities, they made them eager to get out of a province where the people were able and determined to take such vengeance as their invaders had provoked. Marshal Ney indeed would have endeavoured yet to make a stand,

*Marshal Soult retreats from Galicia.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
June.

if Soult would have continued to co-operate with him; but even if there had been no\* ill will between them, views of more extensive measures, and necessity also, would have induced that General to form a different determination. He had received neither succours of any kind, nor instructions, nor even intelligence from Madrid for five months, so well had the Spaniards and Portuguese cut off all communication. There was not a place in Galicia where he could rest and supply his troops, or leave his sick in security, except the two great ports; and there he well knew they would be shut up between the Galician force and the English ships. He therefore refused to concur in any further movements, and began his retreat from Val-de-orras and Viana by the Portillas de la Cauda and Requejo to the Puebla de Sanabria. Ney, finding he was thus left to his own resources, immediately prepared to evacuate Coruña and Ferrol. He destroyed the magazines and stores of every kind, and the defences on the land side, spiked the guns, and completely disarmed both the place and the people. Ferrol was evacuated by the last division of the enemy on the 21st, Coruña on the following day, and Ney retreated through

*Ferrol and  
Coruña  
evacuated  
by the  
French.*

\* The writer of Marshal Soult's campaigns loses no opportunity of displaying this temper. According to him (p. 290) Marshal Ney concealed the fact of his defeat at S. Payo, and assured Soult that he found the position of the

enemy too strong to think of attempting it. He has so represented this as to conceal the fact himself, his book not giving the slightest intimation of an action that effected the deliverance of Galicia.



CHAP.  
XXII.1809.  
*June.*

Lugo, Villa-franca, and Astorga. He had formed an encampment between Betanzos and Lugo; and this, before his final retreat was known, kept the persons whom he had established in authority in fear or hope of his return, so that no communication was suffered with the British ships, except by flag of truce. The batteries and lines on the sea-side having been left uninjured, Captain Hotham of the *Defiance*, impatient of this conduct, landed a party of seamen and marines, and dismounted all the guns which bore upon the anchorage. When *Noroña* arrived a few days afterwards, he expressed some displeasure at this; but the propriety of the measure was so evident when the circumstances which occasioned it were explained, that this feeling was only momentary. Captain Hotham *June 26.* having thus opened a communication with *Coruña*, sent Captain Parker to *Ferrol*, where the joy of the people, at seeing an English officer in their streets, was manifested by the loudest acclamations, and by every possible mark of attachment. The Castle of *S. Felipe* was still held by a traitor whom *Ney* had appointed to the command. He had under him a legion which the French had raised while they were in possession of the two towns, and over these men he retained his authority as long as the real state of affairs could be concealed. This traitor gave orders to fire upon any English ships or boats that might attempt to pass: Captain Hotham, upon this, stood over to *Ferrol* in

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
June.

the Defiance, and landed the marines of that ship and of the Amazon, with a party of armed seamen under Captain Parker, who proceeded to attack the castle. But though the men who garrisoned it had been weak enough to suffer themselves to be enrolled in the Intruder's service, they refused to obey their commander, now that it was in their power to deliver themselves, and joyfully welcomed the English, who entered preceded by the Spanish colours.

*Marshal  
Soult com-  
plains of  
some of his  
officers.*

The retreat of the French was conducted in what was now their usual manner. They are described by Romana as leaving every where marks of their atrocities, whole villages consumed by fire, victims of both sexes and all ages butchered, and committing enormities too dreadful to be recounted. The system had in reality been so wicked, that even some of the French themselves revolted at the course of crimes into which they had been led; and Marshal Soult, in a dispatch to the intrusive government, complained of what he called a moral debility in some of his generals. "In the kind of war which we carry on," he said, "and with the sort of enemy whom we have to contend with, it is of great importance to the success of our operations that the chiefs who are at the head of the troops should be not only impassible, but that they possess a force of mind which places them in all circumstances above events even the most vexatious." It was evident from this that there were officers who were

shocked at the atrocities which they were called upon to order, and to witness, and to execute. The moral debility which was complained of meant a lingering of humanity, a return of honourable feeling, an emotion of conscience, a sense of the opprobrium that they were bringing upon their country, and of the guilt and infamy they were heaping upon themselves. For such a service officers were wanted who should be *impassible*,...not merely unmoved at any effects, however horrible, of the system in which they were engaged, but incapable of any feeling whereby they could possibly be moved.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
June.

The dispatch in which this memorable avowal was contained was intercepted by one of those guerilla parties which now began to show themselves in different parts of Spain. It was written from Sanabria, at a time when Soult was not acquainted with Marshal Ney's intention to evacuate Galicia. The war in that province, he said, was become very murderous, and infinitely disagreeable, and its termination was far distant. The only means of bringing it to a good conclusion would be to fortify seven or eight important posts, each capable of containing a garrison of 500 or 600 men, an hospital, and provisions for four months; by this means the people might be kept in check, the principal passes closed, and points of support provided for the columns acting in the province, in whatever direction they moved, where they might receive assistance and deposit their sick. This, he said,

*He recommends a plan for securing Galicia.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
June.

was a very powerful consideration; for it was not to be concealed that the present circumstances had a great effect upon the minds of the soldiers, knowing as they did, that if they were wounded or seized with fever at a distance from a place of safety, they were liable to perish for want of assistance, or to be put to death by the peasantry. A million of French money would suffice to put Galicia in this state of defence, and no money could be employed to better purpose, especially as a smaller number of troops would then suffice to occupy it. Lugo should be fortified, three block-houses erected on the line of Villa-franca in the Bierzo, and the fortifications of Tuy, Monforte, Monterey, Viana, and the Puebla de Sanabria restored, which might easily be done. A few other posts might be added if needful.

*Romana  
summoned  
to take his  
place in the  
Central  
Junta.*

Some of these measures, Marshal Soult said, he had persuaded Marshal Ney to undertake. But when that dispatch was written Ney was on his retreat, and so harassed by the Spaniards, that he did not feel himself safe till he had got beyond Astorga into the plain country. Soult on his part proceeded to Zamora, and Galicia was thus delivered from its invaders. That kingdom was left in a state of dreadful exhaustion, and the anarchy to which all things tended was thereby increased. Men who had done their part in driving out the enemy, having now no means of providing for themselves, roamed about in armed parties, and lived as freebooters, so



that the condition of the helpless inhabitants was little better than when they were under the French yoke. Romana appointed military governors in every province, and was taking measures for making its resources available to the general cause, when the Junta superseded him in the command. The pretext was that they required his presence among them; for upon the demise of the Principe Pio he had been chosen to succeed him as one of the deputies for Valencia, his native province; but the real cause was the complaints which were made against him by Jovellanos and his colleagues, for his interference in Asturias. Romana regarded not their accusations, knowing that he had acted with the best intentions, and believing that he had done what was best for the country: but he said to his friends that the Junta had never taken so false a step as in removing him at that time.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.  
*June.*

Before he left Coruña he erected a \* tempo- *He orders a*  
rary monument, in the name of his country, to *monument*  
*to be erected*  
*to Sir John*  
*Moore.*

\* What he saw erected was a wooden model of what was afterwards to be executed in marble, with this inscription:

A LA GLORIA

DEL

EX<sup>MO.</sup> SR. D. JUAN MOORE, GEN<sup>L.</sup> DEL EXT<sup>O.</sup> INGLES,

Y A LA DE SUS VALIENTES COMPATRIOTAS

LA

ESPANA AGRADECIDA.

On the other side:

BATALLA DE CORUNA A 18 DE ENERO,

AÑO 1809.

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

*His fare-  
well to the  
army.*

the memory of Sir John Moore and the brave men who had fallen with him. And he published a farewell address to the remnant of those faithful soldiers whom he had brought from the Baltic, and who had accompanied him through all his dangers and privations. "Neither the marches of the Carthaginians in former times," said he, "nor of the French in latter, can be compared with those incessant ones which you have made among the mountains of Castille, Galicia, and Asturias, during six months of nakedness, hunger, and misery. You have fought no boasted battles, but you have annihilated one of the tyrant's proudest armies; aiding the national spirit, keeping up its noble excitement, wearying the enemy's troops, destroying them in petty actions, and circumscribing their command to the ground upon which they stood. You have fulfilled the highest duties of the soldier; and I owe to you the reward, which all my labours, and cares, and thoughts as a general have aspired to. Your country was long ignorant of your best services; but the actions of Villa Franca, Vigo, the fields of Lugo, Santiago, and San Payo, free you from all reproach for having avoided to engage in fatal battles, and will make you terrible to those ene-

Marshal Soult also ordered the following inscription to be engraved upon a rock near the spot where Sir John Moore fell:

HIC CECIDIT JOHANNES MOORE, DUX EXERCITUS,  
IN PUGNA JANUARIJ XVI. 1809,  
CONTRA GALLOS A DUCE DALMATIÆ DUCTOS.

mies who have been conquered and driven out, wherever the superiority of their forces was not too great to be overcome. Brave Spaniards, I acknowledge this day the want of that composure which I have always felt at your head. I am no longer your General. The government calls me from you to take a place in the Supreme Central Junta. Nothing but its irresistible will should separate me from you, nor make me renounce the right I have to partake in your future welfare, under your new commander. Take, soldiers, the last farewell of your General, and reckon always upon the gratitude and paternal love of your compatriot and companion in arms."

The Central Junta, upon the deliverance of Galicia, addressed one of their animated proclamations to the inhabitants. "People of Galicia," they said, "upon seeing you fall into the power of the enemy without resistance, your naval ports and arsenals occupied by them, and so powerful and important a province subjected from sea to sea, indignation and grief made your country break out in cries of malediction and reproach, like a mother who complains to heaven and earth of the degradation of a daughter in whom alone she had confided. At that time reverses followed each other, as successes had done before. After the battles of Espinosa, and Burgos, and Tudela, came the passage of the Somosierra, the capture of Madrid, and the rout at Ucles, and then, to afflict the heart of the country, the ruin of Zaragoza, the defeat in

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

*Address of  
the Central  
Junta to the  
Galicians.*

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

Catalonia, and at Medellin. In all these memorable events, though fortune failed, our reputation was not lost, and Spain, suffering as she did, retained her confidence. But Galicia.. Galicia, entered without resistance, subdued without opposition, and bearing tranquilly the yoke of servitude, .. Galicia deranged all calculations of prudence, and was destroying the country by destroying hope. Who then in that night of misfortunes would have looked to Galicia for the first day-spring of joy? More glorious in your rise, than you had seemed weak in your fall, magnanimous Galicians! despair itself made you feel the strength of which you had not before been conscious. The cry of independence and vengeance was heard in your highways, your villages, your towns; the conquerors in their turn began to fear they should be conquered, and retired into their strong places; there they were pursued, and assaulted, and taken. Vigo delivered itself up with its oppressors, and Galicia, sending these prisoners to the other side of the sea, gave a proof as authentic as it was great, that the Spaniards had not wholly forgotten the art of subduing and binding the French. This was the first day of good fortune that rose on Spain after five months of disasters, .. others followed. In vain did Soult, hardly escaping from our allies at Porto, come with the relics of his beaten division to succour the weakened Ney. Harassed in their marches, decimated in their parties, cut off in their com-



munications, and baffled in their hope of fighting great actions, these arrogant Generals despair of conquest, and execrate a war in which their men are consumed without glory. Weary of struggling against a physical force which every day strengthened, and a moral resistance which had made itself invincible, they fled at last from your soil in a state of miserable exhaustion, giving to Castille a new and great example that it is not possible to force the yoke upon a people who are unanimous in resisting it.

*“The Spaniards do not yet know what war is,* said those traitors to their country, who under the mask of a false prudence concealed their guilty selfishness. With such disheartening language they endeavoured to repress the generous impulses of loyalty. Base and pusillanimous men, we know what war is now! this terrible lesson is written upon our soil with the finger of desolation, it is engraved in our hearts with the dagger of vengeance. The execrable criminals whose instruments you have made yourselves have in their atrocities exceeded all that your perfidious mind could have foreseen, all that your terrified imagination could have foreboded. Transport yourselves to Galicia, if ye dare do it, ye miserable men, and there learn what is the standard of the true Spanish character! The blood which has there been shed is still steaming to heaven, the houses which have been burnt are still smoking, and the frightful silence of depopulation prevails over a country which was

CHAP.  
XXII.

1809.

lately covered with villages and hamlets. But ask those families who, wandering among the mountains, chose rather to live with wild beasts, than communicate with the assassins to whom you had sold them: ask them if they repent of their resolution; seek among them one voice that shall follow you, one vote that shall exculpate you!

“People of Galicia, you are free! and your country, in proclaiming it, effaces with her tears of admiration and tenderness the mournful words wherein, in other times, she complained of you. You are free, and you owe your freedom to your exaltation of mind, to your courage, to your constancy. You are free, and Spain and all Europe congratulate you the more joyfully in proportion as your case had appeared desperate. All good men bless your name; and in holding you up as a model to the other provinces, we regard the day of your deliverance as a fortunate presage for the country.”

## CHAPTER XXIII.

CATALONIA. BATTLE OF VALLS. DEATH OF RE-  
DING. BLAKE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.  
BATTLE OF ALCANIZ. FLIGHT OF THE SPA-  
NIARDS AT BELCHITE. COMMENCEMENT OF  
THE GUERILLAS.

THREE circumstances had materially contri-  
buted to the success of the Galicians: the aid  
and confidence which they derived from the  
British ships, whereby they were assisted first  
in recovering Vigo, and afterwards at the bridge  
of S. Payo; the rare virtues of Romana, whose  
single thought was how to serve his country,  
and who for that object, shrinking neither from  
responsibility nor obloquy, acted always with  
promptitude and decision upon his own judge-  
ment; and, lastly, the very condition, or rather  
destitution of his army: its name and presence  
had a powerful effect in rousing and encouraging  
the people, while the troops themselves felt and  
understood their utter inability for any other  
mode of warfare than that which their leader  
was pursuing, and thus derived strength from  
the very knowledge of their weakness. In Cata-  
lonia the people were not less brave and pa-  
triotic; there was a stronger British squadron  
off the coast; and the army was respectable for

1809.  
*February.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.

numbers, sufficiently equipped, and in a state of discipline not to be despised. But the Generals in succession were deficient either in military skill or natural talent, or that vigour of mind without which all other qualifications in a commander are of no avail.

*Proceedings  
of the  
French  
after the  
fall of  
Zaragoza.*

Neither in Aragon nor in Catalonia had the French been able to follow up their success. They had paid dearly for Zaragoza: even the army of observation had been so harassed during that ever-memorable siege, that it was necessary to allow them some repose. Having possessed themselves of Jaca by the treachery of the governor, and of Monzon, which was evacuated by the garrison because Lazan had taken no effectual measures for supplying it with provisions; they were repulsed in three attempts upon Mequinenza. They summoned Lerida, thinking to intimidate the inhabitants by the fate of the Zaragozans; but that example had produced an effect which neither Buonaparte nor his Generals were capable of anticipating; they estimated every thing by success, and with them to be unfortunate was to be despised and miserable. Marshal Lasnes was told in answer to his summons, that Zaragoza, unprotected as it was, had held out ten months against its besiegers, and that Lerida was a strong place. The Spaniards were also reminded that the Prince of Condé had been baffled before that fortress. It was expected by some of the Spanish officers that St. Cyr, in conjunction with the



French from Aragon, would besiege the city without delay; that he would afterwards attack Tarragona, and then, marching from conquest to conquest, proceed against Valencia. Others supposed, that for the more immediate object of securing the communication between France and Barcelona, his first measure would be to get possession of Hostalrich. Orders were indeed sent to St. Cyr to undertake with his corps the sieges of Gerona, Tarragona, and Tortosa, at the same time; enterprises so much beyond his means, that the order made him doubt whether it was an error in the ciphers of the dispatch, or an act of folly in those who dictated instructions which could not have been obeyed without exposing the army to some great and inevitable disaster. That General had as little reason to be satisfied with his situation, as with the cause in which he was employed. Having exhausted the resources within reach, he was obliged to quit his position at Martorell, S. Sadurni, Villa Franca, and Vendrell, and draw nearer to Tarragona, Reus, and Valls. His great object was to bring on another action, for the purpose of establishing the superiority of the French arms in the feelings of his own army, as well as of the Spaniards; for notwithstanding the splendid successes which he had achieved, that opinion was daily losing ground while the Catalans confined themselves to a system of desultory warfare.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.

*Cabañes,*  
c. 14.*St. Cyr,*  
130.*St. Cyr,*  
118.

Upon such a system Reding had resolved to act in conformity to the opinion of all his best

*State of the*  
*Catalan*  
*army.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.

officers. Hope, enterprise, and activity, were thus excited; and the spirit not of the irregular force alone, but of the troops, was raised, as every day brought tidings of some partial and animating success. Meantime he exerted himself in endeavouring to bring the army into a state of discipline, acting when that was in question with a decision which he wanted at other times. One regiment he broke for having refused to obey a Swiss officer in action. His character stood so high with the Catalans, that this vigorous measure did not injure his popularity; for he had the full support of public feeling and of the local authorities. The Junta of Tarragona coined not only the plate of individuals, but that of the churches also, for the pay of the troops; and for two months the hospitals received their whole supplies, and the army the whole of their pay, clothing, and food, from the inhabitants of that faithful city. It was at this time that one of the best and ablest men whom these calamitous times forced into action, the Baron de Eroles, D. Joaquin Ybañez, resigned his place in the Superior Junta, and putting on the Miquelet uniform, took the command of a body of those troops, believing that he could serve his country more effectually in the field than in council. Throughout the whole subsequent course of the war no Spaniard made himself more conspicuous, nor has any one acquired a higher or more irreproachable name.

*Cabañes,*  
c. 14.

*New levies.* A conscription of every fifth man throughout

the principality was called for, without distinction of ranks, in obedience to the decree of the Central Junta; the men were willing to serve, but an error was committed in embodying them with the regular troops, because the Catalans disliked that service, and were proud of the name as well as attached to the privileges of the Miquelets. Some attempt was made to bring this irregular but most useful force into a better state of order and uniformity, for which purpose the camp-marshal, D. Josef Joaquin Marti, was appointed their commander-in-chief; but this proved altogether abortive. Even the proper returns of the men who were to be under his command could not be obtained; and though he had ability as well as zeal to qualify him for the charge, nothing could be done, when means of every kind were wanting. The province, however, was in arms. The people, knowing their own physical strength, and impatient of seeing their country oppressed by a handful of invaders, began to murmur at the General's inactivity: he was assailed by anonymous writings, accusing him of incapacity or treason; and this General was as sensitive to such attacks as he was sensible of the difficulties that surrounded him. Brave, honourable, humane, and well acquainted with the art of war, he wanted the main qualifications for it when entrusted with command; having neither fortitude to persevere against vulgar clamour in the cautious system which he was sensible was best suited to the

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.

*Reding de-  
termines to  
act on the  
offensive.*

time, nor promptitude to act with vigour and decision when he departed from it.

The Central Junta had sent D. Tomas de Veri, one of its members, as its representative to Catalonia. A like measure had been adopted in the tumultuous times of the French Revolution; the circumstances in Spain were altogether different, and these missions appear neither to have produced good nor evil. On the present occasion Veri was in favour of active operations; and that opinion, which had necessarily much weight with Reding, was strengthened by assurances that an insurrection would be attempted in Barcelona as soon as any movements on his part should be made to favour it. The Camp-marshal Marti was called upon to form the plan of a general attack; his own judgement was decidedly opposed to it, but Reding had determined upon action in deference to the popular cry. He did not like to hear it remarked that the troops were more willing to eat their rations than to march against the enemy; and he wished also to ascertain in the field whether any reliance might be placed upon the Somatens, and upon that general enthusiasm which he did not participate, and in which he had no faith. If he entertained any hope, it was founded upon the promised effort in Barcelona, . . which of all hopes had the least foundation; . . for the fortresses having now been well victualled, the time was gone by when it might have been of advantage to have got



possession of the city. But even after his resolution to act on the offensive was taken, the movements of the army were delayed by that ominous mood of mind which draws on ill fortune more surely than it foresees it. And in strange opposition to what happened in all other parts of the Peninsula, all Reding's plans were perfectly well known to the French, while he obtained no information of their movements or of their numbers on which he could rely. On the other hand, by a singular perversion of principle, the Catalans whom the French had in their pay made it a point of honour and conscience to communicate full and true intelligence. The task was not difficult; for Reding, in the certainty that his intentions were betrayed as soon as they were formed, gave up all hope of secrecy; and every thing was talked of in public, with a desperate carelessness, as if it were useless to observe even the rules of common prudence.

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
February.

---

*Staff. Befreiungs  
Krieg der  
Katalonier,  
p. 148.*

The Spaniards occupied a line from Martorell to Tarragona, through Bruch, Capelladas, S. Magi, and Col de S. Cristina; the head-quarters, under Camp-marshal D. Juan Bautista de Castro, being at Igualada: this line covered the whole south of the principality, and touched upon the north at Valls, where the levy in mass was to be effected. St. Cyr waited till the Spaniards had weakened themselves to his desire by extending their line so far as to render it vulnerable in many points: then leaving Souham's division at Vendrell to observe the troops

*The Spaniards  
driven from  
Igualada.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

Feb. 17.

at Col de S. Cristina and near Tarragona, he, with the divisions of Pino, Chabot, and Chabran, attacked the Spaniards on their left at various points, and, though at one time Chabot's division was in danger of being routed, succeeded in driving them back upon Igualada, where, with an imprudence which experience had not corrected, large magazines had been assembled. They had neglected to occupy the road from Llacuna in sufficient strength, though it was the key to all their positions on the way to Barcelona; by this road they found themselves attacked in the rear, when falling back already dispirited and in confusion; and it was only by flight that they escaped in the directions of Cervera, Cardona, and Manresa. Castro was removed from his command, for the want of skill or of zeal which he had manifested in these operations. His subsequent conduct confirmed the worst suspicions that could then have been entertained; for he entered the Intruder's service, and holding a military command under him, became, as far as his power extended, the scourge of his countrymen.

St. Cyr,  
103-106.  
Cabañes,  
c. 14.

*Failure of  
the French  
attempt  
against the  
Abbey of  
the Creus*

It was part of St. Cyr's plan that Souham, when he was apprised of the success of these operations, either by the ceasing of the fire, or by any other means, should beat the detachment at Col de S. Cristina, and join him at Villarroña, when it was hoped that the Spaniards might be driven from all their positions, in utter rout, once more within the walls of Tarragona.

To effect this the French commander proceeded with Pino's division against a body of Spaniards under Brigadier D. Miguel de Iranzo, who occupied the position of S. Magi. The distance had appeared trifling upon the map: it proved long and difficult, the road during great part of the way being so narrow that the troops, foot as well as horse, could only defile man by man: they did not reach the position till four in the afternoon; the attack lasted till night closed, and the Spaniards then, unable to maintain their ground, retreated under cover of the darkness. Here, however, an unexpected difficulty impeded the conquerors; they were not acquainted with the country, nor had they been able, with all their exertions upon the march, to find any person who could serve them as a guide. From this perplexity they were relieved by a circumstance which would not have occurred if St. Cyr had not deserved and obtained a reputation, most unusual among Buonaparte's generals in Spain, for observing the humanities of war. A Spanish officer, who had been wounded and taken prisoner in this last affair, relying upon the French commander's character, entreated that he would let him be carried to Tarragona: St. Cyr not only granted his request, but finding from him that he was able to direct those who bore him, added, that as there were no peasants to be found at S. Magi or in the adjoining parts, he would send him as far as the Convent of the Creus. By this act of

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*February.**Feb. 18.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
February.

Feb. 19.

compassion the French were extricated from the difficulty in which they had placed themselves. The wounded officer gratefully acknowledged this kindness, little thinking in what manner he was to serve the enemy. On the morrow accordingly he was sent forward; two or three persons at convenient distances behind observed his way, and the French by their direction followed the unconscious guide. During the whole day they did not fall in with a single person; but in the evening when they drew near the monastery, instead of finding there, as they had expected, good quarters and comfortable stores for the troops, who stood in need of both after four days' exertions, they discovered that Iranzo had fallen back to this very point, and occupied it in strength. The French immediately saw that the post could not be forced without artillery, and they had none with them; they made, however, a feint of attacking it, with the intention of attempting an escalade, if the Spaniards should betray any want of alacrity in the defence. But the walls of the enclosure, the windows of the buildings, the roof of the church, and the tower, were presently manned; and a fire was opened upon them from two *violentos*, . . pieces of small artillery, so named from the manner in which they are used; they are fired not less than twelve times in a minute, and the exertion which this requires is so great, that the strongest and most expert artillerymen cannot continue it more than a quarter of an hour.



CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
February.*Reding  
takes the  
field, and  
collects his  
scattered  
troops.*

The French had learnt at Zaragoza what it was to attack the Spaniards where there were walls and buildings to be defended; and St. Cyr was not a man who would throw away the lives of his soldiers. His men, instead of the good quarters and better fare which they had promised themselves, were fain to bivouac upon the heights; and in the morning when the General had determined to cross the Gaya for the purpose of getting into a more open country, and effecting his junction with Souham's division, they were obliged to defile under a sharp and well-directed fire of musketry from the Convent. When they reached Villarrodoña, to their great disappointment Souham was not there; the dispatches which had been sent to him had been all intercepted, and a day and half were lost in waiting till he arrived from Vendrell. Reding meantime, as soon as he heard that his line had been broken, concluded that nothing now was to be done but to collect as many of the troops as he could, and withdraw them again under the protection of Tarragona; and feeling that this service was of too much importance to be entrusted to any one in whom he had not the most entire confidence, he set out himself on the morning in which St. Cyr marched from his unsuccessful attempt upon the Convent. He took with him only a battalion of Swiss, 300 horse, and six pieces of flying artillery; and as he marched from Pla saw the enemy on his right, where they were employed

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

in sacking and burning Villarrodoña and La Puebla. Reding was not aware that the French Commander-in-chief was with this body of the invaders, nor did St. Cyr know that the Spanish General was passing within sight with such a handful of troops. His force, however, was soon increased with the detachment which had retired from Col de S. Cristina, and with the 1200 men under Iranzo, whom he now recalled. He then proceeded to S. Coloma de Queralt, and there effected his junction with Castro, with the detachment stationed at that place, and with the force which Castro had collected after his defeat. But here he was alarmed by learning that the enemy had entered Valls.

*He is advised to retreat.*

St. Cyr on his part was not without some anxiety concerning Reding's intention. The movement which that General had made from his right upon his centre, led him to apprehend a purpose of re-establishing the line of communication with his left beyond the Noya, in which case the French detachment at Igualada would be in danger. That thought had passed across Reding's mind. He had supposed that the object of the French, by occupying Valls, was to cut off his retreat to Tarragona, and intercept his communications with that fortress; and his first impulse was to move upon Igualada, and then upon Montbuy, to cut off the enemy at both places. But it was his fate never to decide resolutely and act with promptitude: a council of war was held; the Deputy Veri was for re-

treating, with the view of covering the plain of Tarragona. Accordingly they set out from S. Coloma, with the intent of leaving Valls on the right. That day they reached Montblanch. A party of French appeared in their rear, reconnoitred them, and then turned by the Col de Cabra toward Pla and Valls. As it was thus made certain that the enemy was observing them, a second council was held on the following morning, at which Marti was present, who had been summoned from Tarragona, where he had been left with the command. The force which Reding had with him consisted at this time of 10,000 men, who were in a better state than any body of troops which the Spaniards had yet brought into the field in that quarter. The question was asked, Where the French were posted, and in what numbers? The General could only answer that they were supposed to be in Valls, and that he estimated them at from 5000 to 6000, without artillery. Marti's opinion was, that as the object was to save the army and protect the plain of Tarragona, where Reus and the other towns would otherwise be at the mercy of the enemy, it was not advisable to risk an action with a foe whom they knew to be superior in cavalry, and who, they had reason to conclude, had other troops near enough at hand to be brought together and overpower them if a battle should be ventured. He advised, therefore, that a few light troops and Miquelets should make a demonstration by the

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*February.*



CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

*Cabañes,*  
c. 15.

Col de Lilla against Valls in the morning, and make their way afterwards as they could, either to join the corps on the Llobregat, or to Lerida; that their guns should be sent to that fortress, and that the troops should defile during the night by Prades and a mountain path impracticable for artillery to Constanti, where the whole army might be collected safely in a position that would cover the plain.

General Doyle, who, after the most anxious endeavours to effect something for the relief of Zaragoza, had joined the Catalan army that day on its march, was for hope and enterprise. The troops were in good condition and in good heart, and the opportunity favourable, when they were within reach of a force inferior in number. Reding, perplexed by these jarring opinions, and never venturing to decide at once upon his own responsibility, took a middle course. He thought it derogatory to steal as it were away through a mountain path like a guerilla chief; and moreover Marti was one of the persons on whom his suspicions had fixed. The course on which he determined had neither the prospect of advantage, nor the certainty of safety. It was to retreat with his artillery and baggage by the Col de Riba and the banks of the Francoli; to begin the march that evening; not to seek the enemy, but not to refuse battle if a favourable opportunity should be offered. Marti represented that to take this line was not only seeking the enemy, but putting it in their



power to bring on an action upon ground advantageous to themselves. But Reding certainly had not come to this determination in the view of bringing on a battle, without incurring the responsibility of such a measure. He suffered some provision carts to be cut off by a reconnoitring party almost under his eyes, without permitting his troops to resent the insult; . . . they were tired, he said, and he would not weaken the main body by sending out any detachments. Nor could Doyle prevail upon him to make his retreat by day. It was commenced at seven in the evening, in good order and with all possible silence.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

*Cabañes,*  
c. 15.

St. Cyr, who was at this time with Pino's division at Pla, had ordered Souham never to lose sight of Reding's movements. That General occupied Valls; he had entered it on a market day, and supplied his hungry troops with the corn brought thither from Aragon and the plain of Urgel, as if there had been no enemy to fear! His advanced guard was to the north of that town, having its left upon the Francoli; his right was in the direction of Pla, and he had a post at Picamoxons, the point at which Reding must debouche upon the plain of Valls, if he went either by the valley of Montblanch or the Col de Lilla. At this point Souham's orders were to give him battle; though some apprehension was entertained that he might pass by the Col de Cabra, with the view of cutting off the French from Barcelona. No

*Battle of  
Valls.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

Feb. 25.

such thought had ever entered Reding's mind \*. The narrowness of the passes and the badness of the road made the night march slower than had been calculated; at five in the morning, however, the vanguard under Castro and half the centre had passed Valls, leaving the enemy's camp-fires on the left. They were proceeding silently and in the best order, and no advanced post of the enemy had yet been discovered, when, as the General was passing a little bridge, a volley of musketry opened upon him within pistol shot. This unexpected attack occasioned a momentary disorder: measures, however, were immediately taken to prevent the enemy from cutting off that half of the army which had not yet come up; the troops took their station with alacrity and precision; the artillery on both sides began to play: the French descended from the heights of Valls in several columns; they were met by the Spaniards, and attacked so vigorously, that notwithstanding the advantage of the ground, they were driven back.

\* M. St. Cyr (p. 118) represents Reding as seeking this action by General Doyle's advice; but it is certain that his intention was not to risk one. The French Commander renders justice to this brave and unfortunate General in all respects, except that he always imputes to him a presumptuous confidence, which Reding never felt. The constitution of his mind disposed him to the very opposite error. This is not asserted speculatively, but

upon his own statements and other equally incontestable documents. M. St. Cyr says that Reding escaped in the ensuing action from the hands of a young officer only because that officer had the generosity not to kill him, as he might easily have done, when a pistol shot put an end to his own life. The condition in which Reding escaped does not seem to show that there was much desire of sparing him.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*February.*

All the information which Reding had previously obtained concerning the enemy agreed in affirming that they had no artillery. It was therefore not without surprise that he had found two batteries open upon him. They had been silenced, however; the Spaniards had behaved even to his wish, and a manifest advantage had been gained. But when the French had been driven to the heights, reinforcements arrived which enabled them to make a stand, and Reding perceived by their smoke-signals and their rockets, that they were communicating with a fresh body of troops. It was now noon; his own men had been marching all night, and having been several hours in action, they began to feel exhausted. He therefore concentrated them, sent off the whole of the baggage, and determined to continue his retreat, as soon as they should have taken food or rest. The position which he had chosen was a good one, behind the bridge of Goy, on the right bank of the Francoli, and covered by that river. But time for rest was not allowed them. Pino's division had now come up, and St. Cyr himself had arrived. That General, who was desirous of gaining such a victory as should give the French the utmost confidence in what was called their moral superiority, forbade his artillery to fire; though the opportunity for firing with advantage was such, that the commandant feigned not to understand the order, and when after a third discharge it was repeated to him in the



CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

*St. Cyr,*  
125.

*Cabañes,*  
c. 15.  
*St. Cyr,*  
117, 126.

*The French*  
*received at*  
*Reus.*

most formal manner, expressed the unwillingness with which he obeyed. That of the Spaniards was well served; and when, having crossed the river and ascended the height, the French proceeded with the bayonet to the attack, they advanced under a fire of musketry which could not have been more regular at a review. The right wing of the Spaniards was threatened, but the main attack was made upon the left, and this the enemy succeeded in breaking between four and five in the evening, about an hour after the action had been renewed. The Spaniards then began to retreat in good order for the next half hour, .. but then as usual fear and insubordination prevailed as soon as hope was lost. Reding himself, when it was no longer possible to perform the part of a general, was distinguished for his personal bravery. A body of French dragoons surrounded him and some of his staff: two of his aide-de-camps were killed, and he himself received five sabre wounds from a French Colonel, with whom he was personally engaged. The cavalry rendered little service in covering the retreat; but the infantry of the right and centre, and part of the left, retired through the vineyards, where the horse could not pursue them. The other part of the broken wing took to the mountains, and made their way to Tortosa.

The French estimated their own loss in this action at about a thousand men, that of the Spaniards at four; .. the Spaniards supposed it



to be about two thousand on either side. In fact the evening was so far advanced, that they suffered comparatively little in their flight. Reding reached Tarragona that night; . . . that city was only three leagues from the scene of action, and thither the greater part of the dispersed troops found their way before morning, some corps in good order, others in small parties. Some made for Reus, and from thence to Cambrils and Col de Balaguer. The artillery and baggage fell into the enemy's hands. On the following day Souham entered Reus, a rich commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona. The inhabitants had not, as had every where till now been done, forsaken it; on the contrary the municipality went out to receive the conquerors, and agreed to raise a contribution for the use of the army. Their wealth may explain a conduct which, in the then state of public feeling, surprised the French\* themselves. This supply came at a time when the paymaster had not a single *sous* in the chest. Resources of every kind were also found here, and here were some thousand of sick or wounded Spaniards in the hospital, whom St. Cyr sent to Tarragona. This measure led to a negotiation with Reding, by which it was agreed that in

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*February.*

---

*Arrangement concerning the wounded.*

\* It is said by M. St. Cyr that they acted by Reding's advice, and that by so advising them he saved the city from inevitable destruction. But this does not accord with Reding's own lan-

guage, for in a part of his dispatch to the Central Junta which was not published, he mentions this conduct of the Cabildo with indignation.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*February.*

*St. Cyr,*  
127-8.

*Alarm at*  
*Tortosa.*

future whatever patients might be found in the hospitals should not be regarded as prisoners, but allowed to remain where they were, and to rejoin their respective armies upon their recovery.

The enemy now occupied Villaseca and the port of Salon, and thus cut off Tarragona from all communication by land with the rest of Spain. They profited by their success with their wonted alacrity; and yet they might have improved it farther, and gained a far more important advantage than the victory itself, had they been aware of the alarm which prevailed at Tortosa, and of the condition in which that fortress had been left. The Governor and the Junta sent for General Doyle, who, as far as personal influence and example could go, possessed in an extraordinary degree the talent of exciting activity and creating confidence. He found the fortifications in such a state that they could not have resisted a coup-de-main; and the city so ill provided, that if the works could have resisted an enemy, it must presently have been reduced by famine. Provisions were now collected by requisition from the neighbourhood, receipts being given for the amount (for the public money had been constantly ordered to Tarragona), and the citizens were called out to work upon the ramparts; so that the place was put in a state for resisting any sudden attack. There were but two roads by which artillery could be brought against it: one was defended by the fort at Col de Balaguer;

but from that post the troops at this important crisis were deserting for want of provisions. By General Doyle's exertions it was immediately stored, and the other road, through Falcat, which there had been no attempt to guard, was occupied according to his directions by 600 Somanes. This was a position which could well be maintained by a small force, and this timely occupation prevented the advance of a French detachment which had been ordered thither. The Tortosans were soon encouraged by the arrival of the Marqués de Lazan, who brought his army there when they might better have kept the field. The want of cordiality between this General and Reding had been sufficiently manifested to be known even by the enemy; and Lazan now formally announced, that having previously been appointed second in the Aragonese army by the Cortes of that kingdom, he had upon the loss of his brother succeeded to the command in chief; and considering himself as independent of the commander in Catalonia, should thenceforth look upon the protection of Aragon as his proper business: but he would do whatever he could consistently with this object, for covering Catalonia on that side. Reding represented this to the war-minister as an act by which Lazan crippled the Catalan army, and exposed his own troops to certain destruction, without the possibility of effecting any service; and instructions were accordingly dispatched from Seville that he should obey Reding's

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
February.

*Lazan separates his  
army from  
Reding's  
command.*



CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

orders. The same spirit of provincialism was prevailing in Valencia; a corps of 6000 men from that kingdom was stationed at Morela, with orders to remain there, though neither this place nor that part of the country were threatened, but because that position covers Valencia on the side of Aragon. There was neither unity in counsel nor in command; .. each of these three provinces had its own army, acting upon its own views, and of course all acting without effect.

*Mortality  
in Tarra-  
gona.*

And yet St. Cyr had mistaken the character of the Spaniards when he supposed that the battle of Valls would convince them of their moral inferiority to the conquerors. Far from it; it had even raised the spirit of the Catalans; and the Central Junta spake of it in their proclamations as one of those defeats in which ill fortune brought with it no dishonour, but rather hope and confidence. It proved to the Spanish army far more disastrous in its consequences than in itself; they were crowded into Tarra-gona, and the French commander, by sending thither several thousand sick and wounded from the hospitals at Reus, increased or perhaps occasioned an infectious disease which broke out among them, and was aggravated by the uncleanliness arising from want of linen, the neglect of those precautions, and the destitution of all those means without which armies cannot be kept in health. We reconcile ourselves to the slaughter of a battle or a siege, because such



destruction is the business of war, and the men engaged in it take their chance bravely for the evils which they are inflicting upon others; . . but there is somewhat at which the heart revolts in making a league with pestilence or famine, however much the system of war may require and justify it. St. Cyr knew that disease was doing his work in Tarragona; officers as well as men were dying in such numbers, that if he could have kept them thus shut up within the seat of the contagion, more would perish in a month than he could have hoped to destroy in four pitched battles. He determined therefore to remain in the plain of Tarragona as long as his army could be supplied with a quarter of a ration.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
March.

*St. Cyr,*  
133.

But the Spaniards were not idle. The Somatenes were once more in force and in activity; and the left of the Catalan army, which had not been engaged in the defeat, harassed the enemy on their right and in the rear. When Reding had formed his unfortunate plan of operation, 10,000 Miquelets and Somatenes, under Wimpffen, had been sent beyond the Llobregat to take advantage of any insurrection that might be attempted in Barcelona. These irregular troops, when they had no longer to depend upon the combinations of the Commander-in-chief, but were left to themselves to carry on their own kind of warfare in their own way, began again to acquire that superiority which such warfare assured them; Chabran's di-

*St. Cyr re-  
moves to the  
plain of  
Vicq.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*March.*

---

vision, harassed by repeated assaults, fell back successively from Igualada upon Llacuna, S. Quinto, and Villa Franca; and the Spaniards in that quarter, full of hope as ever, resumed the blockade of Barcelona. For a time they cut off St. Cyr's communication with that city, and their position excited no trifling uneasiness in Duhesme and Lechi, who well knew the disposition of the inhabitants. But the English squadron, the sight of which always afforded hope to the Barcelonans, was compelled by a heavy gale to stand out to sea: and Chabran's division, recovering the ground and the reputation which it had lost, once more broke up the irregular blockade. St. Cyr meantime maintained his position as long as it was possible to feed his army there; he then determined upon moving it into the little plain of Vicq, where he expected to find corn, and to remain till the harvest should be ripe in the environs of Gerona, where he foresaw that in the course of the siege his army must be established. The battle of Valls had not given that army the confidence which their General was so desirous they should possess; there was in fact an impression upon them which they had never felt in any other service; they knew that they were not the objects of mere military hostility, in which there is neither enmity nor ill will between man and man, but that they had the hatred and the curses of the whole country. Their removal now they looked upon as a retreat, and they knew what

were the dangers of a retrograde movement in Catalonia. St. Cyr better understood how little able Reding was to take advantage of such a movement at that time; and for the purpose of showing his men that he could defy the Spaniards, while at the same time he was careful not to wound the feelings of a General whom he respected, he sent an officer to Tarragona with a flag of truce, and a letter stating that, as circumstances rendered it necessary for him to draw nearer the French frontier, he should depart from Valls the following day at noon, and if General Reding would send a detachment thither at that time, the hospital which had been formed in that town, and which it was of such consequence for him to preserve, considering the number of his sick, should be consigned to him as it stood. It was well furnished from the houses which the inhabitants of Valls had abandoned on the entrance of the enemy. The French commander left only a very few wounded men, who were not in a state to bear removal; because he doubted whether Reding would be able to make the Spaniards observe the agreement which had been concluded upon that subject. As far, however, as opportunity was given, it was properly performed.

This done, after having remained something more than three weeks in the plain of Tarragona, the French retreated toward the Llobregat. Chabot's division occupied at this time Montblanch, for the double purpose of rendering it more

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
March.

*St. Cyr,*  
134, 145-7.



CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
March.

St. Cyr,  
138.

*Vicq de-  
serted by  
its inha-  
bitants.*

difficult for Reding to communicate with Wimpffen, and of preventing the latter from holding any communication with Lerida. A brisk firing in a quarter where no alarm was looked for, occasioned this General to send out a reconnoissance. It was in time to save a detachment of 600 horse and foot, with two pieces of cannon, which Marshal Mortier had sent from Fraga to communicate with St. Cyr's army, and bring him back intelligence of the state of things from Catalonia. A smaller party would have had no chance of succeeding in this service; and if this had been four-and-twenty hours later, it would have been cut off. They were fortunate enough to find a division of their countrymen here, but only half their object was accomplished; for though the army delayed its movements two days in the hope of facilitating their return, and escorted them to some distance, the attempt was found to be so hopeless, that they were fain to continue with St. Cyr.

The troops in Tarragona were not in a condition to harass the French on their retreat; but the retreat was most important to them. They obtained room to distribute their sick, and the progress of the contagion was stopped as soon as its main cause was thus removed. Some affairs took place beyond the Llobregat with Wimpffen's division, which dispersed, as it became irregular troops to do, when they were not acting at advantage. When the enemy reached Vicq, they found that that city had not been



infected by the ill example of Reus; the Bishop, five or six old men, and the sick who were unable to remove, were the only inhabitants of that populous city who remained. The others, with a spirit worthy of their country and their cause, upon the unexpected approach of the invaders abandoned all that they could not carry with them in their instant removal, and went to seek shelter where they could; many of them actually lived among the mountains during the whole three months that the French continued there, though at the time of their flight the weather was severe, and the snow daily falling. There had been no time to destroy the provisions, much less to remove them; if St. Cyr had not succeeded in effectually concealing his intention of quartering the troops there, this would have been done, and his army could then have derived no advantage from their change of position. As it was, they found corn enough to last till the harvest, lard for a month, and wine for a fortnight: but the change of diet, air, and climate (for they had moved into a higher region), and the want of wine as soon as the stock was exhausted, produced disease among the soldiers; and it was well for them that neither Reding nor his army was in a state to resume offensive operations; so that they were enabled to rest.

St. Cyr himself remained some three weeks in Barcelona. From the depôts of the Spaniards, which in the course of this successful

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
March.

St. Cyr,  
156.

*Arrest of  
the persons  
in office at  
Barcelona  
for refusing  
the oath.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
March.

campaign had fallen into his hands, he had supplied the garrison of that city with grain, pulse, and salt for three months' consumption: but there was not enough ammunition for a fortnight's siege. Of being formally besieged indeed there was not now even the remotest danger; but from within there was sufficient cause for inquietude. The honourable feeling of nationality, for which the Catalans are eminently distinguished, was in no part of the principality stronger than in its capital. At this very time Barcelona had two *tercios* of Miquelets in the field, raised among its inhabitants, and paid and clothed by them. The individuals of those regiments, having no uniform by which they could be recognised, used to enter the city fearlessly whenever it suited them, for the purpose of visiting their friends, raising recruits, and receiving money or clothing: nor was it in Duhesme's power, with all the vigilance, and it may be added, all the villany of his police, to detect a single person in this practice; so unanimous were the Barcelonans in their detestation of the intrusive government, and so well was the secret kept. That police was continually reporting to Duhesme and Lechi, and these again to the Commander-in-chief, the existence of conspiracies which they had discovered; but the members of the police were men of such character, that St. Cyr suspected these schemes to be suggested by their agents, if they were not mere fabrications, brought forward for

the most nefarious motives. Now, however, that he was on the spot, he allowed Duhesme to exact an oath of allegiance to the Intruder from all the public functionaries, and from the Spanish soldiers who had been disarmed after the treacherous seizure of the place. Sunday was the day chosen for this act of oppression. They were summoned to the house of the Royal Audience, which was surrounded with horse and foot, and 3000 troops were drawn up on the esplanade and the sea-wall; the display and the actual force being necessary to keep down the indignation of a generous and most injured people. Every member of the Audience refused thus to disgrace himself and betray his country; only one of the *Relatores* took the oath, and only three of the numerous persons employed in the inferior departments. The French were not more successful in tempting the military. Persuasions and promises availed as little as the threat of immediate imprisonment. The Contador Asaguerre told Duhesme, that if all Spain were to acknowledge Joseph, he would expatriate himself. The French executed their threat. Nine-and-twenty of these honourable Spaniards were sent prisoners, some to Monjuic, others to the citadel. The people, undeterred by their strong escort, followed them as in procession, cheering them as they went, and promising that their families should be well provided for during their imprisonment. Many others were put under arrest in their own houses,

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
April.St. Cyr,  
142-4.*Prisoners  
sent to  
France.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*April.*

*St. Cyr,*  
151, 158.

*Barcelona*  
*relieved by*  
*sea.*

*Reding dies*  
*of his*  
*wounds.*

and the whole of the military were, by St. Cyr's orders, marched with the prisoners of war, under convoy of Lechi's division, as far as the Fluvia, where Reille received and sent them into France : and by Lechi's return the commander-in-chief received the first intelligence from that country which had reached him since he crossed the Fluvia himself, . . five months before. His last remaining anxiety was for the provisionment of Barcelona; and that was removed soon afterward by the arrival of a squadron from Toulon, which had the rare good fortune to reach its destined port and return in safety. The place was thus amply supplied with military stores as well as provisions, and the siege of Gerona then became the only object of the French.

The dispatch in which Reding informed the Central Junta of his defeat at Valls, was marked equally by his habitual despondency and his magnanimity as to every thing which regarded himself. He rendered the fullest justice both to the policy and humanity of St. Cyr's conduct as opposed to that of Duhesme and Lechi, and expressed an apprehension that it had produced some effect upon the public mind. Some ground for this had been afforded by what had happened at Igualada and at Reus ; but the evil extended no farther. He had no reliance upon the Somatenes, he said, nor upon the enthusiasm which they displayed ; order was wanting among them, and where order ended confusion began.



He complained that he could obtain no intelligence of the enemy's numbers, whereas they were well informed of every thing that related to his army ; and he gave as a reason for having taken the field, the opinions of those whom he had consulted, and the popular cry. He made no mention of his own wounds ; and when the government published such parts of his dispatch as were intended for publication, they noticed, as it became them, his silence upon this point. The wounds, though many, were not thought dangerous, and they appeared for a time to be going on well ; but the symptoms changed, and in the course of a month they proved mortal. He fell in a foreign land, and in the service of a foreign state ; but the cause in which Theodore Reding fell was the same for which his brother Aloys had fought amid their native mountains ; and it was the cause of his own countrymen as well as of the Spaniards ; the cause of all good men every where. The motives for which ordinary wars have been undertaken are so mean and transitory, and come so little to the heart of man, that after a few years have elapsed all interest concerning them is exhausted ; and even nationality does not prevent us from feeling, that they, whose lives have been expended in such contests, have died rather in the exercise of their profession than of their duty. But the struggle of Spain against Buonaparte is of the same eternal and unfading interest as the wars of Greece against Xerxes : at whatever distance

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
April.

of time its records shall be perused, they will excite in every generous mind the same indignant and ennobling sympathy. Not, therefore, in an ungrateful service did Reding lay down his life, for with those records his name will be perpetuated: Switzerland will remember him with pride, as one of the most honourable, though not most fortunate of her sons, and Spain with respectful gratitude, as a soldier not unworthy of her service in its best day, and true to it in its worst.

*Peasants of  
the Vallés.*

Right as this General was in his opinion, that the co-operation of an irregular force was not to be relied on in a plan of regular operations, he estimated the effects of a popular resistance below its real importance, nor did he fairly appreciate the Catalan spirit. A fine example of it was shown immediately after his death by the peasants in the Vallés. Their country lies in the line between Vicq and Barcelona, and the peasants taking arms to impede the communication occupied the heights near the Church of Canovellas, about a mile from Granollers, which is the capital of that district. The district is so strong, that the invaders were desirous of opening the communication by persuasion rather than by force; and therefore communicated to these insurgents in due form, that the French commanders ordered their troops to make war upon soldiers only, not upon peasants; that if they would lay down their arms, and retire every man to his house, no in-

jury should be done them ; but otherwise there was a division of the enemy in their front, and another was coming in their rear. A written answer was returned, in the name of the peasants of the Vallés. "They held it a great honour," they said, "to form a part, though but a small one, of the Spanish nation ; and they had seen what their requital had been for receiving and entertaining the French troops, when their government had commanded them so to do ; their peaceful habitations had been invaded, their property plundered, their houses burnt, their women violated, their brethren murdered in cold blood, and above all, the religion of their fathers outraged and profaned. Nothing remained for them but to repel force by force ; and as they could not by themselves defend their open villages, they had taken to the mountains as to a strong hold : from thence they would defend their valleys, and oppose to the enemy the most obstinate resistance, as long as the government enjoined them to consider as enemies the subjects of Napoleon. The Spanish general in Catalonia was the person whose instructions they were to obey. For themselves, emulating as they did the courage and constancy of all Spain, they would never depart from those principles which the whole nation maintained. General St. Cyr and his companions might have the dreadful glory of seeing nothing but ruins in all that country ; . . they might pass in triumph over the bodies of

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*April.*

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
April.

those whom they had sacrificed; but neither they nor their masters should ever say that the people of the Vallés had submitted their necks to a yoke which the whole nation had justly rejected." The Spaniards are a nation upon whom deeper impression would be made by a circumstance of this kind than by the defeat of one of their armies; and the success with which these peasants harassed the French, and cut off some of their artillery and baggage, raised the spirits of the Catalans more than the battle of Valls had depressed them.

*Blake appointed to the command.*

Upon Reding's death the command devolved upon the Marques de Coupigny, till Blake was nominated as his successor, and with more extensive powers, being appointed Commander-in-chief in Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon. This General, after leaving Romana, had been sent to serve under Reding, and was in Tortosa at the time of Reding's decease, where Lazan, obeying without hesitation the Central Junta's instructions, resigned to him the charge of his division, and continued with it, to serve under him. The Aragonese had not been disheartened by the loss of their capital; they had regarded the former siege with a happier, but not with a prouder feeling, for of all examples, that of dignified suffering makes the deepest impression upon a generous and high-minded nation. The lordship of Molina de Aragon was surrounded with points which were occupied by the enemy. Nevertheless, the people, cut off as they were

*Movements of the Aragonese.*



CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*April.*

from support, took arms, trusting in themselves and the strength of their country: for want of better weapons some of them used slings, as the Somatenes also had done with good effect; and they made wooden artillery, so light, that a single man could carry one of these pieces up the heights, and yet strong enough to bear from fifteen to twenty rounds. The French endeavoured to surprise them with a detachment of 1800 men, for the purpose of opening the communication with Madrid, which they had cut off; but part of this body was itself surprised in Iruecha, and put to flight with some loss. The Molinese were about to pursue their success against another party in Alcolea, when they learned that General Suchet, who had now the command in Aragon, had passed the Puerto de Daroca, and was entering the lordship on its open side, with some 4000 foot and 600 horse. In the course of two hours the cavalry would reach Molina. The Junta gave instant orders for removing the ammunition, the town was deserted by all its inhabitants, and the men in arms retired with the Junta to the mountains five leagues distant. The efforts of the French to arrest the Junta or any of its members were in vain; the proclamations which they issued to intimidate or to delude the people were of no effect; and after remaining five days in Molina, they returned with no other advantage from this expedition than that of carrying away all the flocks and herds they could find.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
May.*Monzon  
recovered  
by the Spaniards.*

There was no part of Spain in which the French had imagined themselves to be so secure as in Aragon, after the fall of Zaragoza. During that siege the army of Aragon had proved completely inefficient, and the Catalans were too hardly pressed themselves to make any efforts in behalf of their neighbours. In reliance upon this, some troops had been withdrawn to march into Germany; and that larger detachment under Mortier had been called off towards the Douro, which was to co-operate with Marshal Soult. Advantage was taken of this when Blake's appointment to the command had raised the spirits of the soldiers and of the people, . . both being alike ready to impute their ill success to any cause except the true one, and to expect better fortune with every new commander. Blake brought with him a good name, for though always unfortunate, the Spaniards had never suffered any disgrace under his guidance; and the Roman government never demeaned itself with more generosity toward an unsuccessful general than the Central Junta. The first effect of the impulse which his arrival communicated was on the side of Lerida. As soon as Mortier had withdrawn from the neighbourhood of that city, the garrison, in conformity to Blake's instructions, was on the alert. A French detachment occupied Barbastro and the places near, with other points on the right of the Cinca; on the left of that river they were in possession of Monzon; and from thence, as from a strong

hold, they tyrannized over the country, levying contributions without mercy. The town of Albalda having refused to answer one of these oppressive demands, a detachment of 1400 was sent to make what was called an example of that place for its disobedience. The governor of Lerida, D. Josef Casimiro de Lavalles, who was apprised of this movement, stationed 700 of his garrison at Tamarite, under Colonels Perena and Baget, with some Aragonese and Catalan Somatenes, who succeeded in routing the enemy; the greater part retreated to Barbastro, and in consequence of this movement and defeat, about 200 only remained in Monzon. The inhabitants rose against them, though they had only seven muskets; knives and bludgeons supplied the place of other weapons; they recovered the Castle, and drove the invaders out.

Monzon, though in these days a place of little strength, was nevertheless a fortress of importance in that country, and in a war where every advantage, however trifling, raised the spirits of a people whom no disasters, however severe, could depress. The French therefore being determined to retake it, and punish the people, came in considerable force, horse and foot, down the right bank of the Cinca to Pomar, where they crossed by the ford and the ferry. Perena, who had hastened to Monzon upon its recapture, was there to receive them with his battalion and with a *tercio* of Miquelets; and they were repulsed in their attack. They ob-

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
May.*Capture of  
a French  
detachment.*

May 16.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

tained reinforcements, and repeated it on the morrow, and forced their way into the streets; but Baget with his detachment came in all speed from Fonz, and arrived opportunely enough to assist in driving them out a second time, with considerable loss. They called to their assistance the 2000 men that were left in Barbastro, but meantime the Cinca had risen so as to be no longer fordable; and while they were thus cut off from succour, the Spaniards at Monzon were in communication with Lerida. Perceiving now their danger, they made for Albalate, hoping to cross at Fraga by the bridge; their intention had been foreseen, and a detachment from the garrison of Lerida, weak as it was, was dispatched to secure that point. Thus anticipated in that direction, and being now not more than 1000 men, with about forty horse, they fled toward Fonz and Estadilla, to cross the river in the mountains, above its junction with the Eseva. They were closely pursued by Perena and Baget; their commander was drowned in attempting the passage, eight companies were made prisoners, the whole detachment which had crossed the Cinca was thus cut off, and the French in consequence withdrew from Barbastro.

*Blake moves  
upon Al-  
cañiz.*

The prisoners were marched to Tarragona, where the Catalans, after so many reverses, were in no slight degree elated by seeing them. More however from humanity than from a motive of ostentation, proposals for exchanging them were immediately made to St. Cyr, and accepted by



him. The French suffered another check, less mortifying indeed and less important, but one which impeded their movements, in the destruction of their flying bridge upon the Ebro. This, which was large enough to carry some hundreds at a time, they had removed from the river where it approaches Caspe, to the part near Alborge, where it was surprised and burnt by a detachment from Mequinenza. Blake meantime was not less successful in his own operations. Part of his troops were stationed at Morella, to oppose the French division which occupied Alcañiz and its district, and to cover that part of Catalonia and Valencia which there borders upon Aragon: others formed a cordon along the Algas, to guard the difficult country by which they might have threatened Tortosa, or interrupted the communication between that place and Mequinenza. With the approbation of the Junta Blake formed a plan for driving the enemy from this part of the country; for which purpose it was necessary to collect these troops, and strengthen them with a small detachment from the garrison of Tortosa. The French division was that which Junot had commanded at the siege of Zaragoza, and was now under General Laval; it consisted of from 6000 to 7000 men and 500 horse, having lost about half its number during the siege. Laval's headquarters were at Alcañiz, where the greater part of the division was stationed; but he was at this time in the field with 2000 or 3000 men, for

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*May.*

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*May.*

the purpose of driving away the Spaniards, who were observing him too closely, and continually harassing his posts.

*May 16.*

D. Pedro Roca was to conduct the troops from Morella to the place appointed for their junction, Lazan those from the Algas. Both had orders to avoid any action with the enemy till the junction should have been effected. But it so happened that Laval took up his quarters in the village of Beceyte on the day when Lazan had to arrive there, and the Spanish general rightly concluded that his instructions were not intended to prevent him from seizing any decided advantage which might present itself. He stationed some light troops in points that commanded the defiles through which the French must pass, and killed or wounded about an hundred of the enemy, with the loss of only five or six men on his own part. On the following day the junction was effected at Monroyo, great difficulty having been overcome in bringing the artillery through such a country. Having reached the Ermita at Fornoles, the vanguard

*May 18.*

under D. Pedro Texada was sent forward to interpose between Alcañiz and Val de Algorfa, which was the usual position of the enemy's van. Two columns, under D. Martin Gonzalez da Menchaca and D. Joseph Cucalo, had preceded them to occupy the villages of Castelseras and Torrecilla. The remainder of Blake's little army, consisting of three columns of infantry, the cavalry, and the artillery, began their march

by night along the only road from Morella to Alcañiz, from which place they were five or six hours distant.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

Upon reaching Val de Algorfa, it was seen that the enemy were protected by the walls of the inclosures, and by a chapel, where they had formed a parapet. They were some 500 or 600 in number, and being dislodged from thence by the artillery, retreated toward Alcañiz; but when they had advanced about half a league, they came upon Texada's detachment, and being thus between two fires, dispersed with as much alacrity as a body of Spaniards could have done. By this time Menchaca and Cucalo were approaching the city from the left, and the French, who were sallying forth against Texada, seeing themselves threatened on that side also, began to retreat hastily in the direction of Samper. There, and at La Puebla and Hajar, they collected their troops, withdrawing them from Caspe and Calanda. The people of Alcañiz, priests, women, young and old, went out to meet their deliverers, carrying refreshments for the soldiers, and blessing them with prayers and tears. Blake himself was affected at the sight, and said, that if the tyrant of the world, as he called Buonaparte, could have seen the emotions of that multitude, and heard their shouts for their King, their country, and their religion, he would perhaps have begun to doubt the possibility of raising for his brother in Spain

*The French  
withdraw.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

*Suchet  
comes  
against  
him.*

*May 21.*

a party, not of persons attached to his cause, but even of those who would be resigned to his usurpation.

Upon the approach of a Spanish detachment the enemy withdrew from Samper to the Puebla de Híjar, and being there reinforced from Zaragoza, advanced towards Alcañiz, to revenge themselves for their late reverses. They were now 10,000 foot, with 800 horse and twelve pieces of artillery. Suchet commanded in person. Blake was informed of their approach, and drew up his army to meet them on the plain of Alcañiz, before that city. The plain is surrounded with heights. About two musket shot from the city is a range of hills, accessible for cavalry, and on all sides sloping gently to the plain. The road to Zaragoza crosses there. Here he stationed the main body of his forces, their wings being supported by two batteries, which, with others in the centre, completely flanked the whole line. The weak side of this position was on the right, where the plain was lowest, and there were trees enough to afford cover to the enemy; but the heights terminated here, and upon their loftiest part, where a chapel commanded the road from Caspe, he stationed 2000 men, under Camp-marshal D. Juan Carlos Areizaga. The vanguard, under Texada, was placed on an eminence in front of the position; some light troops, among the olive-yards on the left, to prevent the French from turning them



on that side; and the cavalry, under D. Miguel Ibarrola, in front of all, upon the Zaragoza road.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

At six in the morning the enemy appeared: the advanced parties retired before them, and the cavalry and the vanguard fell back before superior numbers, as they had been instructed; the infantry to the chapel on the right, the horse, with two pieces of flying artillery, to the protection of their batteries. The chapel, as Blake had anticipated, was the main point of attack; the enemy presented themselves in front of this post and on the right, and occupied all the immediate heights. After a brisk fire on both sides, a column of about a thousand grenadiers attempted to take this position with the bayonet: they were broken presently, and the light troops of the Spaniards in their turn attacked the French on the heights, who kept their ground. In the hope of relieving this post, which he saw would be again attempted in force, Blake directed Menchaca to make an attack upon the enemy's centre; but the French were strong enough to attend to this and renew their efforts against Areizaga. The second effort, however, was not more successful than the first. The Spanish cavalry had been ordered from the Zaragoza to the Caspe road, to assist in supporting this point: and as they came out from the trees, a discharge from the French infantry wounded their commander Ibarrola; they

May 23.  
*Defeat of  
the French  
before Al-  
cañiz.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809..  
*May.*

---

were attacked with a superior troop of horse, and fell back to the position. The enemy, now abandoning their first plan of winning the chapel, turned upon Menchaca, who found himself suddenly assailed by very superior numbers; he fell back in good order to the position, but one light battalion found it necessary to retire upon Areizaga's post. Encouraged by this, the French made a desperate attack upon the centre of the Spanish line: it was saved by the artillery: they approached almost to the cannon's mouth, but were mown down by a fire of grape; and those who turned one of the batteries fell by the fire of the troops. Defeated in this attempt also, they withdrew to the heights on which they had first been seen, and after an action of seven hours, both armies remained looking at each other. The rich plain of Alcañiz was between them; and Blake said in his dispatch that the sight of it might have warmed the heart of the coldest Spaniard, and animated him to defend the beautiful country which God had given him. It would have been rash in him to have attacked the enemy when they had the advantage of the ground; to have thus decidedly repulsed them was no inconsiderable advantage in the state of his army, some corps of which had never before been in action. The French retreated under cover of the night, and took up a strong position behind the Huerba near Zaragoza. They left 500 dead on the field,

and their total loss was estimated at \* 2000; that of the Spaniards did not amount to 400.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

Among the officers whom Blake particularly commended for their conduct Lazan was one, who was at his side during the whole day; Loigorri, the commandant of the artillery, was also deservedly noticed, and Areizaga, upon whom the brunt of the action had fallen; to the two latter he frankly declared that the victory was owing. He returned thanks to his army; and noticing that a few wretched men had fled from the field, said their names should be struck off the roll, that the Spanish army might no longer be disgraced by them. The Central Junta, in consequence of this success, nominated him Captain General of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Murcia, as well as General-in-chief of the united army of those provinces, and conferred upon him the *Encomienda* of the *Peso Real* in Valencia. The officers whom he recommended were promoted also, Areizaga to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

The day on which the battle of Alcañiz was fought was celebrated at Valencia as the anniversary of their insurrection against the intrusive government. The ceremonies were characteristic of the times and of the people. The festivities, as usual in Catholic countries, began on

*Anniver-  
sary at  
Valencia.*

\* Marshal St. Cyr speaks of this as *un petit événement heureux*. (165.) Comparatively small as the numbers were on either side, and uninfluential as it was

upon the issue of the war, it was a well-fought battle, in which the French, under one of their ablest generals, were fairly defeated.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
May.

the eve of the holiday ; the city was illuminated on the preceding night, the portraits of Ferdinand and his ally the King of Great Britain were exhibited under the flags of the allied kingdoms ; and the Valencians displayed their national humour in caricatures of Murat, Buonaparte, and Joseph. In the morning, the civil authorities, the new-raised levies, and the city volunteers, went in procession to the Plaza of the Cathedral, where a statue of Ferdinand had been erected upon a Grecian column. The statue was concealed behind a silk curtain, so disposed as to fall in tent-hangings and disclose it, when the Captain General, D. Joseph Caro, asked the people in their own dialect if they wished to see their King ? At the same moment the music struck up, the bells were rung, the guns fired, and the shouts of the multitude were heard prevailing over all. They then proceeded to the Cathedral, where the banners of the volunteers were blessed by the Archbishop at the high altar, and afterwards delivered to them at the feet of the statue. The display was in French taste, but it was sanctified by Spanish feeling. The Valencians were reminded of their defeats as well as of their triumphs ; they were told that many of their countrymen who had assisted in driving Moncey from their gates had fallen in the field of Tudela, or lay buried under the ruins of Zaragoza.

*Celebration  
of King St.  
Ferdinand's  
day.*

A week after the ceremony Blake reviewed his army at Caspe, on St. Ferdinand's day, which



of all festivals in the year the Spaniards then regarded with most feeling. The Romanists, instead of birthdays, keep the festival of the saint from whom they take their names; this therefore was especially sacred to a people who, measuring the virtues of their captive King by their own loyalty, believed him to be all that they desired, and all that he ought to have been. They were told by their government that King St. Ferdinand, who had united in himself all the virtues of a man, all the talents of a hero, and all the qualities of a monarch, looked down from the heights of Heaven with complacent eyes upon the defenders and avengers of one who, as he inherited his throne and name, so also did he imitate and adore his virtues. An annual service on this day was appointed to be held in all cathedral and collegiate churches for evermore in remembrance of the sacred war against the usurper; and the day following was to be kept as a perpetual anniversary for the souls of all who fell in it. Blake's army had now been increased to 14,000 men: their late conduct had filled him with what might have seemed a well-founded hope; and their appearance and discipline were now so satisfactory, that as they filed before him, he said, a few more such days as that of Alcañiz would open for them the way to France. There were indeed at that time evident marks that the French were dispirited: they had been weakened by the withdrawal of Mortier's division; and having in this last action

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*May.*

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

for the first time been beaten by a Spanish force, not superior to them in number, and when the advantage of cavalry was on their side, it was believed that they were preparing to retire from Zaragoza. Blake was informed that their papers and baggage were already without the city, ready to be removed ; and that they had actually begun their march toward Navarre, but returned in consequence of receiving dispatches on the way. The news of Buonaparte's failure at Essling arrived at this time ; and when Blake communicated it to the troops in general orders, he observed that it had taken place on the day when they had defeated another of his armies at Alcañiz.

*Executions  
in Barce-  
lona.*

*May. 16.*

While the hopes of the Spaniards in this quarter had thus been raised by their own success, by the events in Germany, and by the news from Portugal, circumstances occurred at Barcelona to heighten their indignation against the oppressors of their country, and exasperate the desire of vengeance. In conformity to a scheme concerted with the inhabitants of that city, Coupigny had sent a body of troops, who were to be admitted in the night, while the attention of the garrison should be called off by the cannonade of a Spanish frigate upon one of the batteries. The ship performed its part, and the troops approached the gates ; but no movement was made to favour them. The French had obtained sufficient intelligence to put them upon their guard, and render it impracticable,

and several persons were in consequence arrested. One of these, by name Pou, a doctor of laws in the university of Cervera, being asked upon his trial before the military tribunal whether he had not distributed fifty muskets, replied yes, and that he would do so again if he had an opportunity, as they were for the defence of his religion, his King, and his country. They told him this could not be, for religion forbade the shedding of blood, the King desired no such proceedings, and the country abhorred them: he replied, that as they neither professed the Catholic religion, nor acknowledged Ferdinand for King of Spain, nor belonged to that country, it was to be expected that he and they should differ in opinion. They asked him to whom the muskets had been distributed: his answer was, to good and loyal Spaniards, whose names he would never disclose. A young tradesman, who was tried before the same tribunal for endeavouring to purchase ammunition for the same purpose, threw back the appellation of traitor upon Duhesme, saying, "Your Excellency is the traitor, who, under the cloak of friendship, took possession of our fortresses: I only bought part of what you plundered from us." This person, with two others, was hanged, at the same time that Pou and the Prefect of S. Cayetano were strangled, the Prefect administering the last offices of religion at the place of execution to his fellow-sufferers.

These executions occasioned a strong feeling

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*June.*

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

*Blake ad-  
vances to-  
ward Zara-  
goza.*

among the Catalans, and it was heightened by a decree of Duhesme's against the clergy, who were at the head, he said, of all the conspiracies for assassinating the French, and who made their churches and convents so many places of meeting for the conspirators. All such buildings therefore were ordered to be closed at six in the evening, and not opened till half after five in the morning. If any person were found in a church or belfry between those hours, or in a convent if he did not belong to it, he was immediately to be delivered over to a military commission as a conspirator ; and a secret agent of the police was to be appointed, who was to watch every church and convent, and be paid at its expense. The indignation of the Spaniards made them more eager in their hopes and expectations of deliverance ; and the Valencians more especially expressed their confidence of fresh victories, because of the appearance and temper of the troops who marched from their city to join the army under Blake. That general's head-quarters were at Samper de Calanda, part of his troops being stationed at Hajar and Puebla de Hajar. Having received intelligence that a French corps, which was estimated at a third part of the force under Suchet, had been detached to Carineña, and was committing its usual excesses in the surrounding country, he formed a plan for cutting off this corps, and then advancing upon Zaragoza, in the hope of effecting the deliverance of that city, an exploit



which, if it were achieved, would of all possible successes produce the greatest impression upon the public mind, not in Spain alone, but throughout Europe. With this view he directed Areizaga to take post with his division at Botorrita, while he with the rest of the army proceeded to Villanueva de la Huerva. The artillery was to move behind Longares, where it was expected that the enemy would pass on their retreat to Zaragoza as soon as they knew the Spaniards were in motion. When Areizaga reached Botorrita, he learned that the greater part of the French had retired to their main body, about 1500 only remaining at Puebla de Muel, and these moved off so quickly towards the Xalon, that it was not possible to cut them off, .. only a convoy which they would have escorted to Zaragoza was taken by the Spanish advance.

As this corps had not fallen back upon the main body, which it might easily have done, but had passed on toward Alagon, Blake was confirmed in his opinion that the French did not mean to defend Zaragoza if it should be attacked. Nevertheless, reflecting that the country in his rear was entirely open, and considering the general situation of the Spanish armies, the importance of preserving his own, which was in so promising a state, and the complicated and hazardous movements of a retreat, in which he knew how little it could be trusted, he deemed it by no means advisable to bring on a general action, and therefore did not alter

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
June.

---

*Suchet at-  
tacks the  
Spaniards.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

June 14.

Areizaga's position, looking upon Botorrita as a strong post, where, in case of any reserve, the enemy might be detained. When he joined Areizaga there, the troops had begun to skirmish; this had been brought on by that general's making a reconnoissance in considerable strength; and Blake was so well satisfied with the behaviour of his troops, that he endeavoured to surround the enemy, but they retired in time. Early on the following morning Suchet drew out his whole force from Zaragoza to attack him. The firing began at the advanced posts by five in the morning, and went on increasing till the same hour in the afternoon, when the French resolved to break the Spanish line, supposing that the men were weary and the ammunition spent.

*Blake retreats to Belchite.*

Blake's advanced guard was at Maria, where the road from Zaragoza to Madrid crosses the cordillera: the ground between him and the city consisted of hills and vales, ridge behind ridge. His cavalry was stationed in the high road, the rest of the line was formed by the infantry and artillery. The Spaniards, fighting and retreating in good order, fell back successively from one of these heights to another, but when they reached the fourth, their cavalry had been worsted. Blake then thought it necessary to fall back on Botorrita, which he did with as much order as the nature of the ground would permit. A few guns were spiked and abandoned; not from necessity, but because it was

more advantageous to fire them to the last than bring them off. The two armies were near, and in sight of each other, when night closed. Blake expected to be attacked the next day; but as the enemy manifested no such intention, he rightly concluded that they were manœuvring either with a view to surround him, or to threaten his rear. Accordingly he ascertained that 3000 French were posted at Torrecilla. About two hours before nightfall a brisk fire was opened upon his left, with the intent of making him change his position, in which case his rear would have been exposed to this detachment. But the attack was repulsed, as was a second which the enemy made upon the centre a little before midnight. The Spanish general then retreated to Belchite in perfect order, which he did without being molested. The next day the enemy came again in sight, and Blake, who had hitherto had no reason to distrust his troops, took a position in full expectation of being attacked on the morrow, and in good hope of repelling the enemy as completely as he had done before Alcañiz.

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

---

June 16.

Belchite, once the capital of a petty Moorish sovereignty, stands upon the slope of some bending hills, which almost surround it: toward Zaragoza the country is level, covered with gardens and olive-yards. The position which Blake had taken was singularly advantageous; his right was completely safe from the enemy's cavalry, and protected by a chapel, with a num-

*Flight of  
the Spa-  
niards.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*June.*

*June 18.*

ber of outbuildings and two large sheep-folds, which were all pierced for musketry : to attack the centre, the enemy's horse must be exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and the left had their retreat upon the strong post which was occupied by the other wing. Blake's arrangement was so made, that if the enemy, as he expected, should make a great effort on his left, three columns might be brought to attack them on that side ; and if unsuccessful, they could have fallen back upon the centre and the right flank, being meantime assailable only in front, and protected the while by their artillery, which also had its retreat secure to the same strong post. He had harangued his troops, and they made a thousand protestations that they would do their duty. The attack was made, as he had expected, on the left ; four or five shot were fired on both sides, and the French threw a few shells, which wounded four or five men. But upon one shell falling into the middle of a regiment, the men were seized with a sudden panic and fled ; the panic instantly spread, . . a second and a third regiment ran away without firing a gun, and in a few minutes the generals were left with none but a few officers in the midst of the position. With all their efforts they could not rally more than two hundred men, and nothing was left for them but to make for the nearest strong place, leaving artillery, baggage, and every thing to the enemy.

The defeat was in all its circumstances so



thoroughly disgraceful, . . so disheartening and hopeless in its consequences, that Blake almost sunk under it. He told the government that he was incapable of entering into details, but considered it due to the nation that a judicial inquiry should be instituted into the conduct of a general under whose command an army of from 13,000 to 14,000 effective men had been utterly routed and dispersed. "He knew that he had not been culpable," he said, "but after so many proofs of his unhappy fortune, he wished not to be employed any longer in command. As a Spaniard and a soldier he was still ready to serve his country in an inferior station, and he requested only that some portion of his present pay might be continued for the support of his family, or a part of the *Encomienda* which had recently been conferred upon him, but which it was not fitting that so useless a person should retain. The government, however, neither accepted his proffered resignation, nor instituted any inquiry. The former would have been unjust towards a brave and honourable officer whose conduct was unimpeachable, and his character above suspicion; the latter must have been altogether nugatory. The panic had been instantaneous and general, and it was impossible to punish a whole army. All that could be done was to publish the whole details, in no degree attempting to disguise or palliate the injury and disgrace which had been brought on the nation: to declare that the commander-in-

---

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

*Blake offers  
his resignation,  
which  
is not ac-  
cepted.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*June.*

chief and the generals had done their duty, and retained the full confidence of the country, and to brand the fugitives in a body, as men who were the opprobrium of the Spanish name, and had rendered themselves objects of execration to their countrymen.

The men who in their panic had thus lost all use of reason, as well as all sense of honour and of duty, were not likely, when they found themselves in safety, and recovered their senses, to be affected by this denunciation. A religion which is contented to accept the slightest degree of attrition, and keeps short reckonings with conscience, had taught them to be upon easy terms with themselves; . . . moreover the moral disease was so endemic, that it had ceased to be disgraceful: the greater part of these men had behaved well at Alcañiz and in the subsequent operations; and no doubt expected to be more fortunate on a better occasion, for a report was raised that the French had received so great a reinforcement at the moment of commencing the action as to render resistance hopeless; and though this was indignantly contradicted by Blake, the men found an excuse for themselves in believing it. The disgrace was deeply felt by the government, and by the general whose hopes were blasted by it in the blossom; but the Spaniards were in no degree disheartened, not even those upon whom it brought immediate danger; and when the French, in the course of a few days, attempted

to carry Mequinenza by a *coup de main*, they were beaten off with considerable loss.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

*Commence-  
ment of the  
guerillas.*

At this time also that system of warfare began which soon extended throughout Spain, and occasioned greater losses to the French than they suffered in all their pitched battles. The first adventurers who attracted notice by collecting stragglers from their own dispersed armies, deserters from the enemy, and men who, made desperate by the ruin of their private affairs in the general wreck, were ready for any service in which they could at the same time gratify their just vengeance and find subsistence, were Juan Diaz Porlier in Asturias, and Juan Martin Diaz in Old Castille, the latter better known by his appellation of the \* Empecinado. A lawyer, by name Gil, commenced the same course in the Pyrenean valleys of Navarre and Aragon. After a short career of some two months he disappeared, and Egoaguerra, who renewed the attempt, withdrew from that wilder way of life to engage in Doyle's battalion. The third adventurer who at this time raised the spirits of the Pyrenean provinces, and for a while gave employment to the French in Navarre, was that

*Porlier.*

*The Empe-  
cinado.*

\* Various explanations have been offered of this name. One account says, that upon finding his family murdered by the French, he smeared his face with pitch, and made a vow of vengeance. Another, that he was so called because of his swarthy complexion. But in the account of his life it is said that all the

inhabitants of Castrillo de Duero, where he was born, have this nickname indiscriminately given them by their neighbours, in consequence of a black mud, called *pecina*, deposited by a little stream which runs through the place; and the appellation became peculiar to him from his celebrity.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
May.*Renovales  
in the valley  
of Roncal.*

D. Mariano de Renovales by whom the Convent of S. Joseph had been so gallantly defended at the last siege of Zaragoza. Having been made prisoner when the city surrendered, he had effected his escape on the way to France, and collected in the valleys of Roncal and Anso a body of men and officers, who, like himself, believed that the scandalous manner in which the terms of capitulation had been violated by the French released them from any obligation of observing it. They had probably agreed to rendezvous in these valleys as many of them as could escape, and his intention was to form them into a body, and rejoin the army. But when it was known that they were collecting there, and that the mountaineers, confiding in their presence, refused obedience to the intrusive government, 600 men were ordered from the garrison of Pamplona to enter the valleys at six points, and reduce them to subjection.

*He defeats a  
French de-  
tachment.  
May 21.*

Men who, like Renovales and his officers, had served at Zaragoza, were neither to be lightly surprised nor easily taken. They were upon the alert, the mountaineers were ready for their assailants, and of the column which advanced against the little town of Anso not a man escaped. The four columns which entered by Navasques, Uztarroz, Salvatierra, and Fago, effected their junction; but the movements of the Spaniards were concerted and executed with as much precision; and after two days' fighting the French were driven to the foot of a high rock



CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
June.

called Undari, where all that survived, seventy-eight in number, with their commander, the chef de bataillon, Puisalis, were taken prisoners: the sixth column was not engaged, forty men having deserted from it before they entered the valleys; the others thought it imprudent to proceed, and thus they were preserved from suffering a like fate with their companions. Puisalis, being severely wounded, was lodged by Renovales in his own quarters, and treated with the utmost care. The other prisoners were sent with a guard of forty men to be delivered to General Blake, but the ruffian, Buruchuri by name, who had charge of the escort, when he had advanced far enough to be under no control, massacred them all; . . a crime which he appears to have committed with impunity. Puisalis was more fortunate; as soon as his wounds were healed, he was sent with five other prisoners to Blake, and reaching him a little before the rout at Belchite, recovered his liberty at that time.

This intelligence cheered the Aragonese and the Catalans after that most disgraceful dispersion, and both Lazan and Blake took measures for assisting and encouraging the mountaineers. Ammunition was sent from Lerida; Renovales himself was indefatigable in his exertions: he collected arms from all the villages within reach, sent for armourers from Eybar and Placencia, and set up an armoury in Roncal. A second force was dispatched to crush the growing in-

*A second  
party de-  
feated.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

June 15.

surrection. The valley of Roncal was the part which they attacked; the Spaniards were driven from the point of Yso, where their advance was stationed; but Renovales arrived in time with 200 men of the vale, and as many more from that of Anso; he drove the enemy out, and pursued them as far as Lumbier, with the loss of more than forty killed; and twice that number of wounded were removed on the following day to Pamplona. This second defeat had so weakened the garrison of that city, that the Spaniards now cut off their communication both with Aragon and with France; they scoured the roads in all directions; not a day passed in which some party of the invaders, who hitherto had travelled in safety in those parts, was not intercepted and cut off, and sometimes the enemy were pursued to the very gates.

*Proclamation of the  
Duque de Mahon.*

The Duque de Mahon, one of those traitors to their country who had sided with the Intruder, in full confidence that they were taking the safe part, was at that time Viceroy of Navarre: and he addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Roncal, affecting to believe that they had taken no share in the insurrection; calling upon them to unite with the French troops for the purpose of apprehending and punishing the disturbers of the peace; and assuring them that the present struggle was excited solely by the personal resentment of certain individuals, whose interests were opposed to those of the nation, of the clergy, and of the nobles.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*June.*

If they should be seduced by these deceivers, the result could only be, the loss, if not of their lives, yet certainly of their liberty, and of that happiness which they had hitherto enjoyed. But, on the contrary, if they proved themselves worthy of the King's favour, by their obedience to his government and their cordiality with the allied French troops, it was his intention and that of the French commandant at Pamplona, General D'Agoult, to represent their good behaviour to the throne; that when the arms of the Emperor, now victorious at Vienna and throughout all Italy, should expel the enemies of public order from Spain, they might partake in the benefits which were to be expected from so wise and humane a prince. This proclamation was answered by Renovales with the bitterest scorn. He addressed the viceroy as Ex-*June 28.* Duque de Mahon, telling him, if he disliked that style, that the person who used it was a Spaniard, and one who respected the orders of his sovereign; which sovereign, acting through the Supreme Central Junta, had proscribed him as a traitor, and therefore he had now no title. He reproached him with ingratitude towards the house of Bourbon, with disgracing his ancestors, with sacrificing his religion, his king, his country, and his honour. He told him that the people of Roncal, like those of Anso, were attached to their own institutions, and true to their lawful king; that they had fought for him

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
June.

with a spirit like that of their ancestors; that the magistracy had encouraged the enthusiasm of the people; and that he, unworthy as he was, had enjoyed the honour of leading them to victory. They despised his favour, and they despised his threats; and if he would march out at the head of a French division, and fix time and place where the question between them might be put to the decision of the sword, he, Renovales, would meet him there, a true Spaniard in the cause of a rightful though an oppressed king, against a false one in the cause of a potentate whom his followers impiously called almighty; and if the Ex-Duque would appoint this meeting, that almightiness should be tried.

*Executions  
and reprimands.*

Five persons who were charged with having joined the insurgents of Roncal were put to death at Pamplona upon the Intruder's law of extermination against all who should take arms against him. The gallows was erected without the gate of S. Nicholas, and the sufferers were executed with their faces toward Roncal, and left hanging there. The proclamation which announced their punishment, declared, that for every person, whether soldier or countryman, who should be murdered by the banditti, a prisoner who had belonged to them should be put to death. This was answered by an act of retaliation. Renovales seized five persons who were acting under the intrusive government, beheaded them, and exposed their bodies on



the high road, with an inscription on their shoulders, saying they were agents of the French robbers, who had been thus punished by Spanish justice. He declared, that, for every Spaniard whom the French should put to death, he would behead two French prisoners; and that if the commandant of Jaca continued to plunder the people and the churches, and burn the houses, as he had begun, he would, for every house that should be burnt, set a village on fire on the French side of the Pyrenees, instead of promoting peace and friendly intercourse, as he had hitherto done, between the peasants on the frontier.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*June.*

General D'Agoult tried what might be done with Renovales by conciliatory means. He thanked him for his treatment of Puisalis, and of those prisoners whom Buruchuri had butchered; a crime of which he entirely acquitted the Spanish officer. He applied to him now, he said, by General Suchet's orders; and joined his own entreaties to that General's offers. First he requested him to send back twenty-five artillerymen who had been captured by his people on the road from Tafalla, and who he understood were well treated. Renovales, he observed, owed him this in consideration of the manner in which his prisoners were used, though more than six and thirty officers had broken their parole, beginning with the Camp-Marshal Villava. After experiencing every kindness, he had found means to escape by a

*Attempts to  
win over  
Renovales.*

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*August.*

---

bribe of 4000 livres, and was said to be now in Roncal, having thus dishonoured himself. If Renovales also had broken his word by escaping when he was a prisoner of war, there had been something in his conduct which justified it; and if he would now pacificate Roncal and the valleys of Aragon, and restore order there, he would entitle himself to esteem and to the King's favour. "You are supporting a chimera," said the French commander; "your troops are routed on all sides. You reckon upon the English. I know them better than you do; and if you desire the good of your country, take the advice of an old soldier, who went through the Revolution as a royalist, and joined the present government when he saw that the only man capable of supporting it had appeared. You are in a like position. The Bourbons exist no longer upon the throne. The Emperor and his family have superseded them. Let us be his faithful friends and allies, and render our country happy, instead of contributing to its ruin."

Renovales answered, the artillery-men were his prisoners, thought themselves fortunate in being so, and would have entered among the troops if he would have allowed them. Villava was not in Roncal, nor in the district under his command; wherever he was, he would be able to answer for his own conduct in making his escape. "If I did the same," said he, "on the way to Pamplona, it was because the French

had violated a solemn capitulation. I was the first person whom General Morlot, in contempt both of his word and honour, and in breach of the terms, plundered of horse and baggage; and if a French general may be allowed thus to disregard so sacred a right, I know not why a Spanish prisoner should be withheld from attempting to escape. Wonder not at seeing me at the head of the Spaniards, since I have seen General Junot in Zaragoza at the head of the French, after his \* capitulation in Portugal." To all the offers which were held out to him, he replied, that he was and would continue true to his legitimate King, whose faithful subjects would freely shed their blood in his cause, and would yet reverse the scene, and re-establish him upon his rightful throne. "I know," said he, "that your Excellency feels the injustice of the cause which France is supporting; . . that you hear the voice of honour in your heart, and that you know what is the right path." General Plique, commander of the citadel at Zaragoza, endeavoured also to bring over Renovales to the Intruder's service, representing to him that the Austrian army was destroyed, that Russia had given the most public proofs of its connexion with France, and that the French had obtained a most decisive victory † in S. Do-

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*August.*

\* Renovales evidently did not know the terms of that capitulation.

† There could be no intention of deceiving Renovales, nor was

a victory in S. Domingo likely to have any effect in determining his conduct. But this mention of one may show how little the French officers knew of public

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
August.

mingo. No efforts, no combination of events could now prevent the complete establishment of King Joseph. The blow which had ruined Austria had destroyed all the hopes of the Spaniards. "Insurrection," said the Frenchman, imitating the style of his Emperor, "insurrection passes away; madness rages and destroys, and then becomes calm; the good alone is permanent. Secure for yourself the glory and the delight of saving a country which ought to be dear to you; join the cause of a good King, who desires not, by a terrible and necessary execution, to reign over ruins and carcasses; and I am authorized to offer you the rank in his armies which you hold among the insurgents."

*Troops sent  
from Zarago-  
goza  
against  
the Valleys.*

The answer was such as became a man who had done his duty at Zaragoza. "Till the moral strength of the Spaniards and of their government were destroyed," he said, "it was in vain to think of ruining their armies. Neither the supposed victories upon the Danube and in S. Domingo, nor the adhesion of the Emperor Alexander, nor the immense forces which were said to be at Napoleon's command, would break the spirit of Spain or of England, actuated as those countries were by principles of justice and high-minded rectitude." The hope of seducing Renovales being now no longer entertained, 5000 men were sent against him from

events; nothing in fact but what their own government chose to let them know, . . . and that go-

vernment gave them always as much falsehood as truth.



Zaragoza ; 2000 of these, being reinforced with 500 more at Jaca, proceeded against S. Juan de la Peña ; and having, after a long resistance, driven D. Miguel Sarasa from that post, advanced upon the valley of Anso. Plique, with the other 3000, occupied the positions of Salvatierra, Castilla Nuevo, and Navascues : 800 from Orbayceta and Pamplona united in the valley of Salazar, and 450 from Lumbier at Zavalza. Their numbers enabled them to move upon more points than the Spaniards could guard ; and having entered Salvatierra, where the advanced parties were driven before them, they proceeded next day in four columns, two on the right attacking the heights of Sasi and Virgen de la Peña, the centre by the strait called La Foz, and the left by the heights of Mayhia, which divide the jurisdictions of Salvatierra, Navascues, and Burgui. These positions were attacked by 3000 men, and defended only by 600 ; they were maintained from six in the morning till two hours after mid-day ; the French then on the right gained the height at Sasi ; and this success would have enabled them to come upon the rear of the Spaniards at the other point. Renovales therefore fell back to the bridge and town of Burgui, from which he was compelled to withdraw as evening began to close, and the enemy then entered and set fire to it. The town of Anso was entered the same day by the first division of the French, after a brave resistance.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
August.

Aug. 21.

Aug. 27.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
August.*Aug. 29.  
Renovales  
capitulates  
for the Val-  
leys.*

From Burgui, on the following morning, the French in three divisions attacked the Spaniards, the right and left on the heights of Mendivelza and Odieta, the centre upon Bochuela. At all these points they were three times repulsed, some Russian deserters distinguishing themselves greatly on the Spanish side. The mountaineers thought the day their own, till, at noon, they were apprised that the French division from Anso was coming by Garde upon their rear, and already occupied the heights of Puyeta and Muga de Roncal. Renovales then fell back in good order upon the town of Roncal, took up a position there, and maintained it till evening closed. But as the ground there was open enough to give the enemy room for manœuvring, he fell back to the strong ground about Urzainqui, the position where he had before determined that in case of necessity the last stand was to be made. During the night, he was apprised that 4000 men were marching from Oloron upon those valleys, and 800 by way of Salazar. Many of his people had dispersed; those who remained were well nigh exhausted; . . but he was enabled to demand terms, and capitulate for the valleys, as for a fortified town, in a manner of which there had been no other example during the war, and to withdraw with those who chose to follow him, for other opportunities of serving their country; . . more fortunate their future services might be; they could not be more honourable.

The French are said to have lost 500 killed and 800 wounded in these latter actions, and this by their own account. Among the Spanish officers who distinguished themselves were D. Miguel Sarasa, and D. Gregorio Cruchaga, names soon connected with that of Mina, which now first began to be known.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*August.*

Xavier Mina\*, the son of a landholder who cultivated his own estate, and was deputy for one of the valleys of Navarre, was a student at Pamplona when the revolution began. He was then in the eighteenth year of his age, and during the earlier part of the war had been confined to his father's house by a severe illness, from which he recovered just after Renovales had been compelled to withdraw from Roncal. A French commander, whose corps was encamped in the neighbourhood, sent a serjeant requiring the father in his capacity as deputy to provide rations for his † men. The serjeant disappeared on the road, and in consequence the house was surrounded at midnight by a detachment of infantry, who had orders to

*Xavier  
Mina.*

\* This account of Xavier Mina differs materially from that which has been published under the title of *The Two Minas and the Spanish Guerillas*, as extracted from the work of a German officer, Captain H. Von Brandt. The German officer, who collected his information in the country, acknowledges that the accounts given upon the spot differ essentially from each other. My statement was derived from

Mina himself during his short abode in England. Certainly I have never seen any person whom, from his countenance and manners, I should deem less likely to be given to such company and such courses as in that publication are imputed to him.

† They were to be a pound and a half of bread, ten ounces of meat, and a bottle of wine per day for every man.

CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*August.*

arrest the elder Mina, and bring him to head quarters. The son, however, had time enough to secure his father's escape, and then in his name presented himself to the officer. The French General before whom he was carried threatened him with death, unless the serjeant were produced; but as every thing in that quarter was to be arranged by means of money, Mina obtained his liberty after being detained three days. The party who arrested him had plundered his father's house. This usage, the danger he had escaped, and the injustice of the whole proceeding, roused into full action those feelings which had only been suspended by disease and languor. He provided himself with a musket and cartridge-box, and in that trim presented himself in his own village, and offered to take the command of as many Spaniards as would engage with him in the good work of avenging their country upon its invaders. Twelve adventurers joined him; they took to the near mountains, and there, while they waited an opportunity of action, maintained themselves on his father's sheep.

His first adventure was to surprise a party of seven artillerymen, who were escorting two pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition from Zaragoza to Pamplona. This success procured him twenty volunteers. He sent off his prisoners to Lerida, retired again to the mountains, and being informed that a general officer was on the road, travelling with an escort of



CHAP.  
XXIII.1809.  
*August.*

thirty-four foot and twelve horsemen, he laid an ambuscade for them, in so favourable a spot, that a volley was fired upon the French with sure effect before they had any apprehension of danger. The general was shot in his carriage, some of the escort were made prisoners, and some money fell into Mina's hands. This he immediately distributed among his men, recommending them to send part of it to their families, and retain no more than would be necessary to defray the expenses of their own interment, exposed as they must now continually be to death. The men were thus raised in their own esteem and in that of their countrymen wherever this was told; and volunteers now presented themselves in abundance, attracted by a success which was reported every where, with such exaggerations as such tales gather in their way. He received however none but those who brought arms, or whom he could supply with the spoils already taken from the enemy. His party amounted now to about threescore persons, distinguished by a red riband in their hats, and a red collar to their jackets.

He proceeded now toward the frontiers of Aragon, where a band of fifty robbers were adding to the miseries of that afflicted country. These he succeeded in surprising; the greater number were killed on the spot, the rest he sent prisoners to Tarragona. Twelve horses were taken from the party, on which he mounted some of his men, and armed them with lances;

CHAP.  
XXIII.

1809.  
*September.*

*Two Minas,*  
*p. 16.*

*Siege of Ge-  
rona com-  
menced.*

and every day added now to his numbers and his reputation. Rations were voluntarily provided for his people wherever they were expected, and given as freely at one time, as they were paid for at another from the spoils of the enemy. He levied a duty on the passes, where a considerable trade in colonial produce was then carried on; the clergy also assisted him from their funds, and with these resources he paid and equipped his men, and kept in pay also a sufficient number of intelligencers. It was in vain that the French made repeated efforts to crush this enterprising enemy; if his troops dispersed upon the appearance or the attack of a formidable detachment, it was only to reunite, and by striking a blow in some weak point or distant quarter, render themselves more formidable than before. General D'Agoult was accused of secretly favouring this young adventurer, and sending convoys under weak escort, with the intent that he should intercept them. Perhaps this suspicion was entertained only because he had been a royalist, and therefore may have been supposed to abhor at heart the service wherein he was engaged. An inquiry into his conduct was instituted, and before it was concluded he put an end to his life by poison.

St. Cyr meantime was informed that Marshal Augereau had been appointed to supersede him in Catalonia, and that General Verdier, who had been an old aide-de-camp of Augereau, had already arrived in the Ampurdan to take the

command in place of General Reille, and commence the siege of Gerona. The rout at Belchite enabled the enemy to make all their preliminary movements with little other molestation than what the insufficient garrison of that city could give them; and when Verdier encamped before the place, St. Cyr removed from Vich, and took up a position to cover the siege.

CHAP.  
XXIII.

---

1809.  
*September.*

---

END OF VOL. III.

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

6/2104 11















